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'The Treatment of Foreigners in Revolutionary France, 1789 - 1797'

Michael George Rapport

A thesis submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Ph.D in the Faculty of Arts.

Submitted May 1997.

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Abstract

The French Revolution inherited structures in which foreigners played a role at almost every level in social, economic and administrative life. In the revolutionary conception of the state, only citizens were to be admitted to political rights. This idea challenged the position of foreigners in the army, clergy, administration and state finance, leaving unthreatened only those engaged in economic activity. Diplomatic, political and economic concerns, however, prevented the revolutionaries from following the 'nationalising' implications of their ideology. In the first two years of the Revolution, for example, foreign troops retained their separate units and regulations. Foreign clergy were immune from the decrees which reformed the Gallican Church until the Terror. The pragmatism of the revolutionaries was such that even as the approach and outbreak of war saw an upsurge in xenophobia, different types of foreigners were protected. This treatment contradicted the rhetoric and even the laws against foreigners. What increasingly determined the fate of foreigners was less their nationality than either their usefulness to the Republic or the extent to which they conformed to the increasingly narrow confines of political orthodoxy. Foreign soldiers, artisans, merchants and bankers were protected from legislation against enemy subjects. Foreign patriots suffered less for their nationality than for their political affiliations with opponents of the revolutionary government. Those who could demonstrate active loyalty to the government were sheltered from arrest or expulsion. Three conclusions are mooted. Firstly, the gap between ideology and practice in the treatment of foreigners suggests that revolutionary discourse alone is insufficient to explain revolutionary action. Secondly, circumstances ensured that the revolutionaries could not exclude foreigners from the new civic order. Finally, the distinctions between citizens and non-citizens remained blurred, implying that the political order established by the Revolution bore as much Ancien Régime practice as it did modernity.

Dedication

For the Boss

Acknowledgements

My first debt is to Bill Doyle for his supervision. His broad knowledge of both French and European history was brought to bear in his highly constructive comments on the first drafts of this dissertation. His patience with both my sprawling draft chapters and the somewhat erratic pace by which this thesis was completed is also much appreciated. The brainstorming sessions which we had at Bristol were enjoyable and stimulating. It has been an honour and a pleasure to work under his alert eye.

I have also been fortunate over the past three and a half years to have worked in two institutions which have lively groups of historians. I have found colleagues whose company I enjoy and who have, in many different ways, contributed to this work. Friends in both the History section at the University of Sunderland and the History Department at the University of Stirling have helped in the honing of my ideas. There are simply too many to list them all, but I should mention Peter Waldron, Don Macraild, Pete Kirby, Peter Wilson, Bob McKean, Emma Macleod, Carolyn Grohmann, Colin Nicolson, Fiona Watson and George Peden. The last-mentioned read an entire draft and made helpful comments. Norman Hampson has also been very generous in his advice and encouragement. He allowed me to roam freely across academic pastures where his expertise is widely known and respected. He shared his ideas and knowledge on the 'foreign plot', on French attitudes towards the British and on the law of 7 Prairial and so contributed in no small way to my work.

If the assumption of academic positions at both Sunderland and Stirling delayed submission of this thesis, the teaching itself helped to broaden my perspectives on the revolutionary period. It ensured that I remembered both the broader issues and the context into which my work on foreigners might be placed. I am therefore grateful to my students, particularly those in my final year classes on revolutionary Europe, who strengthened my belief that teaching and research should feed each other in a symbiotic relationship. I am also thankful to those at Stirling who organised my teaching so that I could make full use of my time as a probationer and finish this dissertation.

Many of the arguments in this thesis were first tested at seminars or conferences. The annual conference of the Society for the Study of French History has proved to be a fertile ground for friendly advice, criticism and the exchange of views. Edna Lemay kindly allowed me to attend her seminar at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. There I received much constructive advice after reading a paper to the group.

Helpful comments were also received after papers read to the European history seminar run by Julian Swann and Roger Mettam at the Institute of Historical Research and to the Modern History Research Seminar at my alma mater, the University of Edinburgh.

The peripatetic nature of my career so far has meant that I used many different libraries and archives in the completion of this work. I am particularly grateful to staff at the Archives Nationales, the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris. In Britain, I should thank staff at the university libraries of Bristol, Stirling, Sunderland and Edinburgh, in particular, as well as staff at the British Library and the National Library of Scotland, at the Institute of Historical Research and Christine Johnson at the Scottish Catholic Archives in Edinburgh.

Until taking up my first post at Sunderland, this research was funded by a Major State Studentship from the British Academy, for which I am extremely grateful. While in Bristol, I enjoyed the hospitality of my friend Ian Wei and my cousins, the McLarens. Until Helen and I found a home in Scotland, my mother-in-law, Mrs. Elizabeth Comerford, provided shelter and tolerated with superhuman patience my papers and books strewn across one of her rooms. Research trips to London have been made especially pleasurable by the friendship and hospitality of Ross and Nina Bryson. My parents on both sides of the Atlantic have provided help of all kinds. Their support over the past few years has been immeasureable. My father is not an academic, but is extremely knowledgeable in a range of historical subjects. His opinions both on the French Revolution and on history in general have kept me on my toes. The same goes for my stepfather, Mike. My mother and Jane have provided interesting views of their own, often over a 'good lunch' or a 'good dinner', to use the parliamentary euphemism. I hope all four will accept my love and thanks.

Finally, the one person who has lived and breathed this dissertation with me from start to finish is my wife, Helen. We were together in Paris as I did my research, which made it one of the most memorable times of my life. Helen has her own strong views on nationality and nationalism and, as we never agree on anything, has been a lively foil for my own arguments. She also proof-read this thesis and the *droit d'aubaine* came back to haunt her more than once. Her friendship, companionship, love, understanding and intellect make this her work as much as it is mine.

Author's declaration

The work contained in this thesis is entirely my own work. The views expressed in the dissertation are entirely my own, and not those of the University of Bristol.



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Introduction

At the end of the First World War Albert Mathiez published a book whose arguments and tone were heavily influenced both by the conflict which had engulfed Europe with such horror and by the Bolshevik Revolution which had begun the previous year. *La Révolution et les étrangers: cosmopolitisme et défense nationale* remains the only study dedicated entirely to the experience of foreigners in revolutionary France.[1] Mathiez drew comparisons between revolutionary Europe after both 1789 and 1914. In a statement clearly coloured by bitterness after four years of war, he claimed that in neither year did the French people have bellicose feelings: 'loin de se préparer aux prochains combats, ils rêvaient la réconciliation des peuples dans le travail et dans le progrès. Ils oubliaient les vieilles haines et ils se proclamaient volontiers citoyens du genre humain'. In both cases it was the aggression of 'Germanic' sovereigns which forced the French into conflict. While the war which began in 1792 was to defend the social achievements of the Revolution, that of 1914 was fought by those powers who wished for independence from Germanic *Kultur*.[2] Such an interpretation might be expected after years of wartime propaganda, but it ignores both the popular response in Britain, France and Russia to the outbreak of war in 1914 and the revolutionaries' own warmongering in 1791 - 1792, to say nothing of the imposition of French political *Kultur* on European peoples between 1792 and 1815.

Beyond the parallels drawn between the 'Great War' of 1914 - 18 and the Revolutionary Wars, Mathiez also saw similarities between the socialist internationalism of the early twentieth century and the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth. If the internationalism of the French Revolution did not take the form of congresses, parties and slogans, 'elle existe dans les âmes'. He explained that across Europe 'toutes les élites ... , grâce à la philosophie du XVIII^{e} siècle, sont cosmopolites. Il règne partout un esprit européen. Ce qui rapproche les hommes et ce qui les divise alors, c'est moins la race et la langue que les idées et les besoins'. Come the French Revolution, the European bourgeoisie championed the cause of their French social counterparts, while the

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[1]Recently, Sophie Wahnich has examined how foreigners were perceived by the revolutionaries, but not how they were treated in practice ('La notion d'étranger en l'an II: Les constructions d'un dialogue Paris-Province dans les *Archives parlementaires*', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* lxii (1990), 379 - 403; 'L'étranger paradoxe de l'universel: analyse du discours politique révolutionnaire sur l'étranger, de la Fédération à Thermidor', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* lxix (1997), 121 - 130.

[2]Mathiez, A., *La Révolution et les étrangers: cosmopolitisme et défense nationale* (Paris, 1918), 1 - 2.

European clergy and nobility joined in solidarity with the French privileged classes.[3] There were obvious parallels with the socialist aspirations put in the mouths of European proletarians by the Communist International, as against the capitalist-bourgeois classes. The First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution clearly led Mathiez to discuss the tension between cosmopolitanism and patriotism and the emergence of nationalism.

In his book he argues that in the early years of the Revolution French patriots 'prenaient au sérieux leur rôle d'instituteurs des nations, de protecteurs des opprimés. ... Dans toute étranger, ils voyaient un frère, un frère un peu inférieur dont ils se constituaient les tuteurs charitables et généreux.' After the flight to Varennes this pacific cosmopolitanism gave way to a more militant kind in which foreign patriots, 'stimulés et bientôt subventionnées par les Girondins', were encouraged to distribute propaganda among their countrymen and in which the Girondins campaigned for a war to liberate Europe. Mathiez can scarcely conceal his dislike for this development: 'les étrangers n'ont jamais été plus choyés, plus exaltés qu'à ce moment de notre histoire où nous engagions un combat à mort contre leurs patries d'origine.' An over-confidence in the power of revolutionary principles and in the sincerity of foreign patriots, Mathiez suggests, meant that for the first year of the war no security measures were taken against foreigners. These same people were therefore allowed to have undue influence in revolutionary politics and 'cette situation anormale ne pouvait se prolonger sans de graves inconvénients'. Even when the revolutionaries understood this, they tried to reconcile their cosmopolitan ideology with the demands of national security, refusing to take reprisals against enemy subjects when their own governments mistreated French citizens: 'Autant dire que la République se privait d'une des armes les plus efficaces pour atteindre ses ennemis'. Eventually, however, circumstances discredited cosmopolitanism and forced the revolutionaries to act against foreigners.[4] Albert Soboul follows this interpretation, arguing that 'la guerre étrangère et l'acharnement de la lutte donnèrent vite à la mentalité populaire un caractère nationaliste et xénophobe qui se marque dès la fin de l'été 1793 ... les sans-culottes classèrent les étrangers parmi les suspects et les traitèrent comme tels.'[5]

The rejection of the Revolution by peoples 'liberated' by the French, renewed defeats at the hands of the coalition and internal troubles led the revolutionaries to take the first

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[3]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 2 - 3.
[4]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 29, 60 - 61, 72, 81, 91.
[5]*Les Sans-Culottes Parisiens en L'An II. Histoire politique et sociale des Sections de Paris, 2 juin 1793 - 9 thermidor An II* (La Roche-Sur-Yon: Imprimerie Henri Potier, 1958), 208.

general measures against foreigners. These circumstances ensured that 'la défiance contre les étrangers est à l'ordre du jour' and that 'le cosmopolitisme reculait tous les jours.' The overthrow of the champions of foreign patriots, the Girondins, naturally made matters worse. The problems faced by the revolution deepened over the summer, both politically and economically. In response 'le nationalisme commercial progressait du même pas que le nationalisme politique.' The ultimate expression of this development was the Terror, which for Mathiez was nothing other than an 'état de siège', which entailed the suspension of civil liberties and, above all, the arrest of enemy subjects and the seizure of their property. He suggests that as revolutionary ideology lost its cosmopolitanism and focused on the defence of the nation itself ('défense républicaine et défense nationale ... se confondaient') so an exclusive, chauvinistic form of nationalism was born. This development occured because foreigners' involvement in revolutionary politics tended be on the side of the opposition to the revolutionary government, namely the Hébertists or the Indulgents. It was this fratricidal conflict, involving the famous 'foreign plot' which put unwelcome foreigners at the heart of politics both in reality and in the revolutionary imagination. This development convinced the government to complete its repressive legislation against foreigners. Mathiez does not, however, claim that this was anything more than 'le réveil du nationalisme'. He recognises that the whole panoply of revolutionary laws against foreigners did not amount to the same severity exercised against all enemy aliens by the belligerent powers in 1914. 'Par là,' he concludes almost elegiacally, 'on peut mesurer dans quel sens la civilisation a marché depuis un siècle.'[6]

I

There are good reasons to re-examine the treatment of foreigners in revolutionary France. Historical writing on the French Revolution has undergone a sea-change since Mathiez published his book. Since the 'Revisionist' assault on interpretations which, in varying degrees, rested on economic and social determinism, politics and culture have become the focus of the work of historians. This development has, in turn, spawned

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[6]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 123, 125 - 126, 132 - 133, 137, 147, 162 - 163, 171 - 172, 177, 181.

various interpretations, as historians seek to explain the origins, course and effects of the Revolution in terms of politics, culture and their social context.[7]

Firstly, among the most important of these developments are interpretations which place ideology and rhetoric at the heart of the Revolution. In *Penser la Révolution française*, François Furet argues that the Revolution substituted the absolutism of the monarchy with the absolutism of popular sovereignty. If the king was not absolute in political terms, the eighteenth century maintained the idea that he was: 'La Révolution française n'est pas pensable en dehors de cette idée, ou de ce fantasme, qui est un legs de l'ancienne monarchie. ... C'est dans cette tentative de refaire un pouvoir sans partage avec une société sans contradictions que se constituera la conscience révolutionnaire'. As popular sovereignty was absolute, so revolutionary politicians had to mirror the will of the people precisely: any attempt to represent sectional or personal interests was not only pernicious, but counter-revolutionary. The claims of the Revolution for the absolute power of the people made pluralistic politics, in which different and contradictory interests could be represented and debated, impossible. Opposition was regarded as selfish, sinister and conspiratorial, the absolute extreme to the supposed transparency of the popular will. Obsession with plots was, for Furet, one of the central ideological dynamics which drove the Revolution. It stemmed from 'la conviction democratique nouvelle, selon laquelle la volonté générale, ou nationale, ne peut rencontrer d'opposition publique des intérêts particuliers.' A logical product of the absolute pretensions of popular sovereignty, this phobia explains the paranoia, the punitive mentality and the violence of the September massacres and the Terror. If such atrocities were the product of revolutionary ideology rather than simply a reaction to circumstances, as Furet argues, then they were inherent in the Revolution from the moment the revolutionaries accepted the sovereignty of the nation as their guiding principle.[8]

Other historians, such as Lynn Hunt in her *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, have expanded on Furet's work by looking at the various expressions of revolutionary ideology in rhetoric, symbolism and ritual and at the people who practised politics. In placing political ideology in a broader social and cultural context, Hunt supports many of Furet's suggestions. She accepts the potency of revolutionary ideology or rhetoric as the dynamic which drove the Revolution along its path to Terror. The

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[7]Jones, P. (ed.), *The French Revolution in Social and Political Perspective* (London: Arnold, 1996), 1 - 10.
[8]Furet, F., *Penser la Révolution française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 49, 69 - 70, 81 - 84 - 95, 300, 311 - 312.

obsession with conspiracy, above all, was 'the central organizing principle of revolutionary rhetoric'. She does suggest that this particular phobia was common to early modern society and cannot be attributed entirely to revolutionary ideology. Hunt also argues that 'although the Terror followed logically from the principles enunciated in revolutionary rhetoric, it was not the only possible deduction from those principles.' None the less, she claims that conspiracy only became 'a systematic obsession' with the emergence of mass politics and therefore shares Furet's generally pessimistic prognosis of the course of the Revolution.[9]

These interpretations of the Revolution raise important questions about Mathiez's work on foreigners. If, as he suggests, repressive legislation against foreigners resulted from the retreat of cosmopolitanism and the awakening of an exclusive nationalism, then this supports the contention of the centrality of ideology or rhetoric in the engine which drove the Revolution headlong into the Terror. As if anticipating Furet and Hunt's contentions about conspiracy, Mathiez recognises that the revolutionaries did have a tendency to blame foreigners for almost all their domestic and external difficulties.[10] None the less, while he gives ideology an independent role, that is not what drives the revolutionary response to foreigners: 'Si les doctrines dictèrent encore les phrases, les nécessités de plus en plus dictèrent les actes.'[11] In contrast to the thesis suggested by Furet and Hunt, it was circumstances which forced the revolutionaries to take harsh measures against foreigners. This difference in interpretation raises the question as to whether or not the exclusion, arrest, and expulsion of foreigners in the Terror was the logical product of revolutionary ideology, or whether the revolutionaries were genuinely reluctant to enact such laws against foreigners. If, as Furet and Hunt suggest, the Terror can be deduced from the principles enunciated in 1789, then this puts a pessimistic twist even on the pacific cosmopolitanism expressed in revolutionary rhetoric in 1789 - 1790 and on the universal pretensions of the doctrine of natural rights. This thesis will examine the effects of both ideology and circumstances to explain developments in the revolutionary treatment of foreigners.

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[9]Hunt, L., *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (1984) (London: Methuen, 1986), 19 - 51.
[10]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 121 - 122, 172.
[11]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 81.

Secondly, the focus on ideology and culture has led some historians to identify 'the creation of modern political culture' as the main achievement of the Revolution.[12] This was a development encouraged in large measure by Furet's radical interpretation in 1978. Among the most important frames of reference in the new political culture were the citizen and the nation. Such terms, however, had to be defined: who was to be included, and who excluded? Research on this issue has taken different forms including broad discussions of citizenship, popular sovereignty, notions of patriotism and elections.[13] So far, however, little work has been published on the experience of foreigners as the revolutionaries defined the nation and its membership, yet the notion of the foreigner was one of the defining limits of the new civic order.[14] A discussion of the treatment of foreigners and their assimilation or exclusion in state and society might offer useful perspectives on how the revolutionaries sought to define citizenship and nationality.

Foreigners were not, of course, the only people on the fringes of the new body politic: Jews and blacks were all subjects of debate and action among the revolutionaries as they debated the limits of civil and political rights.[15] Significant advances have been made in the study of women and their role in the French Revolution in particular.[16] Joan Landes's work in this area offers an interesting parallel to the revolutionary experience of

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[12]See, for example, the collection of papers edited by Keith Baker, François Furet, Colin Lucas and Mona Ozouf, *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture* (4 vols.) (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987 - 1994).

[13]See, for example, Waldinger, R., Dawson, P., Woloch, I. (eds.), *The French Revolution and the Meaning of Citizenship* (Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 1993); Cranston, M., 'The Sovereignty of the Nation'; Sewell, W. H., Jr., 'Le citoyen/la citoyenne: Activity, Passivity and the Revolutionary Concept of Citizenship'; Hampson, N., 'La Patrie': all in Lucas, C. (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, ii, *The Political Culture of the French Revolution* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 97 - 104; 105 - 123; 125 - 137; Crook, *Elections in the French Revolution.*

[14]Wahnich, 'La notion d'étranger en l'an II', 379.

[15]On Jews, see Girard, P., *La Révolution française et les juifs* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1989); Godechot, J., 'La Révolution française et les Juifs', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, xliii (1976 (1)), 47 - 70; Necheles, R., 'L'Emancipation des Juifs 1787 - 1795', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, xliii (1976 (1)), 71 - 86. On blacks, see Blackburn, R., *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776 - 1848* (London & New York: Verso, 1988), 161 - 264; Césaire, A., *Toussaint Louverture. La Révolution Française et le problème colonial* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1961); Gauthier, F., 'La Révolution française et le problème colonial: le "cas Robespierre"', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* lxiv (1992), 169 - 192; McCloy, S. T., *The Negro in France* (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1961).

[16]For example, Landes, J., *Women in the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1988); Olwen Hufton, *Women and the Limits of Citizenship in the French Revolution* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1992).

foreigners. Explicitly adopting Jürgen Habermas's concept of the 'bourgeois public sphere', she argues that in the Revolution the absolute monarchy gave way to 'a more pervasive gendering of the public sphere'. Despite the patriarchal character of the Ancien Régime, women did participate in and influenced politics and political language in their roles at court, in the salons of literary society, in the traditional process of popular protest and even in formal political activities such as the elections to the Estates-General. Such exclusion from the public sphere which women experienced did not seem exceptional because few men or women enjoyed political rights anyway. Although the breakdown of authority in 1789 and the crisis of 1793 opened the public sphere to all forms of political expression, in which women played a prominent role, ultimately women were deliberately and explicitly excluded by the revolutionaries. This exclusion from political life was 'central to its incarnation ... the bourgeois public sphere is essentially, not just contingently, masculinist. ... The Republic was constructed against women, not just without them.' In the bourgeois view of universal natural rights, men were seen as properly political, while women were regarded as naturally domestic. None the less, the idea that rights were universal allowed feminists to expose the discrepancies between principle and practice: republican ideology had a capacity 'to encompass both feminist and antifeminist alternatives'.[17] Landes's work raises the question as to how far the revolutionaries also deliberately sought to define the nation and their political culture not only without foreigners, but even against them.

Thirdly, discussions of the creation of modern political culture have led to debate over just how novel the political structures and practices of the Revolution were. If much of François Furet's work owes an explicit debt to the Tocquevillian approach which stresses continuities, he claims that in ideological terms the Revolution represented a complete break with the past. 'L'ancienne France était un royaume de sujets, la nouvelle une nation des citoyens. L'ancienne société était celle du privilège, la Révolution fonde l'égalité. Ainsi se constitue une idéologie de la rupture radicale avec le passé'.[18] Furet subsequently argued that this break with the past led the revolutionaries to innovate and so 1789 was the 'birth of political modernity'.[19] This 'rupture' thesis has been not been accepted by historians who have worked in detail on the political structures and practices of the Revolution. In recent works, both Peter Jones and Malcolm Crook argue the persistence

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[17]Landes, *Women in the Public Sphere*, 2, 4 - 7, 12 - 13, 20 - 21, 105 - 107.
[18]Furet, *Penser la Révolution française*, 49.
[19]Quoted in Jones, P. M., *Reform and Revolution in France. The Politics of Transition, 1774 - 1791* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2.

of older forms and customs within French revolutionary politics.[20] An examination of the treatment of foreigners might also contribute to the question of rupture or continuity in the revolutionary creation of a modern political culture.

Finally, historiographical developments outside the field of French Revolution studies have produced stimulating work on identity of various kinds.[21] Different attitudes towards foreigners are ways of emphasising the separateness, or even uniqueness, of one's homeland. The study of the identity of any people is consequently incomplete without some consideration for the way in which that people regards their neighbours and treats foreigners staying among them. Theodore Zeldin has written that 'France was defined as a nation not only by the policies of its rulers - or, alternatively, by the peculiarities of the provinces from which it was formed - but also by the way it distinguished itself from the nations that surround it. To understand France, one must appreciate the complexity of its attitudes towards foreigners.'[22] Studies of identity, because of the very nature of its slow evolution, must take a long-term perspective, as both Eugen Weber and Linda Colley do in their studies of France and Britain. None the less, it is hoped that in taking a snapshot of an eight-year period in which French attitudes towards and the treatment of foreigners underwent many mutations, some tentative remarks might be offered on the Revolution's impact on French national identity.

In summary, this dissertation seeks to address several questions: how far was ideology an overriding factor in the treatment of foreigners in revolutionary France? How far, on the other hand, did circumstances dictate revolutionary policies, and how far did circumstances interact with ideology to produce the legislation regarding foreigners? How far did the revolutionaries seek to define the nation and membership of it by the deliberate exclusion of foreigners? How 'modern' were the measures and attitudes which emerged and how much do they owe to Ancien Régime practices? Finally, can revolutionary attitudes towards and treatment of foreigners tell us anything about the Revolution's influence on the development of a French national identity?

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[20]Jones, *Reform and Revolution in France* and Malcolm Crook, *Elections in the French Revolution. An apprenticeship in democracy, 1789 - 1799* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[21]For France, see, for example, Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870 - 1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). On Britain see Linda Colley, *Britons. Forging the Nation 1707 - 1837* (1992) (London: Pimlico, 1994).

[22]*France 1848 - 1945: Intellect and Pride* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 86.

This thesis accepts that while the privileged, corporate structure of Ancien Régime society allowed foreigners to serve the king without any apparent anomaly, the revolutionary notion of the sovereignty of the nation implied that they be excluded from serving in the French state, namely the army, the church and the administration. On the other hand, it is argued that any ideological dynamic which emerged from the principles of 1789 was not the main force in determining the fortunes of foreigners in France. The 'nationalising' tendencies inherent in the Revolution were never fully applied because the revolutionaries were pragmatic enough to understand the very real practical problems which they faced. These problems led them to take decisions which may have been explained or justified with reference to revolutionary principles, but which nonetheless were not driven by those ideas. In the case of foreigners, it was the diplomatic, economic and political fallout which might have come from their exclusion and the useful services which they might offer which dictated revolutionary policy. Revolutionary pragmatism may have limited the extent to which ideology acted as a factor in the development of political culture.

The same pragmatism none the less meant that the revolutionaries were willing to exclude foreigners when circumstances made certain types appear to be more of a threat than previously thought. This was particularly true in the wake of the flight to Varennes, the fall of the monarchy, the military crisis of early 1793, the Prairial uprising, the Quiberon landings and the Babeuf conspiracy, when all other considerations seemed to be secondary to the external and internal security of the state. None the less even during the Terror nationality was not the only factor which determined the fate of foreigners. Their ability to be useful to the new order ensured their freedom and might even have saved their lives. Equally important, however, was loyalty to the revolutionary regime. As the Revolution became more radical, so it became less tolerant of opposition and diversity of opinion until, during the Terror, loyalty was meant to focus on the government itself. Such a development affected French citizens and foreigners alike, so, exclusive as political orthodoxy became, it cut across lines of nationality. Despite the letter of the laws which targeted foreigners for their nationality, even the regime of the Terror made allowances for those who were still useful to the war effort or whose loyalty to the government was in little doubt.

This study does not claim to be comprehensive in its coverage of foreigners. Mathiez's work concentrates on foreigners engaged in revolutionary politics and in the foreign legions recruited in the first year of the war. There were, however, other important

categories of foreigner, such as regular troops, clergy, merchants, manufacturers and financiers. A study of their experience might yield different perspectives on the place of foreigners in a country which was seeking to regenerate itself through principles and concepts which threatened to exclude them. The limits of this thesis have also been dictated in part by constraints of space: the story is taken up to the peace of Campo Formio in October 1797. While the essential arguments can be made without reference to the subsequent period, the last two years of the Directory and the period of the Consulate saw their own developments in the treatment of foreigners and are worthy of consideration. The years after Campo Formio will be the subject of further research and this thesis only represents an interim report.

II

Finally, the scope of this dissertation must also be defined by determining who were French and who were foreign in this period. The Ancien Régime definition of a foreigner was stated baldly in 1779 by the jurist Claude-Joseph de Ferrière as 'celui qui est né hors le Royaume'.[23] Conversely, to have been born in France was to be a *régnicole*, a natural subject of the king. It was assumed that such an individual accepted the king's protection and offered obedience to his laws in return. This simple formula immediately posed problems, as the frontiers of the French kingdom were not easily defined. A few years previously, Turgot set up a Topographical Bureau with the task of marking out the limits of French territory, but the task was not a simple one, because the exact position of the frontiers were not certain. In Lorraine, for example, it was not clear where the possessions of the king of France ended and those of the Elector of Trier began.[24] Border arrangements were still being discussed with princes of the Holy Roman Empire in the mid-1780s.[25] Moreover, the French monarchy periodically laid claim to territory beyond its existing frontiers, and could treat those who were technically living under the sovereignty of another prince as its own subjects. The Comtat-Venaissin and Avignon

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[23]Ferrière, C.-J. de, *Dictionnaire de droit practique contenant l'explication des termes de Droit, d'Ordonnances, de Coutumes & de Pratique: avec les jurisdictions de France* (2 vols.) (Toulouse, 1779), i, 658.
[24]Jones, *Reform and Revolution in France*, 13.
[25]Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), K//2033; F/7/4399; Sahlins, P., 'Natural Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century', *American Historical Review*, xcv (1990), 1440 - 1441.

were papal territories enclaved in the south of France. Both enclaves were ceded to the Pope, the Comtat in 1275 and Avignon in 1348. In 1789, as the British traveller Dr. Edward Rigby discovered, Avignon 'still belongs to the Pope . . . we were therefore required to take a passport on leaving it.'[26] Yet the border was far from insurmountable for these papal subjects: in 1348 an edict of Philip VI declared the Avignonnais and the Venaissins to be French subjects and this was confirmed in 1540. By these edicts, inhabitants of the enclaves could even hold ecclesiastical benefices in France, a privilege otherwise denied to all but *régnicoles* by the Blois ordonnance of 1579.[27] Culturally and linguistically, too, the inhabitants had much in common with the people who lived in the kingdom of France itself. In all aspects of French life, therefore, Avignonnais and Venaissins were in practical terms completely indistinct from *régnicoles*: quite simply, they were not treated as foreigners. In a similar fashion, from 1702 the inhabitants of Savoy were treated as *régnicoles*, although they were subjects of the king of Sardinia.[28] Such rulings were dictated by the monarchy's desire to justify and reinforce older claims on the territory concerned.

Moreover, there were territories within France over which the king laid claim to sovereignty, but in which he recognised certain legal jurisdictions of foreign princes, as in the enclaves of Alsace. There, inhabitants owed allegiance to the princes of the Holy Roman Empire by virtue of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, by which France won possession of the province, but recognised some of the legal and fiscal rights of the princes who owned estates and fiefdoms there. Such privileges varied from one lord to another, but they included the appointment of judges and clergy, the imposition of taxes and the levying of dues.[29] The population of these enclaves therefore owed obedience not only to the king of France, but also to their princely, German lord.

Such overlaps were not considered unusual by the standards of the Ancien Régime in Europe. Concepts of nationhood were developing and some European sovereigns did seek to consolidate their dynastic lands into single parcels, but the weight of tradition,

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[26]Rigby, E., *Dr. Rigby's Letters from France, etc., in 1789, edited by his daughter Lady Eastlake* (London: 1880), 126.
[27]Villers, R., 'La Condition des Étrangers en France dans les trois derniers siècles de la Monarchie', *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*, x, *L'Étranger* (Brussels: Editions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1958), 144, 148; Jourdan, Decrusy, Isambert, *Recueil général des Anciennes lois françaises depuis l'an 420 jusqu'à la Révolution de 1789* (29 vols.) (hereafter Isambert), xii, 743.
[28]Boizet, J., 'Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime' (Thèse de droit, Paris, 1943) (Paris: Lavergne, 1943), 51.
[29]AN, F/7/4399.

prescription and international treaties - the *droit public* of Europe - led most people to accept such apparent anomalies as existed in Avignon, the Comtat, Savoy and Alsace. Such attitudes meant that there was no clear-cut, codified definition as to what constituted a French subject and, conversely, a foreigner. Certain general terms describing a foreigner, such as *aubain*, had emerged from customary rules and judgments of lawcourts, but these were not always consistent.[30]

In 1694, the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie* defined the nation as 'all the inhabitants of the same state, of the same country who live under the same laws and use the same language.'[31] If this were the case, then the people over whom the king of France claimed sovereignty would never constitute a nation. In addition to the overlaps in sovereignty, linguistically, religiously, culturally and even geographically because of the Vosges, the inhabitants of Alsace were very different from the other people in the French kingdom. In July 1789 Arthur Young remarked that 'I found myself to all appearance veritably in Germany ... here not one person in a hundred has a word of French' and he commented on how striking it was 'to cross a great range of mountains; to enter a level plain, inhabited by a people totally distinct and different from France, with manners, language, ideas, prejudices, and habits all different.'[32] He also commented that the inhabitants of Roussillon 'are Spaniards in language and in customs, but they are under a French government'.[33] Furthermore, Basque was spoken along the western Pyrenees and Breton in Lower Brittany. Conversely, French was spoken in Brabant, under Austrian sovereignty. French language and the culture stemming from it could not, therefore, be one of the prime legal determinants of French nationality.

Similarly, religion was not a factor, despite the theoretical commitment of the French monarchy to extirpate heresy. It is true that, to be naturalised, a foreigner had in theory to convert to Catholicism, but this practice became rarer over the course of the eighteenth century. The king tolerated Jews and Protestants among his subjects, even if they were 'second class' behind Catholics. Ethnicity excluded Jews and blacks from the full privileges and protection of the law under the Ancien Régime, but contemporaries still saw them as subjects of the king of France, if only, for one, as a religious and racial

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[30]Brubaker, R., *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 36 - 37.
[31]Quoted in Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 192n..
[32]Young, A., *Travels in France during the Years 1787, 1788 & 1789* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929), 180.
[33]Young, *Travels in France*, 38.

minority to be grudgingly tolerated and, for the other, as a racial group to be subjected to segregation and exploitation. Jews and blacks themselves regarded themselves not as foreigners, but as French subjects suffering severe discrimination. Zalkind Hourwitz, a Jew of Polish origin, argued that the cultural characteristics which differentiated Jews from other French subjects arose because of the laws which restricted their behaviour and prevented them from realising their full potential. Suppress those laws, the argument ran, and Jews would assimilate with the French people.[34] When Jews were accorded full civil and political rights on 27 September 1791, the revolutionaries implicitly rejected the view of abbé Maury, that 'calling Jews citizens would be like saying that without letters of naturalization and without ceasing to be English and Danish, the English and Danish could become French.'[35]

Blacks were enslaved not because they were foreigners, but because of their race, which determined the entire social hierarchy in the French colonies.[36] Enslaved blacks were not only subject to the will of their immediate 'owners', but also to the *Code noir* and as such were forcibly subject to the authority the king of France. If they were freed from slavery, which was theoretically possible if they arrived in metropolitan France undeclared by their master, they became full subjects of the king and thereby enjoyed the *qualité de français*.[37] Similarly when slavery was abolished in the French colonies on 4 February 1794, blacks were not required to be naturalised. All men 'without distinction of colour' were to be considered French citizens enjoying all the rights assured by the French constitution.[38] The revolutionaries were not naturalising blacks, but abolishing one of the last and the most despicable of the hierarchical societies in the French empire: the one based on race.

Under the absolute monarchy, the varieties and distribution of privilege among the king's subjects did not matter, nor did their various languages, ethnic origins and even religions. What bound together the French kingdom and empire was the monarchy itself, or rather the assumption that ultimately all those born on the domains of the French king

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[34]Godechot, J., 'La Révolution française et les Juifs', 54; 'Vindication of the Jews', extract in Hunt, L. (ed.), *The French Revolution and Human Rights. A Brief Documentary History* (Boston & New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1996), 48 - 50.
[35]Maury's opinion of 23 December 1789, in Hunt, *The French Revolution and Human Rights*, 89.
[36]Césaire, *Toussaint Louverture. La Révolution Française et le problème colonial*, 31.
[37]For a full but dated study of blacks in France see McCloy, S. T., *The Negro in France* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1961) and, by the same author, 'Negroes and mulattoes in eighteenth-century France', *Journal of Negro History*, xxx (1945), 276 - 292.
[38]Decree in Hunt, *The French Revolution and Human Rights*, 116.

were subject to his laws, and received his protection in return for their obedience. Legal, linguistic, religious, cultural and ethnic differences between subjects were not anomalous to eighteenth-century jurists such as de Ferrière, because it was related to the very nature of Ancien Régime society. Privilege, or absence of it, defined the various individuals, guilds, corporations, towns and provinces from each other. In this corporate society, what tied them all together was loyalty to the same king. Their Frenchness was defined only by the vertical ties of obedience to the monarchy, while they remained separate and distinct from each other because of their differences in privilege.[39] During the elections to the Estates-General, some provinces resisted the idea that they formed part of the kingdom of France, invoking a purely dynastic link to the French crown. The Estates of Navarre, for example, were scandalised at being treated as anything other than a kingdom separate from France.[40]

The question as to what constituted French nationality boiled down to whom one owed ultimate allegiance. In cases such as Alsace, the papal enclaves and Savoy, international treaties, the *droit public* of Europe, determined the principle, if not the practice, of nationality. If the people of Alsace owed their first obedience to their immediate masters in the Holy Roman Empire, at a deeper level they were considered French rather than German because their ultimate overlord, by virtue of the treaties of Westphalia in 1648 and Ryswick in 1697, was the king of France.[41] Meanwhile, and despite their naturalisation by the French monarchy, inhabitants of the papal enclaves and of Savoy were legally foreigners. In practice, of course, the subjects in question may have felt differently and behaved accordingly: an Avignonnais, technically a foreigner, had more in common with a French-speaking subject of Louis XVI than did a German-speaking Alsatian. None the less, people born in France were assumed to have made the commitment of loyalty to the king. This territorial basis of nationality was referred to as the *droit de sol*, and included those born in France of foreign parents, and children born abroad of French parents, provided that they fixed their domicile in France. What,

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[39]Fitzsimmons, M. P., 'The National Assembly and the Invention of Citizenship', Waldinger, Dawson, Woloch, *The French Revolution and the Meaning of Citizenship*, 29.
[40]Jones, *Reform and Revolution in France*, 13 - 14.
[41]This did not, however, preclude disputes over the extent of French royal sovereignty over the German princes themselves (Muret, P., 'L'affaire des princes possessionnés d'Alsace et les origines du conflit entre la Révolution et l'Empire', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* i (1899 - 1900), 434 - 439).

conversely, defined a foreigner was his loyalty to a sovereign other than the king of France, and this was usually determined by birth in another kingdom.[42]

The revolutionaries aimed to create a new civic order based on the abolition of all distinctions based on birth and privilege among all citizens. At the same time, they made the nation, rather than the king, the source of political legitimacy. Both developments redefined the relationship of the citizen to the state. The abolition of privilege on 4 August 1789, the administrative division of the kingdom into departments, the emancipation of Protestants, Jews and eventually blacks theoretically erased the old sources of social differentiation and identity. People's loyalty and identity were now expected to focus on the entire French people, rather than one's corporation, guild, town, or province. What defined French nationality was no longer one's loyalty to a monarch, but rather to the community of citizens who shared the same rights within the same *patrie*.

In this respect, the Revolution inherited from the Ancien Régime the tendency to define French nationality only in political terms, without reference to language, culture, religion or race. Sieyès defined the nation in 1789 simply as 'un corps d'associés vivant sous une loi *commune* et représentés par la même *législature*'.[43] On one hand, this confirmed the assimilationist tendency in the definition of French nationality, which could encompass anyone who sought to participate and contribute to the life of the nation. On the other hand, this definition was not only dictated by principles. To insist on language, ethnicity or religion as a basis for nationality would have made France as it was in 1789 merely a state rather than a nation, and a state constructed from a variety of 'nations' or peoples who might demand, on the basis of the Revolution's own ideology, their own rights to self-determination. By defining a nation in the broadest sense, without reference to race, language or religion, the revolutionaries precluded such a possibility. Moreover, the short-lived attempt to impose linguistic conformity on all French citizens by the law of 20 July 1794 floundered because it was unworkable.[44] Besides, the surging of revolutionary armies into Belgium and the Rhineland, the ultimate annexation of the

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[42]Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 38; Danjou, C., *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger dans les trois derniers siècles de la Monarchie* (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1939), 11.

[43]Sieyès, E., *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?* (Paris, Flammarion, 1988), 40.

[44]*Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des chambres françaises* (1ère série: 1787 - 1799) (96 vols.) (Paris, 1877 - 1990) (hereafter AP), xciii, 367 - 368; Lyons, M., 'Regionalism and linguistic conformity in the French Revolution', Forrest, A., & Jones, P. (eds.), *Reshaping France. Town, country and region during the French Revolution* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 185, 188.

former and the claims on the latter naturally reinforced the tendency to exclude language as a defining characteristic of French nationality. If the Revolution represented a break with the past in terms of the transfer of sovereignty from king to nation, the definition of membership of the nation, and the motivation for it, marked a continuity.

The Revolution also inherited the same problems of making a line of demarcation between French and foreigners. Unlike the Ancien Régime, the absolute pretensions of the principle of national sovereignty could not accommodate such overlappings of jurisdiction as existed in Alsace. It could not resist for long the demands of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin for 'reunion' with France, either, as they were apparently the express will of the people of those enclaves. In the cases of the papal enclaves and of Alsace, the Revolution sharpened the focus in the definition of French nationality by denying the legitimacy of the apparent anomalies tolerated by the old *droit public* of Europe.

More problematic was the fact that the political boundaries of the French nation were in flux for most of the revolutionary period, mainly because of the war. This meant that the limits of French nationality still remained unclear. The example of the Belgians and Liégeois will suffice to illustrate this point. Early in 1793, the Convention accepted the mainly extorted 'petitions' from Belgian communes for 'reunion' with France. Henceforth, the Belgians and the Liégeois might have expected to be considered French citizens, as indeed they were legally. None the less, when the Austrians reconquered their territory the revolutionary authorities treated Belgians and Liégeois in France ambiguously. Sometimes they were deemed French citizens, but on other occasions they were treated as foreigners.[45]

The question of the nationality of Belgians and Liégeois was eventually decided when their countries were formally annexed by France on 1 October 1795. This annexation and the forced cession by the Empire of the left bank of the Rhine in December 1798 represented victories for the proponents of France's 'natural frontiers' or 'grandes limites'. They also made, in theory at least, French citizens out of Flamands and more German speakers. Appeals to nature justified these expanded limits of the Republic and, tellingly, if the Rhine was France's 'natural' frontier, nature herself had not preordained nations to speak the same language. The revolutionaries were in reality guided by strategic

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[45]For example, while they were exempt from the confiscation of foreigners' property on 7 September 1793 on the grounds that they were French, on 25 December Robespierre had them exempted from the law expelling all foreigners from elective office not because they were considered French citizens, but because they fulfilled their functions honorably (AP, lxxiii, 504; lxxxii, 304).

concerns. It was such calculations which dictated the geographical limits of the nation and, consequently, the definition of the French people. As the revolutionaries created a new state and a new political culture, therefore, the very people whom they sought to regenerate by these changes remained fluid both in definition and in fact.

Chapter One. To live Free, to die a Slave: Foreigners in Ancien Régime France.

On a December morning in 1750, a funeral procession left the Renaissance château of Chambord. A carriage, draped in black and built specially for the occasion, was drawn by six horses also clothed in black. The coffin was attended by no less than three equerries, two pages, four valets, six lackeys and four guards. This cortège was in turn escorted by one hundred horsemen, bristling with sabres, carbines, lances and dressed variously as dragoons, uhlans and tartars - a reflection of their diverse and exotic origins, from Africa to eastern Europe. This procession was made rarer by its destination: not a local churchyard or family mausoleum, but the Lutheran chapel of Saint Thomas in Strasbourg.

The man honoured in this way was Maurice de Saxe, Marshal of France, Duke of Courland and natural son of Frederick-Augustus, the Elector of Saxony and later Augustus II, King of Poland. The cavalrymen escorting his coffin were once his own, part of his thousand-strong regiment of horse, the Saxe-Volontaire. Maurice's final journey would take two months. On its way through the garrison towns of north-eastern France, church bells tolled solemnly and guards of honour presented arms. In the countryside, small clusters of peasants followed in silence. When the convoy finally reached Strasbourg on 8 February, it was greeted with twelve cannon shots and attended by officials and notables of Alsace, non-commissioned officers of the Saxe-Volontaire, four lieutenant-generals of the royal army and no less than forty-three Protestant pastors. The entire garrison of the city lined the route from the Porte de France to the chapel. Banners were lowered in respect as the carriage rumbled by and drums, covered with black crêpe, quietly rolled. After the funeral service, the crowds which had massed in the street were allowed to file past the tomb, either to pay homage to the Marshal or to satisfy their curiosity.

The bill for these sixty-odd days of deference to a Protestant foreigner, as Maurice de Saxe was never naturalised in spite of thirty years' service to the French crown, was footed by the royal treasury.[1] This favour bestowed on Maurice by Louis XV was only the last of many. Besides his rank of *maréchal de France*, de Saxe had also been granted a pension, Chambord and all its dependencies, the governorship of Alsace, the right to enter the Louvre in a horsedrawn coach and, significantly in a court still meticulously

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[1]The details of Maurice de Saxe's lavish funeral are taken from Hulot, F., *Le Maréchal de Saxe* (Paris: Pygmalion/Gerard Watelet, 1989), 266 - 268, and Fieffé, E., *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France* (2 vols.) (Paris: 1854), i, 280 - 282.

governed by fine points of etiquette, the right to sit when in audience with the King and other members of the royal family.[2] He had furthermore been granted permission, unlike many other foreigners in France, to dispose of his property to whomsoever he pleased.[3] With such favours, it might have been that Maurice de Saxe never felt the need to be naturalised. The absense of naturalisation also allowed Maurice to remain a Protestant even while occupying some of the highest military and administrative positions in the Catholic kingdom.

Maurice de Saxe had no need to convert to Catholicism, let alone be naturalised, to prove his loyalty to the French crown: he had won the trust of Louis XV and immense popularity amonst the people at large thanks mainly to his victory at Fontenoy in 1745. Equally important for the King, however, was his fidelity. When Maurice was *maréchal de camp*, a relatively humble position among the higher echelons of the military, his half-brother Augustus III of Poland offered him the command of his army in the War of Polish Succession (1733 - 1735). The Saxon Protestant replied that he had served the King of France for thirteen years and would not now abandon him. As French policy dictated support for Augustus' rival, Stanislas Leszczinski, Maurice found himself duty-bound to fight against his blood-relative, to whom he was not reconciled until 1736. It was such displays of loyalty, as well as his success on the battlefield, that made Maurice de Saxe's status as a foreigner a minor consideration.

There were others like him in eighteenth-century France. As a Protestant the Genevan banker Jacques Necker was denied entry into the royal council and excluded from the post of *contrôleur-général* of finances, but he nonetheless took charge of them with a different title, as *directeur-général*, from 1776 to 1781 and again from 1788 to 1790. He never converted to Catholicism and he was never naturalised, unlike one of his predecessors, the Scottish Protestant John Law.[4] Both Necker and de Saxe remained Protestants and foreigners, but they reached the pinnacles of the French state. What mattered was not their nationality, but rather the personal ties of service and loyalty between monarch and servant. Their respect for these bonds, and the recognition of their value to the state, gave de Saxe and Necker the credentials required for the highest positions in the kingdom without having to undergo a religious conversion or naturalisation. Necker and de Saxe

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[2]Hulot, *de Saxe*, 176.
[3]Isambert, xxii, 185.
[4]Harris, R. D., *Necker: Reform Statesman of the Ancien Régime* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1979), 1 - 2.

were, however, remarkable exceptions. The privileges which de Saxe and Necker enjoyed underscored the disadvantages which humbler foreigners usually faced in France.

While there were rules and obstacles which theoretically applied to all foreigners, the main legal divide was not between Frenchmen and foreigners. What mattered to a foreigner, as much as the fact of not being French, was the function which he or she performed in French society, and the privileges and obstacles which that function presented to them. Privilege defined relationships between the component parts of Ancien Régime society,[5] and different foreigners enjoyed different privileges and confronted a variety of difficulties, depending upon their occupation. Naturalisation, inheritance laws, religious and legal obstacles all affected foreigners,[6] but not equally from one foreigner to the next. Foreign soldiers, clergymen, artists, intellectuals and exiles, merchants, manufacturers and bankers and poverty-stricken migrants all enjoyed or suffered differing degrees of privilege and disabilities depending on a variety of factors. Among those factors was their country of origin, religious affiliation and, crucially, occupation.

Such a variety of conditions did not go unchallenged in the eighteenth century. By 1789 both the government and the limited, literate section of the population which made up public opinion had occasionally challenged both the privileges and the barriers affecting foreigners in France. On the one hand, the questioning was based on eighteenth-century 'philosophic cosmopolitanism' and new economic philosophies, which tended towards the greater assimilation of foreigners into French society by the removal of the legal disabilities imposed on them. On the other hand, some of the challenges tended towards exclusion of foreigners, not from France or from much of the life of the nation, but certainly from sections of the French state where foreigners had traditionally played a part. Both these challenges to Ancien Régime customs and practices were to be given fuller expression and implementation during the Revolution.

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[5]Jones, *Reform and Revolution in France*, 58.

[6]Much work has been done on these general conditions affecting foreigners. See, for example, Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime'; Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger dans les trois derniers siècles de la Monarchie*; Folain-Le Bras, M., 'Un projet d'ordonnance du chancelier Daguesseau: étude de quelques incapacités de donner et de recevoir sous l'Ancien Régime' (Thèse pour le doctorat: Paris, 1941); Villers, R., 'La Condition des Étrangers en France dans les trois derniers siècles de la Monarchie', *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*, x, *L'Étranger* (Brussels: Editions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1958), 139 - 150. More recently Rogers Brubaker has considered the status of foreigners in Ancien Régime France in *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 35 - 39.

I

The most important of these old practices towards foreigners was the *droit d'aubaine*, which was the right by which the king was the only inheritor of the property of foreigners who died in France without leaving *régnicole* - French-born - heirs. Even naturalised foreigners who had no heirs born in France, or who had failed to write a will, were subject to this *droit*. Tobias Smollett, arriving in France in July 1763, called it a 'tyranny' and explained that it was 'founded at first upon the supposition, that all the estate of foreigners residing in France was acquired in that kingdom, and that, therefore, it would be unjust to convey it to another country.'[7]

While Smollett's explanation for the *droit d'aubaine* was certainly one expressed by French jurists,[8] the legal justification for the confiscation of foreign inheritances rested on a distinction, drawn from Roman law, between *droit des gens* and *droit civil*. The former was 'celui que la raison naturelle a établi parmi tous les hommes, & qui est communement reçu & observé par toutes les nations' and therefore applicable to all people, even foreigners, while the latter was 'le Droit de chaque peuple en particulier' and therefore applicable only to citizens of the country in question. Montesquieu, while opposed to the *droit d'aubaine*, made a similar distinction between the two branches of law.[9]

Under the *droit des gens* foreigners were capable of making contracts, to receive, buy, give or sell property from or to anyone, regardless of nationality. The crucial point was that all these activities were done while the foreigners concerned were alive. Such acts were considered part of the *droit des gens* because all human beings had the right to provide for themselves and their families while they were still alive: the need to work, eat and live were naturally common to all human beings. On the other hand, transmission of wealth because of death, through acts such as wills and testaments were considered to fall into the realm of *droit civil* and could not, therefore, be enjoyed by foreigners, either as the deceased or as the inheritors. The explanation as to why foreigners could provide for

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[7]Smollett, T., *Travels through France and Italy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1907), 9.

[8]'Ainsi les biens qu'ils laissent ici en mourant appartiennent au Roi qui a bien voulu leur permettre d'en acquérir dans son Royaume' (Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 142).

[9]Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 585 - 586; Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Loix* (1748), in *Oeuvres Complètes de Montesquieu* (3 vols.) (Amsterdam and Leipzig: 1758), book i, chapter 3.

their families while alive, but not in death, came from Roman law, in which foreigners 'vivent à la vérité comme libres; mais ils meurent comme esclaves'.[10] Foreigners did not, therefore, share the same rights in civil law as free citizens. Why wills and testaments should have belonged to French *droit civil* rather than the *droit des gens* was never satisfactorily explained by French eighteenth-century jurists, but it is possible that it stemmed from a broad application of the Roman law of citizenship, whereby one of the privileges enjoyed by a citizen was the right to trade with other Roman citizens.[11] If foreigners in France were 'free' when alive, they could therefore make contracts and exchange wealth, but if at death they fell to the status of 'slaves', the right to freely dispose of one's property was withdrawn. If Smollett had been aware of this justification of the *droit d'aubaine*, his language might have been even stronger.

Despite the justifications based on Roman law, the origins of the *droit d'aubaine* are obscure. In the eighteenth century, *aubain* was a legal term to describe a foreigner, while *aubaine* was a foreigner's inheritance, but in a memorandum for Vergennes, the foreign minister, in 1785, it was explained that the word *aubain* was in regular use by the ninth century to describe any outsider who had settled on a lord's domain and who was liable to *mainmorte*.[12] This use of the term predated the introduction in the thirteenth century of the Roman distinction between *droit des gens* and *droit civil*.[13] By the eighteenth century, Roman law had become the principle explanation for the *droit d'aubaine*, but it was not at the root of the practice.

Right up to its abolition in 1790, the *droit d'aubaine* was not applied uniformly from province to province, or even from town to town. Exemptions and different rules as to the applicability of the *droit d'aubaine* limited its impact across the kingdom, particularly

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[10]Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 141 - 142.
[11]Heater, D., *Citizenship: the Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education* (London and New York: Longman, 1990), 16.
[12]Archives de la Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (hereafter MAE), Affaires Diverses Politiques (hereafter ADP), France, 1, dossier 1 ('Par M. Steffel', c. 1785). *Mainmorte* was the right of the *seigneur* to seize the property of a deceased vassal whose children were no longer resident on the domain. The fact that *mainmorte* was practised in many parts of western Europe might explain why the *droit d'aubaine* existed not only in France, but in Germany and elsewhere. The link between *mainmorte* and the *droit d'aubaine* may have arisen from the assumption behind both that those who left the domain to which they were originally attached were fugitives, liable to servitude wherever they settled, and as such assumed to have no legal family under the law - and significantly the term *aubain* was also used to describe the child of a bastard (Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 591; Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime', 33 - 34).
[13]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 23.

in provinces and towns only recently absorbed by the French crown. Out of respect for its customary laws, for example, the king admitted in 1689 the claim that foreigners in the bishopric of Metz were exempt, while the bishoprics of Toul and Verdun insisted that they had similar rights.[14] Entire provinces also claimed, or were granted, exemptions. In response to a questionnaire on legal practices sent by Chancellor d'Aguesseau in August 1738 to the various *parlements* and *conseils souverains* of France, both the parlement of Toulouse and that of Besançon claimed the inapplicability of the *droit d'aubaine* for, respectively, Languedoc and the Franche-Comté. Other *parlements* placed limitations on the extent and the specific circumstances in which the *droit d'aubaine* applied.[15]

If the king alone held the *droit d'aubaine*, that meant that he, too, could alter its applicability and extent, and even abolish it outright.[16] It was this use of royal power which made the occupation of a foreigner as important as his nationality. The king granted privileges to those whom he wished to attract to the kingdom, namely merchants, manufacturers and mercenaries.[17] In the eighteenth century, however, the exemptions granted to merchants were generally considered to apply only to their movable goods and their merchandise. Soldiers who served the king of France were also the object of privileges. In 1481 Louis XI issued *lettres patentes* exempting his Swiss guards, their wives and families from the *droit d'aubaine*, an exemption which underwent many renewals and remained in force up to the Revolution.[18]

Exemptions were also granted out of diplomatic necessity: to avoid any incidents, ambassadors and the members of notable families had a privileged status regarding the *droit d'aubaine*. De Ferrière explains that ambassadors and their train were exempt because their function was 'de droit commun entre tous les souverains'.[19] Diplomats were

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[14]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 111.

[15]AN, K\\873, dossiers 4 & 9. The replies of all the *parlements* on the *droit d'aubaine* are analysed in great detail in Folain-Le Bras, M., 'Un projet d'ordonnance du chancelier Daguesseau', 68 - 84.

[16]MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier 1 ('Par M. Steffel', c. 1785).

[17]For example, *lettres patentes* of Louis XI in 1472 and 1474 exempted all foreign merchants established in Bordeaux - with the notable exception of the English - from the *droit d'aubaine*, provided that the wealth passed on or inherited from those merchants was not transported out of the kingdom. Merchants at the fairs of Troyes, the Champagne and Lyon were also exempt. To attract foreign investors, Henri III exempted from the *droit d'aubaine* those who bought royal *rentes* in 1586, but bonds drawn from other sources were still liable to the *droit* (Folain-Le Bras, 'Un projet d'ordonnance du chancelier Daguesseau', 47, 47n.; Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 83; Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 593; Isambert, xiv, 604).

[18]Isambert, xi, 310 - 312; xii, 23 - 25.

[19]Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 592.

protected by the *droit des gens* and therefore it would have been unjust to submit them to the *droit d'aubaine*. Under the protective shell of the *droit des gens*, ambassadors, unlike other foreigners in France, could leave wills and even die intestate without their property being seized by the crown. This dispensation applied only to movable goods, however: all real estate and *rentes* acquired by ambassadors in France were subject to the *droit d'aubaine*, as was made clear by an *arrêt du conseil* of 21 July 1726.[20]

In the later eighteenth century, however, is was not local privilege or a foreigner's occupation which determined the extent of his or her subjection to the *droit d'aubaine*, but increasingly the important factor was their nationality. From the mid-1760s, a series of treaties between the king of France and other sovereigns provided for the reciprocal abolition of the *droit d'aubaine*. Over the last two decades of the *Ancien Régime* these treaties severely reduced the extent of this ancient royal right. Much has been made of the influence of the Enlightenment and of *laissez-faire* ideas in the decline of the *droit d'aubaine*,[21] but evidence suggests that pressures of more immediate concern were of greater importance.

There was undoubtedly a growing belief that the *droit d'aubaine* had outlived its usefulness. Necker declared in 1785 that the fiscal advantages of this *droit* could not compensate for all the obstruction it caused to the commercial development of the kingdom, while the populationist Moheau wrote in 1778 that the numbers of non-exempt foreigners were so few that the *droit d'aubaine* could be of very little benefit to the royal treasury.[22] Both Necker and Moheau were writing after the torrent of treaties had begun, but they were in fact expressing 'expert' opinion on what many people had already suspected for decades: that the revenue gained from the *droit d'aubaine* was minimal compared to the damage it did to the French economy. This belief did not stem from any new ideas, however: the earliest exemptions from the *droit d'aubaine* in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were, after all, aimed at encouraging trade. Furthermore, the royal minister who in 1780 first proposed, in vain, a unilateral and general abolition of the *droit*

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[20]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 100; Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 593.

[21]Boizet especially stresses the role of new ideas in the demise of the *droit d'aubaine*, saying that the 'Economists' saw it as a useless obstacle to trade. Boutillier described it as 'haineux', while Montesquieu regarded it as 'insensé' ('Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime', 129); Folain-Le Bras also cites Montesquieu and says that the *droit d'aubaine* fell into disfavour with the *philosophes* and the 'Economists' as the idea of conserving riches in France was replaced by more liberal economic ideas of the free circulation of wealth ('Un projet d'ordonnance du chancelier Daguesseau', 82 - 83).

[22]Both cited in Villers, 'La Condition des Étrangers en France', 146n..

d'aubaine was Necker, who was far from being a Physiocrat. The individual treaties addressing the *droit d'aubaine* suggest that commercial and political motives were more important than new economic theory and enlightened ideas.

The abolition of the *droit d'aubaine* for Spaniards in France nestled as only one clause among many in the renewal of the *pacte de famille* between the monarchs of Spain and France in 1760.[23] The *lettres patentes* abolishing the *droit d'aubaine* for Polish subjects, issued in 1777 stress the king's wish to 'donner à la nation polonoise une preuve de notre bienveillance'.[24] It is perhaps more than coincidence that these letters were issued less than a year after the collapse of French policy in Poland. No doubt the 'preuve de bienveillance' offered by the French crown to the victorious pro-Russian Polish government was an attempt to salvage some of the flagging French influence in eastern Europe. Economic motives were rarely absent, of course, but this does not mean that they were necessarily dictated by new economic ideas, or that they were more important than political aims. The convention between Louis XV and Maria-Theresa abolishing the *droit d'aubaine* in France for her Bohemian and Hungarian subjects was clearly intended for political purposes, even though the commercial impulse was present. The two monarchs declared that, among other reasons, they wanted to 'resserrer de plus en plus les liens de l'alliance, de l'union & de l'amitié sincere qui subsistent entr'Elles'.[25]

When Necker's proposal to abolish the *droit d'aubaine* unilaterally in France was rejected by the government, it was probably afraid that such an act would lead to a flight of capital, leaving France at a disadvantage. Foreigners would have been able to take any inherited cash and kind out of the country, while French subjects could not bring back into France any legacies from countries which exercised the *droit d'aubaine*. Consequently, the theme of reciprocity echoes both in the treaties and conventions abolishing the *droit d'aubaine* and in their execution. Almost all of the seventy-nine treaties made by 1789 stressed that their clauses only applied if they were mutual.[26]

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[23]Villers, 'La Condition des Étrangers en France', 148.
[24]Isambert, xxv, 151.
[25]AN, K\\2033 (Convention signed on 24 June 1766).
[26]MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier 1 ('Tableau pour le code diplomatique des Aubains'). See also the treaty between France and the Duke of Württemburg, signed in 1778 and the correspondence between the French envoy to the Swiss Protestant cantons and the Chancellery of Basle in 1761 in AN, K//2033.

This emphasis on reciprocity belies the claim that by the Revolution the *droit d'aubaine* had all but disappeared in France.[27] Had any sovereign failed to keep to the stipulated terms of the treaty, then the king of France would have had the right to exert anew the *droit d'aubaine* against the subjects of such recalcitrant princes. The decline of the *droit d'aubaine* was therefore far from irreversible. Furthermore, many treaties did not abolish all restrictions on foreigners' inheritances. Many German princes in particular retained the *Abzug* or *Abschoß*, which usually amounted to ten percent of the value of inheritances exported from their lands. Under the conditions of reciprocity, therefore, the king of France could also exercise this right, called in French the *droit de détraction*, on the relevant foreign subjects, including those from thirty different German states, cities and orders, Austria, Portugal, Britain and Poland.[28] Seen in the light of reciprocity and the persistence of the *droit de détraction*, the treaties abolishing the *droit d'aubaine* appear at the very most to be a compromise between the new ideas of the freedom of circulation of wealth and older mercantilist thinking which sought to restrict its exit from the kingdom.

Some treaties had limitations other than the retention of the *droit de détraction*. The British and the Swedes, in 1739 and 1784 respectively, enjoyed the abolition of the *droit d'aubaine* only for movable goods,[29] while others only enabled foreigners to *inherit* legacies by testament - and not to bequeath them. Even the *lettres patentes* of 1787 (significantly after the treaty of commerce of the previous year) allowing the British to inherit all types of property in France make no mention of their right to dispose of wealth by will or testament.[30]

The variety of the provisions of the treaties and the diversity of their scope show that if the *droit d'aubaine* was dying out by 1789 it was doing so in a very irregular way. Rather than improve conditions for all foreigners equally in France, the treaties created many differences in the status of different nationalities. The most favoured were people such as

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[27]Villers, for example, says that by 1789 the droit d'aubaine was 'moribund' ('La Condition des Étrangers en France', 150); J. Mathorez claims that by the time the Constituent abolished it in August 1790, it had virtually ceased to exist anyway (*Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime. Histoire de la Formation de la Population française* (2 vols.) (Paris: 1919 - 1921), i, 139).

[28]MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier 1 ('Tableau pour le code diplomatique des Aubains'). For examples of treaties in which the French king retained the *droit de détraction*, see AN, K\\2033; Isambert, xxv, 151 - 152, 258, 265, 285, 363, 394; xxvi, 44 - 46, 106, 117, 348; xxvii, 166; xxviii, 316 - 318; Villers, 'La Condition des Étrangers en France', 149).

[29]In 1789 there were eight treaties of this kind, including those with Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, Tunis and Turkey (MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier 1 ('Tableau pour le code diplomatique des Aubains').

[30]Isambert, xxviii, 316 - 318.

the Americans and Russians, who were among the subjects of twenty-seven states who benefited from the complete abolition of the *droits d'aubaine et de détraction* on all kinds of property.[31]

Among other reasons, it was this lack of system, the unequal treatment of different types and nationality of foreigners in the *droit d'aubaine* which offended the revolutionaries who abolished it in 1790. By making the exemptions usually dependent upon reciprocity, by retaining the *droit de détraction*, by sometimes abolishing the *droit d'aubaine* only for specific types of wealth, or only for receiving and not transmitting inheritances, the monarchy showed that it had no intention to abolish completely the *droit d'aubaine*.

Another restriction on the lives of foreigners in France was more successfully overcome by government initiative. Many foreigners came from countries where the established religion was not Catholicism, but Protestantism and, in rarer cases, Orthodox Christianity or Islam. Since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, the French government had the problem of maintaining religious orthodoxy among its subjects, while also trying to entice often Protestant foreigners, with all their expertise and wealth, to the kingdom. As early as 1686, Louis XIV was passing edicts in an attempt to encourage foreign Protestants to remain or move to France.[32] Religious toleration was offered to foreigners, but precautions were taken to ensure that French subjects were not exposed to the 'errors' of other faiths.

Thanks to the concessions won between 1715 and 1729 by their ambassador Hop, Dutch Protestants in Paris were assured of decent burial and freedom of worship, but only in the embassy chapel. Royal soldiers were posted outside the chapel doors with orders to arrest French subjects to prevent them from submitting to 'les erreurs du calvinisme chez le sieur Hop'.[33] Foreign Protestants of all nationalities were guaranteed a Christian burial when in 1713 Louis XIV gave permission to foreign Protestants to bury their dead in France and declared that a site would be designated in Paris for this purpose. This did not actually occur until the Regency. A persistent petitioning campaign by Protestant foreigners in Paris, who had been reduced to burying their dead in private gardens or in the semi-rural area behind the Invalides, brought the *Conseil d'état* to provide a burial

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[31]MAE, ADP, France, 1, dossier 1 ('Tableau pour le code diplomatique des Aubains'); Isambert, xxv, 200 - 201; xxviii, 483.
[32]MAE, ADP, France, 7, dossier 155 (*Arrêt* of the *Conseil d'état*, 1720).
[33]Quoted in Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, ii, 325 - 326.

ground in 1720. The edict was hedged in by precautions which would ensure that no French subjects would be encouraged to dissent from the established Catholic faith: article six of the *arrêt* stressed that Protestant burials could not serve as a pretext for foreigners to practise their faith publicly. To ensure that none of the Protestant contagion spilled over onto the streets of Paris and infected the king's subjects, burials were to be performed without ceremony and within the hours designated by the *lieutenant-général de police*. No French subjects were allowed to attend. Furthermore, the edict insisted that the cemetery be enclosed behind a high wall and guarded by a *concierge* appointed by the king. This last condition was probably intended as a prophylactic to protect French people from Protestantism, but when the site was opened near the Porte Saint-Martin, it was not enclosed. The first corpse to be buried in the new site, that of the Saxon minister plenipotentiary, was exhumed at night by a mob and horribly mutilated. It was in response to this, rather than a fear of Protestantism, that the government built the wall and provided the guard.[34]

The practice of burying foreign Protestants in separate burial sites persisted into the 1780s. Dr. Edward Rigby, visiting Vienne on 27 July 1789, described 'a singular place, something like an apartment in a rock', where Rigby and his companions saw a monument to a young Englishman who had died about a year earlier and been 'buried in unholy and ignoble ground', so 'leave had been obtained to appropriate this place to the interment of strangers, and of those who had professed a foreign religion ... '.[35] Otherwise, the alternative for foreigners was to transport the body out of the kingdom and to do so required the special permission of the king, particularly if the relatives of the deceased were to avoid the indignity of having to pay customs, excise or other *droits* in the process.[36] Besides restrictions on worship and burial, non-Catholic foreigners also faced other civil disabilities which sometimes threatened progress in their careers. A colleague of the German engraver Johann Georg Wille, named Schmidt, could not be accepted into

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[34]MAE, ADP, France, 7, dossier 155 (*Arrêt* of the *Conseil d'état*, 1720; 'Copie d'un Mémoire de M. Baër sur le Cimétière des Protestans à Paris' (July 1784)).
[35]Rigby, *Letters from France*, 121 - 122.
[36]See, for example the permits granted to the families of an unnamed Englishman (1769), Lady Mountgarrett, Jean Hart and Thomas Nash (all three in 1778). The bodies of the last two were deposited in the foreign cemetary in Paris while their relatives awaited royal permission to repatriate them (MAE, ADP, France, 7, dossier 149).

the *Académie royale de peinture* because of his Protestantism until Louis XV gave him special dispensation in 1742.[37]

Schmidt's experience is revealing. The monarchy, for all its apparent Catholic orthodoxy, was willing to waive religious conditions imposed on French and foreign subjects alike if it thought the potential of the individuals concerned was worth such a concession. Furthermore, the French monarchy was not entirely dogmatic in its Catholicism when it came to converts from Geneva. This city was the only state with which the French monarchy had an agreement for the repatriation of children who fled one or the other state in order to change faith. Calvinist children from Geneva under the age of seventeen who fled to France in order to convert to Catholicism could be returned to their families if they appealed to the French government. The families of French Catholics of the same age who slipped across the border to the city-state in order to become Calvinists had the same right.[38]

By the 1780s the growing religious tolerance in the French government loosened some of the restrictions on foreigners' worship. At first, treaties with specific countries in the decade preceding the Revolution permitted foreigners to practise their faith freely, as in the commercial treaty between France and Britain in 1786 and the treaty of navigation and commerce between France and Russia in 1787.[39] This freedom to worship was however restricted to private observance, a condition probably dictated as much by a concern for public order as by a desire to preserve the Catholic orthodoxy of the French people. In November 1787, civil rights were granted to all Protestants in the kingdom, so by 1789 the question of religious tolerance was no longer an issue for most non-Catholic foreigners in France.

If advances had been made in the conditions of foreigners as regards their inheritance rights and religious toleration, other restrictions remained firmly in place. The *cautio judicatum solvi*, for example, was a deposit which a foreign plaintiff had to pay when taking court action against a French defendant. The purpose of this deposit was to ensure that the foreigner could pay the legal costs and penalties should his case fail. French jurists claimed that without such a deposit a foreigner might be able to sue whomsoever

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[37]Wille, J.-G., *Mémoires et journal de Jean-Georges Wille, Graveur du Roi* (3 vols.) (Paris: 1857), i, 82.
[38]MAE, ADP, France, 14, dossier 305 ('Copie de la lettre de M. le C^{te} de Vergennes à M. le C^{al} de la Rochefoucault', 17 September 1779).
[39]Isambert, xxviii, 291 - 292, 317.

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he pleased with impunity as he could easily flee across the frontier to his native land. The *cautio judicatum solvi*, payable in both the first instance and on appeal, did not apply either to foreigners who had sufficient real estate in France (but not movable goods, as they could be spirited out of the kingdom), or to commercial cases. The plaintiff could alternatively present a third party willing to pay any expenses and fines should they have arisen. The deposit was not demanded of foreign defendants, on the grounds that self-defence was natural to all human beings.[40]

Perhaps even more onerous was the *contrainte par corps* for civil (as opposed to commercial) debts. Imprisonment for debt was abolished for French subjects by the ordonnance of 1667, but was maintained for foreigners to prevent them from fleeing the kingdom in order to avoid honouring their payments. Foreign debtors were in fact caught between a rock and a hard place, as they were also denied the right to obtain from the chancellery the *lettres de répi* (from the word 'répit') which granted French debtors who had suffered considerable losses a delay in which to raise sufficient funds to pay off his creditors, who could take no action against him until that delay had expired. Foreigners were also denied what was known as 'le refuge des misérables', the *cession de biens* whereby a debtor unable to make financial payments could hand over his property as payment in kind.[41] These draconian rules were probably based on the assumption that foreigners would rather flee than settle their debts. Had foreigners been allowed to apply for *lettres de répi* or to enact a *cession de biens*, there might not have been any need to imprison them for debt in the first place. As the law stood until the Revolution however, foreigners unable to meet their debts went to prison until they, or someone willing to help them out, came up with the necessary funds to placate their creditors. And foreign debtors were indeed imprisoned. Dr. Rigby witnessed on 13 July 1789 the release from La Force of one such unfortunate, the Irish nobleman Lord Massareene, who was rumoured to have been held in prison for twenty-three years for debts of between fifteen to twenty thousand *livres*. It does seem that if Massareene's time in prison was exaggerated by rumour, it was not by very much.[42] Occasionally the crown could grant letters of safe-conduct, which allowed foreign debtors to collect their property and sort out their affairs without being arrested. These guarantees seem to have been given to

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[40]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 34.
[41]Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 142, 272.
[42]Rigby, *Letters from France*, 52; Alger, J. G., *Englishmen in the French Revolution* (London, 1889), 3 - 8. Alger suggests that Massareene was held for at least nineteen years. He had certainly been in La Force since 1780.

those foreigners whose arrest might cause diplomatic embarrassment, such as the count Gyldenstein, chamberlain to the king of Denmark, in 1720.[43]

Beyond the financial and legal disabilities, foreigners were, in theory, also denied any important role in government, church and judiciary. It was considered dangerous (and of course contrary to the *droit civil*) to give foreigners any authority which they could use against the interests of the kingdom. Ordonnances dating to the sixteenth century barred foreigners from holding ecclesiastical positions,[44] but by the eighteenth century these laws were being ignored or circumvented. In the machinery of state, foreigners were not allowed to become tax farmers. A declaration of 1651 by the *parlement* of Paris banned all foreigners 'même naturalisés' from the *conseil du roi*. While this measure was aimed at Cardinal Mazarin, Necker fell foul of it, resigning in 1781 ostensibly because he was refused a place in the *Conseil d'état*. None the less, both he and John Law still played leading roles in the administration of the royal finances.[45] Foreigners were barred from the judiciary and were not allowed to become *avocats*. In certain commercial spheres, too, the role of foreigners was hedged in by extra regulations. A foreigner could not, for example, run a banking business in France without paying a deposit of 150,000 *livres* every five years.[46]

On top of these legal restrictions, foreigners were also subject to police surveillance, especially in Paris and fortress towns, even if it was discreet and haphazardly executed. On entering Paris, foreigners had their names recorded by the *maîtres des portes* and the owners of *hôtels* and *chambres garnis* were required to keep a register of their guests for the inspection of the police, who would send a report every three days to the ministry of foreign affairs. There, officials would compare the registers of the *maîtres des portes* with those of the *hôtels* and *chambres garnis* to get an idea as to the number and types of foreigners in the city. In Paris, however, these procedures were rarely adhered to strictly. A memorandum in the foreign ministry complained in August 1782 that the records kept by hoteliers 'sont informes, incorrects et prèsqu'indéchifrables'. As not all foreigners entered the city by the royal postal carriages, not all arrivals were easily verified by the

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[43]MAE, ADP, France, 14, dossier 310 ('Saufconduits et sauvegardes, 1714 - 1830').
[44]Villers, 'La Condition des Étrangers en France', 144; Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 51, 52.
[45]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 49; Isambert, xvii, 243; Doyle, W., *Origins of the French Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 58.
[46]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 51, 52.

authorities. Furthermore, there was no means by which the police or the government could know of foreigners who were staying in the private homes of friends or associates.[47]

For this reason, it was suggested that foreign visitors in Paris be subjected to the same system as existed in fortress towns. At every entrance to those towns there were *consignes* where the names of every foreigner arriving by whatever mode of transport were recorded, as well as the address at which they planned to stay. These registers were forwarded to the military commandant and the magistrates. Meanwhile, all inhabitants were obliged to give written details of the foreigners who were staying with them within twenty-four hours, or be liable to a fine. These details were deposited in a locked box at the *hôtel de ville* and were then compared with the registers submitted by the *consignes*. The foreign ministry suggested that while the immensity of the city of Paris made the establishment of *consignes* at every entrance impractical, a box similar to those in fortress towns could be placed in every *quartier*. Every person, without exception, should be obliged to supply details of foreign guests, for the perusal of the *lieutenant-général de police*.[48] Nothing seems to have come of this proposal, but the fact that it was made suggests that certain sections of the government were concerned with keeping a watchful eye over foreigners in the kingdom's largest city. From 1787, at the latest, daily reports arrived at the ministry of foreign affairs giving the names, nationality and lodgings of certain foreigners who had arrived in Paris and details of their intentions and travel plans.[49]

In wartime, such information could be used by the government to great effect. In theory, the subjects of a foreign sovereign could be expelled, arrested as hostages, or have their wealth seized. In practice, the measures taken varied greatly from conflict to conflict and between the nationalities involved. While the French government recognised that there were limits placed by the *droit des gens* as to what actions could be taken against enemy subjects, these limits were never defined with any precision. In 1733, a foreign ministry memorandum took the Treaty of Westphalia as its starting point to advise the government that 'il n'y a point de regle certaine qui designe precisement toutes les *chose permises*, ou non *permises dans la guerre*', but that the *droit des gens* allowed sovereigns to do 'tout ce qui peut contraindre cet ennemy à ceder sur ce qui fait le sujet de la guerre', but that such measures should not be done 'par pur *esprit de vengeance*', which would not

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[47]MAE, ADP, France, 14, dossier 302 ('Rapports avec la Police générale relativement aux Étrangers en France, 1782 - 1826').
[48]MAE, ADP, France, 14, dossier 302 ('Rapports avec la Police générale relativement aux Étrangers en France, 1782 - 1826').
[49]See, for example, the reports made in 1787 (MAE, ADP, France, 8, dossier 203).

bring peace any closer and which would encourage the opposition to exert its *droit de représailles*. This last right was generally believed to belong to any sovereign who, in response to the unfair treatment of his subjects in a foreign country, could exact the same penalties on the subjects of that country who were on his territory. The memorandum concluded that the government could seize all merchandise and vessels which could be used against the French in wartime, as well as arrest all naval and army officers '*par forme de precaution*, en vertu du droit des gens'. On the other hand, merchants and everyday goods were protected to a greater extent by the *droit des gens*, because they worked towards 'l'avantage *commun des nations*'. The government could only take measures which prevented enemy agents and spies from using commerce as a cover for their operations. As a precaution, therefore, merchants should be given between three to nine months to leave the country, but their non-military goods could not be confiscated because they might be trading on behalf of neutral or friendly nations. All these precautions were subject to the principle of reciprocity, which was also provided by the *droit des gens*: the French could go further in their measures only in reprisal for any harsher treatment of French subjects abroad.[50]

The restraints put on government action against enemy subjects in France looked good on paper, but the problem in practice was defining precisely the terms. Almost any form of merchandise or any vessel could be deemed to be useful to the enemy's war effort. Consequently, in the reign of Louis XIV the Dutch, except for those in Bordeaux, found themselves expelled in 1672, while in 1688 all their ships and property in France were confiscated along with those of Spanish subjects. Meanwhile, Austrian notables in Paris were seized as hostages or expelled from the kingdom.[51] In the eighteenth century, despite the number of wars the age witnessed, such 'precautions' taken as a general measure were rare, possibly because they were considered counter-productive in that they disrupted commerce. British subjects were expelled at the outbreak of the Seven Years War, but at the same time, foreigners, and especially the British, were offered an absolute guarantee that their state *rentes* would not be touched, a concession dictated by financial considerations. At France's intervention in the American War of Independence, the government stressed its right to exact reprisals on British subjects, but not to take any

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[50]MAE, Mémoires et documents, Allemagne, 94, document 37.
[51]Isambert, xix, 12; xx, 66, 70, 76 - 77; Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 137.

pre-emptive measures.[52] In practice, however, the French did seize British shipping as a precautionary measure. Such seizures could include the hapless passengers and crew, as the Dutch merchants Paul van de Serre and Girard Meyners found to their outrage in 1779. Their British-built ship, owned in partnership with the British captain was seized in the Mediterranean by a French frigate, even though it was flagged as a Dutch ship.[53]

While in France, foreigners did have some protection in the form of consuls. These foreign officials were sometimes chosen by their government from among merchants or landowners already in France, or they were direct appointees sent to France to act specifically in a consular role. They were expected to look after the interests of their countrymen in France, particularly in commerce, but also to provide assistance when they were legally challenged in civil and criminal cases.[54] The eighteenth century saw a growth of consulates in France, both in number and in the importance assigned to their role. In 1716, there was no list of consuls in the *Almanach Royal*. In 1774, fourteen different countries were listed as having between them sixty-two consuls and vice-consuls scattered around the different cities and ports of France, some of them very small. By 1789, the list had expanded to include twenty-two countries, with no less than 219 consuls and vice-consuls across the kingdom.[55]

Unless he was Maurice de Saxe or Jacques Necker, the only sure way for a foreigner to escape all the legal and civil disabilities was to become a French subject by applying for *lettres de naturalité*. In the hands of the crown naturalisation could be used as an instrument with which to attract foreigners to France. The king granted *lettres de naturalité générales* to specific types of foreign artisans in certain manufactures or projects, or to soldiers who fulfilled certain conditions, particularly in the seventeenth-century. The assumption was that these foreigners had shown, or were going to show, enough proof of loyalty to the king through the exercise of their skills or profession, so

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[52]Isambert, xxv, 331, 353; Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 137; Marion, M., *Dictionnaire des Institutions de la France aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Repr. of 1923 ed.) (Paris: Éditions A. & J. Picard, 1984), 225.

[53]AN, T\\507 - 508 ('Requête et pièces pour les S^rs. Van de Serre et Meÿners, négocians de la ville de Middelbourg en zelande, propriétaires de navire le Jean et Guillaume; Conseil Royal des finances', 19 - 21 August 1779; 'Extrait des Registres du Conseil d'Etat', n.d.).

[54]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 87 - 88.

[55]*Almanach Royal* (1716); (1774), 438 - 441; (1789), 182 - 190.

that the usual procedures for individual naturalisation could be waived. The ultimate aim of these general letters, of course, was to enhance French wealth and power.[56]

The key to individual *lettres de naturalité* - and thereby to French nationality - was an expression of loyalty by a foreigner to his or her new sovereign. Such loyalty was usually, but not always, demonstrated in two ways: by conversion to Catholicism and by permanent residence in France. The king of France swore at his coronation to stamp out heresy and so in theory he could not accept among his subjects people of any religion except Catholicism. Lefèvre de la Planche wrote that 'tout homme en France est présumé Catholique',[57] but in practice being French did not necessarily mean being Catholic, as the existence of Jews and Protestants subjects on French soil attested. Perhaps in recognition of the near impossibility to impose orthodoxy, both Louis XV and Louis XVI tended to waive the demands for conversion by a naturalised foreigner by according a *dispense de catholicité*. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the crown was entirely indifferent to religion as a basis of nationality. *Dispenses de catholicité* tended to be granted only to other Christians. In those rare cases where foreign Jews and Muslims applied for *lettres de naturalité*, they declared their conversion to the Catholic faith. Furthermore, if some Protestants escaped the need to convert, others did not.[58] The engraver Johann Georg Wille, a Protestant born in Königsberg, converted to Protestantism before his naturalisation in 1758: his journal records that his eldest son had his first communion in the parish of Saint-André-des-Arts in Paris, where he had been born in 1748.[59] Jean Lampe, of Danzig, declared on his naturalisation in 1779 that he rejected 'les erreurs du calvinisme qu'il avoit eu le malheur de sucer avec le lait'.[60]

The second proof of loyalty, residence in France, was not a condition prior to naturalisation, but a foreigner, once naturalised, was legally bound to stay in the kingdom for the rest of his life. Although a voyage abroad 'avec l'esprit de retour' did not endanger his naturalisation, a prolonged absence did. The king could waive the condition of residence, however, by granting a *dispense d'incolat* in the letters. Those who received this privilege were usually those who had rendered great services, which were deemed to

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[56]Folain-Le Bras, M., 'Un projet d'ordonnance du chancelier Daguesseau', 51; Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 99; Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 88, 90, 96.

[57]Quoted in Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime', 78.

[58]Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime', 80 - 82.

[59]Wille, *Mémoires et journal*, i, 163, 175; Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, ii, 132.

[60]Quoted in Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime', 81.

be enough of a sign of loyalty to the king without the obligation to live in France. Other dispensations were granted to members of great noble families, probably in recognition of their duties in their country of origin.[61]

The importance of *lettres de naturalité* was that they symbolised the adoption by the king of his new subject. They were a sign of the personal ties of loyalty which bound the subject to the monarch. For a foreigner the registration of the *lettres de naturalité* confirmed both 'l'abdication de son ancienne patrie' and 'la vraye acceptation et l'accomplissement de la grâce du Roy'.[62] Naturalisation was therefore symbolic of the two-way process of loyalty and obedience on the part of the subject and of protection on the part of the king. It was the acceptance of these mutual obligations which determined the new nationality of a foreigner. For people born as French subjects, it was assumed that these obligations were already implicit. It was these personal ties between ruler and subject which defined nationality. All the diverse corporate, municipal and provincial identities in France were bound together as a kingdom through their loyalty to the king and not, theoretically, by the multitude of horizontal threads which interwove the everyday lives of French subjects.

The general treatment of foreigners in France varied according to their specific nationality, their religion and specific exceptions granted by the king. Under the Ancien Régime, however, where social status was determined largely by privilege, the main determinant of the conditions in which foreigners lived was their occupation and, if any, the corporate body within which they practiced their profession. Foreigners participated in almost every major aspect of French society, including the army, the clergy, intellectual and artistic life and the economy. There were also political refugees and those who were considered less desirable, the migrant poor.

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[61]Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime', 72 - 77.
[62]Dupuy, P., *Traitez touchant les droits du Roy très chrestien sur plusieurs estats et seigneuries possédées par divers princes voisins et pour prouver qu'il tient à juste titre plusieurs provinces contestées par les princes estrangers* (Paris: 1655), quoted in Boizet, 'Les Lettres de naturalité sous l'Ancien régime', 19.

> Conservez les régimens étrangers, ceux que j'ai ici sont de toute bonté forts et complets; [*their recruitment*] ôtent des troupes aux ennemis; nous ménagent des sujets et servent pour les sujets du royaume de quoi un homme vous sert pour trois.[63]

It might not be surprising that the person who wrote this favourable opinion of foreign soldiers in the service of the French monarchy was Maurice de Saxe, a foreign soldier himself, but he was merely citing what was conventional wisdom for most governments in early modern Europe.[64] In time of war, one of the quickest and easiest ways of expanding the armed forces was to raise mercenaries who were already trained and experienced in warfare and who were loyal so long as they were paid. None the less, some, such as the Irish regiments, were not mercenaries. The regiments in the Irish Brigade had been in French service since the Williamite war which finished with the evacuation of 20,000 Irish troops by Louis XIV in 1691. Since then, Irish recruits faced dire penalties imposed by the Irish Parliament if they were caught trying to enlist in these units.[65] The Swiss had a long tradition of service in the French army, dating back to the Treaty of Perpetual Peace between the French monarchy and the Swiss Confederation in 1516.

By 1789, there were thirty-two foreign regiments in the French army, out of a total of 172, twenty-four of which were infantry (12 Swiss, 8 German, 3 Irish and one Liégeois) and eight of which were cavalry (one German, one Irish and 6 Hussar, which were theoretically Hungarian). In addition, a seventh of the troops in the twelve light infantry battalions in the French army were foreigners, mostly from the Italian states and concentrated in the battalions of the Chasseurs Royaux-Corses and the Chasseurs Corses.[66] Many of these regiments were founded generations before the Revolution, but

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[63]Letter of de Saxe to d'Argenson, 15 May 1748, quoted in Haas, R., *Un Régiment Suisse au Service de France. Bettens 1672 - 1792* (Pont l'Abbé: 1967), 33.
[64]Anderson, M. S., *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618 - 1789* (London: Fontana, 1988), 51.
[65]MAE, ADP, France, 10, dossier 233 ('Mémoire' of May 1756); Simms, J. G., 'The Irish on the Continent, 1691 - 1800', Moody, T. W., & Vaughan, W. E. (eds.), *A New History of Ireland*, iv, *Eighteenth-Century Ireland 1691 - 1800* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 633.
[66]Scott, S. F., *The Response of the Royal Army to the Revolution. The Role and Development of the Line Army, 1787-93* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 5 - 6, 12 - 13, 115 - 116, 217 - 224; Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères*, i, 393 - 420.

as their members became increasingly assimilated into French society, the genuinely 'foreign' element in them dwindled.[67] Of all the foreign units in France, the Swiss remained the most exclusively foreign, but even they were only three-quarters Swiss: the rest were men of other foreign nationalities and two to three hundred were French.[68]

The varied composition of foreign regiments in the service of France makes a figure for the total number of foreign troops in 1789 hard to calculate. Moreover, a third of all foreigners in the infantry were scattered among French units rather than in those designated for foreigners. One estimate places the figure at less than 8% of all the French infantry outside the Swiss regiments, one-seventh in the light infantry and 6% in the cavalry.[69] If this figure were accepted, then taking the total number of troops in the Royal Army as 156,000 in 1789, of which approximately 13,770 were Swiss,[70] a reasonable estimate of the number or foreign troops in the Royal Army might be around 24,000, or just over 15% of the army, a figure which confirms the more conservative contemporary estimates.[71]

The value which the French monarchy placed on these foreign troops is reflected in the high rates of pay, the fostering of an *esprit de corps* and the privileges granted to certain

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[67]See, for example, the *Compagnie Écossaise* in the royal bodyguard in AN, KK\\537 ('Etat de la Compagnie Ecossoise des Gardes du Corps du Roi. Année 1765'). This document actually has entries dating from 1693 to 1785. Between January 1713 and June 1785, for example, the *Compagnie Ecossaise des Gardes du Corps du Roi* recruited about 1,230 men. Only three were natives of Scotland, while a fourth had a Scottish name, but was born in France. Two were German. While in the Irish regiments the officer corps remained predominantly Irish (90%), at least in name and in heritage, the rank and file were drawn increasingly from other sources: 10% or 12% were probably of Irish or British origin while a similar proportion were French origin. Of the rest, half were from the Austrian Netherlands, Liège and the United Provinces, between a fifth and a quarter came from Germany and the remainder included men from Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Russia and even the nascent United States (Scott, S. F., 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', Gough, H., & Dickson, D., (eds.), *Ireland and the French Revolution* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1990), 15-16). This state of affairs is reflected in the casualty list of the Dillon regiment at the siege of Savannah in 1779 (Murphy, W.S., 'The Irish Brigade of France at the Siege of Savannah, 1779', *The Irish Sword. The Journal of the Military History Society of Ireland*, ii (1954-1956), 100).

[68]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 13.

[69]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 12 - 13.

[70]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 5 - 6; Maradan, E., 'L'Échec de la Propagande du Club Helvetique auprès du Régiment des Gardes 1789 - 1791', Vovelle, M. (ed.), *Paris et la Révolution* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 254.

[71]On 12 December 1789, La Tour-du-Pin, the minister of war, cited precisely this number (AP, x, 519).

foreign units. Foreign troops were paid more than their French counterparts,[72] both because of the desire to attract quality foreign troops into the royal army and because to reduce this pay would lead to an exodus of disgruntled troops, which actually happened in the Irish regiments in 1697. An *esprit de corps* was encouraged by the retention of the 'national' character of each foreign regiment. Each had its own distinctive uniforms and carried special emblems on parade and in battle. The Swiss units wore red coats, as distinct from the Bourbon white, while the banners of the Irish regiments bore the harp. It is said that in 1789, when as little as 10% - 12% of the Irish Brigade were actually from the British Isles, the officers of the Irish regiments still gave orders in Gaelic. In the Hussars, where only 6% of the soldiers were actually foreign in 1789, French recruits were still taught to curse in Hungarian.[73]

The privileges granted foreign troops by the monarchy gave them a status superior to that normally attained by soldiers and none were more privileged than the Swiss. The *capitulations* negotiated between the French king and the Swiss cantons laid out the terms and conditions of service and they guaranteed a wide range of special rights for Swiss troops. They were granted fiscal immunities which included an exemption from the *droit d'aubaine* and taxes such as the *taille*. They were allowed to live on any property which they acquired in France 'comme des Commensaux ou des Nobles', which meant that they only paid the same taxation on land as the French nobility did.[74] The Swiss also had judicial privileges: litigation between Swiss soldiers and French subjects was to be judged in the 'lieux et juridictions des défendeurs'. The jurisdiction for Swiss troops was defined as their regiment, their judges were their officers and so, if they were prosecuted by a French subject, the case was heard by a council drawn from among their own officers.[75] Although there was some dispute as to whether or not this privilege included both civil and criminal cases, soldiers of the élite company of the *Cent-Suisses*, the king's personal

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[72]See, for example, the figures for 1741-1748 in Poussou, J.-P., 'Un monde plein', Lequin, Y. (ed.), *Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France* (Paris: Larousse, 1992), 202, and the figures for 1789 in AP, ix, 261-262.

[73]Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères*, i, 279; Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army*, 13.

[74]Haas, *Un Régiment Suisse*, 4.

[75]Chagniot, J., *Paris et l'armée au XVIIIe siècle. Etude politique et sociale* (Paris: Economica, 1985), 366.

bodyguard, were tried before their own officers in cases when they were accused of crimes against French civilians.[76]

The Swiss were furthermore granted religious toleration, a crucial point if the French wished to recruit from the Protestant cantons. In practice Protestants in the Swiss regiments in France found that to obtain further favours, such as admission to the Invalides on their retirement, a timely conversion to Catholicism was practical if not compulsory. This was particularly true in the earlier part of the eighteenth century: in the 1720s, Swiss Protestants in the Invalides were told that they could enter and remain only if they converted to Catholicism. Between August 1725 and October 1726 nine Protestant former soldiers from the Swiss regiments renounced their faith one or two months after admission.[77] In 1760, however, Choiseul proposed to establish separate companies of Protestant pensioners in the Invalides, probably to conform more closely to the *capitulations*.

If the government was willing to pay the price of maintaining foreign regiments in the French army, the population at large was less so. The privileged position of the foreign regiments, while justifiable in the eyes of the state, was a source of grievance for French people. Particularly galling was the knowledge that foreign troops were paid more than their compatriots for the same service to the King. In 1789, the *cahier de doléance* of the parish of Neuilly-sur-Marne complained that 'il est honteux et humiliant pour la nation, qu'elles soient payées plus cher que les nationales', an opinion shared by the third estate of Toulon, the clergy of Melun and Moret and the nobility of Touraine.[78] Another economic argument was voiced in the *cahier* of the clergy of Melun and Moret, who claimed that the use of foreign troops by the king deprived 'un grand nombre de familles, dans tous les états, des ressources que le service du Roi leur procurerait'.[79] Among some people, there was even the suspicion that foreign troops were actually being paid more money for less return: the parish of Neuilly-sur-Marne, while admitting the loyalty of the foreign regiments, pointed out that some of their conditions of service prevented them from being as useful to France as they might be, 'puisque leurs diverses capitulations ne permettent pas de les envoyer ni en Amerique ni aux Indes orientales, comme on y transport des

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[76]AN, Z\1R\7 (*Cent-Suisses*, criminal cases). See especially the 'Dossier du greffe de la compagnie, François Conus: Plainte et Informations' (1734) and the 'Plainte du procureur du Roy à l'occasion de l'assassinat de Kerner, soldat' (5 June 1764).
[77]Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée*, 367.
[78]AP, iii, 735; iv, 766; v, 790; vi, 43.
[79]AP, iii, 735.

troupes nationales.[180] This claim, while not true for the Irish regiments, which served in the American War of Independence, was certainly correct for the Swiss regiments, whose *capitulations* stipulated that they should not be shipped for service overseas.

There is plenty of evidence that foreign troops assimilated into French society to a great extent, or at least fraternised with locals. Foreign soldiers garrisoned in the provinces often found temporary work, while those in Paris and Versailles, particularly the *Gardes-Suisses*, whose *capitulations* stipulated that they always be close to the king, had opportunities of finding long-term employment, the only interruptions being during campaigns. Many of the *soldats-cultivateurs* who owned plots of land around Paris were Swiss. Others worked as sharecroppers, as field-hands or as guards of granaries. Retirement from foreign regiments often led to assimilation into French civilian society, although former soldiers tended to take up jobs traditionally associated with them. Swiss soldiers on leaving the army were known for establishing cabarets and for working as *suisses de porte*, or gatekeepers in the *hôtels* of the wealthy, as well as church guards.[81] Marriages between foreign soldiers and French women were frequent, especially as marriage could mean an escape from the confinements of military life, even if such marriages did cause problems with the local men. The young men of Argenteuil and Saint-Denis, both towns in which Swiss Guards were quartered, once demanded that the Swiss be sent elsewhere because they left them with no possibility of marriage.[82] In their leisure hours, foreign soldiers frequented bars and cabarets, sometimes in defiance of restrictions placed on them by barracking.[83]

On the other hand, these points of contact with the French population became rarer in the last decades of the *Ancien Régime*, mainly as a result of the army reforms initiated by the duc de Choiseul between 1763 and 1765. As minister of war (merely one of his numerous portfolios), he hoped to shape the French army into a more professional arm of the state by stressing the humanity of the common soldier who was deemed to perform a service 'précieux à l'Etat'. In return, however, soldiers were expected to adopt a more 'professional' attitude by applying themselves exclusively to military tasks, which in turn

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[80]AP, iv, 766.

[81]Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée*, 367; Godechot, J., *La Grande Nation. L'expansion révolutionnaire de la France dans le monde de 1789 à 1799* (2nd ed.) (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1983), 92.

[82]Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée*, 420 - 421, 438; Haas, *Un Régiment Suisse*, 5.

[83]Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée* ... , 420.

meant increasing segregation from civilians, more barracking, less billetting, less work outside military duties and more inaction in soldiers' free time.

While some of these developments may have had some salutary effect on relations between foreign troops and French civilians, by reducing certain sources of tension such as billetting, they also accentuated the isolation of foreign soldiers in France. Of course, all soldiers, whether French or foreign, were increasingly isolated from the population at large and billetting, foraging and the hooliganism of some soldiers were common to French and foreign troops alike. Furthermore, the rift between soldier and civilian could become a gaping chasm when the former was employed by the authorities against rioters and protesters in times of civil unrest. For the foreign soldier, however, the isolation from civilian life was even greater, sometimes owing to linguistic barriers and the privileges extended to them. In 1789 twenty-nine general *cahiers de doléances* called for the 'nationalisation' of the army.[84] At least seven called for the disbandment of their regiments and three came from parishes where people were likely to have come into contact with Swiss Guards: in the Paris region.[85] It was there that, in July 1789, the suspicion that foreign troops were the passive instruments of the monarchy was confirmed.

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[84]See Appendix to Hyslop, B. F., *French Nationalism in 1789 according to the General Cahiers* (New York: Octagon, 1968).

[85]AP, iii, 569 (the Nobility of the *sénéchaussées* of Limoges and Saint-Yrieix - asked that the number of foreign troops be diminished), 735 (Clergy of the *bailliage* of Melun and Moret - asked that all foreign regiments, except the Swiss, be replaced by French units); iv, 338 (the parish and barony of Ballainvilliers, Paris hors-les-murs - asked that the foreign regiments be gradually phased out), 666 (the parish of Magny-Lessart, Paris hors-les-murs - demanded that all foreign regiments, without exception, be disbanded), 766 (the parish of Neuilly-sur-Marne, Paris hors-les-murs - demanded that all foreign regiments be disbanded); v, 541 (the *sénéchaussée* of Rennes - demanded that all foreign regiments be disbanded), 791 (Third Estate of the *sénéchaussée* of Toulon - demanded equal pay with French troops); vi, 43 (the Nobility of the *bailliages* of Touraine - asked that a restraint on the number of foreign troops be considered), 294 (the community of Gardanne - demanded that all foreign troops be disbanded), 370 (the town of Pertuis - asked that only those foreign units in French service by virtue of treaties be maintained).

III

Like foreign soldiers, the foreign Catholic clergy who practised in France were to become suspect during the Revolution. Most were in France as a result of the persecution of Catholics in Protestant countries since the Reformation, particularly in Britain and Ireland. By 1789, there were no less than eighteen monasteries and convents for Irish or British inmates. Of those, ten were English women's convents (four Benedictine,[86] four Poor Clares,[87] one Augustinian and one Immaculate Conception[88]) and eight were men's monasteries, (three English Benedictine,[89] two Irish Franciscan,[90] one English Franciscan[91] and two Irish Capucin[92]). There were also twelve educational establishments intended primarily as seminaries for those who aspired to the priesthood or to become missionaries to the British Isles. They included seven Irish,[93] two Scots[94] and three English colleges.[95] There were also foreigners who became secular clergymen, attending to the needs of laymen around France. In 1772, for example, there were 15 Irishmen who were parish clergy in the diocese of Bordeaux and by 1789 there were about 40 Irish priests in the dioceses of Bordeaux and Bazas, some of whom were in retirement, while others were teachers and 'birds of passage'.[96] This number seems exceptional, but there were a handful of foreign priests who served as private confessors, as tutors, or as chaplains attached to the army. Father Mather-Flint, for example, was not only the curate of Mesnil, but also the confessor to the duchesse d'Orléans.[97] The Irish College in Paris boasted that its

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[86]At Cambrai (founded in 1623), Paris (1633), Dunkirk (1662) and Pontoise (?).
[87]At Gravelines (1608), Dunkirk (1625), Aire (1629) and Rouen (1644).
[88]Both in Paris (1633 and 1658 respectively).
[89]At Dieulouard (1606), Douai (1619) and Paris (1642).
[90]At Boulay (1700) and Bordeaux (?).
[91]At Douai (1616).
[92]At Vassy (?) and Bar-sur-Aube (?).
[93]At Paris (1578), Douai (1594), Bordeaux (1603), Lille (1610), Rouen (1612), Toulouse (1659) and Nantes (1689).
[94]At Paris (originally in 1325, but merged with another endowment in 1639) and Douai (originally in Lorraine in 1576, but moved to Douai in 1592).
[95]At Douai (1568), Saint-Omer (1592) and Paris.
[96]Loupès, P., 'Les Ecclésiastiques Irlandais dans le Diocèse de Bordeaux sous l'Ancien Régime', Fédération Historique du Sud-Ouest, *Bordeaux et les Îles britanniques du XIIIe au XXe siècle. Actes du Colloque franco-britannique tenu à York du 25 au 28 septembre 1973* (Bordeaux: 1975), 88; Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy of the Diocese of Bordeaux during the Revolution', Gough, H., & Dickson, D., (eds.), *Ireland and the French Revolution* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1990), 28.
[97]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Mather-Flint to Placid Naylor, confessor of the English Benedictine nuns in Paris, 13 April 1789).

graduates often became 'des Aumoniers *et Interpretes* aux Armées françoises, comme MM. D'Orleans, de Guichon, de la Motte Piquet et Rochambeau peuvent l'attester'.[98]

These Catholic clergy were refugees, driven from the British Isles by the Reformation, the successive defeats of the Jacobites and by penal laws against Catholics.[99] In France, they sought to follow their vocation and to be trained as missionaries for the salvation of both Catholic souls and Protestant heretics in the British Isles. France, in particular, drew such Catholics for a number of reasons, besides the fact that it was a Catholic country. Firstly, the centre of the Jacobite cause was for a long time the palace at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. There, James II and VII's queen, Mary of Modena, made special efforts to persuade the Gallican clergy to help exiled Catholic ecclesiastics find positions and financial help from the church and the state. Saint-Germain therefore became a centre of patronage for Catholic clergy from the British Isles.

Secondly, France was close to the British Isles and was linked to them by trade routes served by Irish and British merchants resident in the major French ports. Such proximity had two advantages, both expressed in a 1769 petition from a group of English *Carmes déchaussés* seeking to set up a monastery in Boulogne:

> La proximité d'Angleterre Eviteroit les fraix qu'il faut faire pour Envoyer les postulants dans les pays lointains ... et ... la facilité d'une correspondance presque journalière mettront leurs professeurs en un état d'etre instruits des Erreurs dominantes et d'armer ces jeunes atheletes ... pour les Espece de Combat qu'ils auroient à soutenir.[100]

Many of the religious houses acted as seminaries and ran courses for the training of priests and missionaries. The English Franciscan monastery at Douai, for example, offered classes in theology and philosophy.[101] One of the main subjects of study in the Scots College in Paris was 'la langue Ecossoise, pour pouvoir exercer avec fruit les

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[98]AN, D/XIX/30 (Petition of 'Prêtres Irlandois rue des Carmes' to the *Comité Ecclesiastique*, n.d.).

[99]Details of anti-Catholic legislation in England after 1688 can be found in Watkin, E. I., *Roman Catholicism in England from the Reformation to 1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 104 - 110. For Ireland, see Wall, M. (ed. O'Brien, G.), *Catholic Ireland in the Eighteenth Century: Collected Essays of Maureen Wall* (Dublin: Geography Publications, 1989), 9 - 18.

[100]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Mémoire' of the 'Carmes déchaussés Anglais', n.d. [1769]).

[101]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Letter of Bonaventure Healy, 'Gardien des Récolets Anglois', Douaÿ, 27 February 1767).

fonctions de missionnaire en Ecosse'.[102] Crucially, none of the houses were meant to admit Frenchmen, because missionaries from the British Isles were 'les plus capables d'en bien posseder la langue, d'en connoitre les moeurs, le Caractere et les coutumes'.[103] To be a teacher or student in the Scots College of Paris, one had to be born in Scotland and be a Catholic.[104] At Dieulouard, the English Benedictines drew all their recruits from England.[105]

Such policies ensured that the foreign religious houses in France, unlike foreign regiments, actually retained a genuinely foreign character. If members of these establishments were in France because they were pushed there by persecution at home, the French authorities, both secular and ecclesiastic, had their own reasons to welcome and perpetuate their presence in France. There may have been a political motive, at least until the mid-eighteenth century: should the Jacobites have been successful in restoring the Stuarts, the Catholic clergy would have found themselves in some demand in the British Isles and might have played an important part in winning hearts and minds for the Stuarts and for French interests.

It was of course in his interests to show how useful the foreign clergy were to the French state, but Dom Augustus Moore did provide other motives for the support which both church and state in France provided. Speaking of the English Benedictine college and monastery at Douai, he claimed that 'elle a porté toutes ses vues a se rendre utile au public par ses Vœux, par ses prières les plus ardentes, ... par les Milliers de livres qu'elle a depensé dans cette ville, et les Etrangers qu'elle ÿ attire."[106]

The claim that the foreign clergy could be useful in their religious functions was supported by some of the calculations made by the French clergy. In 1769, the King's *Conseil de Conscience*, for example, accepted the argument of the English Carmelite friars that they would be able to fill the vacuum in pastoral care left by the closure of the Minimes' house in Boulogne. Both the officials of the *sénéchaussée* and the Bishop of Boulogne pointed out that the buildings were located in 'un des quartiers des plus peuplés

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[102]AN, H/3/2561/A (Letter of Gordon and Riddock: 'A Messieurs les Commissaires du Parlement', 31 December 1762).
[103]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Mémoire pour la Congrégation des Bénédictines Anglois', n.d. [1768?]).
[104]AN, H/3/2561/A ('Ecossois', report by Cochet, Hamelin and Guerin, 'anciens Recteurs de l'université de paris', to the *Commissaires* of the *Parlement* of Paris, n.d. [1763?]).
[105]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Mémoire pour la Congrégation des Bénédictines Anglois', n.d. [1768?]).
[106]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Letter of Moore, 1 November 1766).

de cette vile, ou il n'y a que deux autres Couvents d'hommes composés l'un et autre d'un nombre peu considerable des religieux'.[107]

Moreover, in showing *largesse* to the stricken Catholic martyrs of persecution and repression in Protestant countries, the monarchy was reinforcing its prestige as an institution founded on the Catholic faith and the foreign clergy were to reciprocate any favours granted to it by perpetuating this image. Many of the *lettres patentes* which allowed foreign clerics to set up houses stress the part they were to play in supporting the Most Christian King.[108] The monarchy's Catholic image needed some reinforcement after the expulsion of the Jesuits and because, between 1766 and 1784, the church itself closed down hundreds of small, uneconomic religious houses. So when the English Carmelites applied to take over the buildings of a suppressed Minimes monastery in Boulogne in 1769, the royal *Conseil de Conscience* saw a means of replying to 'l'accusation de tout détruire'.[109] On the other hand, the foreign clergy had been known to participate in movements which threatened the orthodoxy of the Gallican church. Thomas Innes, Prefect of Studies in the Scots College in the early eighteenth-century, modelled his teaching on practices of the Port-Royal and was accused of Jansenism after the Papal bull *Unigenitus*. In 1737, the acting papal *nuncio*, ordered by the *Propaganda Fide* in Rome to investigate, concluded that the Scots College was infested with the Jansenist heresy. The superiors of the College protested their orthodoxy and loyalty to the Pope.[110]

Moore's other argument is interesting because it reflects a common assumption about the economic benefits of foreigners: that they brought money into the kingdom. There is little doubt that certain religious establishments did provide local tradesmen with business. By the spring of 1790, the twenty English nuns of the Immaculate Conception in Paris owed 20,312 *livres*, mostly to various craftsmen and mainly for repairs to the convent buildings and the properties which they rented out.[111] Among the debts of the twenty-one English Augustinian nuns on the rue des Fossés-Saint Victor in Paris, 1539 *livres* was

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[107]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Rapport du 2 juillet 1769'; 'Du Registre servant a l'enregistrement des assemblées et deliberations de M.M. les officiers de la Sénéchaussée du Boulonnois', 30 April 1770; and 'Avis' of François Joseph, Bishop of Boulogne, 27 April 1770).
[108]See, for example, AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Lettres d'Etablissement des Benedictins Anglois, à Paris', 1650).
[109]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Rapport du 2 juillet 1769').
[110]McMillan, J. F., 'Jansenism and the Scots College books in Paris', *Innes Review*, xliv (1993), 74; McMillan, J. F., 'Jansenists and Anti-Jansenists in Eighteenth Century Scotland: the *Unigenitus* Quarrel on the Scottish Catholic Mission, 1732 - 1746', *Innes Review*, xxxix (1988), 14, 16.
[111]AN, S//4616 (Immaculée Conception rue de Charenton: inventory of 2 March 1790).

owed to Santerre, the brewer and future commander of the Paris National Guard, 'pour fourniture de Biere', in the summer of 1790.[112]

With the apparent advantages to be drawn from foreign religious establishments, the monarchy and church alike were willing to grant certain concessions which made the foreign clergy a particularly privileged group among foreigners in France. Such privileges included the granting of special - and conditional - *lettres de naturalité* enabling foreign clergy to hold benefices. Letters of naturalisation awarded to foreign churchmen by the King had the specific purpose of allowing them to assume benefices and to administer parishes as any French priest could. Sometimes, letters were granted to entire religious communities.[113] Care was taken, however, to ensure that the Gallican church was not adulterated by too many foreigners. Three conditions were usually attached to these *lettres de naturalité*. Firstly, the beneficiary was responsible for getting Papal consent that should his post fall vacant for whatever reason, the successor would be 'à la nomination du Roi'. Secondly, should any disputes arise over the benefice, the incumbent would not be permitted to appeal to Rome, but only to French courts. The third clause usually stated that the receiver of the letters 'ne prendra Vicaires ou Fermiers qui ne soient Français'.[114] This last condition was not always adhered to in practice,[115] although it is possible that those priests who appointed their countrymen as vicars or as successors had obtained the usual, secular *lettres de naturalité*, which did not carry the same conditions.

Both the Gallican church and the secular authorities also granted the foreign clergy special financial privileges and exemptions. In 1700, Louis XIV granted the English Benedictine monastery at Dieulouard the *droit de franc-salé*,[116] which brought exemption from the *salines*, the tax raised, like the *gabelle* in other parts of France, on salt in the north-eastern provinces. In 1634, the English Franciscans of Douai had been granted permission to beg in the town by the magistrates.[117] In 1663, Louis XIV gave the same

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[112]AN, S//4616 ('Municipalité de Paris, Procès Verbal: Religieuse Anglaise rue des fossées St. Victor', 23 June 1790).
[113]See, for example, AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Coppie des Lettres de Naturalité accordées aux Benedictins Anglois établis à Paris' [1674]).
[114]Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, ii, 152 - 153.
[115]See, for example, Loupès, 'Les Ecclésiastiques Irlandais dans le Diocèse de Bordeaux', 91 - 92.
[116]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) ('Chapitre: Etat de la Maison des Benedictins anglois etablis a Dieu Louard en Lorraine', n.d. [1766]).
[117]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Extract from the registers of the 'Recolets Anglois de la Ville de Douay en Flandres', February 1767).

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friars more latitude, allowing them to beg across all Artois.[118] The English Clarists at Aire were given permission to beg by Louis XIV 'à cause de la detresse ou elles se trouverent plongées' when, unexpectedly, charitable donations from English sympathisers began to dwindle.[119] Four years after their establishment in 1603, the Irish seminarists in Bordeaux were allowed by their founder, the archbishop François de Sourdis, to carry the dead at funerals in order to earn their keep. By 1774, however, this 'privilege' was no longer regarded as such. The superior, Martin Glynn, travelled around the British Isles to raise enough money by 1780 not only to reconstruct a crumbling wing of their premises, but also to free the Irish from what was now seen as the humiliation of having to bear corpses at burial.[120] Those studying for the priesthood or as missionaries at the Irish college at Lille were allowed to take collections at church doors and, like their counterparts in Bordeaux, were permitted to carry the dead at funerals. In 1711, the municipality of Lille made the latter a right exclusive to the Irish seminarians.[121]

The French church and state also provided some financial support to the foreign establishments. Such funding was limited, not least because the government made it very clear that the foreigners ought not to become charges of the state. An analysis of the fixed annual revenue of eleven of the English establishments in France shows that the church provided on average only 7% of their annual income, while the state accounted for 10%. The bulk of their revenue came from their property (50%) and their investments (33%) usually *rentes*. The vast majority, if not all, of the original funds for the property and investments came from their own sources. The same was true of the Scots College in Paris, of which Alexander Gordon, the principal, claimed in 1790 that annual accounts proved that the College funds came from the donations of British subjects.[122] In all foreign establishments, these funds included the orders' own movable wealth spirited across the Channel during its flight from persecution; donations from wealthy Catholic benefactors; the dowries of nuns and the endowments or pensions brought by novices.[123]

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[118]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (*lettres patentes* of 27 September 1663).
[119]AN, D/XIX/30 ('Memoire pour les Clairisses anglaises etablies à Aire', 15 October 1790).
[120]Loupès, 'Les Ecclésiastiques Irlandais dans le Diocèse de Bordeaux', 82.
[121]Giblin, C., 'The Irish Colleges on the Continent', Swords, L. (ed.), *The Irish-French Connection 1578 - 1978* (Paris: Irish College, 1978), 19.
[122]Black, J., 'The Archives of the Scots College Paris on the Eve of their Destruction', *Innes Review*, xliii (1992), 56.
[123]The English establishments whose revenue and property were analysed were: the men's Benedictine monasteries at Paris and Douai (described as a 'maison Conventuelle et Collège en même tems': it includes the English College of Douai) in 1766 (AN, G/9/66 (1-

Such money was invested in property and bonds, but not always with success. By 1766, for example, a combination of the disruption of financial ties with Britain in the Seven Years' War, disastrous investments, the high price of staples in France and the cost of repairs to its crumbling buildings forced the English College and monastery at Douai to contract debts of 18,000 *livres*.[124]

The Gallican church gave the foreign establishments financial support in three ways: it might provide them with lump sums of money for investment; it could make an engagement to pay an annual grant, in cash or kind, to individual establishments; and it could grant them property. Royal donations came in four different forms: the king could grant pensions to different establishments or individual clerics; the crown might also donate annual alms to various houses; the state could allow foreign clergy to share in government handouts to the church and finally, the government might subsidise the livelihood of the religious establishments by granting rebates on certain taxes and dues.

Contact between foreign clergy and local people varied from one order to the next, depending upon their rules and function. The strict cloistering of the English Clarists, for example, would not have encouraged frequent interaction,[125] but most of the foreign religious orders claimed to fill the role of preachers, teachers and dispensers of charity among local people. In their pastoral duties, the English Franciscans of Douai claimed to fulfill a catalogue of duties, including 'Visitant les Malades, assistant les Moribonds, entendant les Confessions, tant en Ville qu'a la Campagne ...'.[126] Some of the convents undertook to give French children a basic education not geared exclusively to the religious life. The English Clarist convent at Gravelines in France declared in December 1789 that they received as pupils 'indistinctement des Demoiselles angloises et françoises; elles

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3)); the women's Benedictine convents at Cambrai, Paris and Dunkirk in 1790 (AN, D/XIX/30; AN, S//4619); the convents of the Poor Claires at Gravelines, Dunkirk, Aire and Rouen in 1790 (AN, D/XIX/30); the convent of Augustinian nuns in Paris in 1790 (AN, D/XIX/30; AN, S//4616) and the convent of the Immaculate Conception of Paris in 1790 (AN, D/XIX/30; S//4616). This gives a sample of eleven houses (counting the Benedictine monastery and the English College at Douai as one) out of a total of twenty-nine establishments, including the colleges which were run by the foreign clergy. This sample is admittedly far from satisfactory, not least because it ranges in time from 1766 to 1790. These figures cannot, therefore, give an accurate picture of the financial state of the English establishments in France at any one time, but they may provide an *idea* as to from whom, and to what extent, they received financial assistance.

[124]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Letter of Moore, 1 November 1766).

[125]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (Letter of Frère Philippe André, *Provincial* of the 'Frères Mineurs Recolets de la Province d'Angleterre', Douai, 27 June 1767).

[126]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (letter of Bonaventure Healy, 'Gardien des Récolets Anglois' to the Commission of Regulars, 27 February 1767).

enseignent à ces dernieres la langle (*sic*) angloise qui fait actuellement partie de l'Education francoise', as well as giving them the usual religious education.[127]

Too much contact between the foreigners and locals could lead to a degree of assimilation which was regarded as unsuitable for people intended to return to the British Isles as missionaries. This problem was certainly faced by the Irish College in Paris. Those seminarians who arrived to train as missionaries while still young found that they lost the use of Irish Gaelic, while they became fluent in French. They were less inclined to return to Ireland, so that between 1694 and 1734, only twenty-five missionaries who were not actually secular priests went to serve in Ireland.[128]

There is no evidence that those of the foreign clergy who were cut off from French lay people, either through the language barrier or because of the rules of their order, were respected or resented any more than other ecclesiastics. There was occasional hostility between French laymen and foreign, as in Bordeaux in 1759, when a fight broke out between members of the Irish College and the local *confrèrie* of barrel-makers, over precedence when both organisations tried to bury one of their dead at the same church at the same time.[129] It is not clear, however, that the *tonneliers* were motivated either by anti-clericalism or xenophobia.

Nonetheless, it is certain that the presence of foreign clergy could provoke outbursts of xenophobia among local people, although such outbursts appear to have been rare. In July 1769 the petition of the English Carmelite friars to take over the Minimes monastery in Boulogne was opposed by some of the municipal officers of the town who had been persuaded that the English establishment would act as a Trojan horse for sinister foreign interests. It was claimed that the Carmelites were 'capables d'envahir sous le nom d'un commis le commerce des negocians de Boulogne, et d'y jouir meme le role d'espions du gouvernement d'Angleterre.'[130] British merchants would use the friars as their agents in the port and the friars in turn would be the eyes of the British cabinet. Such fantasies were however dismissed by the Commission of Regulars, who argued out that the monks were unlikely to assist either Protestant merchants or the British government. If anyone

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[127]D/XIX/30 ('Adresse a l'assemblée Nationale par les Religieuses clairisses angloises Etablies à Gravelines', 20 December 1789).
[128]Giblin, C., 'The Irish Colleges on the Continent', 15.
[129]Loupès, P., 'Les Ecclésiastiques Irlandais dans le Diocèse de Bordeaux', 94. Loupès, while admitting that such disputes were common in the Ancien Régime, claims that 'l'affrontement n'en est pas moins révélateur d'un climat latent de xénophobie'.
[130]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (*Memoire* of the Commission of Regulars, in favour of the English 'Carmes Déchaussés', n.d. [1769]).

should worry about the English Carmelites as spies, then it should be the British monarch, because the English friars would be more willing to act on behalf of Louis XV than George III.[131] The response of the Commission of Regulars served to underline the commitment of the Ancien Régime to tolerating the existence of foreign Catholic clergy in France, provided, of course, that they neither became a charge on the state, nor threatened the prerogatives of the king over the Gallican church.

IV

The students who studied at the English, Irish and Scots colleges in any one year were refugees in much the same way as their teachers, the British and Irish clergy. In general, the seminarians planned a religious life, particularly as priests and missionaries for service in the British Isles. Others, however, studied in the foreign colleges because their religious conscience (or that of their parents) barred them from higher education of any kind at home. As Joachim Ingram, of the English Franciscans in France in 1768, explained of the students at Douai, 'les jeunes Elèves ne peuvent aller continuer leurs Etudes en Angleterre ... parce qu'ils ne peuvent s'ÿ appliquer a l'Etude des hautes sciences que dans les Universitées protestantes'.[132] The Irish College in Paris may have been intended as a seminary, but those who entered the *communauté des Clercs et Écoliers* at the College engaged in a five-year course at the Collège de Plessis at the University of Paris and many of them went on to become doctors, surgeons or soldiers in the Irish regiments.[133] The Scots College in Paris, like the English College of Douai, had a dual purpose in educating young men: 'tant pour en faire des missionaires pour la propagation de la foy, dans le païs d'Ecosse, que, pour élever de Jeunes gens à la Science et à la vertu.'[134] By 1789, the College had virtually ceased to act as a seminary, with the last student to be ordained as a priest in 1788.[135] All such colleges were intended for men, however, so it was the English convents which took women as pupils: the convent of the

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[131]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (*Memoire* of the Commission of Regulars, in favour of the English 'Carmes Déchaussés', n.d. [1769]).
[132]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (petition of English Franciscans, signed by Joachim Ingram *Provincial des Recollets Anglois*, to Louis XV, n.d. [1768]).
[133]Swords, L., 'Collège des Lombards', Swords, *The Irish-French Connection*, 53 - 54.
[134]AN, H/3/2561/A (Letter of Gordon and Riddock, *A Messieurs les Commissaires du Parlement*, 31 December 1762).
[135]Moran, P. A., 'Grisy, the Scots College Farm near Paris', *Innes Review*, xliii, 61 & n..

Immaculate Conception on the rue de Charenton in the faubourg Saint-Antoine in Paris claimed in 1790 to have been 'une Maison d'education ou les familles Catholiques d'angleterre, d'Irlande et d'ecosse envoyent instruire leurs enfants ... '. In March, that convent had eight *pensionnaires en classes*.[136] That same year the Augustinian nuns of the rue des Fossés-Saint-Victor, also in Paris, claimed that they 'veillent à l'éducation d'environ vingt quatre enfans en classe'.[137] Two of the four English Clarist convents, those at Gravelines and Dunkirk, declared in the autumn of 1790 that they taught English *pensionnaires* both in religious education and languages.[138]

The teachers at the foreign ecclesiastical establishments were foreigners themselves and sometimes rose to some distinction, although by law they could not become principals or regents.[139] In Nantes, the Irish College itself became a constituent college of the University in 1766 owing to its good academic reputation, accommodation for eighty students and four professors and adequate lecture theatres.[140] Throughout the eighteenth century, Irishmen occupied chairs of Theology, Philosophy and Medicine at the University of Paris.[141] The abbé MacGeoghegan, elected provisor of the Irish College in Paris in 1734, wrote a three-volume *Histoire d'Irlande, ancienne et moderne*. The Irish Jesuit, Joseph Ignatius O'Halloran, educated in Bordeaux and then successively Professor of rhetoric, philosophy and divinity at the University of Bordeaux, was credited with having introduced the philosophy of Newton to the University, displacing Descartes. In the process, he had taken the first steps to reconcile Newtonian physics with Catholicism. Like many intellectuals, however, O'Halloran fell victim to the pressures of orthodoxy: he returned to Ireland when the Jesuit order was suppressed in France. The brothers Thomas and Lewis Innes, Principal and Prefect respectively of the Scots College, gained notoriety for their Jansenist leanings.[142]

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[136]AN, D/XIX/30 ('Mémoire: 4 Pieces justifficatives au soutien de la Petition presentée à l'assemblée Nationale par les Religieuses Angloises de la Rue de Charenton'); AN, S//4616 (Inventory of 2 March 1790).

[137]AN, S//4616 ('Procès Verbal: Religieuses Anglaises rue des fossés St. Victor', 23 June 1790).

[138]AN, D/XIX/30 ('Etat des Biens-fonds et revenus', of the English Clarists at Gravelines, 12 October 1790; address of 'les pauvres Clairisses' at Dunkirk, 10 September 1790).

[139]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 51 - 52.

[140]Simms, 'The Irish on the Continent', 644.

[141]Swords, 'Collège des Lombards', 54.

[142]Jarrett, D., *The begetters of Revolution. England's involvement with France, 1759 - 1789* (London: Longman, 1973), 22; Simms, 'The Irish on the Continent', 645 - 646, 650; Swords, 'Collège des Lombards', 49; Moran, 'Grisy, the Scots College Farm near Paris', 60.

The Catholic refugees were not, however, the only foreign students and teachers in France. There were others in different French educational institutions from as far afield as Brazil, Russia and even China. The Universities of Montpellier and Bordeaux accepted several Brazilian students, mostly from the rich province of Minas Geraïs, to study medicine. When José Joachim de Maïa, one of the future leaders of the 1789 uprising of Minas Geraïs against Portugese rule, graduated from Montpellier as a doctor of medicine in 1787, he took his degree with ten other foreigners who had origins as diverse as the United States, Smyrna in Turkey and Lima in Peru.[143] The University of Angers boasted Polish and German scholars studying law and French, while in the nearby Académie d'Equitation, of 334 *académiciens* taught between 1755 and 1792, no less than 201 whose nationalities are known were foreigners.[144] At the University of Strasbourg 'beaucoup d'Allemands et d'Anglais viennent s'y instruire'.[145] Between 1785 and 1787, of one hundred students of 'distinction' (meaning of social standing rather than academic merit) at the school of medicine, forty-four were Russian. Goethe, himself studying law at Strasbourg, recognised the medical faculty there as the best of them all and he attended classes in chemistry, anatomy and clinical medicine himself.[146] Montpellier, which had a reputation for medicine dating to the Middle Ages, drew numerous German students in the eighteenth century and, after graduation and returning to practice in Germany, continued in their relations with their former masters, asking for advice on recent developments. Between 1751 and 1766, two Chinese students, Ko and Yang, were sent by the Jesuit mission to Paris for their education, presumably for training as Christian missionaries in China.[147]

Foreign students received little or no financial aid from either the French state or the church, as bursaries were only offered to French students.[148] Foreigners could, of course, set up their own endowments, as happened with the Scots College which supported four

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[143]Chacon, V., 'Étudiants brésiliens à Montpellier et Révolution française', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, lxii (1990), 485 - 492; Mathorez, *Les Etrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 104.

[144]Of those 201 foreign students, there were 108 English, 50 Irish, 12 Scots, 8 Swiss, 8 Danes, 7 Americans, 6 Dutch, one Belgian (from Ghent) and one Russian. In addition, there were 31 other students in the sample of 334 whose nationalities are not known, but whose names would appear to indicate that they had British, Irish or North American origins (Mathorez, *Les Etrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 105).

[145]Karamzin, N. M. (trans. Legrelle, A.), *Voyage en France 1789 - 1790* (Paris, 1885), 8.

[146]Goethe (trans. Godwin, P.), *The Autobiography of Goethe. Truth and Poetry: from my life* (2 vols.) (London, 1847), i, 144, 156; ii, 2 - 3.

[147]Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 308, 381; ii, 34.

[148]Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 51 - 52.

students, but they usually studied in France at the expense of their parents, as was the case with the thirty boarders at the English College at Douai in 1766.[149] In 1761 Johann-Georg Wille received as students two Russians (one a Cossack), who had been given bursaries by the Tsarina to study art in Paris. Other Russian students lived, depending upon their means, in modest townhouses or with *fruitiers, dégraisseurs, cordonniers* or wig-makers.[150]

For those students and intellectuals who were not in France for religious reasons, the attractions of the kingdom, and Paris in particular, lay in its reputation as the great cultural hub of Europe. Many contemporaries regarded Enlightenment Europe as *l'Europe française*. This term was first coined in 1777 by the marquis Carracioli, the Neapolitan ambassador to Versailles, as a means of describing the cultural hegemony of France at the time: 'On reconnaît toujours une nation dominante qu'on s'efforça d'imiter. Jadis tout était romain, aujourd'hui tout est français.'[151] This was not to elevate France above all other powers, but simply to state its apparent cultural hegemony at this time. This dominance was partly due to the lead taken by Louis XIV in reshaping courtly culture at Versailles, an example which other monarchs in Europe followed. It was, however, largely due to the use of French as the international language of diplomacy and cultural exchange,[152] but it was not always accepted willingly and it certainly frustrated writers in other languages who sought to elevate theirs to an equal status. Moreover, the apparent importance of French language and culture among the European elites should not be allowed to detract from the important cultural and linguistic differences which separated the *philosophes* from the *Aufklärer* and the *illuminati*.[153] The artistic and literary importance of French culture in Europe nonetheless played an important part in attracting foreigners to Paris. Wille arrived in Strasbourg in 1736 on his way to Paris from his native Bieberthal near Königsberg. When Wille's companion decided that he would not continue the journey to Paris, Wille tried in vain to persuade his friend to reconsider, saying that 'quelque séjour à Paris lui seroit profitable et lui donneroit de la réputation'.[154]

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[149]AN, G/9/66 (1-3) (letter of Augustus Moore, 1 November 1766).
[150]Wille, *Mémoires et journal*, i, 172; Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 309.
[151]Quoted in Réau, L., *L'Europe française au siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1971), 9.
[152]Réau, *L'Europe française au siècle des Lumières*, 261 - 262.
[153]For a critique of the concept of 'l'Europe française', see Blanning, T. C. W., *Reform and Revolution in Mainz, 1743 - 1803* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 1 - 3.
[154]Wille, *Mémoires et journal*, i, 48.

Wille did not, however, travel to Paris on his own. He was accompanied by Schmidt, another artist, and by a Moravian cabinetmaker who quickly found work in the faubourg Saint-Antoine. Schmidt rapidly made his reputation and in 1742 was elected to the *Académie royale de peinture* on the strength of his engravings and then became, like Wille after him, a *graveur du Roi*. Others came to France to study under French masters: David counted at least twenty-seven foreign pupils from North America to Russia. Between 1758 and 1789, thirty Russian students worked under the painters and sculptors of Paris.[155] As Wille established his reputation as an engraver in Paris, he eventually became an integral part of the network of cultural exchange, friendship and rivalries sometimes referred to at the time as the 'republic of letters'. His journal in the 1750s and 1760s shows that he was forever being visited by artists and patrons from across Europe at his home at rue de la Harpe. He corresponded with Kaunitz's secretary; with Hertz, the director of the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts at Augsburg and he engraved the five silver medals which were to be the prize of the Danish Royal Academy; he corresponded with Winckelmann for twelve years and in 1768 he received a visit from the Polish magnate, Adam de Czartoryski. Wille alone received as visitors travellers, merchants, artists and politicians from places as diverse as Amsterdam, Saint Petersburg, Vienna, Madrid and London.[156]

For foreign artists themselves, therefore, association with France was far from being regarded as a betrayal. Even they, however, sometimes came up against certain hurdles before they could obtain the highest honours in Paris. In order to be accepted into the *Académie royale de peinture*, some artists had to get special dispensation from the king if they were to avoid a religious conversion to Catholicism. While Wille converted, Schmidt and the Swedish portrait painter, Alexander Roslin, received special permission not to from Louis XV.[157]

The 'republic of letters' naturally included writers and scientists as well as artists. Of the 120 *encyclopédistes* whose identity is known, at least fifteen were born abroad.[158] They did not all live in France and indeed some of the French contributors lived abroad at the time, but in so doing were part of the broader international network. Other foreign

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[155]Wille, *Mémoires et journal*, i, 60 - 61, 82, 115; Réau, *L'Europe française au siècle des Lumières*, 345 - 346; Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 309.
[156]Wille, *Mémoires et journal*, i, 113 - 409.
[157]Wille, *Mémoires et journal*, i, 82; Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, ii, 372.
[158]Kafker, F. A., 'Paris, centre principal de l'entreprise encyclopédique', Vovelle, M. (ed.), *Paris et la Révolution* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 203.

writers came to Paris, sometimes with a mission of their own in response to French cultural hegemony. Grimm, for example, arrived in Paris in 1748 with his pupil, the count von Schönberg, with a view to 'unir les grâces et le goût français au génie allemand' and he stayed for over forty years. Paul-Jérémie Bitaubé, born in Königsberg in 1732, translated the *Iliad* into French and became a friend of d'Alembert, who urged him to come to Paris, where he stayed and was elected a member of the *Académie des Inscriptions*. Certain *salons* became associated with foreigners: Madame de Geoffrin's became associated with the Poles who surrounded count Stanislas Poniatowski before he became king of Poland in 1764. She also received Hume and Kaunitz. Her rival, Madame du Deffand, counted Horace Walpole and the count Bernstorff of Denmark among her guests. Madame de Boufflers, who was a correspondent of Gustav III, became a focal point for Swedes in Paris, while Madame d'Holbach gathered Galiani, Grimm, Beccaria and Sterne.[159]

Science was also regarded in cosmopolitan terms. Among the seventy-six members of the *Académie des sciences* eight members could be foreign. As Karamzin observed, 'les étrangers regardent comme un grand honneur d'être membres de cette Académie parisienne'.[160] Benjamin Franklin mixed with French scientists there during his stay in Paris between 1776 and 1785. He was appointed with Lavoisier to a committee to investigate Mesmerism and the climax was his embrace with Voltaire at the Academy in 1778.[161] Franklin, of course, had both scientific reknown because of his lightning-rod and had broader popularity because of his acquired plain manners and dress, which made him seem to be the quintessential 'American', straight from the Rousseauistic simplicity and honesty of the New World.[162] Of course, the extensive contacts made in the 'republic of letters' tended to be built up by the successful artists and intellectuals who had established a reputation. This form of cosmopolitanism was very much an élite phenomenon. Nor was it universally appreciated. A wealthy aristocrat from Cleves, Jean-Baptiste Cloots, was once described as 'burnable in Rome, hangable in London, and breakable on the wheel

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[159]Poussou, J.-P., 'Les internationales de l' "honnête homme"', Lequin, *Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France*, 282; Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 251 - 552; ii, 136, 379; Réau, *L'Europe française au siècle des Lumières*, 267 - 270.

[160]Karamzin, *Voyage en France*, 171.

[161]Palmer, R. R., *The Age of the Democratic Revolution. A Political History of Europe and America, 1760 - 1800* (2 vols.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959 - 1964), i, 250.

[162]Higonnet, P., *Sister Republics. The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988),135, 178.

in Vienna'. A francophile and disciple of Voltaire, Cloots settled in Paris in 1775 and became embroiled in the religious debates with his defence of the *philosophes*. His rabid anticlericalism brought him to the attention of the police in 1785 and he was forced to flee.[163] The authorities patronized and basked in the reflected glory of 'l'Europe française' only for as long as its participants did not challenge too explicitly the existing political or moral order.

In another way, the intrusion of foreigners into French cultural life was not welcomed by everyone. It was clear that many viewed French society with a critical eye. The usually 'cosmopolitan' Louis-Sébastien Mercier warned his fellow-countrymen:

> Prenez-y garde, tous ces étrangers, sans exception, sous l'air le plus modeste, se rendront les inspcctcurs et les réviscurs de notre esprit, et ne doutez pas qu'ils n'amassent les matériaux des petites satires qu'ils feront contre les Français ... .[164]

Mercier's warning reflects a concern for how foreigners perceived the French. Such a concern is in itself an important dimension of the way in which a people sees itself as distinct from its neighbours. It was, however, one of the prices to be paid for cultural vitality. If France was one of the epicentres of European civilisation, it had to expect criticism as well as praise. Some towns suffered from this scrutiny: between 1763 and 1789, Montpellier lost pride of place to Nice as the resort of wealthy British tourists and the comments written and published by British travellers, most notably Smollett, who claimed to have been poisoned by garlic and (worse) being served tea without milk.[165]

Nonetheless, with France, and Paris in particular, as a major focal point of the 'republic of letters', its many notable foreign visitors would reinforce certain elements in French identity and politics. For one, the highly-publicised visits of Franklin and other Americans to France helped to reinforce the impression, in 1789, that the French Revolution was directly related to its sister in America. For many of the revolutionaries who had participated in the Enlightenment as publicists, journalists, writers and scientists, even if many had been denied access to the glamour and recognition of the *salons* and the inner

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[163]Gooch, G. P., *Germany and the French Revolution* (London, 1920), 321 - 322; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 48 - 50; Slavin, M., *The Hébertistes to the Guillotine. Anatomy of a 'Conspiracy' in Revolutionary France* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 190 - 191.

[164]Mercier, L.-S. (ed. Kaplow, J.), *Le Tableau de Paris* (Paris: La Découverte, 1989), 172.

[165]Sacquin, M., 'Les Anglais à Montpellier et à Nice pendant la seconde moitié du siècle', *Dix-huitième Siècle*, xiii (1981), 292.

circles of intellectual life, the international focus of Paris and the notion of a 'republic of letters' suggested that all men were brothers. Combined with the highly-charged politics of the Revolution itself, the 'cosmopolitanism' of some of the intellectuals and publicists was to inspire the notion of a 'crusade for universal liberty', which many of the original participants in the pacific republic of letters were to reject in horror. An exception was Cloots, who in 1785 published a tract urging the French government to set its sights on 'la borne naturelle des Gaules': the Rhine frontier.[166] For many of the artists and intellectuals who enjoyed international cultural exchange, however, the improvement of humanity was to remain in the moral sphere of human endeavour and even to be restricted to the educated élites. It was not to be transformed into political action.

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France did, however, attract individuals and groups who had failed in their political endeavours abroad. Over the course of the eighteenth century, they varied in their aims and ideology, from the absolutist and often Catholic Jacobites in the first half of the century to the radical Genevans and Dutch in the 1780s. The Jacobites had come from the British Isles since the Revolution of 1688-89. They included soldiers shipped from Ireland at the end of the Williamite war in 1691, Catholic clergy who suddenly found themselves no longer tolerated after the respite under James II and VII and the Jacobite court, which settled at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The obvious attractions of France for Jacobites was its proximity to the British Isles, its Catholicism and the support the government was likely to give to their cause. Between 1688 and 1760, the French occasionally gave assistance to the Jacobite cause, although the last real hope of the Stuarts perished at Culloden in 1746 and with the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Jacobites used France as a base for their activities against Britain: some, such as the Walsh family of Saint-Malo used their knowledge of English and of the coastal waters to raid the British Isles as corsairs or privateers.[167]

After the failure of the uprising of 1745-46, those Jacobites who escaped limped to France and there received a degree of help from the French government. The foreign minister d'Argenson's private instructions regarding an ordonnance of 15 February 1746,

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[166]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 50.
[167]Simms, 'The Irish on the Continent', 643.

raising two Scots infantry regiments for service in Scotland, promised that those who joined the units and then moved to France would be promised positions in the French army.[168] After the final defeat in April, a large number of Scottish officers did flee to France and received, not commissions in the French army, but handouts from the government to support them in their exile. Between 5 October 1746 and 9 October 1747, for example, just over 227,973 *livres* were allocated in 222 different *gratifications*, varying according to the rank of the recipient.[169] It was not just military men who received financial aid. Among those recommended by the prince for French money were Alexander Gordon, of the Scots College, who received 800 *livres*.[170] There was good reason to treat the Jacobite exiles well: in the event of a Stuart restoration, as unlikely as it was after 1748, the few hundred thousand *livres* spent supporting them in France would reap dividends in terms of gratitude once the Jacobites were in control of one of the most prosperous powers in Europe.

For all the apparent amity between the Jacobite court and the French government and the coincidence of their interests, the exiles were still watched carefully by agents reporting to the ministry of foreign affairs. One report dated 30 July 1746 by d'Eguilles, gives details of the character of leading Scottish, Irish and English Jacobites in Paris, of whom to be wary and, significantly who still had influence with the prince and who was now entirely dependent upon him for their livelihood.[171] Charles Edward Stuart was eventually imprisoned at Vincennes in 1748 and then expelled from France as a condition of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. With the Jacobite exiles, as with other refugees, *raison d'état* took precedence over ideological affinity.

In the case of the Polish exiles, rival groups appeared in France, surrounding different candidates for the throne. In a foreshadowing of the more brutal factional struggles between radical exiles of the same nationality during the Revolution, the supporters of the Russian candidate, Stanislas Poniatowski sparred with those who backed Xavier de Saxe,

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[168]MAE, MD, Angleterre, 79, pièces 34 & 35 ('Ordonnance du Roy pour la création de deux régiments d'Infanterie Ecossoise'; Instructions to French commander in Scotland, from d'Argenson, 15 February 1746).
[169]MAE, MD, Angleterre, 79, pièces 39 & 144 ('Etat des Officiers Ecossois a qui le Roy a bien voulu accorder a la priere de Prince Edouard des gratifications 30 juillet 1748'; 'Etat des Officiers servi dans l'armée du Prince de Galles qui n'ont pas eu part aux gratifications', 31 December 1748).
[170]MAE, MD, Angleterre, 79, pièce 145 ('Etat de la distribution ordonné par le Prince de 36,000 *livres* accordés par Sa Majesté aux officiers Ecossois').
[171]MAE, MD, Angleterre, 79, pièce 147 ('Liste des anglois, ecossois, et irlandois qui sont actuellement a Paris et qui ont quelque liaison avec le prince Edouart', 30 July 1746).

son of Augustus III. The focal points for these groups were, respectively, the *salon* Madame de Geoffrin and Xavier de Saxe himself, who settled in a *hôtel* in the Marais in 1771 after his unsuccessful bid to be elected king of Poland seven years previously. The Geoffrin set had somewhat more success than the Jacobite exiles in influencing French policy. Although in 1764 the government backed Xavier rather than Poniatowski, who was, after all, the Russian candidate for the throne, de Geoffrin used her influence at court to secure French recogntion of the latter's election. She arranged a meeting between prince Sulkowski and Sainte-Foy, of the ministry of foreign affairs, which led to official French acknowledgment of Stanislas as king of Poland in 1766.[172]

The crucial difference between the Jacobites and the supporters of Poniatowski was, of course, that the former had failed in their objectives while the latter succeeded. This meant that diplomatic necessity made the powerless Jacobite exiles pawns while the Poniatowski entourage in Paris, who had Russian backing, were suddenly more substantial pieces in the international game. In another anticipation of revolutionary politics, the status and importance of political exiles was determined less by the sympathy of the government to their cause than by the demands of international politics.

Given its pragmatic approach to political exiles, the toleration by the French government of Genevan *Représentants* who fled to France after 1782 is surprising, the more so because the French had provided troops to oust the Genevan patriots in the first place. Yet Genevan exiles such as the financier Etienne Clavière, Etienne Dumont and Jacques-Antoine Du Roveray enjoyed a remarkably high profile in exile in France in the 1780s, despite the order given in June 1782 that 'l'intention du Roy est que vous ne laissiez plus aucun Représentant passer la frontière'. Furthermore, in July Vergennes wrote that 'les Insurgents que je chasse de Genève ... sont les agents de l'Angleterre'.[173]

Clavière worked through his acquaintances Mirabeau and Brissot to further both his political and financial ambitions and thereby had much publicity in France. He engaged in pamphleteering battles involving, among other institutions, the *Caisse d'escompte* and the *Compagnie des Eaux de Paris*. His campaign against the latter got him into trouble with the authorities. Clavière, the Genevan *Représentant* once accused of being a British agent, who had brushed with the government over the very delicate issue of finances, none the less remained in France and enriched himself further through shrewd investments and

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[172]Mathorez, *Les Étrangers en France sous l'Ancien Régime*, i, 245 - 259.
[173]Quoted in Bénétruy, J., *L'Atelier de Mirabeau. Quatre proscrits genevois dans la tourmente révolutionnaire* (Paris: Picard, 1962), 25, 31.

in August 1788 was made *administrateur-général* of the *Compagnie d'assurances sur la vie*.[174]

For an exile still apparently committed to the overthrow of a régime guaranteed by the French government, Clavière had assumed a very high profile, sometimes aided and abetted by the French government itself. Perhaps the reason behind the authorities' tolerance was the occasional use to which his financial expertise could be put. For Calonne, Clavière had served a useful purpose in his campaigns against financial interests, including the *Caisse d'escompte* and, furthermore, they had a mutual enemy in Necker. Clavière's huge investments in the French financial market appeared to tie up his fortunes so much with the fate of the French monarchy, that he may well have appeared to have been tamed.[175] His closest Genevan associates, Dumont and Du Roveray, did not arrive in Paris until 1789, by which time the government was concerned with matters far more important than the presence of three Genevan dissidents on its territory.

Unlike the Genevans, the Dutch 'Patriots' were more openly welcomed by the French government, in spite of their commitment to overthrow or at least limit the powers of the Stadholder. Having fled from the Prussian invasion of the United Provinces in September 1787, they were the largest single group of political exiles established in France before 1789. By the summer of 1789, there were about 5,000 Patriots gathered in Paris and northern towns such as Saint-Omer, Gravelines, Dunkirk and Watten.[176] Why they should be tolerated by the French monarchy in such large numbers on French soil can be put down to practical politics. The strategic and commercial importance of the Netherlands was obvious to France as well as to Britain.[177]

The French may have accepted some responsibility for the Patriots at their defeat, because, like the Jacobite exiles, they were a ready-made corps of leadership who might be expected to impose Francophile policies should their political fortunes change. For the Patriots' part, the French were still their best of hope of support in Europe. In Brussels, they established a commission to 'support and defend the interests of the Patriot nation at

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[174]Jarrett, *The begetters of Revolution*, 209 - 210; Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 96, 104 - 105, 109 - 111, 115, 137.

[175]Bénétruy suggests that Clavière even sought a change of régime in France, believing that no return to Geneva was possible without such a 'revolution' (Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 95). All the indications were, however, that Clavière intended to stay in France for sometime, whatever he said to his Genevan associates.

[176]Schama, S., *Patriots and Liberators. Revolution in the Netherlands 1780 - 1813* (2nd ed.) (London: Fontana, 1992), 144 - 146; Godechot, J., *La Grande Nation*, 93.

[177]Blanning, T. C. W., *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London & New York: Longman, 1986), 47 - 48; Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 106, 123 - 124.

the court of the King of France and to press with especial vigour for armed assistance to help re-establish the downtrodden liberties of the nation'.[178] Despite the ideological divide between the exiles and the monarchy, both sides could see mutual advantage in maintaining relations with each other. The Patriots, however, had to tread a treacherous path between their 'democratic' language and the practical necessity of retaining French support: the one could not be entirely accommodated without some damage to the other.[179] They seem to have avoided the pitfalls, for, like the Jacobites, the Dutch exiles were soon in receipt of financial assistance from the French government.

In 1788, Johan Valckenaer, one of the Patriot leaders in France, had persuaded the French minister responsible for the Dutch refugees on French soil, Lambert, to provide subsidies towards the fugitives' keep. The usual allocation was 14 *livres* on arrival in France. Unfortunately for all concerned, management of the pensions was devolved onto Coert Lambertus van Beijma, Valckenaer's rival. Van Beijma's mismanagement of the French pensions, coupled with his refusal to allow the government to inspect the registers of the pensions put those very funds in jeopardy. Lambert imposed a deadline at the end of 1788, after which no new arrivals in France would be eligible for pensions. Repeated demands for the opening of the registers for government inspection were not met until 1790.[180] The divide between the Patriots in France would carry over into the French Revolution, with lethal consequences.

The Ancien Régime approach to political refugees was based on political necessity. While ideological affinity may have hidden this fundamental motive in the case of the Jacobites, the use which the French crown had for Clavière and the Dutch Patriots makes it more obvious. The policies of the French Revolution were to be much the same, although once more the basic pressures of practical politics were to be hidden by the ideological pretensions of both the exiles and the revolutionaries. None the less, diplomatic tact and ideological conformity helped to make relations between refugees and government smoother and the latter more inclined to be generous. This factor was also present under both the Ancien Régime and the Revolution, although the peculiar circumstances of the latter were to exaggerate the need for political orthodoxy to an

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[178]Dumont-Pigalle, Patriot leader, quoted in Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 144.
[179]The problem is illustrated by a panicking letter written by the French negotiator at The Hague, the marquis de Rayneval, in the spring of 1787. There could be no 'interest in favouring democracy; I would even say that such a government would lose the Republic (for us) or at least render it a useless ally, for it is impossible to undertake anything or concert anything with democrats' (quoted in Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 126).
[180]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 144 - 146, 669 n. 24; AP, xvii, 377 - 378.

unprecedented extreme. For all the apparent rupture with the past in 1789, the policies of the Revolution towards political exiles were dictated by the same concerns which confronted the ministers of the absolute monarchy. These considerations were the refugees' potential in furthering French interests abroad and the need for some assurance that their presence posed no threat to the domestic and external security of the French régime.

If foreign refugees had a high profile in France, those who contributed to the French economy were less visible, but more than any other type of foreigners were encouraged to settle in France. The establishment of foreign manufacturers, merchants and financiers was nothing new in the eighteenth-century. In the second half of the seventeenth century, Colbert's mercantilism and attempts to build up the French navy had led him to invite or attract foreigners with expertise in specific areas.[181] The eighteenth century witnessed a continuity in these policies, with new expertise and technology being imported by various means, both foul and fair.[182]

Among the fair means by which industrial skills and artisans came to France was through the legitimate migration of foreign artisans and manufacturers, such as Christoff-Philipp Oberkampf or, in some cases, through the adoption of those who felt persecuted or restricted in their home country, like John Kay and John Holker. The fouler methods used included the poaching of skilled workers and entrepreneurs who were enticed to leave their country to develop their manufactures in France. Among these *débauchés* - the term used to describe those lured to France with promises of plump bounties and profits - were the brothers Michael and Joseph Alcock, William Wilkinson and John Badger.

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[181]Poussou, J.-P., 'À l'école des autres', Lequin, *Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France*, 235, 236.

[182]For two brief overviews of the British contribution to French industry, see Mathias, P., 'Skills and the Diffusion of Innovations from Britain in the eighteenth century', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, xxv (1975), 93 - 113; Harris, J., 'The Transfer of Technology between Britain and France and the French Revolution', Crossley, C., & Small, I., *The French Revolution and British Culture* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 156 - 186.

Artisans who travelled to France with their skills or to obtain an apprenticeship could form a substantial proportion of the population in some neighbourhoods. By 1789, perhaps four percent of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine was foreign-born, half of which came from Germany. The artisans of this nationality contributed greatly to the reputation of the Faubourg for cabinetmaking, while craftsmen from Brabant and Liège worked on other furniture, on metalwork and in textiles. The small group of Italians, mainly from Tuscany, made figurines.[183] Such artisans worked in traditional crafts in an area renowned for its artisanal life. Others, however, brought new methods and industries to France, or helped to develop those which were still growing. Christoff-Philipp Oberkampf belonged to this last category.

Born in 1738 at Vaihingen-an-der-Enz, seventeen miles north-west of Stuttgart, Oberkampf came to France after being brought to Basel by his father, a calico dyer, where he began his apprenticeship as an *indienneur*, a printer of the fine cotton cloths imported from Asia. In 1758, he deserted his father and in Mulhouse met an agent for the factory of Jacques-Daniel Cottin at the Arsenal in Paris. After a trial period, Oberkampf was signed on for three years as a colour-maker at the printers. This method of recruitment by French manufacturers, particularly from among foreigners, was not unusual when certain skills and knowledge were in short supply. Adept dyers and printers of fine cloths were scarce in France in the mid-eighteenth century because the import of *indiennes* had been banned since 1686, and the wearing and use of them proscribed by a decree of 1692, in order to protect the producers of *étoffes nationales*, such as Lyonnais silks and Norman woolens. These restrictions started to lift after 1750 and in response Cottin leased buildings in the Arsenal for six years from 1754 to dye cotton using indigo, but over half a century of restrictions meant that local talent for this promising industry was limited, or even non-existent. Cottin was forced to look to areas of Europe where the activity was well-developed, such as Switzerland and western Germany. Oberkampf had precisely the sort of skills which French manufacturers like Cottin required.[184]

Unlike Oberkampf, John Holker from Lancashire had no choice but to come to France. A Catholic, he joined the Jacobite army in 1745 and after his capture was sentenced to

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[183]Monnier, R., *Le Faubourg Saint-Antoine (1789 - 1815)* (Paris: Société des Etudes Robespierristes, 1981), 33 - 34, 71, 302.

[184]Chassagne, S., *Oberkampf: un entrepreneur capitaliste au Siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1980), 21 - 30; Chapman, S. D., & Chassagne, S., *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century. A Study of Peel and Oberkampf* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), 104, 106 - 108, 113 - 115.

death. With his dramatic escape to France in 1746 he brought an expertise in textiles obtained during his partnership in a Manchester calenderer's firm. While an exile in France, he impressed Marc Morel, an inspector of manufactures, with his knowledge of textiles, especially cotton and velvet. He was employed by Daniel Charles Trudaine of the *bureau de commerce* as an agent for the illicit recruitment of British expertise in textiles. Meanwhile, Holker was made a partner in two progressive Rouen firms, one for the manufacture of cotton velvet, the other for calendering and 'English' finishing of cloth. The intention was to integrate Holker into these firms which would employ the British artisans who had been *débauchés*, who in turn would train French workers in their methods. The imported artisans would also be circulated among several firms, to spread the new techniques and to avoid, as Trudaine hoped, the creation of monopolies. As with Oberkampf, Holker and the artisans he lured over from Britain had skills which were lacking in France, but which were nonetheless in great demand: attempts by Rouen cotton manufacturers to introduce cotton velvets and other cloths had floundered owing to lack of the technology and the quality of the fabrics.[185] In September 1754, the cloth-finishing business in which Holker was involved became a privileged *manufacture royale* and a centre for the diffusion of the new techniques in France. It employed ninety-two workers, of whom twenty were British. In 1755, Holker's achievements were rewarded by his appointment as an inspector of foreign manufactures for the *bureau de commerce*. He used this position to entice more skilled artisans and manufacturers to France.[186]

This policy was driven by the desire to keep apace of Britain's rapid economic development in textiles, metallurgy and the manufacture of hardware, but military considerations, such as the manufacturing of weapons, also entered the equation. The *bureau de commerce* was all too aware of advances made in the industrialising areas of France's great rival. Its agents such as Gabriel Jars and Marchant de la Houilière gained access to British manufactures and returned with reports on new techniques.[187] While these experts could not disguise their enthusiasm for the developments, their missions

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[185]Harris, J. R., 'John Holker: a Lancashire Jacobite in French Industry (The First Chaloner Memorial Lecture)', *Newcomen Society Transactions*, lxiv (1992-93), 132 - 135; Wadsworth, A. P., & Mann, J. de L., *The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire, 1600 - 1780* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1931), 196 - 197; Henderson, W. O., *Britain and Industrial Europe, 1750 - 1870. Studies in British Influence on the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe* (3rd. ed.) (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1972), 14 - 17.

[186]Gillispie, C. C., *Science and Polity in France at the End of the Old Régime* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 420 - 424.

[187]Henderson, *Britain and Industrial Europe*, 5.

were often driven by the alarm which the government felt at them. De la Houlière, for example, was sent to Staffordshire in 1775 to discover how the British moulded their cannon and he was struck by the advantages which the British navy drew from the Wilkinson brothers' methods of founding iron and boring the barrels for artillery pieces. He set about enticing the younger Wilkinson, William, to France.[188]

The traffic in artisans and technology was certainly a seller's market, not only because the skills and methods were in great demand, but also because workers and manufacturers who left their home countries were often running grave risks, owing to laws prohibiting the export of machinery and the emigration of skilled workers. In 1756, Michael Alcock's wife was arrested in London with four workers on their way back to France from Birmingham, while in 1765 another recruiter for the Alcocks, William Hyde, was nearly killed with a worker in a shoot-out on their return journey towards London.[189] In order to attract and then retain the migrants or *débauchés* which it so craved, therefore, the French authorities had to pay handsome sums, grant concessions and, in some cases, show inexhaustible patience. John Kay, the inventor of the flying shuttle, had fled from Britain to France in 1747, either to flee the mob violence wherever he tried to introduce his invention, or because of his unsuccessful defence of his patent rights. In France up to his death in 1779, his temperament and ambition made him quarrelsome and a difficult man to deal with, but the French government realised that they had to be patient and generous because 'to leave him without recompense would be to disgust foreigners from bringing their industry into the kingdom'.[190]

The government did achieve some success in enticing foreign entrepreneurs to France. In 1753, John Badger, a calenderer, was brought to Lyon to set up a calendering works to produce watered fabrics. In return, he received one *louis* a week for subsistence on route, the supply of all the necessary machinery and tools, a guinea a week paid to his wife in London during his absence, a promise to look after his widow and two children should he die before his enterprise was established and a pension or a fourteen-year privilege to produce finished silks once he had produced 'des moërres [*moires*] aussi belles que celles

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[188]AN, F\12\1300 ('Memoire sur les Moyens d'employer le Charbon de terre à fondre la Mine de fer, a fabriquer du fer forgé & a Mouller d'excellens Canons, pour la Marine, comme on le pratique en Angleterre', 18 September 1775).
[189]AN, F\12\1315a (Letter of Trudaine to d'Argenson, 18 May 1756; 'Mémoire' for William Hyde, n.d.).
[190]Quoted in Wadsworth & Mann, *The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire*, 465.

d'Angleterre'. His wife soon joined him with his two children.[191] In Staffordshire, de la Houlière played on what he saw as the 'l'esprit de gain trop ordinaire en cette Nation' to encourage William Wilkinson to come to France. Wilkinson was offered an advance of 50,000 *livres* towards the establishment of a foundry in France, 200 - 300 guineas for his moving expenses and a further 50,000 *livres* on the production of the first twelve working cannon.[192] He also received an annual pension of 12,000 *livres* on his arrival in France in 1777.[193]

Such enticements could not be restricted to the manufacturers themselves, as skilled workers were also required to set up the establishments initially and then to train local people in the necessary skills and techniques. Michael and Joseph Alcock, for example, had established a manufacture of hardware such as buttons, candlesticks, buckles and locks at La Charité-sur-Loire in 1756. In order to draw the required skilled workers from Birmingham, special concessions were offered to encourage them to make the often hazardous journey. Workers at La Charité were exempt from the *droit d'aubaine*, all personal taxes, from service in the *milice* and from billetting. Holker further suggested that 150 *livres* be awarded as a bounty to Joseph Alcock for every worker he brought over from Britain. The artisans themselves were offered 'gratifications' for their move to France. In 1759, William Green, who had come to France at the urging of his daughter who was already working at La Charité, was given a bounty of 500 *livres* and a promise by the government that if his work was of good quality, he would be rewarded further.[194]

The efforts of the manufacturers and the artisans were met with some success, both in establishing prosperous factories and in spreading the skills and techniques among the French. At the end of 1759, Oberkampf entered into a partnership with three entrepreneurs to set up a calico-printing plant at Jouy near Versailles. After teething problems mainly involving disputes with his associates and failed experiments, Oberkampf entered into a more successful partnership two years later and in 1787 became the sole owner in the works at Jouy. Just over nine percent of his workers were drawn from

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[191]AN, F\12\1442 ('Etablissement du S^{r}. Badger a Lyon pour les Moërres façon d'Angleterre', 1753).
[192]AN, F\12\1300 ('Memoire sur les Moyens d'employer le Charbon de terre à fondre la Mine de fer, a fabriquer du fer forgé & a Mouller d'excellens Canons, pour la Marine, comme on le pratique en Angleterre', 18 September 1775).
[193]Henderson, *Britain and Industrial Europe*, 40.
[194]AN, F\12\1315a (Letter of William Green to the *bureau de commerce*, 28 February 1759; letter of Holker to Trudaine, 11 March 1759).

abroad, although his overseers were still recruited either from among Oberkampf's family and from Germany.[195]

Oberkampf, however, was not obliged to train French artisans to perform all the necessary tasks. His was a private enterprise, only getting the title of *manufacture royale* in 1784. Holker and the others, meanwhile, owed their businesses to the support of the *bureau de commerce* and were expected to teach the French the new methods. Success in this task was checkered. John Kay's shuttle was tested in Normandy and was adopted in at least one of the *manufactures royales*, but progress in its adoption was slow and by 1790 its use had been dropped altogether.[196] Likewise John Badger's attempts to introduce new silk methods to Lyon were met with difficulties in the procurement of the right parts for the machinery and raw materials, which left the enterprise dependent upon imports from Britain, defeating the whole object of the exercise. Nonetheless, Holker did persuade the government to provide Badger with a subsidy to pay for the training of workers in finishing heavy woollens.[197]

In contrast to these failures, however, Holker expanded from his *manufacture royale* at Saint-Sever, outside Rouen, to set up other plants at Vernon, Elbeuf and Pont de l'Arche. Saint-Sever produced the tools and machinery which could be moved elsewhere in France and French artisans learnt to build the looms and jennies. He encouraged other British manufacturers to come to France with designs and new methods and John Milne and his three sons came with a smuggled Arkwright machine and erected it at Oissel.[198] The Alcocks, too, had some success in communicating their skills. When in 1760 one of their French associates, Frenais, broke away after a dispute, he set up his own manufacture of buttons in Paris, taking with him two workers who were French and who were offered 48 *livres* bounty. The Alcocks also expanded their enterprise by establishing a new manufacture at Roanne in 1765 and then Michael set up a steelworks at Villefray in 1767.[199] By 1788, Willliam Wilkinson had a manufacture at Indret on the Loire near

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[195]AN, F\12\876 (Petition for Abraham Guerne de Tavannes, to Terray, 1774; 'Mémoire' for Oberkampf, 1774); Chapman & Chassagne, *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century*, 121, 127, 176 - 177, 178.
[196]Wadsworth & Mann, *The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire*, 460, 466.
[197]Harris, 'John Holker', 136; Henderson, *Britain and Industrial Europe*, 21.
[198]Gillispie, *Science and Polity in France*, 423 - 424; Henderson, *Britain and Industrial Europe*, 17, 22.
[199]AN, F\12\1315a ('Copie du Procès verbal fait par Mr. de Charaut sub délégué a la Charité Sur Loire le 29 mars 1762'; letter of Joseph Alcock, 18 August 1778; *arrêt* of 28 March 1780).

Nantes and at Le Creusot, where Arthur Young reported that he had employed between 500 and 600 workers - all but two of them French.[200]

As a further means of enriching the kingdom, colonies of foreign merchants in the great maritime towns of France were allowed to develop. In Bordeaux in 1777 there were no less that 111 foreign merchants and *commissionaires*, with Germans being the most important group at 52, the 'Jacobite' *anglo-irlandais* coming next with 33, followed by the Dutch with 17. The rest were Swedish, Danish and Swiss. In Marseille ten years later, of 209 foreign Protestant *négociants*, 157 were Swiss, who also played an important role in banking.[201] These merchants were considered an integral part of the network of commerce which helped to bring prosperity to France and fill the coffers of the monarchy.

To encourage trade, therefore, the French government extended special privileges to the foreign mercantile colonies, such as exemptions from the *droit d'aubaine* and general decrees of naturalisation. In spite of such measures which might have encouraged the assimilation of merchants into the broader French communities, many persisted in doing business with their own countrymen. This might be explained by the merchants' habits of acting as the agents or as the partners of their compatriots, which reinforced the network of commerce in which the French government wanted French-based merchants to maintain a presence. The Irish merchants of Bordeaux and Nantes present good examples of this practice. Many foreign merchants who made enough money then sank it into landed property, and this is particularly true of the Jacobite exiles from the British Isles after mid-century, when it became clear that a triumphal return home under a Stuart monarchy was increasingly unlikely.[202]

The government was also willing to develop some of France's primary industries, particularly in fishing. Nantucket whalers were established at Dunkirk in May 1786, when three ships arrived from across the Atlantic by agreement between William Roth and the French government, represented by the naval minister, the maréchal de Castries. Roth had promised to bring ten to twelve whalers to Dunkirk in return for certain conditions,

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[200]Young, *Travels in France*, 199.

[201]Poussou, J.-P., 'Mobilité et migrations', Dupâquier, J., *Histoire de la Population française* (4 vols.) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1988), ii, 135.

[202]Simms, 'The Irish on the Continent, 1691 - 1800', 647; Poussou, J.-P., 'Recherches sur l'immigration anglo-irlandaise à Bordeaux au XVIIIe siècle', Fédération Historique du Sud-Ouest, *Bordeaux et les Îles britanniques du XIIIe au XXe siècle: actes du colloque franco-britannique tenu à York du 25 au 28 septembre 1973* (Bordeaux, 1975), 71 - 72; Hayes, R., 'Liens Irlandais avec Bordeaux', Hayes, R., Preston, C., Weygand, J., *Les Irlandais en Aquitaine* (Bordeaux: Héritiers E.-F. Miailhe, 1971), 11 - 18.

including a bounty of 50 *livres* for every tonnage of ship brought to France and a guarantee of their freedom to worship as they pleased. By 1788, there were three Nantucket shipowners in Dunkirk, managing eight whalers between them.[203] Meanwhile, Catalan fishermen had long used Marseille as a seasonal port for their fishing expeditions, with special rights dating back to the reign of Louis XIV. The right of Spanish fishermen to fish freely in French waters was confirmed by the *pacte de famille* of 1761. By the time of the Revolution their relationship with French fishermen was marred by tension owing to different techniques and other disputes which were to explode in 1790.

The presence of such foreigners in France had clear advantages for the government. They brought with them skills and techniques which the French would otherwise have lacked, thereby enriching the kingdom (and the tax base) and helping France in its commercial rivalry with Britain. The dividends which the government hoped to reap from the spread of their skills made it willing to spend a lot of time, money and effort in attracting the right people to France and keeping them there. Foreign artisans, manufacturers, merchants and fishermen they tended to avoid politics and so, while some of them were difficult, they were never perceived as posing any threat to the established order of the *Ancien Régime* in the same way that political refugees may have done. This pattern of behaviour was to be altered only slightly during the Revolution.

Banking and finance, however, were so tied up with the state finances that those foreigners who participated in them could not always avoid embroilment in the politics of the court. The involvement of foreign bankers in French administration could have its advantages. The Genevan Jacques Necker, for example, was barely twenty-four when he and another Genevan, George-Tobied Thellusson were given the management of the bank of Isaac Vernet in 1756. By 1770, when the two Genevans took over ownership from Vernet, the bank *Thellusson, Necker & Compagnie* was one of the largest Protestant banks in Europe, with contacts among the vast European network of Huguenot, Genevan, Swiss, Dutch and British bankers.[204] The vast majority of correspondents of another foreign bank, that of Necker's rival and compatriot, Isaac Panchaud, were also abroad,

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[203]Pfister-Langanay, C., *Ports, Navires et Négociants à Dunkerque (1662 - 1792)* (Dunkirk: Société Dunkerquoise & Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985), 270, 271 - 272.

[204]Lüthy, H., *La Banque Protestant en France, de la Révocation de l'Edit de Nantes à la Révolution* (2 vols.) (Paris: SEVPEN, 1959 - 1961), ii, 230 - 231, 315.

especially in the Netherlands, while those in France were also foreigners, mostly British and Swiss, including the Neuchâtelois, Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.[205]

The connections of Necker and Panchaud were useful to the French government when it came to raising much-needed loans, or placating the monarchy's foreign creditors.[206] For the French monarchy to have such an asset explains why the government was willing to create the post of Director-General of Finance to allow Necker control of the royal purse-strings. When Necker was deposed after his first ministry in 1781, the monarchy was not short of similar contacts and it was Panchaud who took over, not as Director-General of Finance, but as financial advisor to Necker's replacement, Joly de Fleury. Panchaud, in turn, used his contacts, mainly in Amsterdam, to float loans for the monarchy.[207]

Furthermore, foreign bankers, like manufacturers and artisans, could bring expertise and ideas which encouraged the development of Paris as a financial centre. It was Panchaud who in 1776 masterminded the creation of the *Caisse d'escompte*, a banking institution which was to become of key importance in the last years of the *Ancien Régime* and a matter of bitter political feuding in the early Revolution. Its primary purpose was to enhance commerce by discounting letters of exchange, as well as acting as a bank dealing with the expenses and revenue of *notaires*, bankers and merchants.[208]

Foreign involvement in French finance none the less fed the paranoia of those who saw in the international Protestant banking network a threat to French (and Catholic) interests. There certainly was plenty of evidence to suggest the involvement of foreign banking interests in French domestic affairs. Both Necker and Panchaud raised money for the French government by selling *rentes viagères* which paid interest until the holder of the bonds died. The exploitation of such schemes by foreign, Protestant financiers led Necker's enemies to claim that he had sold France out to foreign capitalists.[209] Furthermore, perhaps owing to the nature of Panchaud's correspondents, all but two of the members of the *Caisse d'escompte*'s first *conseil d'administration* were foreigners.[210] Suspicion of foreign bankers was to persist and deepen, especially when the state of the monarchy's finances came to light in the late 1780s. By then, the belief that foreign

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[205]Lüthy, *La Banque Protestant en France*, ii, 425 - 426
[206]Jarrett, *The begetters of Revolution*, 159.
[207]Jarrett, *The begetters of Revolution*, 173.
[208]Lüthy, *La Banque Protestant en France*, ii, 433 - 435.
[209]Jarrett, *The begetters of Revolution*, 171 - 172.
[210]Lüthy, *La Banque Protestant en France* ... , 421, 437.

financiers were manipulating the government and the destiny of France had wide appeal. With the continued involvement of foreign bankers, and the indebtedness of the French state to foreign creditors, it was perhaps inevitable that suspicion of foreign financiers should persist into the Revolution, sometimes with lethal consequences.

If foreign manufacturers, artisans, fishermen, merchants and bankers helped to generate wealth in the French economy, there were others who contributed in smaller ways, but whose services were nonetheless widely used. Seasonal migration, brought on by high birth-rates and limited agricultural resources, brought to the large cities labourers from all parts of France and Europe, but especially from Savoy. In Paris, Savoyards emerged from their lodgings in the *quartiers* of the Ville Neuve near the Porte Saint-Denis, or in the *faubourgs* Saint-Jacques and Saint-Marcel to work the streets as lamplighters, messengers, chimney sweeps, shoe-shiners, sawyers or even as *décrotteurs*, people who earned their keep by taking mud off peoples boots. Savoyard women worked in Lyon as *tireuses de cordes* for the silk weavers.[211] They were stereotyped for their poverty: 'Savoyard' became a generic term for anyone who performed the dirty and menial tasks in the streets. Johann Georg Wille stumbled across a group of chimney sweeps in their sordid lodgings and he concluded instantly that they were Savoyards:

> . . . j'entrois dans une maison dont l'allée, remplie d'ordures, me choquoit déjà; mais, par pure curiosité, je pénétrois plus avant où j'y voyois une grande pièce noircie de fumée et salie de tous côtés. C'étoit le logement d'une société de petits ramoneurs de Savoie dont chaque membre avoit le bonheur de dormir sur un grabat de paille hachée, à deux sols de loyer par nuit, payé d'avance. Ah! que je décampai bien vite de cette misérable caverne![212]

Like many of the labouring poor, Savoyards were often regarded with suspicion by the authorities, occasionally being fingered for involvement in the more boisterous political demonstrations. When the *parlement* of Paris was recalled in 1774, the celebrations went on into the early hours of the morning and the guard had to force the crowd from the courtyard of the Palais de Justice. It was reported by the officer in charge that Savoyards were among those ejected.[213]

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[211]Kaplow, J., *The Names of Kings. The Parisian Laboring Poor in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), 33, 43, 52; Mercier, *Le Tableau de Paris*, 142, 144.
[212]Wille, *Mémoires et journal*, i, 89.
[213]Kaplow, *The Names of Kings*, 156.

The Savoyards worked long hours, however, being among the first out on the streets by 5 o'clock in the morning and staying out until late at night.[214] Mercier stressed that, as poor as they were, 'ils épargnent sur le simple nécessaire, pour envoyer chaque année à leurs pauvres parents' and he praised them as 'modèles de l'amour filial'.[215] Mercier was not exaggerating: each year, towards the end of the eighteenth century, up to 40,000 people returned to Savoy with varying amounts of money saved up. Moreover, some were skilled artisans, including among them stonemasons, and *colporteurs* who became small *commerçants* with their own shops.[216]

Savoyards, despite speaking French, retained a distinct identity while in France. Mercier observed that 'ils se distinguent toujours par l'amour de leur patrie et de leurs parents.' They often organised themselves in a self-regulating community which kept them out of trouble with the authorities: 'les plus âgés ont droit de l'inspection sur les plus jeunes ... on les a vus faire justice de l'un d'entre eux qui avait volé; ils lui firent son procès et le pendirent.'[217] They were none the less an important part of French urban life.

At the very bottom of the social pile, however, were those who provoked not just suspicion, but outright hostility: migrant beggars. The same economic factors which drove the Savoyards to seek low-paid work in France also forced less fortunate people to seek a living by charity. Occasionally the problem provoked the authorities at the highest level into action. Between 1780 and 1783, twenty-one beggars, mostly from northern Italy, were arrested in France at places as diverse as Poitou, Angers, Rennes, Pau, Besançon and Aix-en-Provence. What linked them together was that they all carried false letters from religious orders permitting them to beg for alms. They were all forged by a schoolmaster from the Val de Styr in Switzerland, who had acquired copies of the official stamps of the superiors of various monastic orders and made wood-block imitations. On 17 April, the king gave orders for the expulsion of all foreign beggars in France, including foreign peripatetic friars who begged for alms. By 29 April more than sixty religious were arrested and ordered to leave the country. This order was confirmed by an edict registered a year later.[218] If genuine friars were expelled along with beggars with false

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[214]Karamzin, *Voyage en France*, 92; Mercier, *Le Tableau de Paris*, 142.
[215]Mercier, *Le Tableau de Paris*, 142.
[216]Nicolas, J., *La Savoie au 18e siècle: noblesse et bourgeoisie* (2 vols.) (Paris: Librairie de la Nouvelle Faculté, 1978), ii, 937.
[217]Mercier, *Le Tableau de Paris*, 142.
[218]MAE, ADP, France, 12, dossier 265 (letter of de Ségur to Vergennes, 29 April 1783; 'Etat des fausses lettres d'obedience').

papers, it reflects the authorities' determination to get rid of those whom it saw as a threat to the peace of the countryside and towns.

VII

The contrasting treatment of different types of foreigners in France before 1789 shows that they were encouraged to settle in France where they were deemed of use to the state. Such uses could be obvious, such as the role of foreign troops in the defence of the kingdom, the use of foreign refugees like the Jacobites and the Dutch Patriots as pawns in France's foreign policy, and the enrichment of the country, particularly when foreigners had technical skills which French people lacked. Less obvious was the reinforcement of the prestige of the monarchy, either through enhancing its Catholic image by tolerating foreign clergy, or by seeking a reflection of its glory through patronising foreigners in the arts and sciences.

Yet the state also had to balance its use of foreigners with other considerations, such as domestic stability and diplomacy. As open as the Ancien Régime was to the contributions of foreigners, it was also ready to dispense with them or at least control their activities when practical politics dictated. The state sought to prevent the foreign clergy from becoming financially dependent on the crown, for example, and, in order to preserve the essentially French fabric of the Gallican church, it attempted to prevent foreign priests from appointing foreign vicars or successors in their benefices. Despite its interest in a Stuart restoration in Britain, the French government discarded the Jacobites when broader diplomatic pressures required. The absolute monarchy was pragmatic in its approach to foreigners, waiving rules such as religious conformity for naturalisation or membership of French academies when it suited. This pragmatism was possible because it was theoretically within the monarchy's power to establish general rules, but also to tinker and alter them at will. Such an approach also helps to explain why the *droit d'aubaine* was not unilaterally and completely abolished in France before 1789. While it recognised the potential economic benefits of such a measure, the government was unwilling to ease restrictions on foreigners while French subjects abroad remained liable to similar impositions. The monarchy therefore insisted on reciprocity, which meant that far from sliding inevitably to its death, the *droit d'aubaine* was very much alive in various forms, even if its effects were limited to the *droit de détraction* for most nationalities.

The practical way in which the monarchy dealt with foreigners means that the Ancien Régime cannot be judged as being assimilationist or exclusivist except by reference to specific types of foreigners. In fact, the treatment of foreigners depending on their role in French society corresponded with the entire social structure of the Ancien Régime, in which people were organised into groups based on function, each with varying degrees of privilege. In these circumstances, the nationality of foreigners mattered less than loyalty and obedience to the king and, above all, the function they performed in society.

The Revolution presented an ideological challenge to this corporate society, by breaking down the barriers between corporations and, above all, by abolishing the multitude of privileges which defined these groups. In making the nation the essential source of identity, the Revolution put into question the role of foreigners who had long enjoyed a privileged role in various branches of the French state and society. None the less, ideology concealed the fact that the fundamental pressures which had faced the Ancien Régime remained the same. The revolutionaries were not doctrinaires who blindly applied their principles regardless of the consequences. Instead, when they dealt with the problems posed by foreigners they were as sensitive to the financial, political and diplomatic considerations as the Ancien Régime had been. For this reason, the Revolution witnessed a good deal of continuity from the absolute monarchy in its pragmatic ways of dealing with foreigners. This is not to suggest, however, that the intellectual challenges which underpinned revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners were irrelevant, for the importance of the revolutionaries' pragmatism can only be fully gauged against their views of citizenship, nationality and patriotism.

Chapter Two. Patriots and Cosmopolitans. The ideology of assimilation and exclusion in eighteenth-century France.

Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Un corps d'associés vivant sous une loi *commune* et représentés par la même *législature* ...

- Emmanuel Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?* (1789).[1]

La philosophie n'avait pas encore révélé à l'espèce humaine cette grande maxime que la liberté proclame: Les hommes forment une même famille répandue sur la surface de la terre.

- Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac, 6 August 1790.[2]

Je vous l'avois bien dit que les journaux aristocratiques ... criéroient que la dénonciation du COMITÉ AUTRICHIEN n'étoit pas fondée. ... Au reste, quand on a lu les discours de MM. Gensonné et Brissot, et quand on ajoute aux faits qu'ils dévoilent, la masse des faits plus connus dont personne ne peut avoir perdu le souvenir, on trouve contre les *conspirateurs Autrichiens* tant de *preuves*, qu'il n'y a plus d'embarras que sur le choix.

- Jean-Baptiste Louvet, *La Sentinelle*, May 1792.[3]

In the decade which followed the convocation of the Estates-General, the revolutionaries expressed a wide range of attitudes towards foreigners, from the broad, assimilationist definition of the nation by Sieyès and the cosmopolitan appeal by Barère to the xenophobia of Louvet. Historians of the period and of nationalism have identified the main development as a progression from the enlightened cosmopolitanism of 1789 - 1790 to a narrow, militant nationalism by 1793 - 1794. In this view, the French Revolution eventually rejected the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment and put in its place an

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[1]Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?*, 40.
[2]AP, xvii, 628.
[3]*La Sentinelle*, No. 7 (26 or 27 May 1792).

aggressive ideological force which excluded on the basis of nationality and which justified territorial expansionism.[4] This view is acceptable, but needs some some qualification.

In the first place, the cosmopolitanism and patriotism expressed by the revolutionaries were based less on the content of the Enlightenment itself, than on the revolutionaries' own adaptations of the various strands of eighteenth-century philosophy. Such interpretations were adapted to suit their own circumstances. In this respect, revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism was an invention of the revolutionaries themselves. Moreover, attitudes towards foreigners were not based only on the intellectual currents, but on the legal, political and cultural conditions in which the revolutionaries had been immersed before 1789.

Secondly, a move away from pacific cosmopolitanism to an aggressive nationalism is apparent, but this is only part of the picture. Revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners and other countries were based not only on ideological and cultural currents, but also on a pragmatic response to circumstances. Consequently, while the ideology might have become nationalist, exclusive and aggressive, outside the public halls of debate revolutionary authorities quietly ensured that certain foreigners were protected from the

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[4]Albert Mathiez, for example, writes of the summer of 1793 that 'la défiance à l'égard des étrangers s'accommodait mal avec la continuation de la propagande dans les pays voisins. ... Le cosmopolitisme reculait tous les jours. ... Le nationalisme commercial progressait du même pas que le nationalisme politique. Après le Purgatoire, les étrangers allait connaître l'Enfer.' (*La Révolution et les étrangers*, 130, 132, 137). In his study on Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, Thomas J. Schlereth writes that despite the avowed cosmopolitanism of the Revolution, 'a strain of national intolerance and aggressiveness soon became discernible in the words and deeds of the revolutionaries ... the Revolution swung toward a messianic nationalism' (*The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought. Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume, and Voltaire, 1694 - 1790* (Notre Dame & London: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 133). See also the article by Virginie Guiraudon, 'Cosmopolitanism and National Priority: Attitudes towards Foreigners in France between 1789 and 1794', *History of European Ideas*, xiii (1991), 591 - 604. Some studies on nationalism and citizenship have also seen in the French Revolution the transformation from eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism to nationalism. Boyd C. Shafer writes: 'As the Revolution became more violent and as France warred with much of Europe from 1792, the philosophic cosmopolitanism of eighteenth-century liberals tended to disappear and national prejudices and national hatreds to be accentuated.' (*Faces of Nationalism. New Realities and Old Myths* (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), 110). Hans Kohn writes that the war converted the French 'from the peaceful spirit of eighteenth century Enlightenment to the aggressive dynamism of modern nationalism' (*Nationalism. Its Meaning and History* (rev. ed.) (Princeton: van Nostrand, 1965), 27). More recently, Derek Heater has written that 'the forces of cosmopolitanism and nationalism struggled for supremacy in the French Revolution' (*World Citizenship and Government. Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1996), 76).

effects of the rhetoric. In such circumstances political orthodoxy and usefulness, rather than nationality, became the determining factor in the way in which foreigners were treated. Such a situation had implications for the meaning and content of patriotism and cosmopolitanism in the 1790s.

I

The role of the Enlightenment in shaping revolutionary ideology has long been a source of controversy among historians.[5] The different and often contradictory strains of Enlightenment thought encapsulated a range of ideas and attitudes which were often contradictory. The extent to which the revolutionaries were directly influenced by the *philosophes'* views on issues such as man's common humanity, war and peace is questionable. The deputies to the Estates-General were certainly familiar with some elements of Enlightenment thought and language, but in the early months of the Revolution, at least, they were more likely to allude to history and the classics than to Rousseau or to Voltaire.[6] It is possible, therefore, that if revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism stemmed from certain aspects of Enlightenment thought, it was less the product of direct continuity, than of the revolutionaries retrospectively interpreting and claiming as their own certain strands of the Enlightenment.[7] The actual content of the ideas of the *philosophes* was not so important as how the revolutionaries interpreted, extrapolated and used it for their own ends. The debates in May 1790 on the constitutional question as to who had the right to make war and peace, which spilled over into broader issues, such as international law and the conduct of foreign policy, illustrate this. The discussion led to the famous declaration of 22 May 1790, inserted into the Constitution of 1791, in which 'la nation française renonce à entreprendre aucune guerre

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[5]See, for example, the readings in Church, W. F. (ed.), *The Influence of the Enlightenment on the French Revolution: Creative, Disastrous or Non-Existent?* (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1964).

[6]Tackett, T., *Becoming a Revolutionary. The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergencé of a Revolutionary Culture (1789 - 1790)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 65.

[7]As Roger Chartier suggests, 'it was the Revolution that made the books and philosophy' by selecting certain works and authors said 'to have prepared and announced it'. It amounted to a 'retrospective construction of the Enlightenment' (Chartier, R. (trans. Cochrane, L. G.), *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1991), 87 - 88.

dans la vue de faire des conquêtes, et n'emploiera jamais ses forces contre la liberté d'aucun peuple'.[8] On both sides of the argument, the revolutionaries alluded to a vast array of authorities. Those from the eighteenth century included the abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Montesquieu and the abbé de Mably.[9]

Saint-Pierre had envisaged a European Diet which would be the forum for compulsory mediation between potentially warring sovereigns, an idea which Rousseau later criticised for depending too much on the good will of monarchs, but which he also popularised in the process.[10] There is clear evidence that their work was known to French people outside the National Assembly, among pamphleteers, journalists and political clubs.[11] For most revolutionaries, however, as for most eighteenth-century philosophers, war was a sad fact of human existence. Voltaire, above all, mobilised his wit in his abhorrence of war, but he was no pacifist and derided plans such as Saint-Pierre's: 'les hommes seront toujours fous; et ceux qui croient les guérir, sont les plus fous de la bande'.[12]

The revolutionaries did not inherit any clearly-defined cosmopolitan ideology from the Enlightenment, but rather a vague humanitarianism which regarded the pursuit of happiness as a legitimate human activity and which accepted that man was naturally good.[13] Such views on humanity led to an abhorrence of war and persecution which fed into both the left and right wings of the Constituent Assembly. In the debates of May 1790, both sides in the argument on war and peace therefore tried to appropriate the same authors and texts, and Montesquieu in particular, to support their own arguments. Reubell, Robespierre and Pétion used arguments similar to those adopted by Montesquieu

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[8]AP, xxxii, 541.

[9]See, for example, the speeches by the duc de Lévis on 16 May, by the duc de Praslin and the abbé Maury on 18 May, the abbé de Montesquiou on 19 May and Bengy de Puyvallée on 20 May (AP, xv, 526, 558, 566 - 567, 590, 616).

[10]Saint-Pierre, C.-I. C. de (ed. Goyard-Fabre, S.), *Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe* (1713) (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1981); Rousseau, 'Jugement sur le projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l'abbé de Saint-Pierre' (1782), *Petits Chefs-d'Oeuvre de J.-J. Rousseau* (Paris, n.d.), 268 - 271.

[11]Lemaître, M., *Réflexions philosophiques sur le projet de l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre par M. L***, de Versailles* (n.p., 1790); *Le Patriote Français*, No. 459 (10 November 1790).

[12]Voltaire, F.-M. A. (trans. Butt, J.), *Candide* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947), 25 - 26; Voltaire (trans. Besterman, T.), *Philosophical Dictionary* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 231; Gay, P., *The Enlightenment: an Interpretation* (2 vols.), ii, *The Science of Freedom* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 404; Meyer, H., *Voltaire on war and peace*, Besterman, T. (ed.), *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, cxliv (Banbury: Voltaire Foundation, 1976), 169.

[13]Mornet, D., *Les Origines Intellectuelles de la Révolution Française (1715 - 1787)* (2nd ed.) (Paris: Colin, 1934), 109 - 111, 258.

and Rousseau, even if they did not cite them by name. Rousseau had argued that kings were unlikely to temper their ambitions for the sake of the common good, while Montesquieu suggested that the spirit of monarchy is war and expansion, while that of a republic is peace and moderation.[14] Their opponent, Maury, cited Montesquieu's *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur et de la décadence des Romains* against the view that republics are naturally peace-loving.[15]

The Enlightenment also had some influence in shaping views on international law, referred to as the *droit des gens* and as the *droit public de l'Europe*. None the less, most deputies had probably been introduced to the concept less through reading the *philosophes* than through the legal training which much of the Third Estate had received. The *droit des gens* governed relations between individuals of different nationalities and was meant to offer them some protection when they were abroad. The term was also used to describe the theoretical rules of international relations. Under this tacit law, foreigners and commerce were supposed to be protected from the worst abuses of alien governments and atrocities committed in wartime were meant to be proscribed. The *droit public* consisted of the actual treaties and alliances by which states were meant to abide in their relations with each other. Of the Enlightenment writers cited by the revolutionaries, Mably wrote about the latter, Montesquieu the former.[16] Montesquieu's views on international law were cited in the May debate by the duc de Lévis.[17] Rousseau also wrote on *droit des gens* and was more critical than Montesquieu about the way in which it failed to remove all abuses inflicted on enemy subjects in wartime. He particularly condemned the *droit de représailles*, whereby one government could enact measures against the subjects of another in retaliation for similar abuses.[18] The revolutionaries inherited this same disgust for these bad old ways but, in the first year of the Constituent, the revolutionaries persisted in using Montesquieu, not Rousseau, as a source of authority in their efforts to build a new conception of relations between the states and the treatment

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[14]AP, xv, 518, 539, 559; Rousseau, 'Jugement sur le projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l'abbé de Saint-Pierre', 268 - 271; Montesquieu, C.-L. de Secondat, *De l'Esprit des Loix* (1748), book ix, chapter 2.

[15]AP, xv, 567.

[16]Mably, abbé G. B. de, *Principes des Négociations, pour servir d'Introduction au Droit Public de l'Europe* and *Le Droit Public de l'Europe, fondé sur les Traités*, vols. vii - x of *Oeuvres Complètes de l'Abbé de Mably* (19 vols.) (Toulouse, 1791); Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Loix*, book i, chapter 3.

[17]AP, xv, 526.

[18]Rousseau, J.-J., *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755) (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1971), 126 - 127.

of foreigners in France. On 6 August, Barère quoted Montesquieu in his attack on the *droit d'aubaine*, describing it as one of the 'droits insensés' of the Dark Ages.[19] Montesquieu popularised the Ancien Régime's legalistic and diplomatic conception of the *droit des gens* among those who had neither diplomatic experience nor legal training.

The sparse references by the revolutionaries to Grotius, Pufendorf, Mably and Montesquieu on the subject of international law suggests however that those revolutionaries who seemed comfortable with the concept of the *droit des gens* may have been familiarised with it through other media. Many deputies had received legal training and dictionaries of law and works on jurisprudence explained the term at length because the distinction between the *droit des gens* and the *droit civil* justified the legal treatment not only of foreigners, but also of illegitimate children.[20] The work of the Genevan international jurist Emmerich de Vattel was certainly known to some of the deputies.[21] The large contingent within the Constituent Assembly who had some sort of legal training suggests that many of the revolutionaries may have acquired familiarity with the concept through texts on jurisprudence rather than the Enlightenment. The theorists of international law may therefore have had a more direct influence on the revolutionaries in their attitudes towards foreigners because they discussed the justifications behind the rules of conduct towards foreign subjects, as well as the laws themselves.

Combined with the humanitarianism of the Enlightenment, ideas on international law led some revolutionaries to give universal application to revolutionary ideology. These revolutionaries proclaimed that henceforth French diplomacy and the treatment of foreigners would be based on a new legality. Volney, whose *Ruines, ou Méditations sur les révolutions des empires*, published in 1791, envisaged a General Assembly of Peoples,[22] made a similar suggestion to his fellow-deputies in May 1790: 'Dans cette grande société générale, les peuples et les Etats considérés comme individus jouissent des mêmes droits naturels et sont soumis aux mêmes règles de justice que les individus des sociétés partielles et secondaires'.[23] While Volney's Assembly of Peoples was regarded as a chimera by most revolutionaries, his appeal to regard the whole human race as forming a

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[19]AP, xvii, 628; Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Loix*, book xxi, chapter xvii.
[20]See, for example, Ferrière, *Dictionnaire de droit practique*, i, 585 - 586.
[21]Vattel, E. de, *Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle* (1758). See Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, 75 and Hinsley, F. H., *Power and the Pursuit of Peace. Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 166 - 167.
[22]Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, 78.
[23]AP, xv, 576.

single society struck a chord, as it did with Barère when he called for the abolition of the *droit d'aubaine* on 6 August.[24]

Economic theory, however, also entered into the equation. A few revolutionaries who had given attention to economic thought before 1789 were aware of Adam Smith's work, *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776. Smith was cited in the discussions on the *caisse d'escompte* by Mirabeau and Dupont de Nemours, both of whom had developed the economic ideas of the 'Physiocrat' François Quesnay.[25] Their ideas pointed to the same conclusion, that free trade ought to be beneficial to all concerned.[26] While much of the stress on free trade sought to provide the country's own needs, some idealists went further in regarding international commerce as a channel through which moral, social and political benefits could flow, as both Voltaire and Smith himself wrote.[27]

Progressive eighteenth-century thinkers saw a link between commerce, a nation's wealth and the ability of foreigners to settle freely in the country, without fear for either their personal security or their property. In 1755, Turgot translated and published a pamphlet written by Josiah Tucker on the British parliamentary bill for the naturalisation of foreign Protestants. The message, he believed, applied equally to France. Foreigners contributed to the manufacturing, commerce and, therefore, the wealth of the nation. The naturalisation of hardworking, thrifty and sober foreigners would reform the morals of the nation.[28] The economic benefits of immigration encouraged some royal ministers including Necker and Calonne to consider a unilateral abolition of the *droit d'aubaine*.

The revolutionaries inherited this thinking. In January 1790, Jean-Paul Marat wrote in his newspaper:

> Nous observons ici avec joie, qu'une constitution libre deviendra pour la France une source intarissable de biens. Réunis à la beauté du climat, à la fécondité du sol, à la douceur du commerce de ses habitans, les charmes de la liberté attireroit bientôt parmi-nous une foule

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[24]AP, xvii, 628.
[25]AP, ix, 363 - 364; x, 139 - 140.
[26]Lewis, G., *The French Revolution. Rethinking the Debate* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 64 - 65.
[27]Voltaire, *Lettres philosophiques* (1733) (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1964), letter x; Smith, A., *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), Gay, P. (ed.), *The Enlightenment: a comprehensive anthology* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 609, 611.
[28]'Questions importantes sur le Commerce, à l'occasion des oppositions au dernier *Bill* de Naturalisation. Pamphlet économique de Josias Tucker, traduit et annoté par Turgot' (1755), Daire, E. (ed.), *Collection des Principaux Économistes* (15 vols.) (Paris, 1843 - 1848), iii, *Oeuvres de Turgot*, 322 - 351.

> d'étrangers, avec leurs talens, leurs arts, leurs fortunes; ajoutons avec leurs vertus, car il n'y a que les coeurs honnêtes, les âmes élevées qui se passionnent pour la liberté. ... l'exemple de leurs vertus, fixeront la mobilité de notre caractère; ils nous donneront des lumières et des moeurs.[29]

Such ideas received practical application later that year, with the abolition of the *droit d'aubaine*. There were also broader, cultural and political influences at work in developing attitudes towards foreigners in the eighteenth century. Cosmopolitanism was not only a philosophy which recognised common characteristics among all humanity, but for an élite few, it was a way of life. The network of patrons, friendships and rivalries across Europe and the Atlantic in the eighteenth century, existed not only among the *philosophes*, but also among merchants, artists, academics, scientists, journalists, military officers, diplomats and aristocrats on the 'Grand Tour'. Those who partook in the exchange of ideas, art, literature and science believed, like John Adams, that 'science and literature are of no party nor nation'.[30] During the Seven Years War, Casanova was told that a personal letter of introduction would ease his passage across war-torn Germany far more than any official passport.[31]

The development of international communication was aided by the fact that French was the international language of culture and diplomacy, which led some contemporaries to speak of *l'Europe française*. The cosmopolitanism of the western world's political, cultural and scientific élites and the role of the French language in promoting it should not be overstated. Enlightenment cosmopolitanism and *Europe française* papered over deep cultural differences which in the long term proved to be more lasting than the cosmopolitan networks and lifestyle of the cultural and political élites. Local social, cultural and political circumstances produced regional and national peculiarities within the European Enlightenment itself.[32] None the less, in France itself some of those who engaged in the veneer of cosmopolitan culture, or who saw it through the window of literature and the press, may have been left with the impression that Europeans and Americans thought in fundamentally the same way as the French.

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[29]*L'Ami du Peuple*, No. 96 (13 January 1790).
[30]Quoted in Wood, G. S., *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1993), 221.
[31]Pomeau, R., *L'Europe des lumières. Cosmopolitisme et unité européenne au 18e siècle* (Paris: Éditions Stock, 1966), 16.
[32]See, for example, the discussion of the *Aufklärung* in Blanning, *Reform and Revolution in Mainz*, 1 - 37.

In literature, fictional foreigners, sometimes from very exotic places, were the innocent observers of French or European mores. Their alien origins detached these fictitious observers from everyday European life and allowed the writer to criticise and lampoon targets through the ignorant or naïve eyes of their character.[33] Such literary devices, of course, did not in themselves bring people to regard foreigners in a different light. As a means of criticising French and European customs and habits, however, they might have persuaded some of the more adventurous readers to consider that the norms of foreigners may have been viable, if not better, alternatives to those of the French. Such attitudes fed into a longer-term trend, at least among the intellectual élites, which stemmed from interest in both 'primitive' peoples on continents such as the Americas and civilisations such as the Chinese, both of which were idealized to some extent by some of the *philosophes* and other writers of the eighteenth century.[34]

Most French admiration for other cultures, however, focused on other European peoples, or those of European origins. For much of the eighteenth-century, *Anglomanie* was a strong cultural force among the social élites. *Anglomanie* operated at two levels: as a deep, critical interest in British society, letters and institutions and as a superficial imitation of British fashion and demeanour, sometimes to the extreme.[35]

Voltaire had sparked the interest in British institutions with his *Lettres philosophiques*. If he was not uncritical of Britain,[36] his approach was intended to imply that things were worse in France. This device was used against various aspects of French politics and society and one did not need to be blindly anglophile to do so. Echoing Voltaire, many writers praised British legal and political institutions, while savaging the superficial adoption of British fashions by French men and women of society. Louis-Sébastien Mercier wrote that the French had adopted British styles of clothing and entertainment, but 'quand leur prendrons-nous quelque chose de plus important à saisir, comme par

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[33]See Granderoute, R., 'Comment peut-on être peruvienne ou *Les Lettres d'une peruvienne* de Madame de Grafigny', Centre Interdisciplinaire bordelais d'études des lumières, *Regard de/sur l'étranger au XVIII^e siècle* (Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1958), 35 - 50.

[34]Mornet, *Les Origines Intellectuelles*, 259; Hampson, N., *The Enlightenment* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 26 - 27, 104, 107.

[35]Grieder, J., *Anglomania in France. Fact, Fiction, and Political Discourse* (Paris & Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1985), 7 - 31.

[36]Voltaire appreciates the extent of religious toleration offered by Britain, but still points out that non-conformists cannot take office because of the Test and Corporation Acts (*Lettres philosophiques*, letter v).

exemple la loi *habeas corpus?*[37] The political content of Anglomania in France was potent. Supporters of the *Parlements* sometimes suggested that the solution to the problems of absolutism was in the adoption of British parliamentary institutions.[38] Voltaire, Montesquieu and Chastellux all praised the balance of crown, people and parliament.[39]

The American Revolution and the drafting of the United States constitution in 1787 delivered a blow to the British political system as the avant-garde model for French opponents of ministerial 'despotism', who by the 1770s were calling themselves 'patriots'.[40] By late 1789, admiration for British institutions was more likely to be expressed by the *monarchiens* to the right of the National Assembly rather than the left, who debunked the British example because of its bicameral legislature and the power it afforded the king and his ministers.[41] None the less, a residual interest in British institutions and practices ensured that, for the early years of the Revolution at least, British travellers and residents in France would be feted, as Dr. Rigby, Arthur Young and John Moore found between 1789 and 1792. For political models, however, some radicals by then had dismissed looking abroad altogether and sought ideas in their own, French genius. They could still however turn to the United States for inspiration. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789 had striking similarities to American versions, particularly Virginia's, and this is partly explained by the fact that Lafayette was active in the preparation of the French document. He worked closely with Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time. On the other hand, for French patriots American political structures could not offer a blueprint for French institutions, for like the British, the Americans had split the people's representatives into two houses. At the very least, however, the United States was a precursor, a model of political virtue, with a constitution on which the French could now improve.[42]

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[37]Mercier, *Le tableau de Paris*, 204.
[38]Jarrett, *The begetters of Revolution*, 77.
[39]Hampson, *The Enlightenment*, 147; Voltaire, *Lettres philosophiques*, letter viii; Higonnet, P., *Sister Republics. The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (Cambride: Harvard University Press, 1988), 122.
[40]Doyle, W., *Origins of the French Revolution* (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 91.
[41]As Josephine Grieder writes, 'at no time is *anglomanie* more reactionary than when it appears most triumphant' (*Anglomania*, 31).
[42]Mornet, *Les Origines Intellectuelles*, 389 - 399; Higonnet, *Sister Republics*, 166; Godechot, J., 'Le Bicentenaire de la Révolution Américaine', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, xlviii (1976), 481 - 483. R. R. Palmer argues that the similarities between the French Declaration of Rights and its American predecessors were the result

Revolutionary cosmopolitanism was a cocktail made from very different cordials. Enlightenment humanitarianism, legal concepts of international law, economic theory, international cultural exchange, anglomania and the idealization of America all weighed in varying degrees on individual revolutionaries. This diversity of intellectual and cultural origins, however, meant that cosmopolitanism would be given a wide variety of expression by different revolutionaries, whose motives were almost always driven by practical considerations. To speak of eighteenth-century 'cosmopolitanism' is only useful, therefore, as a shorthand for a range of humanitarian sentiments and ideas, some of them very vague, which recognised the unity of mankind in a variety of forms. The revolutionaries succeeded in giving these impulses some coherence through the doctrine of the rights of man and, in doing so, created their own, 'revolutionary' cosmopolitanism. As human rights were attributed to man by nature, it followed that they were universal, as some of the American revolutionaries had claimed. The French Revolution was regarded, and not only by the French, as a force for positive change in the world, either as an example to follow, or as an active, proselytising agent. Once the universal implications of the rights of man were understood, so the other intellectual and cultural influences which the revolutionaries had inherited from the decades before 1789 were invested with a more radical meaning.

These cosmopolitan impulses had their opposites and contradictory implications which were equally rooted in the intellectual and cultural background of the eighteenth century. Such antitheses to cosmopolitanism were also given coherence by the egalitarian notions of the rights of man. Humanity was so vast that benevolence was most effective if it was not aimed at people too far away. One's first duty was to one's fellow citizens.[43] The obverse side of the cosmopolitan coin was therefore patriotism, and Rousseau has borne much responsibilty for its development.

The influence of Rousseau on the political ideas of the revolutionaries in 1789 has been hotly debated. If the deputies had read Rousseau, who was undoubtedly a popular author among all the reading public from artisans to the aristocracy, they were not necessarily influenced by his political ideas.[44] Whether Rousseau was influential before 1789, or

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of a 'community of ideas' rather than of any direct influence from America. While recognising the role of Jefferson and Lafayette, he points out that it was Mounier who drafted the first three articles, and he was not close to the American ambassador (Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, i, 487).

[43]Mornet, *Les Origines Intellectuelles*, 111.

[44]Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution*, 27; Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 65; Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, 83 - 84.

whether his writings were plundered retrospectively, what matters is that the revolutionaries, at some point, used his ideas in their formation of a patriotic ideology. At issue, therefore, are the varieties of patriotism which might have been drawn from his ideas.

When Rousseau's conception of the social contract and the general will was discussed by the people who read and understood his ideas, as they did during the Maupeou crisis of 1771, its relevance focused on the internal tension within the state, in relation to the politics of the Ancien Régime. Those who opposed royal power called themselves 'patriots' not in the sense that they felt threatened by or aggressive towards foreigners, but because they sought to put the interests of the country as a whole above the sectional interests of royal ministers. By 1789, this patriotism also entailed an assault on privilege, for the same reasons. For as long as patriotism meant opposition to the government, it was entirely compatible with cosmopolitan sentiments. Volney, the visionary of world citizenship, was regarded as one of those who styled themselves as 'national' or 'patriotic' opinion in the pamphlet war over representation to the Estates-General in 1789.[45]

None the less, some of Rousseau's celebrations of patriotism did have connotations which were opposed to cosmopolitanism and which entailed the exclusion of foreigners from the nation's political and social life. Concerned for the well-being of his homeland, a patriot might well be suspicious of the cosmopolitans who read approvingly of far-off places, but did nothing for their fellow citizens. This was what Rousseau meant in his influential work on education, *Émile*, when he warned 'Défiez-vous de ces cosmopolites qui vont chercher au loin dans leur livres des devoirs qu'ils dédaignent de remplir autour d'eux.'[46] This, written in 1762, was a reversal of his view published seven years previously in the *Discours sur l'inégalité*, which described the 'grands âmes cosmopolites qui franchissent les barrières imaginaires qui séparent les peuples et qui ... embrassent tout le genre humain dans leur bienveillance.'[47] It has been suggested that Rousseau recognised man's common humanity in the abstract, but put patriotism first because communal solidarity is limited by distance.[48] Rousseau remained steadfast in his denial of cosmopolitanism from 1762 onwards. In *Du Contrat Social*, he suggested that most of

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[45]Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution*, 91, 146.
[46]Quoted in Hazard, P., 'Cosmopolite', *Extrait des Mélanges Baldensperger* (Paris, 1930), 9.
[47]Rousseau, *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité*, 126.
[48]Lecercle, J.-L., 'L'abbé de St-Pierre, Rousseau et l'Europe', *Dix-Huitième Siècle*, xxv (1993) 31 - 32.

what Peter the Great did for Russia was misguided because the Russians were not ready for government through civil law: 'he tried to turn them into Germans or Englishmen instead of making them Russians'.[49]

For Rousseau, there could be no constitutional or legal blueprint suited to all men, but rather they must suit the particular character and circumstances of the people for whom it was destined. National character was not only desirable, but necessary. In his *Projet pour la Constitution de la Corse* written in 1765, he declared that 'le meilleur mobile d'un gouvernment c'est l'amour de la Patrie et cet amour se cultive avec les champs'. A national identity should be invented if one did not exist already: 'tout peuple doit avoir un caractère national et s'il en manquait il faudrait déjà commencer par lui en donner'.[50] In this respect, Rousseau is rightly seen as the founder of modern nationalism, because he recognised the need of a people with no coherent identity or a clear-cut historical claim to nationhood to invent or to extrapolate one from the past, from language and from culture. For the Poles, in particular, the need for an aggressive patriotism was pressing in the struggle for independence and survival.

Rousseau's view of nationality and its relation to the state was also modern in that it implied the exclusion of foreigners from the internal workings of the state. Foreigners did not have a sense of national identity inculcated from birth and so they would not have the necessary passion for the interests of the country. For this reason, Rousseau warned the Poles against mercenaries in his *Considérations sur le gouvernment de Pologne*.[51] The idea of a citizen army had a certain appeal among French people in the later eighteenth century, if only because both within the government and outside it many were already thinking along the same lines.[52]

It was not, however, only to the army that the general ideas of national exclusion might have been applied, but also to government, administration and the clergy. At least one *cahier de doléances* in 1789 denounced the appointment of foreigners to French public office and clerical benefices, while another complained that foreigners could acquire

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[49]Rousseau, J.-J. (trans. Cranston, M.), *The Social Contract* (1762) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 90.
[50]Quoted in Suratteau, J.-R., 'Cosmopolitisme et Patriotisme au Siècle des Lumières', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* lv (1983), 369.
[51]Quoted in Meyer, *Voltaire on war and peace*, 170.
[52]See, for example, the comte de Guibert's ideas on a citizen-army (quoted in Blanning, T. C. W., *The French Revolutionary Wars 1787 - 1802* (London: Arnold, 1996), 13) and the complaints and suggestions in the *cahiers de doléances* of 1789 over the use of foreign troops (AP, iii, 569, 735; iv, 338, 666, 765 - 766; v, 310, 541, 790; vi, 43; suppl., 294).

lettres de naturalité too easily. On the other hand, such expressions of exclusivity were rare. More *cahiers* were inclined to make naturalisation more accessible to foreigners, while others proposed that foreigners receive the same protection of the law as French people.[53]

If Rousseau's ideas on patriotism had resonance among the reading public of the decades before the Revolution, it was because, as has been shown, they coincided with concerns and ideas already in circulation, but there were also broader, cultural influences. The most important of these, at least for educated people, was their knowledge and reading of the classics. Those who opposed royal power were more likely to draw on examples from Greek or Roman history than from Rousseau. If they looked to any eighteenth-century *philosophe* in their support for the *parlements*, it was Montesquieu, who himself referred frequently to the classics. While defying the crown, the *parlementaires* themselves played the part of Roman patricians defending the interests of the *patrie*.[54] During the Revolution, Hercules would come to symbolise the French people and the speeches of the revolutionaries would rely on classical examples, which could be traced to their education. While patriots in the later eighteenth century could find models worthy of emulation in the contemporary examples of the United States, Switzerland and Britain, history offered only the beacons of Sparta, Rome and Athens, with the intervening period being dominated by kings and oppressive noblemen.[55]

The main difference between the patriotism understood by opponents to royal power and that of conservatives was that the former focused on the internal political life of the nation itself, while the latter identified the *patrie* with the king rather than the people. Although conservatives were no more susceptible to xenophobia than their 'patriot' opponents, their defence of royal power put them in the forefront of the reaction against *anglomanie* before 1789. Meanwhile, 'patriotic' opponents of royal prerogatives were more willing to look abroad, for example to the United States and Britain, for models which they considered to be worthy for an enlightened people such as the French. Moreover, the example of the American Revolution had impressed French observers of the power of patriotism. Lafayette commented on the commitment of the American troops, saying that 'only citizens could support the nakedness, the hunger, the labours, and

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[53]Hyslop, B. F., *French Nationalism in 1789 according to the General Cahiers* (1934) (New York: Octagon, 1968), 33 - 35.
[54]Hampson, 'La Patrie', Lucas, C. (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, ii, *The Political Culture of the French Revolution*, 126.
[55]Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, 28 - 29, 33, 51, 94 - 115.

the absolute lack of pay'.[56] For French patriots, the Americans offered a model of virtue, combining moral, political and scientific progress with the self-sacrifice required in the service of their fellow-citizens.

The French intervention in America none the less gave conservatives the opportunity to express their own form of patriotism. In helping to establish a republic in America, defenders of royal absolutism ironically regarded the war as a struggle against the less radical, but apparently more threatening, British way of life. An anonymous correspondent of the Russian court reported of the atmosphere in Versailles in January 1778, saying that 'il s'agit d'humilier l'orgueil Anglois et de rendre à la France son égalité et sa supériorité sur la mer'.[57] The intervention in America did not, of course, create anglophobia. Besides a long-standing rivalry which naturally found expression in culture and politics, from the mid-eighteenth century anglophobia was in part a reaction against anglomania, particularly for political conservatives. For Fougeret de Montbron writing in 1757, 'English Liberty' was nothing other than 'le droit féroce de pouvoir insulter impunément à la Majesté Roïale', that source of national identity for conservatives. During the Seven Years War, the conservatives' assaults on anglomania broadened in purpose. From defending the French system of government against its French opponents, they also sought to reinvigorate national pride. Their efforts intensified after the bitter disappointment of the peace. In 1765 the government commissioned from Pierre de Belloy a play entitled *Le Siège de Calais*, which met with resounding success. The heroes were naturally the six burghers who were willing to sacrifice all for their loyalty to their king and dismissive reviews by *philosophes* such as d'Holbach provoked fury from the piece's supporters, one of whom accused the iconoclasts of attempting 'une Saint-Barthélemy philosophique' on filial, fraternal and patriotic devotion.[58]

Conservatives sought to show that their political opponents lacked love of country and that they slavishly imitated British forms and fashions. The mobilization of xenophobia as a political tool was to be used to devastating effect by the revolutionaries against their domestic opponents, but it is now clear that they did not invent this type of tactic. Jacques Necker suffered for his apparent adoption of 'British' practices, such as the publication of the *Compte Rendu*, attacked by conservatives who feared that he preferred British forms of government and even sought to introduce them into France. Moreover,

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[56]Quoted in Heater, *Citizenship*, 45.
[57]Quoted in Grieder, *Anglomania*, 19.
[58]Grieder, *Anglomania*, 7, 118 - 122.

as a Genevan banker, he was suspected of being at the centre of an international network of Protestant financial institutions behind which lurked the British government.[59] In the last years of the Ancien Régime, conservatives who supported the government's coup against the *Parlements* in May 1788 accused the judges of 'anglomania' for their attempts to play a role in the governing of the kingdom. In the dispute over the organisation of the Estates-General, conservatives equated anglomania with republicanism and blamed British ideas for the Third Estate's intransigence. By 1789, the centre of debate had itself shifted leftwards after the collapse of royal authority. Consequently, the debate was no longer between absolutists and constitutional monarchists, but between different degrees of the latter. The admirers of the British 'constitution' now found themselves on the conservative side as the radicals looked to other sources of inspiration. Anglophobia now became the reserve of the left.[60]

In the years immediately before the Revolution, anglophobia was given another, popular appeal by the effects of the Eden-Vergennes commercial treaty between Britain and France signed in 1786. Of at least forty-six *cahiers de doléances* which mentioned the treaty, eleven expressed strong reservations about its effects.[61] Reading between the lines, it is possible to detect a smouldering resentment at the British in these denunciations.[62] On 4 November 1787, Arthur Young was amazed to find people crying for war against Britain in Lille, ostensibly over the United Provinces. Young, however, was certain 'that the origin of all this violence is the commercial treaty, which is execrated here, as the most fatal stroke to their manufactures they ever experienced.'[63] Normandy was also reputed to be in favour of war for the same reason. Some manufacturers and artisans suspected that the British were not honouring the terms of the treaty and, while flooding France with their goods, were boycotting French imports.[64]

As much as the British, the Austrians were also the targets of French revulsion. Matters were made worse because they appeared, at least to educated French eyes, to have no redeeming features such as a model constitution and civil liberties. Like Britain, the Habsburgs had long been a traditional enemy of France, going back more than two

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[59]Acomb, F., *Anglophobia in France 1763 - 1789. An Essay in the History of Constitutionalism and Nationalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1950), 91 - 92; Jarrett, *The begetters of Revolution*, 155.
[60]Acomb, *Anglophobia*, 94, 96, 100.
[61]See, for example, AP, i, 753; ii, 173; iii, 524, 531, 648; v, 549, 622.
[62]This, at least, is what Jacques Godechot suggests (*La Grande Nation*, 63).
[63]Young, *Travels in France*, 94.
[64]Acomb, *Anglophobia*, 118.

centuries, at least to the age of Emperor Charles V. As d'Argenson wrote, 'it has always been a fundamental rule of our statesmen that Habsburg power must be reduced to the point at which the lands of the Emperor are no greater than those of the wealthiest Elector'.[65] Yet by the time of the French Revolution, public opinion in France also had to swallow the bitterness of an unpopular alliance with Austria in 1756. The ensuing decades saw foreign policy disasters for France,[66] which explains why, in the words of the French foreign minister, de Bernis, Frederick II was 'loved to the point of madness' in France, while 'the court of Vienna is hated because it is seen as the bloodsucker of the state'.[67] Hostility to the Austrian alliance was shared by public opinion outside the court and the foreign ministry. In 1778, the abbé de Mably predicted that 'the Emperor will call on us to restore Lorraine, Alsace and anything else he pleases'.[68] Austrophobia appears to have had the power to unite, however ephemerally, conservatives and 'patriots' in later eighteenth-century France. Supporters of royal absolutism blamed the Austrian alliance both for defeats by the British while their opponents suspected an Austrian faction at work in the court of Versailles. They regarded Maria Theresa, not unfairly, as a religious bigot and as a friend to the Jesuits. In common with the conservatives, opponents of the absolute monarchy blamed the Austrian alliance for undermining French prestige and power on the international stage.[69] Austrophobia was translated into very personal terms when it was aimed at Marie-Antoinette. Much of the gossip about her profligacy, her sexual appetites and her undue political influence stemmed from rival political factions in the court itself. The revolutionary phobia about the 'Austrian Committee' and the fantastic charges levelled at Marie-Antoinette at her trial can therefore be traced back in part to the politics and malicious rumour of the court at Versailles.[70]

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[65]Quoted in Sorel, A. (trans. Cobban, A., & Hunt, J. W.), *Europe and the French Revolution: the Political Traditions of the Old Régime* (London: Fontana, 1969), 324.
[66]Blanning, T. C. W., *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London and New York: Longman, 1986), 42; Sorel, *Europe and the French Revolution*, 328.
[67]Quoted in Blanning, T. C. W., *The French Revolutionary Wars 1787 - 1802* (London: Arnold, 1996), 23.
[68]Quoted in Sorel, *Europe and the French Revolution*, 329.
[69]Jarrett, *The begetters of Revolution*, 217 - 218, 223; Sorel, *Europe and the French Revolution*, 329.
[70]Furet, F. (trans. Nevill, A.), *Revolutionary France 1770 - 1880* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 30 - 31; Sorel, *Europe and the French Revolution*, 330; Darnton, R., *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 201 - 202; Hunt, L., 'The many bodies of Marie-Antoinette: political pornography and the problem of the feminine in the French Revolution', Jones, P. M. (ed.), *The French Revolution in Social and Political Perspective* (London: Arnold, 1996), 275.

The revolutionaries' notions of patriotism stemmed from a wide variety of sources. If Rousseau's ideas influenced the development of revolutionary patriotism, then they did so because they coincided with and reinforced broader cultural and political factors. Concerns of people about royal 'despotism' naturally made them receptive to Rousseau's ideas about the general will, the social contract and the need for institutions which reflected the 'national character' of the people, but Rousseau was not the only factor in shaping revolutionary patriotism. Patriotism defined as opposition to royal power drew inspiration as much from the classics and from the examples of Britain and America as they did from Rousseau. In turn, these cultural and intellectual influences were given weight by the experience of politics in the last decades of the Ancien Régime, which most educated people viewed as spectators.

Patriotism as understood by the revolutionaries in 1789 was inward-looking in the sense that it focused on the good of the people and the state, rather than outwards in any aggressive fashion. In this respect, it was possible for a *patriote* to be a *cosmopolite* as well. Before 1789 it therefore fell to conservatives to express a strain of patriotism which was more explicitly xenophobic. Anglophobia was the reserve of the defenders of absolute monarchy. These conservatives sought to show that, as their opponents sought to introduce foreign systems into France, they were at heart unpatriotic and even the agents of foreign interests. The revolutionaries would later use similar tactics against their opponents, but it is clear that they were not the first to use xenophobia as a political weapon. As their political thinking led them to identify the king with the *patrie*, conservatives were also led to focus more exclusively than their opponents on traditional French institutions, for at least two reasons. First of all, as the last Bourbon kings themselves claimed, these institutions emanated from royal authority. Secondly, they were the very structures which the 'patriots' sought to change. This is not to say, however, that the 'patriots' were immune from xenophobia, or that the conservatives had a monopoly of it. Austrophobia appears to have been shared in equal measure by both camps, even if it was for different reasons. During the Revolution, it was the 'patriots' of the left and not the right who expressed hostility to British institutions, because, in a reversal of Ancien Régime conservatives' motives for anglophobia, they were not radical enough.

If the origins of revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism present a complex picture, so too does the relationship between them. It has already been suggested that in 1789 it was possible to be both a patriot and a cosmopolitan, but if patriotism meant

surrendering one's interests for the good of the nation, that also meant defending it from foreign attack. During the summer of 1790, therefore, some revolutionaries were moved by the threat of war into cosmopolitanism, while others were driven to xenophobic and bellicose patriotism. The fact that the same circumstances could provoke such a wide range of responses among the revolutionaries suggests that they - and the Revolution itself - were not driven by any single ideological dynamic. There were cases where patriotism and cosmopolitanism coincided, usually when the revolutionaries saw national interest being served by adopting pacific or humanitarian policies. Such a coincidence was also made possible because both patriotism and cosmopolitanism shared similarities in their cultural and intellectual origins. If the revolutionaries gave them some ideological coherence, they did not eliminate the possibility of overlap between the two. For this reason revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners did not develop from a clear-cut conflict between cosmopolitanism and patriotism.

II

The revolutionaries gave coherence to the various manifestations of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism and patriotism by anchoring them to the doctrines of the rights of man and the sovereignty of the nation. Ideology, of course, was not the only factor which shaped attitudes towards foreigners: the traditional phobias and prejudices brought into the Revolution from eighteenth-century society were important as well. The xenophobia which emerged as early as the summer of 1791 in response to the flight to Varennes, but which received its sharpest expression during the Terror, was not created by the Revolution. Rather the problems which arose, many of which were admittedly of the revolutionaries' own making, gave rise to phobias which had been deeply embedded in both élite and popular culture for years before 1789. Xenophobia, invasion scares and conspiracy theories were not a product of revolutionary ideology, but the revolutionaries were certainly not above manipulating these customary fears for their own political ends. The result was that revolutionary ideology often incorporated longer-term prejudices, the one giving greater force to the other.

Eighteenth-century culture did not, of course feed only into xenophobia. The legal minds of many of the deputies made them respect the basic civil rights of foreigners and object, even in the autumn of 1793, to some of the measures taken against them on

various ideological and economic grounds. Outside the Assembly, there is evidence to suggest that, from 1789 to the Year II and beyond, lower-ranking officials and ordinary people were receptive and sympathetic to foreigners. Revolutionary ideology provided a coherent framework within which these various impulses and traditional attitudes could be expressed. Meanwhile, this ideology itself had both cosmopolitan and patriotic implications. Circumstances and the revolutionaries' pragmatic responses to events determined the evolution and relationship between the two.

Historians who have identified ideology and rhetoric as the dynamic which pushed revolutionary politics to ever more radical positions until the Terror of the Year II[71] have not, of course, looked specifically at attitudes towards foreigners. None the less, the fact that the concept of national sovereignty implied that foreigners should be driven from participation in French public life - and the fact that this did not happen in any clear-cut way - begs the question as to how important any ideological dynamic really was when set next to more pragmatic concerns. For this reason, it is worth examining the development of revolutionary patriotism and cosmopolitanism during the various crises faced by the revolutionaries. It is best to begin this examination by looking at the concepts of national sovereignty and the rights of man.

In defining the nation simply as a group of associates who lived under the same laws and same legislature, the abbé Sieyès allowed for a wide scope of people to be included. A common culture, history, religion, language and ties of race or 'blood' are absent, which implied that anyone who sought to affiliate with the nation could do so merely by expressing a desire to live under the same laws and legislature as everyone else. There were practical as well as ideological reasons for this assimilationist approach, but when Sieyès wrote these words naturalisation and immigration were not foremost in his mind. For Sieyès early in 1789, those who elected not to live under the same law and the same legislature were the privileged orders. None the less he also asked whether those who did not contribute to the life of the nation in some way should be admitted to political rights.[72] He answered his own question during the discussion of the rights of man and the citizen in August 1789: women, children, foreigners and 'those who contribute nothing to maintaining the public establishment, should have no active influence on public affairs'.

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[71]See, for example, Furet, *Penser la Révolution française*, 81 - 119; Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution*, 19 - 51. Hunt, at least, admits that 'although the Terror followed logically from the principles enunciated in revolutionary rhetoric, it was not the only possible deduction from those principles' (48).

[72]Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?*, 40, 47, 61 - 62.

They can all 'enjoy the advantages of society' and share in civil rights, but only those who contribute to national life 'are the true active citizens, the true members of the association'.[73] Revolutionary concepts of rights explicitly excluded foreigners from the body politic from the very outset of the Revolution. Foreigners could contribute privately to the economic and social life of the nation, but revolutionary ideology had a 'nationalising' logic which ought to have led to their exclusion from the military, the church and from politics, because those activities entailed direct involvement with the state.

The doctrine of the sovereignty of the nation also had implications for foreigners outside France and it was in that direction that its first great challenge was inadvertently directed. The decrees of 4 - 11 August 1789 theoretically destroyed not only seigneurial privilege, but also distinctions between provinces, towns and corporations. In so doing, they attempted to make the nation rather than the province or municipality the source of identity and legitimacy. The application of these decrees in Alsace challenged not only the patchwork quilt of internal French differences, but also the *droit public* in Europe. Princes of the Holy Roman Empire who had estates in Alsace had privileges and sovereignty which had been guaranteed by treaty since the province first fell into French hands in 1648. The revolutionary assault on privilege and the absolute nature of national sovereignty was theoretically irreconcilable with this apparent anomaly of overlapping or enclaved sovereignty within French territorial limits. The attempt by the revolutionaries to apply their laws and their principles to Alsace therefore brought them running headlong into the established international order.[74] The response of the revolutionaries revealed two tendencies, one in favour of compromise, the other unbending and doctrinaire. La Rochefoucauld sought to reconcile the interests of diplomacy with the principles of the French Revolution, and suggested negotiation with the princes for compensation. On the other hand Rewbell, himself an Alsatian, insisted on the absolute sovereignty of the people: the National Assembly's decrees must apply and there should be no compensation.[75] In the end, the Constituent accepted la Rochefoucauld's more diplomatic position on 28 October 1790. The decree recognised that the princes should be compensated not as of right, but because of 'la bienveillance et l'amitié qui, depuis si

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[73]Sieyès, 'Preliminary to the French Constitution', Hunt, *The French Revolution and Human Rights*, 81; Jennings, J., 'The *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* and its critics in France: reaction and *idéologie*', *Historical Journal*, xxxv (1992), 843.
[74]AP, xiii, 159 - 162.
[75]AP, ix, 34 - 35.

longtemps unissent la nation française aux princes d'Allemagne', which was a polite way of saying that compensation was being offered out of diplomatic necessity.[76] The revolutionaries were clearly not being led by their ideology, but by pragmatic diplomatic considerations.

For the first two years of the Revolution, most deputies believed that it was in the national interest *not* to challenge the international order, despite the implications of their principles. This pragmatic approach to international politics emerged both in the affair of Alsace and in the declaration of 22 May 1790, but is most dramatically illustrated with the papal enclaves of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin. The eloquent support of left-wing deputies like Pétion and Robespierre for the petitions of the Avignonnais and the Venaissins for annexation did not convince the Constituent Assembly to accept their requests for annexation until late in its existence. This was despite the fact that from June 1790 onwards both territories had chased out the papal rulers, that the inhabitants of the enclaves had long been treated as French subjects and that the evidence suggested that the desire of most of the inhabitants for 'reunion' with France proper was sincere.[77] Both Robespierre and Pétion based their arguments on the right of self-determination.[78] Ironically, both men had also been leading proponents of the declaration of 22 May, but there was little contradiction in supporting the annexation of Avignon and the Comtat. The deputies on the left were convinced that annexation of the papal enclaves would be no conquest as the peoples there had exercised their sovereign right to determine their own political allegiances.[79] Both the May declaration and the arguments for annexation were also based on a particular view of national interest. The former aimed at ensuring that France would be left at peace while the latter claimed that the papal enclaves were the refuge of émigrés and counter-revolutionaries.[80]

For the time being, however, most of the deputies were too wary of the consequences of applying the principle of self-determination outside France's frontiers. At least Alsace had been ceded to France by treaty, which was why the government could have some legitimacy in implementing the laws of August 1789. For Avignon and the Comtat, no such traditional legality existed, bar a few ancient and obscure edicts which suggested that

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[76]AP, xx, 84. Some of the princely complaints and the memoranda on the progress of negotiations may be found in AN, F/7/4399.
[77]Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 69.
[78]See, for example, Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, vi, 589.
[79]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, vi, 591.
[80]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, vi, 594.

the French kings had retained control of the enclaves.[81] For a while the political sense of the revolutionaries made them reluctant to apply the idea beyond France's borders.

The revolutionaries were equally pragmatic when they implemented their ideas and their legislation on foreigners living in France. If they were not immediately aware of the exclusive implications of their ideas, they were very much aware of the practical pressures to purge the army, church and state of foreigners whose dedication to the nation might have been considered less than wholehearted. At the same time, however, to have followed these impulses might also have caused a diplomatic furore and have practical effects on the state. Moreover, the very concept of natural rights lent itself to the cosmopolitan strands of eighteenth-century thought and culture which encouraged the participation of foreigners in French society.

For the revolutionaries, patriotism implied a recognition of the rights of one's neighbours, as well as the interests of the nation. While one merely had to be born human to have natural rights, it was in society that these rights became civil and perhaps active political rights. It was the many institutional differences by which man traded his natural liberty for his civil liberty which was one of the factors which differentiated one nation from another. None the less, these differences could not obscure the fact that they stemmed from the same, universal and natural rights.

In the early years of the Revolution the more exuberant patriots were in no doubt that it was the role of the French to enlighten other peoples of the good news about their universal and inalienable rights. On 5 August 1789, the abbé Fauchet told his audience that 'la France sera le modèle des Nations & l'institutrice de la vraie Liberté dans l'Univers.'[82] Early in 1790, Barère wrote that France was now 'une nation éclairée, amie de l'humanité' which would 'adresse enfin à tous les peuples le seul langage qui puisse convenir à la sagesse humaine: *les droits de l'homme sont la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté, et la résistance à l'oppression.*'[83] There was of course a good deal of national self-congratulation in this assumption of the role of moral leadership. This feeling fed naturally into the later view that the French should take a more active role in 'liberating' the subject-peoples of Europe. For the time being, however, the revolutionaries'

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[81]Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars*, 78; Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars*, 50 - 51.

[82]Fauchet, C., *Discours sur la liberté françoise, prononcé le mercredi 5 août 1789* (Paris, 1789), 15. See also Fauchet's *Sermon sur l'Accord de la Religion et de la liberté prononcé dans la Métropole de Paris, le 4 Février 1791* (Paris, n.d.), 31-32.

[83]Barère de Vieuzac, B., *Etrennes du peuple, ou Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, précédée d'une Epître aux Nations* (Paris, 1790), 9.

assumption of the mantle of educators was expressed in a more pacific way. As the debates on war and peace in May 1790 show, many deputies were painfully aware of French military and fiscal weaknesses, a knowledge which gave pacific cosmopolitanism potency. The National Assembly adopted the famous declaration of non-aggression because the revolutionaries could follow no other policy. It did, however, coincide happily with the sincere beliefs of some deputies.

Beyond the hard realities of foreign policy, some revolutionaries argued in 1789 - 1790 that France was to reap the benefits of liberty by attracting the skills, expertise, wealth and morals of foreigners. In 1790 both Marat (himself Swiss of origin) and Barère pragmatically argued that foreigners would bring various benefits to France.[84] Combined with the doctrine of natural rights, such ideas led the revolutionaries to take an assimilationist attitude towards those foreigners who could offer something to the nation, economically, socially or intellectually. The desire to adopt foreigners who chose to live in France and to become French citizens was therefore based on a combination of enlightened self-interest and cosmopolitan ideology.

This coexistence of national interest with cosmopolitanism was graphically illustrated by the festivals in the summer of 1790. Across France they had a distinctly martial tone, with the National Guards, regular soldiers and officials taking pride of place. Besides the emphasis on national unity and the rule of law, both of which were internally-focused, the festivals also stressed the willingness of citizens to fight and die for the whole community, the *patrie* within which individual citizens enjoyed their rights.[85] On the other hand, politicians and citizens alike saw no contradiction in admitting foreigners to the celebrations. In Paris, for example, Anacharsis Cloots led thirty-five 'commissaires' of the 'comité des étrangers' to the bar of the National Assembly on 19 June 1790 and received permission to participate in the celebrations.[86] French militia and regular troops swearing to defend the *patrie* alongside foreigners celebrating the unity of the French nation suggested that the Revolution was of universal significance and that its defence would be a struggle not only for the French people, but for all mankind. In Nantes a festival was held 23 August 1790 to celebrate a future federation of understanding between Britain and France. The organisers saw no contradiction in proclaiming 'patrie', 'union', and 'fédération du 14 juillet' next to 'révolution de l'Angleterre' (that of 1688-89) and 'grande-

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[84]*L'Ami du Peuple*, No. 96 (13 January 1790); AP, xvii, 628 - 629.
[85]Viguerie, J. de, 'Étude sur l'origine et sur la substance du patriotisme révolutionnaire', *Revue historique* ccxcv (1996), 91; Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, 60.
[86]AP, xvi, 373.

charte' (Magna Carta).[87] To the Nantes Jacobins, national unity and patriotism cohabited with cosmopolitanism.

Such symbolism and ideas were not always lost on people beyond those who could afford journal subscriptions or the dues payable to political clubs. An awareness, no matter how inaccurate or crude, of the political situation of other countries could lead some among the *menu-peuple* to feel sympathy for the plight of other peoples, and perhaps to express these feelings in terms of the rights of man and revolutionary cosmopolitanism.[88] The evidence for this is impressionistic, and is limited to chance encounters between travellers and ordinary French people. In Paris on 14 July 1789, for example, Doctor Edward Rigby and his English travelling companions were 'recognised as Englishmen; we were embraced as freemen.'[89] He was told by a shopkeeper at Antibes that 'the English had a Revolution a hundred years before, but he hoped the French would have a more complete one.'[90] Sometimes, the reputation of a single foreigner might elicit favourable ideas about that person's nationality. The Russian traveller, N. M. Karamzin, was speaking German with his companions at a frontier inn on 4 March 1790. An old man, hearing them talk, approached and spoke of the *maréchal* de Saxe in glowing terms.[91] If the people at large had little conception of cosmopolitanism, they had their own legends and images which made them no less willing to accept foreigners in their midst. They were certainly neither indifferent to foreigners nor traditionally xenophobic.[92]

None the less, both revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism had its opponents. There was first of all conservative patriotism, which rejected both eighteenth-century

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[87]*Révolutions de France et de Brabant*, iv, Nos. 45, 47; *Patriote Français*, iii, No. 407 (19 September 1790).

[88]Cobb, R. C., 'Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire (avril 1793 - thermidor an II)', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, vi (1959), 107.

[89]Rigby, *Letters from France*, 62 - 63

[90]Rigby, *Letters*, 144 - 145.

[91]Karamzin, N. M. (trans. Legrelle, A.), *Voyage en France 1789 - 1790* (Paris: 1885), 19 - 20.

[92]Georges Lefebvre, however, states that 'cosmopolitanism was in reality nothing more than an aristocratic and bourgeois veneer, a modish idea in intellectual circles' (Lefebvre, G., (trans. Evanson, E. M.), *The French Revolution from its origins to 1793* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 71). Simon Schama writes that 'ecumenical egalitarianism was confined to the the warriors of the salon like Condorcet, Brissot and Vergniaud. The common people remained untouched by the servitude of Poles or Dutchmen. Their intuitive xenophobia led them to believe ill rather than good of any *étranger*, be he from the next province or a country at the other end of Europe' (Schama, S., *Patriots and Liberators. Revolution in the Netherlands 1780 - 1813* (2nd ed.) (London: Fontana, 1992), 149).

cosmopolitanism and revolutionary patriotism, because they both implied criticism and change of traditional French insitutions. In the National Assembly on 21 May 1790, the royalist Cazalès rose to express this more exclusive love of country, which focused entirely on the French people themselves. 'La patrie', he declared, 'doit être l'objet exclusif de notre amour'.[93] His distrust of cosmopolitanism did not come from any latent xenophobia so much as a concern for national honour and pride in national institutions. For Cazalès, a person received his attributes as both a man and a citizen only through his love of the *patrie*, which was more than just a political association, but a whole cultural and social ethos attached to the country. In this view, there were more factors dividing the whole of humanity than those bringing them together. For this reason, national honour was more important than peace or the rights of other nations. Similarly, on 15 May the duc de Biron suggested that never before was peace more vital to France's interests and was worth pursuing at any price, 'mais non pas celui de l'honneur et du caractère national.'[94]

The conservative emphasis on honour jarred with the left's version of patriotism. On an individual level, honour was aristocratic because it could stem from the conferring of privilege and office by the king. It conflicted with revolutionary egalitarianism and meritocracy. The German traveller Campe witnessed a commotion in the National Assembly in August 1789 when Target opened a speech with 'L'Assemblée nationale a l'honneur ... '. He was shouted down with cries of 'Point d'honneur! Point d'honneur! Effacez ce mot!'[95] In July 1791, Brissot claimed that the *philosophes* had undermined honour in favour of virtue, which meant that patriotism was to be based not on service to the crown, in return for honour and position, but on the citizens' willing subjection of their own personal interests for the greater good of the nation.[96]

Much conservative pride in national institutions and character was not that different from some of the sentiments which underlay the patriotism of the left. The essential difference was that the left wished to take pride in institutions which it sought to create, while conservatives sought to preserve traditional French structures as much as possible. On 15 July 1790 the editor of the *Gazette de Paris* complained that the Festival of the Federation was being compared to those given in Ancient Rome and Greece, which he

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[93]AP, xv, 640.
[94]AP, xv, 515 - 516.
[95]Campe, J. H. (trans. Ruffet, J.), *Été 89: Lettres d'un Allemand à Paris* (Paris: Éditions du May, 1989), 105.
[96]Hampson, 'La Patrie', 130.

saw as republics: 'Let us not change our ancient formulas. Heirs of the *Franks* ... let us fight, love, live and die like them, faithful to the principles of our Fathers'.[97] Like this conservative journalist, some radical, left-wing patriots also rejected classical models, but because they saw the Revolution as a complete break with the past and rejected all precedents.

The focus of such radical patriots on modern, French thinking for inspiration could sometimes be expressed in terms of anglophobia. As the Revolution offered opportunities to go further than the British in limiting royal power, so many radicals came to regard the British and even the American constitutions as unsuited to the French, who were beginning with a tabula rasa, and who were theoretically ready and willing to construct a pure system based on the rights of man. If the revolutionaries recognised a debt to the British and the Americans, there was no doubt in their minds that the French were to take the torch of human rights further than their anglophone predecessors. The abbé Fauchet commented that 'la première grande nation qui possède la *plénitude* de la liberté, c'est la nation Anglo-Américaine; la première qui s'apprête à jouir de la *perfection* de la liberté, c'est la nation Françoise'.[98]

The belief that the French were going further than the British and the Americans was not only ideological, but political because it clashed with both royalists and the *monarchiens*. It explains the irritation with which deputies on the left greeted citations of British examples. When Mirabeau presented Samuel Romilly's work on the procedures of the House of Commons for the benefit of the Estates-General in the spring of 1789, the acidic reply, Etienne Dumont remembered a decade later, was that 'nous ne sommes pas Anglais et nous n'avons pas besoin des Anglais'.[99] A more important rejection of the British parliamentary system as a model by the left came during the constitutional debates, in which opponents of the royal veto rejected the British model. It was, in contrast, the moderates and the royalists on the right who enthusiastically cited British, and even American examples.[100]

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[97]Quoted in Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, 28 - 29.
[98]*Éloge civique de Benjamin Franklin, prononcé, le 21 juillet 1790* (Paris, 1790), 31. See also Barère, *Etrennes du peuple*, 23.
[99]Dumont, E. (ed. Bénétruy, J.), *Souvenirs sur Mirabeau et sur les deux premières assemblées législatives* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), 107.
[100]See, for example, the opinions of Robespierre and La Revellière-Lépeaux on the royal veto, contrasted with those of the duc de Liancourt and Sallé de Choux (AP, ix, 65, 78, 82 - 83).

It is one thing to criticise the institutions of a particular country, another to resent its people. Even the latter emerged in some of the speeches of both left and right during the Nootka Sound crisis. On the right, the baron de Menou issued the call to arms, to thunderous applause, 'nous irons attaquer l'Angleterre en Angleterre même.' None the less, he tempered his bellicose rhetoric by admitting that 'l'Angleterre est une nation libre, magnanime et généreuse', although the French, now free, would be a match for the British. Boisgelin, the archbishop of Aix, argued in favour of standing by Spain on 21 May because to do otherwise would be to leave Britain, 'cette puissance rivale', with an open field in which to become 'la maîtresse et l'arbitre du commerce, nous ravirait à la fois et tous les trésors de la paix et toutes les ressources de la guerre.' On the left, Le Chapelier described Britain as a country who 'a toujours été notre rivale et notre ennemie ... Elle menace à la fois nos possessions dans nos îles et notre industrie'. This description of Britain gave rise to murmurs, showing that some in the Assembly on both left and right were carried away by appeals to national greatness and were spoiling for a fight against the old enemy, while there was an equally vocal group, possibly cutting across political divisions, which was anglophile and opposed to going to war for both pragmatic and ideological reasons.[101] Anglophobia was virulent on both left and right and took on both a political form in the constitutional debates and a more emotional expression which stemmed from customary fears and prejudices towards the old enemy.

Such prejudices had a long history, and were shared by a wide variety of people at all social levels. In the 'Great Fear' of 1789, memories of past invasions took on a legendary form in the minds of the peasantry. In Alsace and Lorraine, rumours of Swedish brigands circulated, which can only be explained by folk-memory of the Thirty Years War. In the centre and the Midi, traditions went back even further, to the Hundred Years War. In the Vivarais, one rumoured band of brigands called itself 'la troupe anglaise'.[102] During the first two years of the Revolution, there were various invasion scares in which the local population variously blamed the British and the Dutch (Toulon, December 1789); the émigrés, the Sardinians, Savoyards and Niçois (Marseille, May 1790); the Savoyards and the émigrés again (Grenoble, July 1790); the Austrians (the Ardennes, July 1790); the émigrés supported by Spain, Sardinia, Austria and Prussia (the Comminges, July 1790); the Austrians again (the Clermontais, August 1790) and the Spanish (the Basses-Pyrénées,

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[101]AP, xv, 518 - 519, 636.

[102]Lefebvre, G., *La Grande Peur de 1789* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1970), 25 - 26.

July 1791).[103] Each scare was usually provoked by local rumours embellished by tradition, but they sometimes had foundations in wider political circumstances: it is no surprise that the bulk of invasion scares should have occured over the summer of 1790, when it seemed even to those in touch with diplomatic affairs that France might go to war with Britain. The fright in the Ardennes in July 1790 was echoed within the chamber of the National Assembly itself, as it was tied to the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Austrian ambassador who had sought permission for the passage of Austrian troops across French territory. The rumour of an Austrian invasion spread quickly and in the last ten days of July, peasants in the Ardennes took up arms and patrolled the frontiers at night, awakening their compatriots with cries of 'Aux armes, voici l'ennemi!'[104]

Tied up with these invasion scares and fears of foreign brigands was another cultural tradition common to much of the western world: the fear of conspiracy. Without easy or affordable access to information, peasants, artisans, professionals and aristocrats alike slipped easily into conspiracy theories as a means of explaining problems or crises whose origins were not immediately apparent. If it was such a mentality which helped to drive the Revolution along its radical and bloody course,[105] it was not the product of revolutionary ideology, but of the social and cultural conditions of the eighteenth-century.[106] Such conspiracy theories were often driven by evidence of malign intentions which with hindsight might not have been proof of plots, but which was sinister enough in itself. During the Revolution, foreigners figured highly in such conspiracy theories. The presence of a high proportion of foreign troops in the build-up of forces around Paris and Versailles in July 1789 aggravated the already deep fears amongst the population and politicians alike.[107] The tradition of conspiracy theories and the diverse expressions of xenophobia fed each other and would merge in a most sophisticated way in the Year II with the famous 'foreign plot'.

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[103]AP, x, 567; xv, 497; xvi, 726; xvii, 379, 393, 663; xxvii, 686 - 688.

[104]AP, xvii, 379.

[105]Furet, *Penser la Révolution française*, 90 - 94; Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, 38 - 43.

[106]As Timothy Tackett argues ('The Constituent Assembly and the Terror', Baker, K. M. (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, iv, *The Terror* (Oxford, New York, Tokyo: Pergamon, 1994), 46 - 49; Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 245 - 246). Hunt, incidentally, does not deny the cultural inheritance from the eighteenth-century (*Politics, Culture, and Class*, 39 - 41), but she still agrees with Furet that fear of conspiracy played a central role in revolutionary rhetoric and that the Terror followed logically from such language.

[107]See, for example, Mirabeau's speech on 15 July (*Moniteur*, 15 - 16 July 1789).

The first two years of the Revolution saw the expression of the whole variety of eighteenth-century strands of patriotism and cosmopolitanism. For the revolutionaries, both developments were given a new coherence and expression through the doctrine of the rights of man. As they shared this same ideological framework, cosmopolitanism and patriotism were not immediately in conflict, but overlapped, particularly when the revolutionaries' view of the national interest dictated a pacific, but defensive attitude towards foreign powers. For conservatives, the radical implications of both revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism had to be combatted with their appeals to the exclusive love of country, its traditions and its existing institutions. There were areas, however, where revolutionary and conservative patriotism coincided: many radical revolutionaries and royalists alike rejected anglomania and both could be stirred by the call to arms and the appeal to the martial valour of the nation. Both also rejected appeals to the classical past for models of patriotism. The meaning and direction behind these expression were however different. For radicals, the British system was too monarchical and aristocratic, while royalists rejected it because it stripped the king of too much power. In the middle ground, as was made evident by the festivities and journalism of 1789 - 1790, most revolutionaries were willing to recognise their inheritance from the British and the Americans, while suggesting that the French would go still further. In the midst of this national self-congratulation, it was possible for patriots to cast themselves as the educators of the rest of Europe and, consequently, to be cosmopolitan in their attitudes towards foreigners. Beneath the surface of these pacific forms of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, however, lurked the fears and prejudices inherited from the cultural and social milieu of the eighteenth century. The shock of Varennes and the conservative backlash would upset the careful equilibrium of pragmatism and idealism which the revolutionaries had maintained until the summer of 1791. From that time on, they would give expression to some of the more extreme implications of their ideology. Traditional fears would burst out with a vehemence which drowned out the careful cosmopolitanism of the earlier years of the Revolution.

Revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners were irreversibly affected by the flight to Varennes. Underlying phobias and prejudices erupted into revolutionary politics and, eventually, led the revolutionaries to abandon their former caution and follow the more radical implications of their patriotic and cosmopolitan principles.

On 21 June 1791 Charles de Lameth, denying that the king had been kidnapped, warned of 'ces fédérations des despotes contre la liberté et les intérêts des peuples'.[108] Outside the assembly, Brissot steeled himself for something greater than a defensive war: 'La Révolution française sera le foyer sacré d'où partira l'étincelle qui embrasera les nations dont les maîtres oseront l'approcher."[109] While Brissot did not call for an aggressive war of liberation, the noises he was making were still indicative of a more defiant attitude towards the European powers. He also showed a tendency towards germanophobia. His journal, the *Patriote français*, announced the imminence of a German invasion at least three times in the summer of 1791, months before he made his first bellicose speech as a deputy in the Legislative Assembly on 20 October.[110] From 23 July, Prudhomme's *Révolutions de Paris* urged vigilance against invasion and in August presented a defensive plan against 'la ligue des tyrans."[111] Convinced that Varennes was a prelude to invasion, the radical press now invoked the patriotism which entailed defence of the *patrie*. Patriots were certain that a people fighting for its newly-won freedom would be invincible. The prospectus of the *Journal du Club des Cordeliers* confidently predicted that 'cette horde de vils esclaves et de brigands' would easily be dispersed by free men. The *Révolutions de Paris* declared that the invasion plans of the 'hordes étrangères' would be in vain.[112]

The confidence in the ability of free men to fight for their liberty combined with a genuine fear of foreign attack or interference was a fatal mixture. It turned revolutionary patriotism outwards against the Revolution's enemies and gave revolutionary cosmopolitanism a more militant and aggressive form. Revolutionary perceptions of foreign hostility encouraged two important developments in revolutionary attitudes. First

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[108]AP, xxvii, 385 - 386.
[109]Quoted in Michon, G., *Robespierre et la guerre révolutionnaire 1791 - 1792* (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1937), 22n..
[110]Michon, *Robespierre et la guerre*, 22n. - 23n..
[111]*Révolutions de Paris* Nos. 107 (23 - 30 July 1791), 111 (20 - 27 August 1791).
[112]*Journal du Club des Cordeliers*, 'Prospectus' (1791) (Paris: EDHIS, 1981); *Révolutions de Paris* No. 107 (23 - 30 July 1791).

of all, the traditional suspicions of Austria and, in particular, of an Austrian faction at court, re-emerged. The flight to Varennes and the king's later use of the royal veto on the laws against émigrés and refractory clergy convinced people that government policy was being directed by an 'Austrian committee', led by Marie-Antoinette in collaboration with the émigrés and the Austrian court. This potent cultural and political device only intensified once France actually went to war with Austria.

Secondly, the revolutionaries were more willing to follow their principles of national self-determination. Until the flight to Varennes, the Constituent had been reluctant to accept arguments which legitimised the annexation of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin. It was only from the summer of 1791 that the annexationists gained ground, with the flight to Varennes, the Padua Circular and the Declaration of Pillnitz. These events and wider fears of foreign intervention had prompted the revolutionaries not only to take a more defiant posture towards the European powers, but also to seek jurisdiction over enclaves which, it was claimed, harboured counter-revolutionary elements. It was only when that point was reached that the Constituent annexed Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin on 14 September 1791. That it was less the logic of revolutionary ideas which led the revolutionaries to take this step than a response to the crisis of the summer is shown by the decree of annexation itself, which combined the old and the new justifications. The people had freely expressed their desire to join France, but France had a legitimate claim to jurisdiction over the enclaves by virtue of ancient rights which had never been rescinded.[113]

Although revolutionary principles of self-determination implied a challenge to the international order in Europe, the French themselves only applied them when they felt driven to do so by circumstances. None the less, the long-term result of applying such notions against the traditional *droit public* of Europe was explosive. From the very beginning, the definition of a nation without reference to language, religion or ethnicity had been clearly assimilationist in terms of the internal questions of citizenship and naturalisation. It also implied, however, that there were no set geographical limits to the nation, either.[114] This meaning did not emerge until after the first conquests were made by

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[113]Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars*, 51.

[114]Simon Schama expresses the problem as a question: 'if the nation was simply that body of free men sharing the same law, and not the traditional division of lordship, parish and custom, who then was to say where the frontiers of liberty should lie?' (*Patriots and Liberators. Revolution in the Netherlands 1780 - 1813* (2nd ed.) (London: Fontana, 1992), 6).

the French in the late autumn of 1792. None the less, the fear inspired by the flight to Varennes among patriotic circles and the bitterness felt by the radicals after the conservative backlash led some of the more ambitious among them to exploit the universal implications of the rights of man for their own political ends. Fused with the bellicose language which followed the flight, the cosmopolitanism inherent in revolutionary ideology was finally turned outwards towards other peoples in a militant, crusading fashion.

As a deputy to the Legislative Assembly Brissot had a national platform for the rhetoric which he had poured out in his newspaper. The increasingly shrill demands for war to disperse the émigrés and to prevent foreign powers from interfering in French domestic affairs had a heavy impact on revolutionary patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Although the war was initially billed as a just one of self-defence, revolutionary cosmopolitanism was adopted in the service of the warmongers to give the war a more noble, historic significance. A justification for a cautious foreign policy in 1790, cosmopolitanism became an argument for war against the old régime powers.

If Brissot and his colleagues concentrated their fire on the émigrés who clustered in some of the Rhenish states, they also tried to convince their audience that Austria, Prussia and other European powers were combining forces against the Revolution. The Brissotins and the Fayettists stirred up the urge to defend the *patrie* which had been expressed in the Festival of the Federation, but which became very real and urgent after the flight to Varennes. The campaign for war developed the principle of national sovereignty into an outward, aggressive form. Playing on fears of foreign interference enabled the revolutionaries to reconcile the Constituent's declaration of 22 May 1790 with the fact that they successfully sought to declare war first. On 20 January 1792, Fauchet, while calling for war, disingenuously told his fellow-deputies that while the Constitution forbade aggressive wars, it was still necessary to attack potential enemies on the frontiers.[115] The same formula was used in the declaration of war itself.[116]

For the revolutionaries, however, national defence was compounded with a political ideology which in theory recognised not only the doctrine of national self-determination, but also the universality of natural rights. If the *patrie* was worth defending because it offered the liberty to citizens, then the war would be still more just if it spread these

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[115]Fauchet, C., *Discours sur les traités, les alliances et la guerre, prononcé à l'assemblée nationale, le 20 janvier 1792* (Paris, 1792), 5.

[116]AP, xlii, 218.

benefits to the rest of Europe. With the perceived threat to the Revolution from the outside, it was an easy step to convert revolutionary cosmopolitanism into a more militant ideological device. In what was fundamentally a high-risk political strategem by the warmongers to gain political power, the coming conflict was painted not only as the struggle of the French people to determine its own affairs, but also as a 'crusade for universal liberty', as Brissot put it to the Jacobins on 31 December.[117] Pierre Chaumette proclaimed that 'the land which separates Paris from Petersburg will soon be Gallicized, municipalized, Jacobinized'.[118] It is undeniable that one of the conditions for this transformation existed in the way in which cosmopolitanism had been expressed as early as 1789. There was much national self-congratulation in the revolutionaries' early cosmopolitan utterances and this lent itself to the more militant style of Brissot, Chaumette and, above all, Anacharsis Cloots. The French, Cloots claimed, had achieved the perfection of liberty and would now develop the same virtues in other people.[119] As the French people represented the hope of mankind, both the revolutionaries and their foreign sympathisers alike regarded France as the *patrie* not only of French citizens, but also of any right-thinking people. This feeling could be found from the very early days of the Revolution, but received militant expression in the Legislative Assembly's invitation of 20 April 1792 for any foreigners to range themselves under the banners of the French nation.

In the summer of 1791 Brissot, the Cordeliers and others had stirred up defensive patriotism against foreign and domestic enemies. By year's end they had turned revolutionary cosmopolitanism into a messianic mission. The crusade for universal liberty was a far cry from the bilateral and pacific exchange of morals and ideas envisaged by Marat early in 1790. This change was the product, firstly, of the warlike feelings which had been stirred by the royal flight to Varennes and its aftermath; secondly, of revolutionary cosmopolitanism and a confidence in the French achievement since 1789; and, thirdly, of the doctrine of national self-determination being turned outwards, against the perceived foreign enemies of the Revolution who were accused of interference.[120] It resulted, in short, from the confluence of cosmopolitanism with nationalism.

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[117]Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars*, 111.
[118]Quoted in Furet, *Revolutionary France 1770 - 1880*, 104.
[119]Cloots, A., *Adresse aux Français, par Anacharsis Cloots, orateur du genre humain* (n.p., n.d.), 2.
[120]See, for example, the French declaration of war of 20 April 1792 (AP, xlii, 201 - 213, 217).

The mulling of cosmopolitanism with defensive, national militancy was a development opposed only by a very few, isolated politicians such as Robespierre, whose primary concern was with the threat of domestic counter-revolution. In this respect, Robespierre's opposition to war was 'patriotic' in that it focused on the life of France itself and on the failures of the Revolution to have fulfilled its early, domestic promise.[121] He turned the language of national self-determination against Brissot's notion of a crusade for universal liberty. On 2 January 1792, he responded to Brissot with the famous words, 'Personne n'aime les missionaires armées ... ', and he suggested that foreign peoples would repel them as invading enemies.[122] He accepted that, while not perfect, the Revolution was still the best hope for humanity, but it must be consolidated at home first. To try to spread liberty beforehand, 'c'est d'assurer à la fois notre servitude et celle du monde entier.'[123] In his opposition to the war Robespierre retained the pragmatically-driven cosmopolitanism expressed by many others in the first year of the Constituent Assembly. The ultimate triumph of the war parties represented the swing away from this internally-focused patriotism which could cohabit with pacific cosmopolitanism. Now revolutionary cosmopolitanism flattered aggressive French nationalism with a universal significance.

The outbreak of the war and the first defeats of the summer intensified the kind of patriotism which meant the defence of one's country, as was shown by the response of Volunteers and regulars to the decree of the *patrie en danger*.[124] What helped to sustain the morale of the troops was the support which they felt they were getting from home. Beyond the various social and welfare schemes promised the soldiers by the politicians, the accolades they received from the citizenry, local festivals during the recruitment and departure of the troops, speeches and journals praising them and the cause for which they were meant to be fighting may not have instilled patriotism as they were intended, but they may have reassured the soldiers that they had the support of the people they were leaving behind. Friends, family and community were the personification of the *patrie*, which was otherwise merely an imagined community of citizens.[125]

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[121]See, for example, Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, viii, 48, 61.
[122]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, viii, 81-82.
[123]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, viii, 82.
[124]Lynn, J. A., *The Bayonets of the Republic. Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791 - 1794* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 51 - 52, 179.
[125]Lynn, *The Bayonets of the Republic*, 174 - 176, 179 - 180.

None the less, for the revolutionaries this 'imagined political community'[126] did have political significance. A citizen who died for his country was sacrificing his own life for the greater good of the whole. In return, while he was alive, the *patrie* offered hope of a better future in which the rights of all were recognised and protected by law. The *patrie* had to be defended not only from its foreign enemies, but also from its domestic foes. From early in the Revolution, internally-focused patriotism implied the vigilance of all citizens against counter-revolution.[127] There could be a xenophobic edge to this patriotism where foreigners were believed to be hatching their evil designs in internal politics and the war intensified this into paranoia. Jean-Baptiste Louvet's *Sentinelle*, which first appeared on 20 April and was published every few days until November 1792, whipped up the old fear of Austrian-inspired conspiracy at the heart of the government. The *Sentinelle* bombarded anyone who cared to read it with 'proof' of the existence of the 'Austrian Committee' which lay at the heart of a conspiracy to undermine the war effort and to destroy the Revolution.[128] These accusations were echoed in the Legislative by Brissot, Gensonné and Chabot.[129] Even if the notion of an Austrian committee was a shorthand device to convey patriotic anxieties to the people at large,[130] it would have worked only if the people themselves believed it. Austrophobia was naturally encouraged by the war itself. Dr. John Moore, while impressed that in Paris 'the lowest among the French shew no positive hatred to foreigners', found that in the north, stories of Austrian and Prussian atrocities were readily believed.[131]

The *patrie*, however, was also a beacon for unfree people. The recruitment of foreign legions by the Legislative Assembly suggested that the imperilled *patrie* was not just the resort of French citizens, but also that of enlightened people everywhere. The patriotism which entailed defence of the homeland could still, for some revolutionaries, transcend nationality if the *patrie* being fought for had a universal significance. Such ideas could co-

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[126]The term has been borrowed from Benedict Anderson's study of nationalism, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (rev. ed.) (London & New York: Verso, 1991), 6.

[127]Baker, K. M., 'Conceptualizing the Terror', Baker, K. M. (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, iv, *The Terror* (Oxford, New York, Tokyo: Elservier Science/Pergamon, 1994), xx - xxi.

[128]See, for example, *Sentinelle*, Nos. 5, 6, 7, 9 - 12, 14, 15, 18, 23, 25, 35.

[129]AP, xliv, 33 - 44, 544.

[130]Kates, *The* Cercle Social, *the Girondins, and the French Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 230.

[131]Moore, J., *A Journal during a Residence in France from the beginning of August to the middle of December, 1792* (2 vols.) (London, 1793), i, 229; ii, 3 - 4.

exist with the defensive and even xenophobic patriotism mobilised by the war. For all his austrophobia, Louvet celebrated desertions of Austrian or Imperial troops to the French.[132] What mattered, therefore, was less the nationality of an individual, than his or her political commitment. True enemies of the Revolution were the subject of such xenophobic outbursts as Louvet's attacks on the 'Austrian Committee', while supporters of the cause were celebrated, regardless of their nationality. Besides individual foreigners in France, there were entire nations who were considered to be free, if not quite to the same perfection as the French, particularly Britain, the United States, Switzerland and, for the time being, Poland.[133] Patriotism was not seen by the revolutionaries as an exclusively French attribute. It is not certain, however, that all revolutionaries and militants so easily made the distinction between 'patriotic' and 'enemy' foreigners.[134]

With the fall of the monarchy, the definition of patriotism became narrower. The defining characteristic of a good patriot became an adherence to a certain political regime and set of beliefs, embodied in the Republic. Henceforth, the *patrie* was not simply a community of citizens living under the same laws and legislature, but a moral state as well, in which commitment to a set of ideals, rather than merely to some original social contract, marked one for membership.[135] The stress on political orthodoxy naturally excluded French people from the nation. Saint-Just argued on 13 November 1792 that any citizen could justly kill Louis XVI, as criminals were excluded from the nation by their behaviour: 'Louis XVI must be judged as a foreign enemy.'[136] At a stroke, the destruction of the monarchy put a broad spectrum of revolutionary opinion outside the narrowing definition of patriotism.

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[132]*Sentinelle*, Nos. 10, 16.

[133]See, for example, the reception of the flags of Britain and the United States by the Paris Jacobins in December 1791 (Aulard, F.-A. (ed.), *La Société des Jacobins. Recueil de Documents pour l'histoire de club des Jacobins de Paris* (6 vols.) (Paris, 1889 - 1897), iii, 290 - 291) and similar celebrations by other societies across France from that same month until 14 July 1792, some of which included the Polish flag (Kennedy, M. L., *The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution. The Middle Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 151 - 152).

[134]See, for example, the Rethel affair in October 1792, in which four Prussian deserters were killed by French Volunteers (AN, F/7/4445 - 4550\1; Rousset, C., *Les Volontaires 1791 - 1794* (Paris, 1892), 89 - 92).

[135]Hampson, 'The idea of the nation in Revolutionary France', 18 - 19; Hampson, 'La Patrie', 132.

[136]Hampson, N., *Saint-Just* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 84; Baczko, B., 'The Terror before the Terror? Conditions of Possibility, Logic of Realization', Baker, K. M. (ed.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, iv, *The Terror*, 27.

As it was a moral quality, however, patriotism was the reserve of virtuous people, who were not exclusively French. This was illustrated when the danger of further diplomatic isolation loomed and the revolutionaries saw morale-boosting potential in expressing the universal significance of the Revolution. From this sense of beleaguered righteousness stemmed the decree of 26 August 1792 which naturalised those foreigners 'qui, par leurs écrits et par leur courage, ont servi la cause de la liberté et préparé l'affranchissement des peuples'. The decree argued that such people 'ne peuvent être regardés comme étrangers par une nation que ses lumières et son courage ont rendue libre.'[137] Virtue of the kind demanded by revolutionary patriotism was not an exclusively French characteristic.

The problem with the French Republic was that it was far more radical in conception and in practice that other countries which up to now the revolutionaries had considered to be 'free'. Suddenly, not even constitutional monarchies such as Britain were considered worthy of the same respect as republics such as the United States. The revolutionaries certainly hoped that the British people would remain true to their libertarian traditions and ensure that their government would remain neutral in the war. At the declaration of war on 1 February, however, the British were expected to overthrow the government in their own Revolution. The Jacobin club of Libourne ominously lettered its British flag with the words: 'English! Out of respect for the rights of man, your flag will remain folded up in our hall until the time when your actions show that it again warrants placement next to ours. If you prove, after all, to be slaves of royalism, we will deliver it to the flames.'[138] The British had to fulfill their promise of being worthy of liberty by overthrowing Pitt and king George. For the time being, however, the revolutionaries insisted that their quarrel was with the British and Dutch governments, not the respective peoples.[139] It would be some months before disillusionment set in.

One of the reasons for the deterioration of relations with the Dutch and the British was the French conquests in the autumn and winter of 1792 - 1793. In the wake of Valmy and Jemappes, the revolutionaries abandoned the idea of a crusade for universal liberty and adopted a more nationalist approach to their foreign policy: territorial expansion and the exploitation of the occupied lands. Such policies, however, were cloaked in the language

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[137]AP, xlix, 10.

[138]Quoted in Kennedy, *The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution. The Middle Years*, 159 - 160.

[139]See, for example, the French declaration of war against Britain and the decision to draft an address to the Dutch and British peoples on 1 February 1793 (AP, lviii, 118, 120 - 122).

of national self-determination and of universal liberty. The 'Edict of Fraternity', or the first 'propagandist decree' of 19 November 1792 promised that the French nation 'accordera fraternité et secours à tous les peuples qui voudront recouvrer leur liberté'. At the same time, the *comité diplomatique* was charged with suggesting the means by which France would give such protection.[140] The result was the more hardnosed second propagandist decree. It was couched in the language of liberation and protested the revolutionaries' respect for other peoples' rights to self-determination. In reality it provided for the means by which French generals could both exploit the occupied territories and ensure that the people chose a form of government which suited French strategic interests.[141] This decree shows that the revolutionaries had abandoned hopes for a mass uprising of peoples and it signalled the adoption of a more cynical treatment of France's neighbours.

This change in attitude stemmed from the realisation that other Europeans were not only unwilling to have their own revolutions, but were often downright hostile to their French 'liberators'.[142] To leave the Belgians and the Rhinelanders the absolute freedom to determine their own fate was to allow them the possibility to recall their former rulers, or at the very least to remain weak, independent states incapable of preventing their own reconquest by the coalition powers. The crusading rhetoric of international revolution became a veil for French expansionism. The language of French militant cosmopolitanism had subverted the universal principles of national self-determination in favour of the interests of France alone.

Such nationalism took a more explicit form with the call for 'natural frontiers'. On 31 January 1793, Danton justified the Rhine frontier by appeals to nature.[143] If nature ordained where a nation's frontiers lay, then the rights of those peoples within those limits to decide their own fate were non-existent. A delegation of Savoyards had already presented a petition, on 21 November, for 'reunion' with France, and this was decreed six days later,[144] but the second propagandist decree prepared the means by which the Belgians and the Rhinelanders could be 'persuaded' to vote for 'reunion' with France in order to provide her with the rest of her natural frontiers. From the end of January and

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[140]AP, liii, 472 - 474.
[141]AP, lv, 70 - 76.
[142]See, for example, AP, liii, 407; liv, 347 - 348; Blanning, T. C. W., *The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland 1792-1802* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 301.
[143]AP, lviii, 102.
[144]AP, liii, 506 - 510, 616.

into March, Belgian communes voted, mostly under duress, to join France. On 14, 20 and 30 March, a hundred communities in the Rhineland were also annexed.

The renewed defeats suffered by the French from March 1793, the explosion of civil war in western France and the defection of Dumouriez put the revolutionaries on the defensive once more. Combined with disturbances in Paris, which were blamed on foreign agents, the disastrous first months of 1793 finally brought the revolutionaries to enact laws against foreigners. These measures in turn perpetuated and even intensified xenophobia by setting foreigners apart from the French people among whom they had lived and worked. If political ideals and culture were the sources both of national identity and of nationalism, it was the increasing demands of the state bureaucracy which gave nationality immediate relevance. As the nature of this bureaucratic intrusion was a negative one, aimed at rooting out spies, it naturally put many foreigners under a cloud of suspicion where none had previously existed. By targeting foreigners, the watch committees legitimised and gave a function to xenophobia in the institutional structures of what was to become the Terror.

IV

The rejection of the French Revolution by the Belgians and Germans, the broadening of the conflict, renewed defeats early in 1793 and the range of domestic crises faced by the revolutionaries forced them to reconsider their policies towards foreigners. While remaining defiantly convinced of the justice and universal significance of their cause, the French none the less focused their energies on the life of the French nation itself. On 13 April 1793, the two propagandist decrees were repealed. Despite the occasional universalist claim to the contrary, the revolutionaries officially recognised the war to be what it had been since 15 December 1792: a war not for European liberation, but for national interests. The decree of 13 April laid the foundations of what was to become the foreign policy of the Terror: hostility towards commitments to liberate foreign peoples, along with a vigilance and defiance which focused on the survival of the Republic and the nation itself. The death penalty was also voted for anyone who proposed peace on any basis other than that of the territorial integrity of the Republic. It became clear from the discussion which followed that the annexed territories were part and parcel of 'l'indivisibilité et l'unité de la République'. Not only did this make a negotiated peace an

impossibility, it also made treasonous any concessions over both French conquests and the internal régime of the Republic.[145]

The principles laid down in the decree were reiterated by Robespierre in his speech to the Convention on 17 November. For as long as the Republic was still fighting on its own frontiers, caution was required in foreign policy, particularly towards the few friends which revolutionary France still had and towards neutrals who should not be antagonised. He bitterly denounced the lack of caution with which the Girondins had gone about their crusade for universal liberty, saying that they had deliberately mobilised all the tyrants of Europe against France. Prudence now dictated that France fight only for her own survival. In doing so, however, France was in fact struggling for all humanity in the long-run, even if the actual struggle for universal liberty had been abandoned: 'Que la liberté périsse en France, la nature entière se couvre d'un voile funèbre, et la raison humaine recule jusqu'aux abîmes de l'ignorance et de la barbarie. L'Europe seroit la proie de deux ou trois brigands ... '.[146]

The persistence of such claims to universal importance can be seen in the Montagnard constitution 24 June, which lowered the barriers for naturalisation and proclaimed the Republic's guiding principles in foreign policy. France would not interfere in the domestic affairs of any country, but offered 'asile aux étrangers bannis de leur patrie pour la cause de la liberté'.[147] It was one thing to risk one's own well-being in trying to free other peoples, but it was quite another simply to offer refuge to those persecuted for their ideals. Throughout the period of the Terror, France remained an asylum for foreign radicals, but it was not as comfortable an exile as it had been previously. Like the Constitution of 1793 itself, the cosmopolitanism implicit in the rights of man was to be suspended for as long as the Republic was threatened. Henceforth, the focus of all loyalties was to be the *patrie*, which in turn came be represented increasingly by the government itself. Foreign patriots were expected to understand and accept measures aimed at ensuring the safety of the Republic, even if they themselves suffered by them. Danton argued on 7 September after voting the seizure of property belonging to the enemy, 's'il se trouve dans le nombre quelques patriotes, ils doivent s'estimer heureux de souffrir pour la cause de la liberté'.[148]

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[145]AP, lxii, 2 - 3.
[146]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 171-174, 180, 183-184.
[147]AP, lxvii, 150.
[148]Quoted in Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 149.

Fears of domestic subversion by foreigners were being aimed increasingly at those whose revolutionary credentials had up to now been beyond reproach. This development was a product of the narrowing political orthodoxy brought about by the succession of political events which excluded more and more people from the revolutionary mainstream, particularly after the fall of the Girondins on 2 June 1793. The narrower revolutionary orthodoxy was defined, the more people were excluded. Those who opposed the new order were identified as opponents of the will of the nation, so they could easily be assimilated with the foreign enemy and its agents. On 25 February, for example, Dubois-Crancé implied in the Jacobins that the Paris food riots led by the Enragés had been fomented by the British. On 10 March, riots in which the Girondin journalist Gorsas had his presses smashed were blamed by Lasource two days later on the émigrés, but also on 'les agents de Pitt, de Guillaume ou de François ... les fuyards de la Savoie, de Mayence et de la Belgique qui affluent dans Paris où ils ne sont jetés que pour conspirer.'[149]

The suspicions of the Montagnard Dubois-Crancé and of the Girondin Lasource reveal an obsession with foreign-inspired conspiracy. Fears of foreign spies drove legislation aimed at foreigners, including the recognition of the *comités de surveillance* on 21 March. Apparent evidence of British espionage presented to the Convention on 1 August finally led the deputies to vote a law for the arrest of all enemy subjects. A case of papers had been found on the ramparts of Lille, ostensibly belonging to a British agent.[150] The documents were probably fakes, but what matters is that the government and the Convention took them seriously.[151] The revolutionaries were led to take their measures detaining enemy aliens by what they regarded as the hard evidence of foreign subversion. This led some revolutionaries to express an extreme form of isolationism which could only have had a chance of acceptance because of the war. In two speeches on 3 and 14 August, for example, Fabre d'Églantine urged his colleagues: 'Creusons donc un large fossé autour de la République, que nul ne puisse le franchir de part et d'autre, sans courir risque de perdre sa fortune ou sa vie'.[152]

None the less, not all revolutionaries were convinced of the need to take such drastic measures. In the first place, many took the view that if the Republic was the last hope of humanity, then the *patrie* which was being defended with such desperation still ought to

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[149]Dubois-Crancé and Lasource cited in Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 122 - 123.
[150]AP, lxx, 92.
[151]Hampson, *The Life and Opinions of Maximilien Robespierre*, 212 - 213.
[152]Quoted in Mathiez, *La Revolution et les étrangers*, 148.

be the refuge of the few foreign but enlightened souls who might some day carry the gospel to the rest of the world. On 30 September, Delaunay d'Angers, on behalf of the Commission des Finances, criticised the law of 7 September confiscating enemy subjects' property on these political grounds and for commercial reasons. Secondly, the Ancien Régime belief that wars were matters between governments and ought not to affect individual subjects or citizens also persisted, even among the revolutionaries. As Delaunay argued, to seize the property of individuals was contrary to 'cette foi de peuple, à cette probité universelle dont nous publions le code éternel'.[153] Delaunay dressed up his concerns in revolutionary ideology, but in fact they came from more traditional concepts of the *droit des gens* which were meant to protect individual foreigners in time of war.

These survivals from Ancien Régime practice and from revolutionary cosmopolitanism were however swamped by the xenophobia institutionalised by the Terror. In some cases, the 'nationalisation' of the war was not the direct result of events at the front, but the by-product of the internal political struggles between the revolutionaries themselves. On 7 January 1794, Robespierre proposed to the Jacobins a discussion of the crimes of the British government and the vices of the British constitution. This seems to have been primarily an attempt to focus the club's energies on denouncing an external, common enemy at a time when the club was tearing itself apart between Indulgents and Hébertists. Probably encouraged by a rumour which circulated in the clubs and cafés that there had been an insurrection in London,[154] most speakers dutifully distinguished between the British government for whom they expressed hatred and the people, with whom they sympathised.[155] On 30 January Robespierre finally intervened angrily: 'Je n'aime pas les Anglais, moi, parce que ce mot me rappelle l'idée d'un peuple insolent osant faire la guerre au peuple généreux qui a reconquis sa liberté.'[156] If the British people were to become worthy of French esteem once more, they should have a revolution of their own.

Robespierre's primary purpose on 30 January was to distract the Jacobins from the damaging internecine struggle between the factions. The price of securing this unity,

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[153]AP, lxxv, 363 - 364.

[154]Reports of Dugas, Latour-Lamontagne and Pourvoyeur on 18 January 1794 in Caron, P. (ed.), *Paris pendant la Terreur. Rapports des Agents secrets du Ministre de l'intérieur* (7 vols.) (Paris, 1910 - 1964), iii, 24, 27, 31.

[155]See, for example, the speeches of Butteau, Lachevardière, Couthon and an unnamed speaker (*Gazette Nationale, ou le Moniteur Universel* [hereafter *Moniteur*], Nos. 111 (21 Nivôse II/10 January 1794), 116 (26 Nivôse II/15 January 1794), 122 (2 Pluviôse II/21 January 1794), 130 (10 Pluviôse II/29 January 1794)).

[156]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 348 - 349; *Moniteur*, No. 136 (16 Pluviôse II/4 February 1794).

however, was the stirring of the worst xenophobic emotions, which were already highly-charged after a year of war with Britain. In the wake of this speech, those who sought to show off their conformity and loyalty to the revolutionary government followed suit.[157] Suspected of emigration, the former Constituent Le Chapelier tried to show his loyalty to the government by writing two letters, one privately to Robespierre, the other to the Committee of Public Safety. In both, he spent the best part of his energies expressing his hatred for the British as a guarantee of his good faith, proposing that he undertake espionage missions for the government in London.[158] It availed him nothing.

Anglophobia none the less remained an easy way for revolutionaries to express their adherence to the government. Such emotion was given particularly paranoid expression in the panic unleashed by the assassination attempts on Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois on 20 and 23 May. Barère left no doubt that the British were behind the first attack. The Convention, the Parisian sections, Jacobin clubs across France and the press duly took their cue and let loose a storm of anglophobia reminiscent of Robespierre's outburst in the Jacobins over three months earlier.[159] Much of this was certainly prompted by a desire to seem orthodox, but there is no doubt that much of the hatred expressed was real enough, drawing on deep-seated feelings which predated the Revolution.

The acceptability of the language of national hatred certainly prepared the revolutionaries for more concrete measures which transformed words into deeds, namely the infamous law of 7 Prairial (26 May), which declared that no British or Hanoverian prisoners would be taken by the French armed forces. There was a direct link between this law and Robespierre's refusal to discriminate between people and government in the discussion on the British earlier that year.[160] The ordinary British soldier supported the war against the Revolution, so he should be punished for it. As Barère put it, 'la générosité exercée envers lui est un crime de lèse humanité'.[161] In however an abstract

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[157]The first to do so was Jeanbon Saint-André, whose intervention in the Jacobins provoked Robespierre's outburst in the first place. He made an abject apology for his 'errors' and thanked Robespierre for pointing them out to him (*Moniteur*, No. 136 (16 Pluviôse II/4 February 1794)).

[158]*Papiers inédits trouvés chez Robespierre, Saint-Just, Payan, etc., supprimés ou omis par Courtois* (3 vols.) (Paris, 1828), i, 273, 278.

[159]Bouloiseau, M., *La République jacobine: 10 août 1792 - 9 thermidor an II* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972), 228 - 229; Lefebvre, G., 'Sur la loi du 22 prairial an II', *Etudes sur la Révolution française* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 119, 121 - 123.

[160]Wahnich, S., & Belissa, M., 'Le Crime des Anglais: trahir le droit', *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, lxvii (1995), 233 - 248.

[161]AP, xci, 38.

way, the war was a struggle which would eventually benefit all mankind. The British had put themselves outside humanity for fighting on the wrong side, when they should have known better.

The decree of 7 Prairial marked the low-point of revolutionary xenophobia. It cannot be dismissed as an aberration, in which the revolutionaries forgot themselves and their principles, but it cannot be explained simply as a product of revolutionary ideology either. Ideology certainly played an important part. The vision of the war as a manichean struggle between liberty and despotism gave a perverse logic to the law. Just as Louis Capet was placed *hors la nation* for his behaviour, so the British were now placed beyond the human race. None the less, the emotional reception of the decree by the deputies cannot be explained by this cold logic, but by anglophobia, which had grown from its ancient roots in the acidic soil of Franco-British relations and had been intensified by the conflict since 1793. As abominable as the order was, stirring the revolutionaries was certainly its main effect. Forty individuals, workshops, political clubs, officials and local authorities gave the decree an apparently rapturous response, although many of these may have been driven by an urge to conform at the height of the Terror.[162]

The nationalisation of the war was accompanied by deepening suspicion of foreigners within France itself. This was not only reflected by the legislation passed against foreigners, and enemy subjects in particular, but also in the increasingly frequent association of conspiracy with foreigners or foreign influence. With the xenophobia naturally inspired by the war, it was all too easy for revolutionay politicians and militants to accuse their opponents of complicity with foreign agents and foreign-inspired conspiracy. Marie-Antoinette and the Girondins were among the first to suffer from such charges.[163]

The most intense manifestation of the phobia for foreign conspiracy was the 'foreign plot' which broke in October and November 1793. Originally a financial scandal, it was exploited as the most significant of all 'foreign conspiracies' for two reasons. Firstly, it provided the government with the unifying thread which bound together all its opponents, royalist, Girondin, Hébertist and Indulgent, as part and parcel of the same over-arching counter-revolutionary movement, masterminded by the foreign powers and executed by

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[162]AP, xci, 204 - 205, 258, 273 - 275, 280, 289, 376, 437, 450, 457 - 458, 458 - 459, 518, 625, 628, 704 - 705; xcii, 41, 107, 183, 215, 290, 297, 301, 400, 411, 420 - 422, 451, 452, 478, 485; xciv, 14, 154 - 155, 164 - 165, 321, 335 - 336, 471 - 472, 534.
[163]Wallon, H., *Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire de Paris, avec le Journal des ses Actes* (6 vols.) (Paris: 1880 - 1882), ii, 319 - 320, 340, 372, 386 - 388.

their agents in France. Secondly, its use by the government in this way drove at the very heart of Montagnard politics and, in the end, justified the destruction of both the Hébertists and the Indulgents. It helped to legitimise the dictatorship of the governing Committees.

The device of the foreign plot was effective only because people in general appear to have believed in the possibility of subversion and corruption by enemy agents. This is understandable given the paucity of reliable information, the intensity of the war and apparent evidence for the existence of real conspirators. In August, the Convention itself had done much to publicise the 'British' portfolio found in Lille. People were aware of the existence of the baron de Batz, who cropped up in one denunciation of the foreign plot. Chabot had married the Austrian Léopoldine Frey, whose brothers were also implicated in the denunciations. The marriage itself was commented on by militants who regarded it as a disgrace for a *conventionnel* marry the daughter of a 'slave'.[164]

Such 'proof' encouraged xenophobia and made people receptive to the theory of a great conspiracy led by foreign agents. On 18 January, for example, the police spy Letassy attended a session of the *société populaire* of the Halles section, in which the high price of food was blamed on 'des agents de Pitt partout'.[165] Added to both the austrophobia and anglophobia which had already been in evidence, fear of conspiracy provided fertile ground for the insinuations and accusations which government spokesmen planted against their enemies. The Hébertists were destroyed with scarcely a tremor from the *sans-culottes* they claimed to champion because they were presented as the executors of a foreign plot designed to starve Paris.[166]

Meanwhile the Indulgents were given no reason to celebrate. As Saint-Just announced the arrest of the Hébertists on 13 March, he warned that the Indulgents were also part of the same foreign conspiracy, working towards the same goal of destroying the Republic.[167] As the Hébertists went to trial, Robespierre told the Jacobins that 'l'étranger soudoie parmi nous la faction des modérés et celle des hommes qui, sous le masque d'un patriotisme extravagant, voudroient égorger les patriotes.'[168] When it was the Indulgents' turn to be arrested, the charges against them set out to prove this point.[169]

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[164]Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire', 108.
[165]Caron, *Paris pendant la Terreur*, iii, 27.
[166]AP, lxxxvi, 434 - 442; Slavin, *The Hébertists to the Guillotine*, 138 - 139; *Moniteur*, No. 183 (3 Germinal II/23 March 1794).
[167]AP, lxxxvi, 434 - 442.
[168]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 411.
[169]Wallon, *Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire de Paris*, iii, 157, 159, 187.

The idea of a plot uniting all opponents of the government certainly came from the revolutionary obsession with conspiracy, but this phobia had varied in intensity and scope over time. The revolutionary phobia for plots did not stem purely from an unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of organised opposition,[170] but from the broader cultural background of the eighteenth century. Revolutionary ideology merely gave a novel, political form of expression to a more common obsession. This new expression was encouraged by a combination of the external circumstances of war, civil strife and actual evidence of subversive activity. It is doubtful that the 'foreign' element in revolutionary conspiracy theories would have been so compelling at any point in the Revolution without the events which seemed to point, rightly or wrongly, to foreign intervention in French affairs. In July 1789, it was the use of foreign troops by the royal government. In the summer of 1791, it was the flight to Varennes. The following year, it was the outbreak of war and the defeats at the front. In the Year II it was a combination of the military and domestic crisis as well as evidence, no matter how dubious to modern eyes, of a sinister plot involving powerful opponents of the government. This is not to say that the revolutionaries did not create some of these problems for themselves, or that they were not averse to stoking and exploiting xenophobia for their own political ends. Rather, the obsession with conspiracy, and with foreign conspiracy in particular, had diverse sources, in eighteenth-century popular culture, in the intensity of the crises and certainly, in revolutionary politics itself. None of these factors were constants, as they fluctuated in importance throughout the 1790s.

None the less, repeated denunciations of foreign agents and their conspiracies could not have failed to have placed even foreigners who had long been resident in France under a cloud of suspicion. As patriotism came to be focused increasingly on the revolutionary government, so foreigners who failed to show sufficient loyalty were dangerously exposed. Cloots was given a violent tongue-lashing by Robespierre in the Jacobin club on 12 December 1793: 'Pouvons-nous regarder comme patriote un baron allemand? ... S'il eût été bon Français, eût-il voulu que nous tentassions la conquête de l'Univers?'[171] On 25 December, Barère had the Convention decree that no foreigner could be elected to public office in France, 'il suffit de dire qu'appeler les étrangers à manier les rênes du gouvernement c'est en exclure les Français'.[172] Both Robespierre and Barère were

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[170]As François Furet argues (*Penser la Révolution française*, 91).
[171]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 248.
[172]AP, lxxxii, 304.

suggesting that one could not be a good patriot if one was not French, which would represent a complete rejection of the cosmopolitan content of revolutionary ideology.

The development of a patriotism which focused exclusively on France and the French led some politicians to speak in terms of the *patrie* not only as a political and moral entity, but also as a cultural and geographical place. Robespierre asked the Convention on 25 December, 'Qui peut aimer froidement la patrie?'[173] On 7 May, presenting his plan for a cult of the Supreme Being, he rhapsodised in tones reminiscent of Rousseau's dedication to the Republic of Geneva: 'Oui, cette terre délicieuse que nous habitons, et que la nature caresse avec prédeliction, est faite pour être le domaine de la liberté et du bonheur; ce peuple sensible et fier est vraiment né pour la gloire et pour la vertu.'[174] This suggests that a people was defined not only by the laws and institutions under which it lived, but by its particular characteristics and its attachment to the land. This is less assimilationist than Sieyès's definition of 1789. A people might even need to speak the same language. The law of 20 July 1794 imprisoned for six months all officials who used any language other than French. In fact, this law proved unworkable because of the persistence of regional languages and *patois* and it was suspended after the Terror. None the less, the poetics of Robespierre coupled with the attempt to impose linguistic conformity was the closest the French Revolution got to defining the nation on a cultural basis rather than simply on a contractual one. On these foundations, patriotism could have been defined as the reserve of French-born and French-speaking people.

In fact, the revolutionaries never went that far. The implication that opposition to the government meant being *hors la nation* had its reverse side. If a French citizen's politics could effectively define him as a foreigner, foreigners were equally capable of the political virtue needed to be a good patriot. For as long as patriotism was defined on the basis of one's personal, moral attributes rather than one's place of birth, so some foreigners could still be included in the definition. The revolutionaries never entirely abandoned the notion that loyalty to the *patrie* could still cut across nationality. To have done otherwise would have been to dismiss the possibility that the Revolution was of universal value. It was just that loyalty to the *patrie* was defined extremely narrowly, as obedience to the government, which made the circle of true patriots a very exclusive club.

Individual foreigners who had made the moral migration to the principles of the Revolution might be capable of living in the republican *patrie*, as the United Irishman

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[173]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 276.
[174]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 445.

Archibald Hamilton Rowan and the Dutch Patriot Johan Valckenaer discovered. For a foreigner to show that he was a patriot, he had to accept the revolutionary government which was struggling to establish and protect liberty against overwhelming odds. After all, as Robespierre claimed on 17 November, this struggle was not just for Frenchmen, but for all humanity: 'l'univers est intéressé à notre conservation."[175] The urgency of the situation demanded that enlightened souls of all nationalities support the government in its efforts: that was true patriotism. The mistake of the likes of Paine, Cloots and those implicated in the foreign plot was that they had not shown themselves willing to subject their ideas, their independence and their interests to the government and, therefore, to the manichean struggle between Revolution and reaction. Opposition itself marked one out as a traitor to the universal cause, because support for the rights of man meant support for France in her struggle for survival, and that implied supporting the government. This adherence to a very narrow definition of political orthodoxy made the *patrie* an exclusive clique, but one which none the less did not exclude simply on the basis of nationality.

V

The attitudes which developed during the Terror persisted after 9 Thermidor. The change in the system of government did not ease the fear of conspiracy, did not blunt the acute xenophobia and did not put an end to the association of patriotism with political orthodoxy. None the less, the limits of that orthodoxy relaxed, to allow more debate and, therefore, to include more people within the definition of patriotism. At the same time, victories and conquests at the front brought the return of a war of expansion and 'liberation'.

The debates over the question of France's 'grandes' or 'anciennes' limites and the annexation of Belgium on 1 October 1795 made it clear that the revolutionaries were conquerors in liberators' clothing. This is not to say, however, that the pretence of revolutionary cosmopolitanism had been jettisoned, even if the substance had. This is evident in the establishment of 'sister republics', a system of spoliation which was none the less presented under the guise of international liberation and fraternity. The Batavian Republic recognised by France on 16 May 1795 suffered a punitive peace settlement with France despite her new political order and an alliance with her 'liberator'. The justification

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[175]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 179.

was expressed by General Sauviac who wrote to the Committee of Public Safety that the Dutch had done nothing to avoid being classed as a conquered people.[176]

Implicit in this view was that to prove themselves worthy of complete freedom, the people of occupied territories had to have their own revolution before the French armies invaded. The problem was that the 'patriots' in these countries were always a tiny minority and so could do very little without the help of French soldiers. The role of foreign patriots could therefore be ignored or recognised at the convenience of the occupiers.[177] Absolute independence for occupied peoples might allow them to chose the 'wrong' form of government and it would leave them prey to the enemy forces which might easily overwhelm these small, isolated states and restore the old regime, leaving France's frontiers once more unprotected. Theobald Wolfe Tone was chagrined in March 1796 when he was asked by one of his contacts in the French government, General Henri Clarke, for a guarantee that after independence Ireland would not ally with Britain. A sense of betrayal by the United States, which effectively ruptured the Franco-American treaty of 1778 by signing the Jay treaty with Britain in 1795, may have driven Clarke's concern. Clarke later insisted that, come the revolution, the provisional government in Ireland consult the French on the form of constitution.[178]

The French approach to foreign peoples was not therefore dictated by any crusading, cosmopolitan ideology, but by the cold reasoning of France's own strategic interests. The whole approach of the French government to its conquests and the sister republics is summed up by the Director La Revellière-Lépeaux, 'to unite Holland, France, Switzerland, the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics by an uninterrupted continuity of territory ... a nursery of excellent soldiers and a formidable [strategic] position.'[179] Both the Thermidorians and the Directory therefore placed French strategic considerations above the cosmopolitan ideals of the Revolution.

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[176]Quoted in Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 201.

[177]For example, the Cispadane and then the Cisalpine Republics were established with the help of foreign patriots only because Napoleon Bonaparte wished to fulfil his own personal goals. This development was also against the will of the Directory, which wished merely to use the conquests in Italy as a bargaining chip with Austria in its search for the main prize: the left bank of the Rhine. Likewise, Hoche established the Cisrhénan Republic in August 1797 to prevent the left bank of the Rhine being sacrificed to Austria in order to save Bonaparte's republic in northern Italy (Lyons, M., *France under the Directory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 198 - 199; Blanning, *The French Revolution in Germany*, 78 - 79).

[178]Tone, W. T. W. (ed.), *Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone* (2 vols.) (Washington, D. C., 1826), ii, 51, 93.

[179]Quoted in Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars*, 177 - 178.

None the less, French military success and expansion did not have an entirely negative impact on revolutionary attitudes to foreigners. Peace treaties with former enemies of the Republic, including Prussia, the Netherlands and Spain ensured that people from those countries who happened to be in France would receive better treatment under the law, simply because they were no longer enemy subjects. Symbolic of this superior treatment was the fact that while by the law of 11 July 1795 enemy subjects who were permitted to stay in France had the words *Hospitalité, Sûreté* on their identification cards, those of countries at peace with the Republic bore the additional word *Fraternité*.[180]

As before some nationalities were regarded, more than others, as peoples whom French citizens could respect. Among the countries so honoured was Poland. A delegation of Polish patriots on 14 August 1794 were told by the president of the Convention that 'la fraternité unit tous les peuples libres' and the Poles, locked in a struggle to the death with Russia between March and November 1794, naturally qualified. When the Dutch signed peace with France in May 1795, they were fêted in a way the Spanish and the Prussians were not, because they had established their own Republic. The Dutch, the American and the Genevan flags were all hoisted aloft in the Manège as a sign of fraternity between these free peoples. In contrast, the Swedish ambassador who arrived with his credentials on 23 April 1795 was welcomed without any such accolade, because he was the representative of a monarchy.[181]

As the welcome given to the Dutch showed, 'sister republics' were to be given the same respect as the Americans and the Genevans, even if in reality they were exploitable commodities. If the French were to keep up at least a thin veil of principle over their use of the sister republics, the peoples of those states had to be accepted as fully enfranchised partners in the great enterprise of the Revolution. The 'cisalpinized' Italian states were, contrary to all the initial expectations and demands of the Directory, to be spoken of as one of the fluctuating number of genuinely 'free' peoples. Bordas, speaking as President of the Conseil des Anciens on 20 March 1798, celebrated the sovereignty of the people by speaking of the awakening of nations: 'les peuples de l'Italie en sont la preuve irréfragable. Hier ils étoient encore avilis, dégradés sous un joug honteux et magique: aujourd'hui, ils sont à toute la hauteur des peuples libres'. Of course, they could only live in this new age

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[180]*Moniteur* No. 297 (27 Messidor III/15 July 1795).
[181]AP, xcv, 66, 119 - 122, 393 - 394; *Moniteur* Nos. 217 (7 Floréal III/26 April 1795), 260 (20 Prairial III/8 June 1795), 277 (7 Messidor/25 June 1795).

because the enlightened people in Italy 'appeloient un peuple libérateur.'[182] Behind the bombast, the message was clear: the Italians were free only because the French had made it possible. *La Grande Nation* was less an expression of cosmopolitanism than both a source and a symptom of French national pride.[183]

None the less, if people from 'sister republics' had to be regarded as fellow-travellers of the French, then patriotism was still defined, therefore, as a political virtue which cut across lines of nationality. Tallien declared in the spring of 1795, 'il n'y a d'étranger en France que les mauvais citoyens'.[184] This attitude was reflected in the Constitution of 1795, which besides stipulating the prerequisites for naturalisation, also laid down actions in consequence of which citizenship could be lost. Among them was the acceptance of any honour which required either distinctions of birth or a religious oath.[185] Accepting such an honour was a rejection of the civic equality of the Republic; it was a political statement which put the citizen beyond the pale of acceptable behaviour. To be a citizen therefore still implied adherence to certain republican values, even if they were not as strictly defined as they were by the likes of Saint-Just and Robespierre. As Tallien suggested, such republican values were not the exclusive reserve of French citizens, so that foreigners with sound principles and behaviour could still be defined as 'patriots' in France. The problem was that the definition as to who were 'les mauvais citoyens' changed frequently between 1795 and 1799. This was particularly true under the Directory, where the political complexion of both the executive and the legislature changed with the various elections and coup d'états which affected the regime. None the less, the return to more open political debate meant that the definition of what political orthodoxy was became more relaxed and broader than the confined version which characterised the height of the Terror. It was easier, therefore, for foreigners to be defined as 'patriots' in France after Thermidor.

Despite the conflict, post-Thermidor revolutionaries insisted in trying to 'end the Revolution' and return to normality in domestic affairs as far as possible. It was this, more

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[182]Bordas, P., *Discours prononcé par P. Bordas, président du Conseil des Anciens. Séance du 30 ventôse, jour consacré à célébrer la souveraineté du peuple; an 6* (Paris, an VI), 5.

[183]Norman Hampson suggests that it was the Revolution might have 'increasingly assumed the shape of a commodity for export' in compensation for lack of unity at home ('The idea of the nation in Revolutionary France', 22). It was also a refuge of disillusioned cosmopolitans, one of the 'planks' to which, for example, Louis-Sébastien Mercier clung 'in the shipwreck of his old ideals' (ibid., 24).

[184]Quoted in Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 192n.

[185]*Moniteur* No. 340 (10 Fructidor III/27 August 1795).

than any resurgent cosmopolitanism, which revived interest in the *droit des gens*. A desire to lay down guidelines by which foreign nations and foreigners within France would be treated was nothing new, but the constitutional debates in 1795 at least gave the opportunity to discuss them. This was in stark contrast to the treatment meted out to the abbé Grégoire on 18 June 1793, when he attempted to present his *projet* for the *droit des gens* to be inserted into the 'Jacobin' constitution. Barère gave the proposal short shrift, dismissing it as irrelevant given France's current situation in Europe: 'il ne faut pas s'extravaguer en opinions philanthropiques.'[186]

The Thermidorians self-consciously dismissed this attitude. Fear of a return to the police state of the Terror prompted some deputies to object to measures restricting the freedom of foreigners in France. These objections were usually based, not on cosmopolitanism, but on more general arguments about civil rights and their violation. It was not forgotten that the first legally-sanctioned duties of the surveillance committees had been to watch foreigners. The desire for a return to normality in French domestic politics was particularly strong under the Directory, which was meant to be the definitive form of Republican government without revolution. Despite the latent xenophobia which always lurked not far from the surface, a number of legislators opposed measures aimed against foreigners on the grounds that they presaged a more general infringement of people's liberty.[187] Most revolutionaries feared the rebuilding of the machinery of Terror even as they gave expression to the same xenophobia and fear of conspiracy which had helped to create it in the first place. It was the determination not to replunge into dictatorship and surveillance of *French* citizens which led some revolutionaries to oppose laws against foreigners as the top of the slippery slope. Judging by the legislation restricting the movement of foreigners from 9 Thermidor to Campo Formio, however, the revolutionaries seem to have accepted the argument of Dumas, who told the Council of Elders on 28 March 1796 that 'ce n'est qu'à la paix que vous pourrez débarrasser vos lois de police ... de cette rigidité qui blesse l'indépendence quand elle cesse de la défendre'.[188] It was both the war and the concurrent political instability which gave force to xenophobia and which continued to produce legislation against foreigners.

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the post-Thermidor revolutionaries were devoid of any ideological cosmopolitanism. The end of the Terror and the opening of

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[186]AP, lxvi, 676.

[187]See, for example, the opinions of Pastoret and Cadroy in the Council of Five Hundred (*Moniteur* No. 176 (26 Ventôse IV/16 March 1796)).

[188]*Moniteur* No. 193 (!3 Germinal IV/2 April 1794).

political debate allowed some revolutionaries to develop their more abstract ideas about humanity, its rights and their application both in foreign policy and in the treatment of foreigners.[189] On 23 April 1795, the abbé Grégoire explicitly rejected eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism outright as 'un vagabondage physique ou moral; nous devons un amour de préférence à la société politique dont nous sommes membres'. None the less, he went on to say that:

> L'égoïsme national est aussi coupable que l'égoïsme individuel; le patriotisme n'est point exclusif, l'énergie de ce sentiment se concilie avec cette douce philanthropie qui s'efforce d'anéantir les préjugés, l'intolérance, les rivalités, les haines entre les Peuples, et de resserrer les noeuds de la fraternité entre les diverses sections de la famille humaine.[190]

While Grégoire rejected both the uprooted cosmopolitan attached to no country and the blinkered patriot, his definition of *droit des gens* none the less bore the mark of the war: 'Un peuple a droit de refuser l'entrée de son territoire, et de renvoyer les étrangers quand sa sûreté l'exige'. On the other hand, any action against enemy subjects was to be limited by the application of Montesquieu's maxim that 'les Peuples doivent en paix se faire le plus de bien, et en guerre le moins de mal possibles'.[191] The war clearly had not destroyed Grégoire's humanitarianism, but it was certainly offset by a stress on internal security which would have been less palatable in 1790. On the other hand, the cosmopolitan sentiments in his speech would have been extremely dangerous views to express during the Terror. Grégoire's was a sincere attempt to balance, in diplomatic and legal theory, national interest with the humane cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth-century.

Moreover, the passing of the Terror combined with military success allowed some revolutionaries to express sentiments other than blind hatred for the enemy, and the British in particular. Some of the visions presented by the revolutionaries suggest a revival of the old dream which separated the good British people from their oppressive government. In the Convention on 22 June 1795, Louvet assured the Dutch plenipotentiaries that 'le peuple anglais commence à porter impatiemment le fardeau d'une guerre entreprise pour les seuls intérêts de quelques ministres."[192] On 28 March 1796,

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[189]See, for example, the considerations on the *droit des gens* by Esschassériaux (l'aîné) and by Grégoire, both presented to the Convention (*Moniteur* Nos. 49 (19 Brumaire III/9 November 1794), 217 (7 Floréal III/26 April 1795)).
[190]*Moniteur* No. 217 (7 Floréal III/26 April 1795).
[191]*Moniteur* No. 217 (7 Floréal III/26 April 1795).
[192]*Moniteur* No. 277 (7 Messidor III/25 June 1795).

Mailhet told the Council of Five Hundred that the British political and corresponding societies were 'le seul espoir du peuple pour recouvrer l'exercise de ses droits'.[193] If those clubs were now all but destroyed, at least Mailhet reminded his colleagues that, somewhere in the mass of British subjects, there might still exist enlightened souls who were denied their only means of opposition to their government.

None the less, the xenophobia which gained official respectability during the Terror had not simply evaporated. Many of the attitudes which were expressed in their most acute form in the Year II continued to weigh heavily on the Thermidorians and under the Directory. This was because, no matter how successful the French were on the battlefield, the war itself continued and with it, the real or imagined threat of enemy subversion. That it was the conflict which bears the prime responsibility for the stirring of xenophobia probably explains why the law of 7 Prairial was actually extended to include Spanish soldiers on 11 August 1794, just as the machinery of the Terror was being dismantled. The law was not repealed until 30 December.[194] None the less, never a consistent factor, xenophobia fluctuated according to the circumstances of war and domestic politics. Most persistent of all the hatreds was anglophobia.

For the deputy Barailon on 29 October 1794, just over three months after 9 Thermidor, the British were 'les plus méprisables ennemis de la république ... les plus féroces, les plus acharnés.'[195] This hatred persisted throughout the post-Thermidor period. On 23 February 1796, Wolfe Tone was pleased to hear from James Monroe, the American ambassador, that 'not only the Government, but the whole people were most violently exasperated against England'.[196] Monroe's observation was confirmed by the German traveller Friedrich Meyer, who five weeks later was looking at a plaque commemorating the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre. He was approached by a soldier who bitterly asked, 'Cela peut-il intéresser un mylord Anglais?'[197] The persistence of this particular depth of anglophobia at all levels of society can only be explained by the continuation of the war, in which the British were proving to be the most resilient of France's opponents.

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[193]*Moniteur* No. 192 (12 Germinal IV/1 April 1796).
[194]*Moniteur* Nos. 326 (26 Thermidor II/13 August 1794), 102 (12 Nivôse III/1 January 1795).
[195]*Moniteur* No. 40 (10 Brumaire III/31 October 1794).
[196]Tone, *Life*, ii, 23.
[197]Meyer, F. J. L., *Fragments sur Paris* (2 vols.) (Hamburg, 1798), i, 22 - 23.

It was the stresses of the war which turned the previously anglophile Louis-Sébastien Mercier into an anglophobe who wrote 'Guerre, guerre éternelle aux Anglais!'[198]

As before, such xenophobia was linked to fear of conspiracy, a fear which military victory did little to abate. On 11 July 1795, in a manner reminiscent of Robespierre, the deputy Mariette warned his colleagues that France's military success made it more likely that the coalition would turn to other means to defeat the republic.[199] Tallien had already succumbed to such a view during the Prairial uprising. On 2 Prairial (21 May 1795), he warned his colleagues that 'tous les Anglais ne sont pas sur les bords de la Tamise; il y en a dans Paris, et il faut les exterminer partout où ils se trouvent.'[200] The *journées* of Prairial were not caused by economic distress and popular discontent, he explained, but by British agents in the capital. The virulence of his denunciation was the product of a very real fear of the popular violence of which he and his colleagues had been witness and it was too tempting, in the context of continual warfare, to explain it in terms of enemy subversion. The revolutionaries sought to explain political unrest not as a hostile response to their own policies, but by drawing on the phobias which were rooted in eighteenth-century culture.

The paranoia fed by the Prairial uprising was given real potency by the landing of a royalist force at Quiberon on 27 June - with British backing. It was not to be defeated until 21 July. These circumstances explain why the Convention should have been led to enact new measures against foreigners, at the very moment when France had made peace with two of its former enemies (the Netherlands and Prussia) and was close to signing a treaty with a third (Spain). Similarly, even as French forces advanced into Italy, the arrest of Babeuf and his fellow conspirators, including the Italian Buonarotti, in May 1796, led to a law expelling foreigners from Paris. Even Meyer accepted the view that 'on ne peut pas nier l'intelligence de toutes les conjurations nouvellement découvertes avec l'étranger'.[201] As Quiberon and the Babeuf plot showed, fear of foreign subversion was not always without some cause, but this obsession did lead the revolutionaries to see spies under their beds where in fact none existed. For as long as the war and the attendant political instability continued, the revolutionaries would continue to be prey to their own phobias.

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[198]*Le Nouveau Paris* (6 vols.) (Paris, n.d.), quoted in Hampson, 'The idea of the nation in Revolutionary France', 24.
[199]*Moniteur* No. 297 (27 Messidor/15 July 1795).
[200]*Moniteur* No. 247 (7 Prairial III/26 May 1795).
[201]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, i, 271.

VI

Revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners were not created only by revolutionary ideology: they were brought into the upheaval with the cultural baggage carried in from the eighteenth century. While this means that the increasingly harsh treatment of foreigners cannot be explained exclusively in terms of a response to the war, it also suggests that it cannot be attributed solely to revolutionary ideology. Older prejudices, phobias and more positive legal and cultural values continued to influence the revolutionaries. What revolutionary ideology did was to give these traditions a new, vigorous, political expression. In appropriating these longer-term impulses, both revolutionary cosmopolitanism and patriotism gained potency and acceptance. No matter how much they claimed to be establishing a new order, the revolutionaries could not escape from the weight of tradition.

As they shared both the same cultural roots and the same ideological source in the rights of man, revolutionary patriotism and cosmopolitanism were not always in conflict but could coincide. On one hand the notion of national sovereignty had exclusive implications which allowed only citizens an active role in the various branches of the state. It also justified the assault on the old order in Europe, in Alsace and the papal enclaves. On the other hand, the contractual definition of the nation encouraged assimilation: it did not exclude on the grounds of race, religion or even language. The rights of man were universal, but France was the only country where they were enjoyed to their fullest. People were therefore encouraged to see the French Revolution as the hope and inspiration for all humanity. Enlightened, prosperous and talented foreigners were not only invited to contribute to the French *patrie* and, eventually, to become citizens enjoying its liberty, but they were also urged to spread the good news in their own country. Patriotism therefore cut across lines of nationality. For as long as patriotism meant support for an egalitarian civic order over the ruins of personal privilege, so it was possible for a patriot to be a cosmopolitan, hoping the same good for other peoples.

With the flight to Varennes and the campaign for war, the pacific cosmopolitanism of the first two years of the Revolution was lost in a deluge of militant rhetoric which combined national sovereignty with international fraternity. This defensive reflex created a vision of a war both for the survival of the Revolution and for universal liberty. By the

end of 1792 it became clear that other peoples were hostile to the Revolution and that French strategic and military interests would be better served by exploitation rather than liberation of French conquests. Cosmopolitan ideology became a veil for national interest and aggrandisement.

Despite their disillusionment with the 'crusade for universal liberty', the revolutionaries never entirely abandoned their cosmopolitan pretensions. Even as they indulged in the worst manifestations of xenophobia in the Year II, they accepted that a small core of foreigners whose revolutionary credentials were sound, or who contributed to the war effort, could be free from reproach. The treatment of foreigners was not determined, therefore, solely by the outcome of tensions between the cosmopolitan and exclusive implications in revolutionary ideology. The political tendencies and the wartime potential of the foreigners in question entered into the calculations. In their manichean vision of the revolutionary struggle, the two sides were divided between patriotic virtue on one hand and despotism, vice and self-interest on the other. Frenchmen and foreigners were to be found in both camps. The problem was that as the Revolution became more radical, it excluded groups whose politics did not conform with the demands of the new order. In the summer of the Year II, this development reached its zenith, with patriotism defined as obedience to the revolutionary government. It was this development which excluded foreigners and French citizens alike from the select club of true patriots.

Meanwhile, cultural conditioning overlaid with actual evidence of foreign involvement in subversion encouraged expressions of xenophobia, often in the form of conspiracy theories. This hostility towards foreigners was linked to both the international and internal fortunes of the Revolution. Although the war did not create these various phobias, it was the conflict and the accompanying domestic troubles which intensified them. Eventually, these circumstances brought out the more exclusive implications in revolutionary ideology and led the revolutionaries to use national sovereignty as the justification for measures against foreigners, particularly during the Terror, but also subsequently. National interest demanded the temporary suspension of the rights of foreigners and their exclusion from the life of the state and even from France itself.

None the less the idea that patriotic virtue was not a monopoly of French citizens survived. The beleaguered revolutionaries of 1792 - 1794 took heart from the notion that as they struggled for survival, they were cocooning the rights of man in the protective shell of the French Republic. All friends of humanity, whatever their nationality, still supported France's struggle and were thereby defined as patriots. In France, such

foreigners proved their patriotic credentials either through their contributions to the war effort, or through unswerving political loyalty to the revolutionary government.

Chapter Three. Foreigners under the Constituent Assembly.

Helen Maria Williams at the Fête de la Fédération:

> You will not suspect that I was an indifferent witness of such a scene. Oh no! this was not a time in which the distinctions of country were remembered. It was the triumph of human kind; it was man asserting the noblest privileges of his nature; and it required but the common feelings of humanity to become in that moment a citizen of the world. ... I too, though but a sojourner in their land, rejoiced in their happiness, joined the universal voice, and repeated with all my heart and soul, 'Vive la nation!'[1]

Helen Maria Williams expressed what many foreigners felt in the summer of 1790, one year after the fall of the Bastille. The Revolution in France had a global significance because the French had asserted not any historical, prescriptive rights as a people, but their rights purely and simply as human beings. When it came to the practical reality of foreigners in general, however, the revolutionaries were faced with a myriad of pressures which exerted their force in diverse and often different directions. When the Constituent Assembly embarked on its reform of France and was faced with the privileges of certain types of foreigners, it could not sweep them aside as easily as it did those belonging to French people, because often those privileges had been based on international agreements or on diplomatic considerations. Such concerns prevented the full application of the nationalising tendencies and the egalitarian ideals of 1789 under the Constituent Assembly. Similarly, the cosmopolitan implications of the rights of man were often restrained by the revolutionaries, aware as they were of France's own political and military limitations.

I

If Helen Maria Williams saw herself, for a moment, as a citizen of the world, the Constituent Assembly was faced with the reality of defining the limits of the French nation and how membership could be acquired. They inherited from the Ancien Régime a

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[1]Williams, H. M., *Letters written in France in the Summer of 1790, to a Friend in England; Containing, various anecdotes relative to the French Revolution* (London, 1790), 13 - 14, 21.

situation which was far from clear-cut. For example, while one of the prerequisites for the exercise of political rights was French citizenship, the monarchy had muddied the water somewhat by the occasional admission of foreigners in public affairs, including the elections to the Estates-General, by accident or design. Eligibility was based on those who were born or naturalised French, but on some occasions foreigners did acquire a voice. The Genevan Étienne Dumont attended the elections in the *quartier* of Filles-Saint-Thomas. Although guards had been ordered to admit only local inhabitants, anyone dressed respectably was allowed to join the deliberations.[2] Dumont's situation illustrates how the lack of any clear definition of procedure could accidentally blur the distinctions between residents and non-residents, and even French citizens and foreigners. In the assemblies of the nobility of Gex, Quesnoy and Avesnes, foreign owners of fiefs claimed a right to representation. The keeper of the seals decided on each occasion that representation was the prerogative of property-owners, irrespective of nationality. Sieyès, however, questioned the right of foreigners to vote and to stand for election and on 14 July the National Assembly heard a report contesting the right of the bishops of Ypres and Tournay to sit as deputies and decided six days later that those bishops should not have been elected as they were foreigners.[3] The vast majority of foreigners in France remained without the suffrage and very few non-naturalised foreigners living in France tried to vote or to represent their order in the Estates.

When the Constituent Assembly addressed the two questions of French nationality and the exercise of political rights on 20 October 1789, it was made clear that for a foreigner to have the latter, he would have to have the former first. In other words, he would have to fulfil certain conditions to be recognised as French first, and then he would need to meet the various prerequisites for political rights common to all French citizens. The first condition of an 'active' citizen was 'd'être né Français ou devenu Français'. The phrase 'devenu Français' raised the question as to how a foreigner was to become French: surely, asked the baron de Beaumetz, the Assembly had no intention to retain the old system of *lettres de naturalité*, which implied bonds between king and subject, rather than between citizens? The Constituent did not rescind letters of naturalisation given under the Ancien Régime, but sought to snatch the initiative of naturalisation away from the king and place it in the hands of the nation or its representatives. The lawyer Guy Target of the *comité*

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[2]Dumont, *Souvenirs sur Mirabeau*, 45.

[3]Sieyès, *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?*, 61 - 62; Portemer, J., 'L'Etranger dans le Droit de la Révolution française', *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*, x, *L'Etranger* (Brussels: Editions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1958), part 2, 536n..

de constitution gave expression to the transfer of sovereignty from the monarch to the nation's representatives when he suggested that the Assembly draw up new conditions for naturalisation.[4]

The precondition of French birth or naturalisation for the assumption of political rights effectively disenfranchised those few foreigners who had voted or at least deliberated in the elections to the Estates-General. Similarly, any foreigners who had served in municipalities and corporations under the Ancien Régime were to lose their eligibility in communal and departmental administration. Target recognised their services when he presented new conditions for naturalisation on 30 April 1790: 'les uns ont été officiers dans les anciennes municipalités; les autres sont officiers de la garde nationale: tous ont prêté le serment civique ... ce sont des amis de plus que vous acquerrez à une constitution qui voudrait rendre tous les hommes heureux.'[5]

Target's claim is borne out by the experience of individual foreigners in France. There was no reason why the Genevan Necker could not continue to serve in government, as the appointment of ministers remained a royal prerogative. The Dutch Patriot Jan-Antonie Daverhoult at least took out French citizenship before being elected to the department of the Ardennes.[6] His compatriot Johan Valckenaer did no such thing when taking a commission in the Watten National Guard in Artois in 1790. He successfully urged other Dutch exiles to fill up the ranks.[7] Benjamin Cuenet, a *bourgeois* of Yverdon in Switzerland, became a National Guard officer in Lyon. Eventually, the decree of 29 September 1791 recognised the *fait accompli* by offering French citizenship to all foreigners who served in the militia, provided they fulfilled the other legal conditions.[8]

The significance of the naturalisation law was that it was, among other things, an attempt to assimilate more fully those foreigners already involved in the workings of the French state. Their loyalty to the new order was to be encouraged through their naturalisation: the first condition to be fulfilled was the civic oath, which was a public display of adherence to the Revolution. Nonetheless, the revolutionaries were aware that an oath on its own was no real guarantee of commitment to the new order. Consequently, foreigners were also required to have a material stake in the country. They had to have lived in France continuously for five years. Furthermore, they must have acquired

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[4]AP, ix, 469 - 470.
[5]AP, xv, 245.
[6]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 31.
[7]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 148.
[8]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 31.

property or established agricultural or commercial concerns in France. This clause stressed that the targets of the decree were not the multitude of poor foreigners such as Savoyards who swept chimneys and chopped wood in French cities, but rather those who could enrich France through commerce, industry or agriculture. Indeed, the only way in which a propertyless foreigner could hope to become a French citizen was through marriage to a French woman, which assumed a commitment to staying in France. The social basis of the Constituent's law on naturalisation was an effort to attract wealth and to avoid the assimilation of those unlikely to remain for long, or who were regarded as a drain on national resources.[9]

None the less, naturalisation became a legal right for all those who fulfilled the required conditions: it was no longer a royal prerogative. The new law represented the transfer of sovereignty from king to the nation. It also suggested that the nation was being defined as a community of citizens sharing the same civil - but not political - rights. Naturalisation became the expression both of a desire by a foreigner to join the national community and of the nation's acceptance of the foreigner as one of its own. French nationality was therefore based on individuals recognising each other as compatriots: it represented the abandonment of the corporate society of the Ancien Régime, bound together by loyalty to a king.

The sovereignty of the nation was further implicit in the clause (Article 4) which enabled the legislature to naturalise any foreigner at its own discretion 'sans autres conditions que de fixer son domicile en France et d'y prêter le serment civique."[10] This reservation was an expression of the cosmopolitanism of the Constituent Assembly. The clause was later used by the Legislative Assembly in August 1792 to naturalise foreign men of letters who had supported the French Revolution, or at least causes apparently sympathetic to it. The Constituent was also stressing the absolute sovereignty of the nation. Like the king before, the representatives of the people could waive even their own conditions for French nationality whenever they saw fit.

Additional clauses in the Constitution also determined how nationality could be transmitted from one generation to the next. In doing so, it retained an important tradition of the Ancien Régime, *ius soli*, whereby nationality was determined by the territory upon which one was born. In 1791, those born in France of parents of any nationality were recognised as French citizens provided they continued to make France

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[9]AP, xv, 245.

[10]In version which appears in the Constitution of 1791, Titre II (AP, xxxii, 527).

their home. On the other hand, children born abroad of a French father but who came to live in France and who took the civic oath were also considered French citizens, which suggested that nationality could also be inherited - by 'blood', *ius sanguinis*. The French Revolution combined these two traditions of nationality. It did not replace *ius soli* with *ius sanguinis*, as has sometimes been claimed.[11]

Language was not at this time a consideration. The law made no reference to a need to speak French, probably for the very practical reason that any linguistic condition would literally de-nationalise the peoples of whole French provinces such as Alsace, Brittany and Gascony, where languages and dialects as diverse as German, Yiddish, Breton and Gascon were in everyday use. The law on nationality was also devoid of any religious conditions. By the late eighteenth century the absolute monarchy had in fact rarely insisted on Catholicism from those being naturalised and French Protestants were given full civil rights on 19 November 1787. Nonetheless, the lack of religious content in the new regulations was not devoid of meaning. It is significant that Target's decree on naturalisation was passed a little more than two weeks after the rejection of Dom Gerle's motion which would have declared Catholicism the national religion and have allowed only that faith the right to worship publicly. The Constituent was consciously trying to shape a French nation which might still have supported Catholicism as the state religion, but which did not exclude anyone on the basis of faith either.[12] The law of naturalisation underscored the desire of the revolutionaries to secularise French society by defining its citizenry without reference to religious belief. Indeed, in the final version of the decree on naturalisation which appeared in the Constitution of 1791, the Revolution officially renounced the persecution of the Huguenots by opening the paths of reintegration into French society in the most generous of terms: 'ceux qui, nés en pays étranger, et descendant, à quelque degré que ce soit, d'un Français ou d'une Française expatriés pour cause de religion, viennent demeurer en France et prêtent le serment civique.'[13] The removal of religious conditions meant that, theoretically, French nationality would be

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[11]See, for example, Danjou, *La Condition Civile de l'Étranger*, 11.
[12]Dom Gerle's motion was rejected on the grounds that 'l'attachement de l'Assemblée Nationale au culte catholique, apostolique et romain ne saurait être mis en doute' (quoted in Vovelle, M., *La Révolution contre l'église de la raison à l'être suprême* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1988), 27).
[13]AP, xxxii, 527.

open to people of all beliefs.[14] There were pragmatic grounds for this decision: religious minorities provided wealthy and gifted individuals, particularly in banking and commerce.

The Constituent's marrying of *ius soli* with *ius sanguinis* and the rejection of language and religion as preconditions for French citizenship made French nationality more assimilationist than exclusive. French nationality could be inherited, but a person did not need to have French parents or French 'blood' in order to become a French citizen. They could acquire French nationality either through birth on French territory or through fulfilment of the legal requirements for naturalisation. Membership of the nation was open to all regardless of racial, religious and linguistic background: all that was required was the fulfilment of certain prerequisites which assured their assimilation into both the nation and the new civic order. This ideal of citizenship was not only based on cosmopolitan ideas: there was also some hard-nosed pragmatism at work. The haphazard, historical formation of the French state, with all its linguistic, religious and cultural differences, made an assimilationist definition of nationality not only desirable, but necessary. Moreover, the Constituent sought to exclude transients and poor foreign vagrants. The disinherited and the rootless were not considered worthy of French citizenship. As pragmatic as the revolutionaries may have been, however, the law on naturalisation still stands as a milestone in the civic definition of nationality: it was based not on ethnicity, religion or language, but on a theoretical contract between equals.[15]

Not all foreigners could or would be naturalised, which raised the question of their legal treatment while in France. The Constitution of 1791 declared that foreigners 'sont soumis aux mêmes lois criminelles et de police que les citoyens français ... leur personne, leurs biens, leur industrie, leur culte sont également protégés par la loi'[16] While *droit des gens* still existed as the unwritten code determining relations between states and their conduct towards each others' citizens, the decision to give legal parity to foreigners in France éradicated, in theory at least, the traditional division between *droit des gens* and *droit civil*. The fate of the *droit d'aubaine* was called into question.

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[14]In reality the French Jews themselves had to wait until 27 September 1791 before they received equal political and civil rights with other Frenchmen.
[15]This defintion of nationality has with some justice been labelled 'radical-democratic' by E. J. Hobsbawm (*Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality* (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 40). The term is something of a misnomer in the context of the Constituent Assembly. Perhaps it is better described as 'civic' to distinguish it from cultural, racial and religious bases of nationality.
[16]AP, xxxii, 541.

When Barère rose in the name of the *comité des domaines* on 6 August 1790 and demanded complete abolition, he met little opposition. His arguments were little different to those used by those Ancien Régime ministers who had requested a similar measure. He suggested that the *droits d'aubaine* and *de détraction* yielded a tiny amount of revenue, while abolition would encourage foreigners to invest in *biens nationaux*, commerce, industry and agriculture in France. He stressed the economic and fiscal benefits the measure would bring at such a cheap price. Of course, Barère embellished his speech with plenty of references to the cosmopolitan implications of the rights of man. He recoiled in horror at the exclusion of foreigners from French *droit civil*: *'Il vit libre, mais il meurt serf*: telle est la maxime atroce que les représentants d'un peuple libre doivent s'empresser d'effacer de ses lois. La France doit ouvrir aujourd'hui son sein à tous les peuples de la terre.' It was insult 'au droit naturel et au droit des gens'.[17]

The abolition of the *droit d'aubaine* represented the admission of foreigners to French *droit civil*. The measure was dictated primarily by French economic and fiscal interests, the perceptions of which had not changed very much between the old and the new régimes. The difference, however, lay in the way in which those interests were expressed: wrapped in the language of cosmopolitanism, the abolition of the *droit d'aubaine* and the *droit de détraction* had instant appeal among the deputies. Only one deputy sought to limit the decree, which in the end was voted unanimously with little discussion.[18] For the time being, the revolutionaries' cosmopolitan ideology and their view of what was right for the state coincided.

From the point of view of foreigners themselves, the significance of the abolition of 1790 was its finality, that it made no demands of reciprocity and that it abolished the *droit de détraction*. This meant that the *droit d'aubaine* would not return, no matter what governments of other states did. This was a path down which the absolute monarchy had been unwilling to tread, even when it did make special arrangements with other governments.[19] The *droit d'aubaine* brought little revenue to the state's coffers, but its abolition was symbolic of the new régime's attitudes towards foreigners and their place in society.

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[17]AP, xvii, 628 - 629.

[18]AP, xvii, 629.

[19]The *droit d'aubaine* was none the less re-established by Napoleon's Civil Code after much debate. The First Consul concluded that France was losing out from the unilateral abolition of 1790 and 1791. See, for example the report penned by Roederer on August 1801 (MAE, Fonds Ancien, ADP, France, carton 1, dossier 1).

Despite the claims of the Constitution to give foreigners legal treatment equal with French citizens, however, two Ancien Régime practices aimed specifically at foreigners remained in force. The *cautio judicatum solvi* was not abolished and nor was the *contrainte par corps* for foreign debtors until the Convention did so between 9 - 12 March 1793. On balance, however, when foreigners were not treated equally with French citizens before the law, it was usually in their favour because diplomatic or commercial motives so dictated.

When titles of nobility were abolished on 19 June 1790, the deputies quickly foresaw the problems which might have arisen among titled foreign aristocrats and diplomats in France. The next day the Constituent exempted foreigners without discussion. When an outburst of xenophobia provoked by the flight to Varennes led the National Assembly to close the frontiers on 21 June 1791, discretion ruled a week later. The Assembly's *comités diplomatique, des rapports et des recherches* reported that arrests of foreigners on the frontiers would be counter-productive for both commercial and diplomatic reasons.[20] Foreigners were to be permitted to leave France on production of a valid passport issued by their local municipality or the minister of foreign affairs.[21] While passports were later an ominous way of controlling the movements of foreigners and citizens alike, for now they were a means of exempting foreigners from restrictions on cross-border movement, a luxury denied to most French people for a while. The most dramatic cases of special consideration given to foreigners, however, came with decision to compensate the Imperial princes for the loss of their privileges in Alsace and in the Constituent's treatment of foreign soldiers and clergy. As will be shown in the case of the last two groups, such foreigners were protected from the full implications of revolutionary measures because of the very fact that they were not French.

If the Constituent made important steps towards the equality of French and foreign citizens before the law, it was much more sweeping in terms of giving foreigners full civil rights. Perhaps the most important of such rights for foreigners was to worship freely. The absolute monarchy, of course, had made important concessions to Protestants in 1787 and the Revolution continued this work. The recognition of full civil and political rights for Protestants made redundant the need for separate burial ground, which included the cemetery for foreign Protestants in Paris. While the foreign minister Montmorin

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[20]On 21 June the Constituent issued a declaration of France's peaceful intentions (AP, xxvii, 385 - 386.

[21]AP, xxvii, 358 - 359, 563.

apparently thought that its closure might give rise to protests from foreigners, it was closed without a whimper in 1791.[22]

The Constituent Assembly was pragmatic in its approach to the general conditions of foreigners in France. While they proclaimed high principles, in reality the revolutionaries were led not by ideology but by their view of national interest. None the less, in these early years of the Revolution, those perceptions led them to take an assimilationist approach to foreigners. Political, economic, fiscal and diplomatic considerations brought the revolutionaries to be flexible in the application of their principles. This flexibility could work both in favour and against foreigners. While they abolished the *droit d'aubaine*, the revolutionaries retained the *contrainte par corps* and the *cautio judicatum solvi*, presumably because of the same legal justifications presented under the Ancien Régime. On the other hand, while they claimed to treat foreigners equally with French citizens before the law, they understood that the application of all the sweeping changes to foreigners would have diplomatic and economic consequences and made the necessary exemptions in their favour. Foreign troops and foreign clergy best illustrate this point.

II

The behaviour of foreign troops during the collapse of the absolute monarchy left them open to suspicion and hostility. At the end of the Ancien Régime these troops appeared, to both the authorities and the people alike, to be loyal to their aristocratic officers and to the old order. Their role in the crisis of the summer of 1789 seemed to confirm this prejudice. The high proportion of foreign troops in the military build-up around Paris and Versailles (5,800 out of 17,000 new arrivals) from 13 April 1789 encouraged wild speculation and rumour.[23] The day after the fall of the Bastille, Mirabeau rose in the permanent session of the National Assembly and denounced 'ces satellites étrangers' whose very presence was 'l'avant-scene de la S. Barthelemy'.[24]

The foreign troops, with their reputation for iron discipline and obedience, may have caused consternation among the French population, but in fact they seem to have been as

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[22]MAE, Fonds Ancien, ADP, France, carton 7, dossier 115 (letter of Montmorin to Bailly, May 1790; letter of Lebrun to Pierre Louis Corroy, ex-concierge of the cemetery).
[23]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 51 - 55.
[24]*Moniteur*, 15 - 16 July 1789.

affected by the political instability and uncertainty as French units.[25] There were however important exceptions, such as the Royal-Allemand and the Hussar regiments. For the former, the popular enmity which followed the events of 12 July in Paris was enough to ensure solidarity between officers and men.[26] The very presence of such foreign soldiers in some of the more dramatic manifestations of loyalty and obedience to the old régime determined popular attitudes towards foreign troops, regardless of the realities of desertion and indiscipline in other units.

What most people remembered was the charge of the Royal-Allemand cavalry in Paris on the place Louis XV and the Tuileries in Paris on 12 July. Besenval later praised the restraint of the German cavalry up to the moment they galloped into the crowd,[27] but the civilian population envisaged a more sinister picture of the troops' intentions and they were encouraged in this by the press. 'Trois régimens allemands avec leurs canons se seraient rendus à la porte d'Enfer', reported the *Moniteur*. The crowds returning from their Sunday strolls in the bois de Boulogne were caught up in the confusion of the charge of the Royal-Allemand: 'leur frayeur fut égale à leur étonnement en les voyant investis par des soldats étrangers rangés en bataille'.[28]

People also remembered that thirty-two Swiss troops (from the Salis-Samade regiment) in addition to the eighty-two invalids had guarded the Bastille and fired from its ramparts into the crowd on 14 July.[29] If eventually de Launay had been willing to capitulate, the Swiss commander, Louis de Flue, was not.[30] The *Moniteur* certainly claimed that while the majority of the defenders did not want to fire on the attackers, it was 'les conseils perfides de M. Louis de Flue', himself following orders from Besenval

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[25]The Swiss Diesbach, Salis-Samade and Bouillon regiments all lost abnormally high numbers of men through desertion, while the Swiss Châteauvieux regiment declared that it would never fire of the people. The German regiments of Bouillon and Nassau, the majority of whom were German-speaking French subjects, declared that they 'did not wish to serve against their country' (Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 58, 61).

[26]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 61.

[27]Besenval, P.-V., *Mémoires de M. le baron de Besenval, écrits par lui-même* (3 vols.) (Paris, 1805), iii, 411.

[28]*Moniteur*, 17 - 20 July 1789.

[29]Bodin, J., *Les Suisses au Service de la France de Louis XI à la Légion étrangère* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), 246.

[30]'Relation de la Prise de la Bastille, le 14 juillet 1789, par un de ses défenseurs', *Revue Rétrospective* (1ère Série), iv (1834), 291.

and Flesselles, which brought the garrison to use force. 'On avait fait jurer les Suisses qu'ils feraient feu sur les invalides s'ils refusaient d'obéir au gouverneur ... '.[31]

The plight of foreign troops in France during the Revolution was that if they insisted on retaining their separateness from the rest of the army and continued in their loyalty to the crown which was the cornerstone of their service in France, they would incur the odium of the people and of the new authorities. If, on the other hand, they declared their loyalty to the nation and the new order for the sake of survival and continued employment, they were betraying their own conditions of service and their sense of honour. Meanwhile, the dramatic experiences at the hands of foreign troops and popular hostility evident in the *cahiers de doléances*, put pressure on the revolutionaries to consider very carefully the continued presence of foreign troops in the French army.

In the Constituent Assembly, a number of deputies sought to forestall the counter-revolutionary potential of the army by speaking in favour of different forms of national service, which naturally excluded foreigners. On 18 September 1789 the vicomte Louis de Noailles stressed that the army ought to be considered as 'une partie de la totalité des citoyens qui se chargent à certaines conditions du service militaire, auquel seraient tenus tous les citoyens'. He then argued that the army should never act against the nation which it represents, except in cases laid down by law when public tranquility was at stake. For de Noailles, the army could be a threat in the hands of royalist officers, but it also provided protection against renewed insurrections by the people. For de Noailles, foreign regiments belonged to the former category as they knew only 'une obéissance aveugle' and were therefore a threat to the new constitution.[32]

There was perhaps an element of national pride behind the arguments for the disbandment of the foreign regiments, a sentiment which again echoed those expressed in the *cahiers de doléances*. In addition, the new, egalitarian definition of citizenship allowed no special privileges for any section of society and it admitted no one except citizens to full participation in the state, including the army. These ideas were voiced less than three months later by Dubois-Crancé of the National Assembly's military committee. On 12 December, he seized on the phrase of the military reformer, the comte de Guibert, and declared that 'tout citoyen doit être soldat, et tout soldat citoyen', which left little room for foreigners in French military service.[33] The idea of equality of rights among

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[31]*Moniteur*, 20 - 23 July 1789.
[32]AP, ix, 36 - 38
[33]AP, x, 520.

citizens also implied an equality of duties. Those who did not opt to join the national community neither shared the same political rights as citizens, nor the same duties - and that included service in the armed forces.

Circumstances did not, however, allow the National Assembly to exercise its principles to their logical extent. If Dubois-Crancé's bill did not become law, this was not because the deputies (except for some on the right) objected to the principle of excluding foreigners from service, but because they preferred to continue to rely for the time being on the professional line army already in existence.[34] The revolutionaries recognised the need to maintain the army to prevent continuing internal disorder and to forestall the possibility of invasion by foreign powers tempted by the soft target of a France weakened by domestic instability.[35] With disintegrating discipline and alarming rates of desertion, the army appeared to be bleeding to death at a precarious moment in France's history. Most revolutionaries recognised that to dismiss well-disciplined foreign regiments in such circumstances was the height of folly.

On 18 September 1789 de Noailles therefore proposed, for the *comité militaire*, that while no more foreign troops be engaged into French service, those units already in the French army be kept under new titles. The Swiss, of course, presented a special case: unlike other foreign regiments, they served the king of France by virtue of treaties and capitulations with their respective governments. It would have been diplomatically disruptive to have disbanded the Swiss regiments and so de Noailles insisted that the treaties with the cantons be respected. Even Dubois-Crancé, for all his enthusiasm for 'une conscription vraiment nationale', conceded this point.[36] These pragmatic arguments won the day over the fear and hostility towards foreign troops, the ideology of citizenship and national pride. Even the financial savings to be made by disbanding the foreign regiments did not, for the time being, prevail. The *comité des finances* on 2 October 1789 stressed that any such steps made in order save money should only be carried out 'après avoir mûrement pesé les diverses considérations politiques qui ont fait créer les régiments et leur donner un traitement considérable'.[37]

The Constituent decided that the political and diplomatic considerations in favour of keeping foreign troops were more pressing than those against. The *constitution militaire* of 28 February 1790 stipulated (Article III) that the king could not introduce into France

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[34]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 156.
[35]See, for example, Custine's opinion (AP, x, 556).
[36]AP, ix, 38; x, 522. See also Custine's pragmatic arguments (AP, x, 557 - 558).
[37]AP, ix, 262 - 263.

any foreign troops without the permission of the legislature. Each legislature was empowered (Article XI) to pass further statutes on the admission of foreign soldiers.[38] This compromise reflected the Assembly's desire to retain a competent regular army, to maintain good diplomatic relations, but also to ensure that control over foreign troops was not exclusively in the hands of the king.

The Constituent soon used the powers vested by the *constitution militaire* and fixed the number of foreign troops allowed in the French army. As if in anticipation of such a move, the minister of war, La Tour-du-Pin, suggested that, although the number of foreign troops in France numbered 24,000, they could not be reduced to any less than 22,000, owing to 'les raisons politiques', meaning diplomatic treaties and conventions. No one in the Assembly objected to these proposals, as the message of diplomatic necessity had by then been clearly and often repeated. On 13 July, de Noailles proposed that the number be fixed at 24,581, on the basis that in peacetime there should never be more than one foreign soldier to every 8 3/5 French soldiers and in wartime, one to every 4 3/5. De Noailles supported his proposal by repeating the arguments used by Maurice de Saxe in favour of foreign regiments: they saved French manpower for more productive activities and for as long as they were in French service, they could not be used by foreign powers. None the less, he recognised that foreign soldiers could be useful tools in the hands of the monarch 'dans ces temps de troubles ou d'effervescence' and so recommended the fixed ratios of foreigners to French citizens in the army. On 18 August the Assembly produced its definitive decree which was more generous to the foreign units. In 1791, the entire army would number 150,848 men, of which foreign troops would not number more than 26,000.[39] In other words, while de Noailles anticipated a fighting force in which between 11½ and 12 percent of the troops were foreigners, the Constituent permitted a greater proportion of 17 percent. In practical terms the decree signalled no change in the numbers foreign troops in France.

For as long as the revolutionaries recognised the need to retain foreign soldiers, the main problem became one of how to ensure their loyalty while also reforming the military. The problem was not merely one of ideology: there was genuine worry among both deputies and the people (as their response to foreign regiments in various parts of France made clear) that in retaining foreigners, the authorities were actually nourishing those who might become the stormtroopers of counter-revolution.

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[38]AP, xi, 739 - 742.
[39]AP, xii, 699 - 700; xvii, 74 - 76; xviii, 142.

The first solution proposed applied to all the military. The National Assembly decreed on 10 August 1789 that all soldiers would take an oath 'à la Nation, à la Loi et au Roi, chef de la Nation'. The comte d'Affry, colonel of the Swiss Guards and colonel-general of all Swiss and Grison troops in France, was told by La Tour du Pin on 23 August that 'les Régimens étrangers, comme les Nationaux, devaient y être soumis.'[40] The problem was that the oath demanded fidelity not only to the monarch, but also to the nation and the law, which ran contrary to the traditional oaths of Swiss troops in French service and upheld by their capitulations. It did not take long for the officers of the Swiss regiments to see the implications. On 24 August, captain de Lanther of the Castella regiment wrote an outraged letter to the Petit Conseil at Fribourg expressing the views of all the Fribourgeois officers of his regiment. They declared that the new oath 'touche vos traités avec le Roy, par le serment à la Nation; à nos privilèges et liberté, par celui à la Loi'. Nonetheless, d'Affry decided that to delay taking the oath would be to subject the Swiss regiments to suspicion and hostility and he was supported in this assessment by a number of officers. One by one, the Swiss regiments took the oath, but with the proviso that it would be on a provisional basis until they received instructions from their governments. These orders soon came. On 1 September the Conseil des Deux-Cents of Fribourg advised its subjects in the French army to take the oath, but along with a carefully-worded protest that the oath must not be used as a justification to alter the treaties and capitulations still in force. Other cantons, such as Zurich, saw absolutely no problem with the oath as it stood.[41]

The protests from Fribourg and the reluctance of the Swiss officers to depart from the original formulae suggested that some cantons and officers were hostile to the Revolution itself. This hostility was due in no small part to uncertainty over the future of foreign troops in France. At the time of the controversy over the oath, this issue had not been fully debated, but ideas about 'nationalising' the army had been volleyed about in the chamber of the Constituent. When the Assembly decided to maintain the foreign regiments, it seemed that the problems may have been resolved.

The political situation in France did not stabilise, however, and the very fact that the National Assembly agreed to retain foreign regiments provoked instability in certain

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[40]Quoted in Zurich, P. de, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suisses au service de France sous l'ancien régime', *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte*, xxii (1942), 228.
[41]Zurich, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suisses', 222 - 224, 230, 236.

towns.[42] Relations between foreign soldiers and local people, delicate at the best of times, became strained because of the association of the latter with counter-revolution. Their very isolation and the hostility of the populace brought the troops to close ranks and thus maintain their discipline, which in turn reinforced the popular prejudice of foreign troops being obedient servants of aristocratic and counter-revolutionary officers.[43] In fact, it was the National Assembly itself which sanctioned the use of the military in restoring order, although it appeared to recognise that it was a dangerous card to play. Foreign units were used because, as general de Bouillé recognised, they retained their discipline and were less susceptible than French troops to the blandishments of 'patriots'. De Bouillé estimated that of ninety infantry battalions and of 104 cavalry squadrons in his command, which included Paris and north-eastern France, he could depend on only twenty of the infantry, all German or Swiss, and sixty of the cavalry, a third of which were German-speaking.[44] In 1790, against the background of municipal upheavals in cities such as Marseille and Lyon, in which foreign regiments were involved, a number of deputies in the Constituent raised once again the question of loyalty of foreign troops to the Revolution.

On 5 May Peyssonnel demanded that foreign regiments be placed under the same terms and conditions as French units. He spoke specifically of the German regiments, tying the question to the privileges of Imperial princes who owned fiefs in Alsace. With a strong dose of germanophobia, he warned of the malign potential of the eight German regiments which were garrisoned in Alsace and Lorraine[45] and of the dangers of allowing German princes to retain influence over these troops. Brushing aside the diplomatic arguments, he argued that France's relations with Germany did not depend solely on the maintenance of these regiments. On the contrary, they presented too much of a danger to the internal

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[42]See, for example, the case of the Swiss Ernst regiment in Marseille, which ended with the Swiss being hounded out of French service in May 1792 (AN, F/7/4401 (*Mémoire sur la malheureuse affaire du Régiment d'Ernest*, 3 April 1792); Scott, W., *Terror and Repression in Revolutionary Marseilles* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973), 21 - 26; Haas, R., *Un Régiment Suisse au Service de France. Bettens 1672 - 1792* (Pont l'Abbé, 1967), 18 - 20; Scott, S. F., *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 139 - 141). See also the affair of the Swiss Sonnenberg and the German La Marck regiments in Lyon (Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 141 - 144).

[43]As S. F. Scott argues in *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 61 and 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments', 18 - 19.

[44]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 91.

[45]The Alsace, La Marck, Royal-Suédois, Royal Hesse-Darmstadt, Bouillon, Royal Deux-Ponts, Salm-Salm and Nassau, all infantry, were usually posted on the north-eastern frontier.

security of the new order to be left as they were. The diplomatic fallout from disbanding or merging them with the French regiments was a small price to pay for the elimination of these sources of domestic instability. He conceded that the Swiss regiments ought to be left alone because of the French alliance with the cantons, but proposed that all other foreign regiments be subsumed into their French counterparts, with the same pay, discipline and uniforms. They were to be obliged to swear the civic oath - individually, not collectively as before - which would also act as a naturalisation ceremony. Those who wished to leave French service could and henceforth foreign regiments would recruit only French citizens. 'Par le cours ordinaire des choses', Peyssonnel explained, 'ces corps se trouveraient, en peu de temps, composés de nationaux; le petit nombre d'étrangers qui y resteraient encore, seraient des individus naturalisés, devenus citoyens et dévoués par choix au service de la patrie adoptive.'[46]

Not all foreign regiments were written off by patriots and the people as the workhorses of counter-revolution. Peyssonnel's phobia over German troops ought to have been abated somewhat when in July the Salm-Salm infantry regiment mutinied in Metz over the management of regimental funds. In this affair, the mutineers had the support of local people and they returned to barracks only when the mayor persuaded them.[47] The mutiny of the Swiss Lullin-Châteauvieux regiment along with two French regiments in Nancy occurred in similar circumstances: they had the support of the patriotic townspeople, with whom they attended the local feast of the federation despite the opposition of their officers on 19 April 1790. Some Swiss soldiers joined the Jacobin club and socialised with the National Guard. When disorder broke out on 9 August among the French troops in the garrison, the Swiss joined them the next day. After Bouillé put down the mutiny, on 4 September one of the Swiss ringleaders was broken on the wheel, twenty-two others were hanged, forty-one condemned to thirty years in the galleys and seventy-four punished within the regiment.[48]

The mutiny at Nancy seemed to show that not all foreign troops were immune to radical propaganda, even though there was no evidence to suggest that the Châteauvieux Swiss were acting on anything but strictly regimental grievances.[49] If it still feared the

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[46]De Peyssonel's opinion is reprinted in AP, xv, 403 - 406.
[47]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 89.
[48]Details of the mutiny can be found in Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 92 - 95 and Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères*, i, 357 - 364.
[49]See the demands of the regiment's *comité des soldats*, in Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères*, i, 358n. - 359n..

counter-revolutionary potential of foreign regiments, the Constituent was now equally worried that should they become a source of widespread insubordination, among the most reliable troops in the French army would be disabled. The answer, it seemed, was to insulate all units, French and foreign alike, from radical influences such as political clubs. In September the Constituent accordingly banned all soldiers from attending political meetings and societies, a move welcomed in particular by the Swiss cantons, whose worst fears about the contagion of revolutionary propaganda appeared to be confirmed by the activities of the *Club helvétique* in Paris and by the Nancy mutiny. In fact, by the time the National Assembly banned soldiers from attending political clubs in the autumn, the numbers of soldiers attending the meetings had already begun to tail off and decline. Their own officers had already clamped down on their activities and their respective cantons warned the soldiers that to join the *Club helvétique* would lead to penalties for high treason in Switzerland, including banishment and seizure of property.[50]

The mutiny at Nancy and the involvement of some foreign troops in radical political activity did little to abate popular hostility to foreign troops. If there were expressions of sympathy for the Châteauvieux Swiss, the conduct of other foreign regiments, including those who served against the mutineers at Nancy, did nothing to convince people that foreign troops could also be good patriots. In Belfort, the Royal-Liégeois infantry and the Lauzun hussars, who had both supplied troops to Bouillé in the suppression of the Nancy mutiny, provoked the hostility of the populace when officers of the latter gave a banquet to those of the former on 21 October, hailing 'les vainqueurs de Nancy'. Outside the café where the festivities had taken place, a major of the Royal-Liégeois, perhaps the bolder for alcohol, showed a distinct lack of tact by exclaiming 'Nous sommes les maîtres, il faut hacher les bourgeois!' Other officers got into the spirit of things by running through the streets, yelling 'Vive le roi! Vivent les aristocrates!' and, even worse, 'Au diable la nation!'

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[50]The *Club helvétique* had petitioned the National Assembly on 2 September on behalf of the Châteauvieux regiment, which angered the governments in the cantons, who accused the National Assembly of receiving delegates who had no credentials. Worse, the club had some success in attracting the soldiers to its meetings: its first official meeting on 6 June 1790 drew almost a hundred Swiss citizens, of whom twelve were known to be Cent-Suisses. On 27 June alone, of eighty new members thirty-six came were soldiers of the Gardes-Suisses from the barracks at Rueil and Courbevoie. Méautis, A., *Le Club helvétique de Paris (1790 - 1791) et la diffusion des idées révolutionnaires en Suisse* (Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1969), 52 - 53, 67; Maradan, 'L'Echec de la Propagande du Club Helvétique auprès du Régiment des Gardes 1789 - 1791', Vovelle, M., *Paris et la Révolution* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 256; Zurich, P. de, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suisses ... ', 240.

They waved white handkerchiefs tied at the end of their swords, insulting and even wounding some of the locals.[51] The fallout from the Nancy mutiny also haunted the Swiss Vigier regiment. In March 1791 the regiment could spend only a few hours in Nancy, because of the 'insultes et des outrages que les officiers et soldats ... ont éprouvés'. Vigier, the proprietary colonel, complained to the sympathetic French envoy to the cantons, de Vérac, who wrote to Montmorin that the incident underlined 'la conduite ferme et distinguée que ce Régiment a tenu le 31 août dernier à la malheureuse affaire de Nancy'. He found it disgraceful that the same town should give such a poor reception to the soldiers who had saved it from 'tous les malheurs dont elle etoit menacée'.[52]

What de Vérac did not grasp was that the reputation of a foreign unit among the people depended upon its own actions: if it showed itself to be sympathetic to the Revolution, then it rose in popular esteem. If on the other hand it allowed its politics to be dictated by devotion to officers and to duty, then it reinforced popular prejudices. In turn, hostility from the population simply increased cohesion and discipline within the regiment. On the whole, with the highly-publicised exception of the Châteauvieux regiment, whose own revolutionary credentials were dubious because it only mutinied over internal administration, most of the foreign units seemed to lean towards loyalty to their evidently aristocratic officers.

The reputation of the foreign regiments was brought to a new low among the revolutionaries by the royal flight to Varennes on 20 - 21 June 1791. De Bouillé was charged with providing military cover for the royal family as they rumbled their way towards the frontier in their ostentatious carriage. Of the ten cavalry regiments selected to provide detachments, half were German-speaking, including the notorious Royal-Allemand. The infantry to be used were two Swiss and four German regiments.[53] After the flight, one of the German regiments involved, the Nassau, was forced to march from hostile town to hostile town until the municipality of Metz finally found it in their hearts to let the long-suffering regiment billet there. They were to regret this hospitality, because men of the Nassau regiment promptly engaged in a running battle through the streets with the French troops. When this affair was reported in the National Assembly on 21 July, it was remarked that not only had the Nassau regiment been involved with de Bouillé's

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[51]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 145 - 146; Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères*, i, 369 - 370.
[52]AN, F/7/4400 (De Vérac to Montmorin, Soleure, 30 March 1791).
[53]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 103.

machinations a month previously, but the hostility of the population might also be explained by its presence at Versailles in July 1789.[54]

The atmosphere of uncertainty and fear brought by the royal flight to Varennes intensified the hostility towards foreign troops. The Constituent decided on 21 June that soldiers had to renew their commitment to the Revolution through a new oath which made no mention of the king.[55] The new formula provoked a wave of emigrations among the officers in the French army in general. Among these recalcitrant officers were thirty-one from the Irish Berwick regiment, twenty-seven of whom left France between 3 and 25 July, with a few of the rank-and-file trailing after them, while the rest simply did not return from leave. These men considered that, if the king was not involved in the command of the army, then their last commitment to serve was severed.[56]

For the Swiss regiments the new oath had a similar meaning, but they could not act without the guidance of the cantons. The diplomatic tremors which the oath might have caused were considered a minor inconvenience by the revolutionaries, who believed that they now faced the serious possibility, for the first time since 1789, of foreign intervention. While foreign regiments seemed particularly susceptible to counter-revolutionary suggestion, France needed troops to face the potential threats of civil and external conflict more than ever. So on 25 June, the National Assembly ordered d'Affry to have all Swiss regiments take the new oath. D'Affry obliged, that same day warning his officers that 'les circonstances commandent impérieusement ces dispositions ... '. Between 28 June and 14 July, each Swiss regiment accordingly took the oath, all with the reservation that the oath would have to be sanctioned by their respective cantons. The problem was, however, that on 27 June, unknown to the Swiss troops in France, the government of Fribourg had forbidden the Swiss to take any oaths without its *prior* permission. This was a decision confirmed by the Diet of Frauenfeld, where representatives of all the cantons met on 3 July. News that some of the regiments had already taken the oath gave rise to storms of anger in the diet, which sent off letters reprimanding d'Affry for his conduct and protesting to de Vérac over the way in which the Swiss troops were being treated in France. The oath was eventually approved by all

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[54]AP, xxviii, 471 - 472.

[55]Zurich, P. de, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suisses', 245.

[56]Nine officers of the Dillon regiment refused to take the oath, a further twelve resigned or deserted by October and by the end of 1791 thirty had left the regiment. By September, fourteen of forty-eight officers of the Walsh regiment had refused the oath (Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 106, 159 - 160; Scott, 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 19).

cantons except those Fribourg, Zurich, Bâle and Berne.[57] In the end it was the French who softened their attitude with a new oath, 'd'être fidèle à la Nation, à la Loi et au Roi' on 17 September. The change, applicable to the whole army, was less in response to the diplomatic furore than the fact that Louis XVI had accepted the Constitution and was perhaps aimed at stemming the haemorrhage of officers through emigration.

The treatment of which the Diet of Frauenfeld had complained in July was not restricted to the oath, however: two other measures by the Constituent also brought up more bile. One was the payment of soldiers in *assignats*. The Steiner regiment appealed to the state of Zurich over this, which prompted an official complaint to Montmorin on 22 June 1791.[58] The Diet of Frauenfeld supported this protest on 7 July on the grounds that the capitulations with France 'exige que les appointements des officiers et Soldats soyent payés en argent'.[59]

This was compounded by the second of the 'innovations onéreuses', the decree of 1 May 1791 whereby the decision to forbid soldiers attending political meetings was rescinded. Almost immediately, a conflict blew up between the desires of the Swiss officers and those of the Constituent. On 10 May, d'Affry sent an order to all Swiss regiments, saying that 'le but étant de mettre le soldat françoise (*sic*) a portée de s'instruire des principes de la Constitution française et de s'y éclairer sur ses devoirs comme Citoyen', it did not apply to the Swiss. He nonetheless agreed to allow any soldier who wished to attend the meetings in order to learn about the laws of a 'Puissance alliée et Amie de ses souverains'.[60] D'Affry was trying to balance obedience to the laws of France with the demands of the Swiss cantons.

His compromise was too mild for the Diet of Frauenfeld, which on 7 July unanimously agreed to send the Swiss troops a letter 'dont le but est de les garantir de l'insubordination et de les empêcher de fréquenter les *Clubs dits Patriotiques* ...'. The *Corps helvétique* decreed that should any soldiers attend such clubs, 'nous nous verrions obligés de manifester notre disgrace ... et de les punir même selon l'exigence du cas de peines plus fortes et irremissibles.' On 30 July, both the *Grand Conseil* of Fribourg and the

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[57]AN, F/7/4400 (*Pièces jointes au Recès de la Diète de Frawenfeld tenue en Juillet 1791* [7 July 1791]); Zurich, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suisses', 246 - 247, 249 - 258, 264 - 266.
[58]AN, F/7/4400 (État de Zurich to Montmorin, 22 June 1791).
[59]AN, F/7/4400 (*Pièces jointes au Recès de la Diète de Frawenfeld* ...).
[60]AN, F/7/4400 (D'Affry, circular to the commanding officers of the Swiss regiments, 10 May 1791).

government of Soleure repeated this order.[61] The problem with the Diet's order was that it clashed headlong with the decree of the National Assembly. On 9 August 1791, the directory of the department of the Bas-Rhin heard from the French commandant in Alsace that the Vigier regiment in Strasbourg had received a copy of the order from the Fribourg *Grand Conseil*. The directory decided that no laws other than those of France could be recognised in the kingdom and that the law of 1 May therefore applied even to the Swiss troops. The directory finished by sharply reminding the Swiss officers that the rights and liberties of the soldiers 'ne peuvent être ni agravés ni aliénés par des ordres arbitraires d'un Souverain étranger'.[62]

Two days later, the officers of the Vigier regiment defied this ruling, referring to their capitulations (which gave them jurisdiction over their soldiers) and the order of the Diet of Frauenfeld. The situation was made more critical when an outspoken soldier who refused to obey the order from Fribourg was flung into the guardhouse by his irate officers. In response the departmental administration ordered the commandant to countermand these orders, which represented 'l'usurpation des Magistrats de Fribourg', reminding him that 'la Nation Française soit et demeure seule Souveraine dans l'Empire Française'. On 19 August, d'Affry wrote to Montmorin, justifying the conduct of the officers of the Vigier regiment in a turnabout which can only be explained by the uncompromising stance of the Swiss cantons and his own reprimand from the Diet. If Swiss troops were allowed to attend political meetings, he argued, they would be led to disobey their officers and their government. At the same time, he reminded Montmorin of the diplomatic ramifications of the treatment of the Swiss regiments in France.[63]

In this affair, the department of the Bas-Rhin had taken the uncompromisingly 'national' stance in its refusal to admit the order of the cantons. By repeating that there could be no sovereignty on French soil than that of France, it was asserting the territoriality of French law as against treaties which dated from the Ancien Régime. It was also implying the egalitarian idea that there could be no privileged groups apart from or above the law.

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[61]AN, F/7/4400 (*Pièces jointes au Recès de la Diète de Frawenfeld* ...; letter of the Directory of the Department of the Bas-Rhin to the National Assembly, 13 August 1791).
[62]AN, F/7/4400 (*Déliberation du Directoire du Départment du Bas-Rhin*, 9 August 1791).
[63]AN, F/7/4400 (Letter of Gelb, commandant in Alsace, to the Directory of the Department of the Bas-Rhin, 12 August 1791); letter of the Directory of the Department of the Bas-Rhin to Gelb, n.d. [13 August 1791?]; letter of the Directory of the Department of the Bas-Rhin to the National Assembly, 13 August 1791; letter of d'Affry to Montmorin, 19 August 1791).

Foreigners in France, and foreign troops in particular, could claim no rights or protection other than those guaranteed by French law.

In fact, those such as Peyssonnel who assailed the privileges of the foreign regiments won a victory from the unlikely quarter of the foreign troops themselves. After its odyssey around north-eastern France and the riot in Metz in July 1791, the Nassau regiment had finally had enough. Four or five hundred soldiers tore off their Nassau buttons and insignia: 'ils ont déclaré qu'ils ne voulaient point servir, ni aller avec le régiment, tant qu'ils porteraient l'habit étranger et qu'il serait censé régiment étranger; qu'ils étaient Français et qu'ils voulaient servir comme Français'. These troops were, after all, mainly French citizens, probably from Alsace and Lorraine, and were fed up with being reviled as foreigners. Indeed, they remained in Metz and participated in the festivities on Bastille Day, taking the civic oath.[64]

The patriotic example of a foreign regiment renouncing its privileged ways probably appealed to an Assembly which, in light of the recent role of foreign troops in the flight to Varennes, had come around to the radical thinking of Peyssonnel. On 21 July 1791, the National Assembly decreed that, apart from the Swiss regiments, all foreign units would cease to be considered as separate branches of the French army, would wear French uniforms and receive the same pay and regulations.[65] Apart from the obvious financial advantages from the reduction of pay, the National Assembly had adopted, it thought, a further means of ensuring the loyalty of well-disciplined troops at a time when it appeared that they would be desperately needed. The Assembly hoped to replace separateness with a new source of pride: that of belonging to a national army in which the virtues of equality and patriotism would rise above those of loyalty to one's officers and obedience to a royal master.

Owners of foreign regiments were naturally alarmed by the implications, and no one more than the proprietor of the Nassau regiment itself. De Crolboy, envoy of the duke of Nassau-Saarbrucken, dashed off a memorandum to the Constituent's *comité diplomatique*, reminding its members that the duke was one of France's 'alliés et ... Voisins les plus zélés et les plus fidèles'. He argued that the destruction of the regiment's separateness would ensure the collapse of discipline. The regiment 'ne seroient bientôt plus qu'un rassemblement d'hommes vagabonds, recrutés dans tous les païs et désunis par les

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[64]AP, xxviii, 472.
[65]AP, xxviii, 472.

Moeurs, n'ayant plus de Relations avec leurs Souverains et par Conséquent avec leur Patrie'[66]

The duke regarded the troops' loyalty to his person as a cement which bound the unit together. Even the original capitulation stressed, however, that the officers need not come from the dukedom itself, but anywhere in the Holy Roman Empire and from among officers already serving in other German regiments in France. The rank-and-file were to be drawn from among French subjects, born in Alsace and Lorraine.[67] The more valid argument marshalled, however, was that to reform the regiment without the prince's consent would be to attack his rights and prerogatives guaranteed by the original convention in 1777.[68] De Crolboy's protests were in vain: the men of any regiment other than the Swiss were henceforth not the possession of any individual, nor subject to special privileges, but were to be treated like any other soldiers in the French army. They were expected to be patriotic defenders of the Constitution, faithful to the Nation, the Law and the King.

The Constituent Assembly had resisted calls for the suppression of foreign units for two years, in spite of its own nationalising principles, because of diplomatic concerns and out of the necessity to keep the regular army intact. In the various crises of the period 1789 - 1791, however, the foreign regiments, with one or two exceptions, appeared to be prone to counter-revolutionary activity, justifying the worst fears of even moderate revolutionaries. Many of these fears were self-fulfilling: often treated with hostility by the local population, the foreign troops naturally sought refuge within their own regiment, which usually meant that they were likely to retain their cohesiveness and their discipline. This in turn meant that the politics of the foreign troops were dictated by their loyalty to their officers.[69] Even when foreign troops did mutiny, as at Nancy, it was with strictly internal aims in mind. The support of the local population, fuelled by fears of aristocratic officers, merely gave the impression of 'patriotic' credentials of the soldiers. Most foreign units retained the suspicion and hostility of the population because of their counter-revolutionary reputation. This fear and loathing was intensified by the use of foreign

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[66]AN, F/7/4399 (De Crolboy, 'Régiment de Nassau', n.d. [post-19 July 1791?]). The memorandum protested against 'une Decision précipitée', probably a reference to the decree of 21 July 1791, when the Constituent decided to end all distinctions between the French and foreign regiments, except the Swiss.

[67]AN, F/7/4399 ('Regiment de Nassau': convention between the Louis XVI and the prince of Nassau-Saarbrucken, 1777).

[68]AN, F/7/4399 (De Crolboy, 'Régiment de Nassau').

[69]As S. F. Scott argues in *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 145.

troops in supporting the royal flight to Varennes. Yet at the same time, the apparently hostile gestures of Prussia and Austria over the summer of 1791 made it clear to the revolutionaries that a well-trained and disciplined regular army was needed urgently. To dismiss the foreign regiments would be the height of military folly, but it was politically dangerous to keep them as they were. This dilemma led the Constituent to dispense with diplomatic niceties and to risk relatively minor disputes by taking measures which breached French international commitments in the name of ensuring, or perhaps testing, their loyalty. There may also have been defiance in these actions. The persistence, for example, of the department of the Bas-Rhin in its opposition to the officers of the Swiss Vigier regiment over the summer of 1791, the *comité diplomatique*'s ignoring of the prince of Nassau-Saarbrucken's objections to the decree of 21 July 1791, were borne of the same assertiveness which led the Constituent to annex finally Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin. These actions were not mere posturing, but the application of the nationalising, egalitarian logic of the Constituent's own principles, a logic which was let loose by the desire to ensure both the internal security of the Revolution on one hand and the strength of its military defences on the other.

III

As with foreign troops, the existence of the foreign clergy presented an obstacle to the full implementation of revolutionary reforms. Unlike the foreign troops, they were not protected by treaties, strategic considerations or political concerns, but they actually survived in their original state for longer. Revolutionary legislation directly concerned with the foreign clergy was protective rather than reforming: it sheltered them from most of the measures which affected their French counterparts.

When the Constituent passed its decrees nationalising church lands (3 November 1789), dissolving monasteries and convents, except for those engaged in charitable and educational work, and forbidding religious vows (13 February 1790), no one considered the complex problems which foreign clergy might pose. The first initiative was therefore taken by the clergy. On 8 October 1789, the deputy Lally-Tollendal, himself of Irish descent, presented a donation of silver and the vessels from the church of the Irish College in Paris. While the priests and students declared that they were bound to the French 'par

notre fidelité, par le culte de nos pères et pour le sang de nos Rois', they also swore 'les mêmes sentiments à la nouvelle patrie et au prince qui nous adoptait'.[70]

It is possible that this gift was an attempt to pre-empt any accusations of attachment to the old régime at a time when ominous noises were being sounded by some revolutionaries who, since the decrees of 4 - 11 August, began to argue that ecclesiastical property belonged to the nation. As will be seen there is evidence to suggest that the loyalty of the Irish was sincere, but the Constituent did not take the hint. The special place of foreign establishments in the French church was not even considered when the Assembly nationalised church property on 3 November. For the foreign clergy this seizure by the state presented a double-headed threat. In the first place, they were to lose their most important source of income. In the second place, they faced redundancy: if the French clergy were to be salaried by the state, would foreigners be included? Such fears were understandable, as on 9 November (less than a week after the nationalisation of church property) the abbé Grégoire deplored the appointment of foreigners as curates, a well-established practice in dioceses such as those of Bordeaux and Bazas.[71] Grégoire requested that 'pour posséder un bénéfice à charge d'âmes, l'on soit Français, ou naturalisé et régnicole au moins depuis dix ans.'[72]

This demand was in keeping with the nationalising tendencies of revolutionary ideology, but it was brushed aside without a debate. Why this should be is a matter of speculation, but until the revolutionaries had worked out the broader issues around clerical reform, they presumably could not fiddle with the finer points. In fact, it would be a year before the fate of the foreign clergy would be resolved, if only temporarily. Meanwhile, the uncertainty of their future and the measures already taken by the Constituent provoked the piecemeal mobilisation of the foreign clergy. No concerted effort was made, except within the same orders. On 20 December the English Clairists of Gravelines, Aire, Rouen and Dunkirk drew up a petition in response to calls for the suppression of religious orders.

The wording showed that the foreign clergy were now engaging in the debate on church property and on the fate of the regular clergy within the same frame of references

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[70]AP, ix, 385.

[71]Where in 1789 there were twenty Irish secular priests, an increase of five since the *grande enquête* on parochial clergy in 1772. A number of them were, it seems, naturalised (Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy in the Diocese of Bordeaux during the Revolution', 29; Loupès, 'Les Ecclésiastiques Irlandais dans le Diocèse de Bordeaux sous l'Ancien Régime', 88).

[72]AP, ix, 729.

as the Constituent itself. To the argument that ecclesiastical property had merely been held in trust by the church on behalf of the people, the Clairists set out to show that their property and investments did not come from French sources at all: 'Quelques soient les besoins d'une Nation, peut-elle s'approprier des biens acquis sur son sol par des étrangers et avec des fonds provenant de l'Etranger?' The nuns were appealing to the inalienable and sacred right of property.[73]

The Clairists also fell back on more traditional principles, appealing to the 'droit des gens et celui de l'hôspitalité'. The French *nation*, they argued, had granted them the 'droit d'azile'. They also anticipated by almost two months the decree of 13 February 1790, which dissolved all religious houses not engaged in charitable or educational work by emphasising their role as an educational and charitable order. As if to follow up this point on their usefulness as a social institution, they stressed their civic virtue by offering the Nation a quarter of their revenue: 'elles ont le coeur français quand il faut secourir l'Etat'.[74]

Petitions from the other foreign establishments repeated the arguments made by the Clairists, stressing, above all, the foreign origins of their property. Addresses to the Constituent or its *comité ecclésiastique* all sought to adopt the revolutionaries' own terms and references, particularly the rights of property and usefulness to the state.[75] They combined this with references to Ancien Régime notions such as *droit des gens* and the *droit d'azile*. They often substituted the term 'nation', for 'king' or 'state', as if to underline the idea that the Constituent ought to honour commitments made before 1789.[76]

If the Clairist nuns had French hearts, their petition, and those of the other orders, stressed their separateness from the French clergy in order to show that the National Assembly's decrees ought not to apply to them. Of all the arguments, this one was the most likely to grate against the abolition of privilege. Despite the number of petitions which all made similar points - at least seven were addressed by the English, Irish and

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[73]AN, D/XIX/30 (*Adresse ... par les Religieuses clairisses angloises Etablies à Gravelines*, 20 December 1789).
[74]AN, D/XIX/30 (*Adresse ... par les Religieuses clairisses angloises Etablies à Gravelines*).
[75]See for example, the petitions of the English Augustinian nuns of the rue des Fossés-Saint-Victor on 23 June and 22 September 1790 (AN, S//4616 [*Procès-Verbal: Religieuses Anglaises rue des fossées St. Victor*, 23 June 1790]; AN, D/XIX/30 [*Memoire des Religieuses Anglaises etablies à Paris rue des fossés St. Victor, au Comité Ecclesiastique de l'Assemblée Nationale*, 22 September 1790]).
[76]See, for example, the English Augustinians (AN, D/XIX/30 [*Memoire des Religieuses Anglaises etablies à Paris rue des fossés St. Victor, au Comité Ecclesiastique de l'Assemblée Nationale*, 22 September 1790]).

Scottish establishments to the National Assembly or its *comité ecclésiastique* - the uncertainty over the future of the foreign regular clergy remained until October 1790.

Until then, local authorities and *notaires* made inventories of the property and the revenue of foreign establishments, apparently prior to their appropriation by the state. The first visits by officials began in February 1790 and the foreign clergy took the opportunity to make more statements in their defense on the grounds that most or all of their property stemmed from foreign funds.[77] What forced the revolutionaries to tread more carefully was the intervention of the British government.

Alexander Gordon, the principal of the Scots College in Paris had written to Pitt himself in October 1789 seeking the British government's protection over the college.[78] Lord Robert Fitzgerald, British *chargé d'affaires* until May 1790, eventually presented a petition on behalf of the Scots College in Paris and made similar efforts for the Irish colleges in France.[79] The apparent interest of the British government led Fréteau de Saint-Just to advise the National Assembly that the status of the British and Irish houses 'présente des côtés délicats au point de vue des puissances étrangères'. The Assembly accordingly decreed that all subsequent work on the foreign clergy would be referred not only to the *comité ecclésiastique*, but the *comité diplomatique* as well.[80] Until the Constituent had come up with a definitive decree, however, the uncertaintly continued. Some petitions therefore included requests concerning the disposal of the property of the foreign clergy should they be suppressed.[81]

Finally, on 14 September, the *comité ecclésiastique* decided to propose that the Irish College of Paris be exempted from the nationalisation of church lands. In a further petition the Irish priests urged the committee to formalise its decision with a decree, the most pressing reason being that the new Irish Parliament, elected that same year, was being approached by the British government to pass a domestic education bill, by which loopholes for Catholics seeking to study abroad would be sealed off, in return for some schooling in Ireland. Ironically, the priests also argued that the preservation of the Irish

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[77]Various inventories and declarations can be found in AN, D/XIX/30, S//4616 and S//4619.

[78]Black, 'The Archives of the Scots College Paris', 53, 56.

[79]Scottish Catholic Archives (hereafter SCA), CA1/25/1-8 ('Note remise à M. le Comte de Montmorin, par M. Fitz-Gerald, Ministre Plénipotentiaire d'Angleterre'); AN, D/XIX/30 ('Prêtres Irlandois rue des Carmes - Comité Ecclesiastique', n.d. [1790]).

[80]AP, xix, 241.

[81]AN, D/XIX/30 ('Requête à Nosseigneurs de l'assemblée Nationale', by the English Benedictine nuns of Cambrai, n.d. [1790]); SCA, CA1/25/1-8 ('Note remise ... par M. Fitz-Gerald'); AP, xvi, 109.

colleges would attract many Irish investors in *biens nationaux* 'parceque les Individus croiront a l'inviolabilité de leur propriété'.[82]

This last point, on property rights, was to be of great importance in the revolutionaries' final decision on 4 October. The Constituent's decree designating which lands were to be sold as *biens nationaux* excluded all foreign religious establishments for as long as their own governments respected the property of French citizens abroad.[83] To have done otherwise would be to cast doubt on the Revolution's commitment to foreigners' property rights in France and to have created some undesirable commercial and diplomatic fallout. The importance of this decree, adapted gradually over subsequent days (6 - 15 October), was not only that the foreign clerical establishments were assured of an income from their lands, but also that the revolutionaries implicitly confirmed the legitimacy of their existence in France. It was not long before the ecclesiastic and diplomatic committees made this explicit. On 28 October, they agreed that the continued existence of foreign orders in France would be both 'opposée aux lois constitutionnelles' and contrary to the law of 13 February. In a report which owed much to the arguments made in the foreigners' own petitions, however, the committees urged that respect for legally acquired property should lead the Constituent to decree that foreign establishments 'continueront de subsister, comme par le passé'.[84]

There was a price to be paid for this survival. Any privileges which had been granted the foreign clerics by the church or monarchy were naturally abolished. For the English Benedictine monks of the faubourg Saint-Jacques, such a measure was financially disastrous. In the estimation of the *comité ecclésiastique*, the fourteen benefices held by the clerics of this monastery brought in an annual income of 72,388 *livres*. In accordance with the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, adopted on 12 July 1790, these posts were to be elective like any other. Consequently, the benefices which had been tied to the English monastery could no longer be held by the monks as of right. Those deprived of a function and income were to be given a pension in compensation, backdated to 1 January 1790, but the pensions, alms and donations granted to the foreigners by the crown, as small a proportion of their income as they were, were to be reconsidered by the Assembly. Moreover, any tax exemptions enjoyed by the establishments disappeared.[85]

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[82]AN, D/XIX/30 (Petition of the Irish priests, rue des Carmes, to the *comité ecclésiastique*, n.d. [1790, late September, early October]).
[83]AP, xix, 436.
[84]AP, xx, 67 - 68.
[85]AP, xx, 68 - 70.

While the legal existence of foreign regulars was assured for the time being, the foreign secular clergy, in common with their French counterparts, faced the problem of the oath of loyalty to the Civil Constitution, laid down by the National Assembly on 27 November 1790 and sanctioned on 26 December. The response of foreign secular priests did not mirror exactly that of their French colleagues. In the Gironde, for example, the eighteen Irish priests who actually held parishes or cures were split evenly between jurors and non-jurors. This was different from the figures for all priests across the Bordeaux region, where 59% of the clergy were jurors. Memories of persecution in Ireland may have made the Irish priests more dogmatic in their attachment to the 'old' church.[86] Nonetheless, half of the Irish priests were initially jurors. James Burke, parish priest of the Bec d'Ambès, was even an enthusiast for the French Revolution, despite the fact that the Civil Constitution represented, for him, a cut in the value of his benefice, as it did for another Irish juror in the parish of Yvrac, François de Loebardy. Burke even bought *biens nationaux*, taking over the lands of the Ursuline convent at Ambès with two French merchants in March 1791. He administered the property and its sixty labourers until his arrest in October 1793.[87] Some Irish jurors may have found nothing in the Civil Constitution or the oath to contradict Catholic doctrine. They might have been guided in their decision by their French congregations, but for some this was a painful step, as the number of retractions, even before the Pope spoke out against the Civil Constitution, seems to indicate.[88]

'Irish' factors did not necessarily lend themselves to conservatism. There is evidence to suggest that the very fact of persecution in Ireland pushed some clergy into the arms of the Revolution. The priests of the Irish College in Paris certainly showed revolutionary sympathies, arguing in one of their petitions that the French Revolution would inspire the Catholic majority in Ireland to throw off the yoke of British rule. The Irish Colleges had their part to play in instilling the principles of the rights of man in their students.[89] While the priests had ulterior motives, seeking to ensure the survival of their institution, their dislike for the British government was probably sincere. Crucially, they had identified the importance of loyalty to the new order as a factor in their survival as an institution. None the less, the priests in the College were more than just Irish exiles, but Catholic clergymen

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[86]Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy', 30.
[87]Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy', 32, 35 - 37.
[88]Philippe Loupès names two Irish jurors, François Loebardy and Matthew O'Leyn, who retracted in the early months of 1791 (Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy', 32).
[89]AN, D/XIX/30 (*Observations à M. le Rapporteur*, n.d. [1790]).

as well. If the oath was a test of loyalty, many priests in the College still refused it. Perhaps for many Irish clergymen, the Revolution seemed as anti-Catholic as the Anglo-Irish ascendancy. For some Irish priests, therefore, the Church and their place in it probably overrode all other considerations. This was especially true when the congregations of the foreign clergy were hostile to the oath. In January 1791, the English students at Douai provided the force behind the opposition to the administration of the oath, provoking a confrontation with the civil authorities.[90]

Such resistance to the oath implied hostility towards the Revolution and would mark out the clergy, French and foreign alike, for both official and popular suspicion. In coming years, acts of loyalty to the Revolution - or a lack of them - would determine the fate of foreign clerics in France. When popular hostility towards the foreign clergy did break out, it was based primarily on the fact that they were clergy, not that they were foreigners. None the less, the fact that they appeared to remain a separate, privileged group did provoke resentment. After Robert Fitzgerald's intervention on behalf of the Scots College in Paris, the *Moniteur* fumed that the College was 'opposé aux Décrets de l'Assemblée Nationale, quand le Clergé de France ... est détruit comme Corps, anéanti comme Ordre, et ne présente plus que des Citoyens fonctionnaires!'[91]

It was the schism over the clerical oath which brought such hostility to the surface. Cornered in the faubourg Saint-Marcel, one of the heartlands of Parisian popular radicalism, the English Benedictine convent was a natural target for popular resentment towards the refractory clergy. The house was mobbed by a crowd 'consisting of the worst sort of people'.[92] On 26 June 1791, Richard Marsh, superior of the English Benedictines at Dieulouard, had referred to Rome the question as to 'whether we may carry secular [clothes], since the religious habit is so ill look'd upon in France.'[93] Even the Irish College in Paris, for all its priests' protestations of their revolutionary sympathies, was not left unmolested. In the disturbances surrounding the oath in 1791, a crowd tried to break into the College and were only prevented from doing so by a pistol-brandishing student. In September 1791, however, the demonstrations turned violent because the Irish College chapel was being used by French people who sought mass from a refractory priest. On

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[90]AN, S//4619 (Letter addressed to Mme Hagan, of the English Benedictines of Paris, 29 January 1791),
[91]SCA, CA1/25/1-8 ('Extrait du Moniteur No. 160').
[92]'Narrative of the English Benedictine Nuns, Rue de l'Allouette, Paris', reproduced in Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 301.
[93]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Richard Marsh to Naylor, 26 June 1791).

leaving, the congregation was mobbed and a lady, probably French, was publicly flogged.[94] The Irish priests were seen to be abusing French hospitality by harbouring, and encouraging, non-jurors and their congregations. The foreign clergy had finally run afoul of revolutionary orthodoxy.

Until that point, however, the main problem facing the foreign clergy were the deepening financial difficulties which were partly the effects of the ecclesiastical reforms of the Constituent, but which had long-term roots. The Revolution was financially disastrous for the foreign clergy. The uncertainty over their future, at least until 28 October 1790, ensured that recruitment of students and novices - and the fees and dowries which came with them - was reduced to a trickle. The English Augustinian nuns in Paris claimed on 22 September 1790 that while they had nineteen pupils, 'à l'epoque de la Revolution y étoient en plus grande quantité'.[95]

The imposition of taxation on the clergy proved to be another grave problem. On 9 September 1791, Marsh complained to Naylor that the taxes due since Easter amounted to 800 *livres*.[96] For many houses, however, taxation merely compounded financial problems which predated the Revolution. Another inmate at Dieulouard, Fisher, had been frank with Naylor in a letter in June 1791 as to the causes of the establishment's difficulties with money. While he did assign some of the blame to the Revolution, he also attributed some to mismanagment of funds and long-term debts.[97] By the summer of 1791, the Benedictines were considering drastic steps for the monks at Dieulouard. They contemplated an offer to take over the English Carthusian house at Nieuport in the Austrian Netherlands, in return for which 'they wou'd teach all the lower classes publicly'. This meant leaving France for good, so they deferred their decision in favour of other measures. Marsh tried to prevail on Bennett, the superior of the apparently money-soaked English College at Douai, to transfer some of the wealth to its poorer relative at Dieulouard.[98]

Dieulouard's tribulations under the Constituent Assembly reveal the complexity of the problems faced by the foreign clergy in France. Suffering at first from uncertainty over their place within the new regime, even when the Constituent recognised the legitimacy of

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[94]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 163.
[95]AN, D/XIX/30 (*Mémoire des Religieuses Anglaises etablies à Paris rue des fossés St. Victor, au Comité Ecclesiastique de l'Assemblée Nationale* [22 September 1790]).
[96]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Richard Marsh to Naylor, 9 September 1791).
[97]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Fisher to Naylor, 26 June 1791).
[98]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Marsh to Naylor, 26 June 1791).

their establishments their troubles were far from over. They were not integrated into the new order, but merely co-existed with it, their foreign status protecting them from most of the reforms which affected the rest of the church in France. This in itself caused some resentment. For as long as they remained a special case, their existence would sit awkwardly with the new state-sponsored ecclesiastical settlement.

Against any 'nationalising' urge to storm these survivals of clerical privilege stood an equally strong respect for one of the inalienable rights of man - property. The foreign clergy successfully convinced the revolutionaries that theirs had been legitimately purchased with their own funds. The revolutionaries realised that to nationalise this property would be to discourage foreign investment in the French economy and to cause diplomatic ripples. There was no ideological dynamic which made the eventual abolition of the foreign clergy inevitable. Rather, their survival was officially guaranteed by the revolutionaries' own respect for property, which was as much, perhaps more, a part of their ideology as was egalitarianism.

The threat to this balance came from anticlericalism which stirred and expressed itself in ever more violent ways in the wake of the controversy over the ecclesiastical oath. Although they could not have known it at the time, many foreign clerics compromised their long-term chances of continued practice in France by refusing to swear. Their foreign status already placed them outside the reformed structures of revolutionary France, so their refractory status made them still more so. Nonetheless the violence and the popular hostility towards the refractory clergy were still not officially sanctioned by the authorities, so the single most important threat to the foreigners under the Constituent remained their financial problems. Taxation and uncertainty over their long-term future often compounded with financial difficulties which predated the Revolution. The financial problems were serious, but this did not drive out the foreign clergy - and nor did the revolutionaries seek to do so. It would take a dramatic shift in political opinion to do that.

IV

The fate even of those who were enthusiasts for the French Revolution, and who had much to gain from it, was also anchored in the precariously shifting sands of political alignments. These people were foreign radicals, political refugees and sympathisers to the

Revolution. In addition to the recognisable groups of radicals, such as the Dutch, the Swiss and the Genevans who were already in France, there were also individuals who had settled in France before 1789 who, with the fall of the absolute monarchy, embraced the Revolution. Most famous among these was Jean-Baptiste (later Anacharsis) Cloots; Paul-Jérémie Bitaubé from Königsberg and Karl Konstantin von Hessen-Rheinfels-Rothenberg, a Hessian prince who in 1789 was serving in the French army. Karl Reinhard, a tutor to a Protestant family in Bordeaux, wrote enthusiastic letters on the Revolution to a newspaper in his native Württemberg. Etta Palm d'Aelders, born in Gröningnen in the Netherlands, had moved to France in 1774 and in the Revolution aired her feminist views with the support of the *Cercle Social*, a radical society of which she was a member. William Priestley, oldest son of the Unitarian minister, scientist and reformer Joseph, was in Paris when the Bastille was stormed and scribbled an excited letter home to break the news to his parents.[99]

Organised groups of radicals had been in France not through any ideological affinity with the Ancien Régime, but because they lived in hope that *raison d'état* might induce the monarchy to encourage them in their projects. The French Revolution provided an additional and more inspirational reason to be in France. The collapse of censorship, and the rise to prominence of the very people with whom foreign radicals and intellectuals had hob-nobbed in previous years seemed to show that political and moral regeneration was possible even in a kingdom like France. Paris was no longer simply a centre of the Enlightenment, but was now showing the way to a new era. France therefore attracted more radicals and intellectuals, some into long-term exile, others for brief, inspirational visits. A young Wilhelm von Humboldt arrived in France with his tutor, Campe, on 18 July 1789 in order to witness the fall of despotism in France. The basis of both men's enthusiasm was a philosophical cosmopolitanism.[100] Thomas Christie, a Unitarian and a former pupil of Dr. Price, twice travelled to France in the period of the Constituent

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[99]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 49; Ruiz, A., 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand: idéologie et activités de certains de ses représentants notoires en France pendant la Révolution', Furet, F., & Ozouf, M. (eds.), *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, iii, *The Transformation of Political Culture 1789 - 1848* (Oxford, New York, etc.: Pergamon Press, 1989), 257; Gooch, G. P., *Germany and the French Revolution* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), 321 - 322, 326 - 327, 332; Kates, G., *The* Cercle Social, *the Girondins, and the French Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 122; Alger, J. G., *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 14.

[100]Campe, *Été 1789: Lettres d'un Allemand à Paris*, 26; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 16.

Assembly, staying for six months from October 1789 to April 1790 and returning again, for a brief period in May 1791. After his second trip, he addressed his defence of the Revolution, *Letters on the Revolution of France*, to Edmund Burke.[101]

Cloots, Humboldt, Reinhard and Christie shared the cosmopolitan view that the French Revolution was the dawn of a new era in which old prejudices - religious and national - would be swept aside as people recognised their common rights. The Revolution was a moral as well as a political transformation which would affect all mankind. Decrees such as the renunciation of wars on conquest and aggression in May 1790 caused a sensation in radical and intellectual circles in Europe. Some revolutionaries invited, rhetorically or otherwise, foreign 'patriots' to share in the fruits of France's regeneration.[102]

For some revolutionaries, the main advantage of France's openness to foreign radicals was the moral and intellectual cross-pollenation which would result. Some revolutionary politicians actually made practical use of these exiles. Mirabeau gathered around him the four leading Genevans as a 'think-tank'. Such behaviour merely served to confirm that the Revolution was the property of mankind in general, open to all who cared to participate.

Many individuals were thus drawn to France in the period of the Constituent Assembly. Thomas Paine crossed the Channel in the late autumn of 1789, staying in France until early 1790, writing to George Washington that 'a share in two revolutions is living to some purpose'. He revisited France in February 1791, staying in Paris until 9 July, when he returned to London. He would later reappear in France as a deputy to the Convention and a fugitive from prosecution in Britain.[103] Benjamin Vaughan was a Unitarian and, like the Genevan Etienne Dumont, a protégé of Lord Lansdowne. He visited France in 1790 and partook in some of the activities of the Nantes Jacobin club in November, before returning to Britain, ultimately to take up a seat in the House of Commons. Helen Maria Williams arrived in France with her sisters and mother in the summer of 1790 in order to view the Fête de la Fédération on 14 July. By 1791, they were settled in Paris. A similar decision to turn a visit into something more permanent was reached by the vegetarian and former High Sheriff of Shropshire, Robert Pigott, who presented an address to the National Assembly in 1790 and, after dividing his time between Geneva and Lyons, was to

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[101]Christie, T., *Letters on the Revolution of France and on the New Constitution established by the National Assembly: occasioned by the publications of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, M.P. and Alexander de Calonne, late Minister of State* (London, 1791), 58 - 59.

[102]See, for example, Marat, *L'Ami du Peuple*, No. 96 (13 January 1790) and Camille Desmoulins, *Révolutions de France et de Brabant*, i, No. 8 (18 January 1790).

[103]Philp, M., *Paine* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12, 14, 15.

die in Toulouse in 1794.[104] John Oswald, a Scot by origin, spent the first months of the Revolution flitting between Paris and London. In Paris, he established the *Universal Patriot*, intended to appear simultaneously in Paris, Calâis and London as a cross-Channel companion to Brissot's *Patriote français*. In May 1790, when the paper first appeared, Oswald left Britain to settle in France.[105] John Paul Jones, the Scots-born American naval hero, came to France from Warsaw in November 1789, possibly seeking a post in the French navy. He would die in France of dropsy in July 1792.[106]

It was not just British or American enthusiasts who trickled into France. German moralists and intellectuals were also drawn to the country. Gerard Anton von Halem, from the duchy of Oldenburg, visited Paris in the winter of 1790, observing the activities of various clubs before returning to commit his thoughts to paper. Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz was a former Prussian military officer and publicist who came to Paris in the summer of 1791 to establish a journal, the *Minerva*, of Feuillant persuasion. Konrad Engelbert Oelsner and count Gustav von Schlabrendorff arrived in Paris in 1790 and both stayed until their deaths during the Restoration. The former worked on von Archenholtz's *Minerva*. Georg Kerner entered Strasbourg University in the summer of 1791 to study medicine, but to the fury of both his father and the Duke of his native Württemberg, he engaged in the Jacobin club there. Johann-Georg Schneider entered in Alsace in the summer of 1791. Originally from Würzburg in Franconia, Schneider settled in Strasbourg as Professor of Canon Law and as the vicar of the constitutional bishop of the Bas-Rhin, Franz Brendel, when the Elector of Trier dismissed him from his post as Lecturer of Rhetoric at the University of Bonn. He would soon rise to the leadership of the city's Jacobin club.[107]

From regions further south, Jean-Nicolas-André Castella was a leader of the Fribourg uprising in 1781 who was in exile in Savoy in 1789. He was persuaded to cross the frontier by his compatriots in France during the campaign to press the National Assembly to release two *fribourgeois* prisoners from Brest in May 1790.[108] François-Amédée

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[104]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 39 - 44, 69, 91 - 92.
[105]Erdman, D. V., *Commerce des Lumières. John Oswald and the British in Paris, 1790 - 1793* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1986), 82, 114.
[106]Morris, G. (ed. Davenport, B. C.), *A Diary of the French Revolution 1789 - 1793* (2 vols.) (London: Harrap, 1939), i, 440, ii, 468; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 26; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 48 - 49.
[107]Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 257, 258 - 259, 261, 262, 264; Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 335, 338, 341, 348 - 350.
[108]Méautis, *Le Club helvétique*, 34.

Doppet, a radical Savoyard doctor, left Chambéry for Grenoble, where he embarked on a military career.[109] Alfieri, the Italian poet, lived in Paris in the early years of the Revolution, writing advice to Louis XVI. Louis Pio was a knighted secretary to the Neapolitan ambassador, but was forced to resign when he expressed enthusiasm over the French Revolution. On 11 March 1790, at the instigation of the abbé Fauchet, the Commune of Paris accepted the petition of the Feuillants district to decree his naturalisation as a French citizen.[110]

These individuals all had cultural, intellectual or political influence beyond their small numbers. Of greater numerical importance were those who fled upheavals which were crushed after 1789: the 'revolutions' in the Austrian Netherlands and the bishopric of Liège. The first refugees from these struggles for independence from, respectively, the Habsburgs and Holy Roman Empire, arrived in France before defeat seemed imminent. Camille Desmoulins, who reported religiously on events in the Low Countries, printed a letter from Lille, dated 22 November 1789: 'Les Brabançons arrivent ici en foule; les maris amenent leurs femmes & leurs enfants & retournent combattre pour leur liberté.'[111]

Lille, in fact, was one of the main towns in which the Belgian exiles congregated after they were defeated. The first to arrive were the 'democrats', supporters of Jean-François Vonck, who had sought not only independence, but also domestic political reforms for the Austrian Netherlands. Hundreds of fugitives, including Vonck himself and the banker Edouard de Walckiers fled to France, stopping first at Lille and then making their way to Paris. When the Statists in their own turn were ousted by the returning Austrians in the late summer of 1790, they also fled to France, congregating around the duc de Béthune-Charost at Douai.[112]

The Liégeois fared little better than their Brabançon counterparts. The reformed municipal council, led by burgermeister A. G. J. Donceel, scrambled to the safety of Givet in the French Ardennes when Austrian troops restored the prince-bishop in January 1791. They were followed by hundreds of soldiers led by general Ransonnet. While Donceel

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[109]Doppet, F.-A., *Mémoires Politiques et Militaires du Général Doppet* (Carouge, Mont-Blanc, an V / 1797), 20 - 21.
[110]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 26, 29 - 30.
[111]*Révolutions de France et de Brabant*, i, no. 1 (30 November 1789), 31.
[112]Godechot, J., *La Grande Nation*, 94; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 39; Delange-Janson, L., *Ambroise. Chronique d'un Liégeois de France* (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1959), 25; Palmer, R. R., *The Age of the Democratic Revolution. A Political History of Europe and America, 1760 - 1800* (2 vols.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959 - 1964), i, 355.

succumbed to illness in February, other Liégeois leaders such as Jean-Nicolas Bassenge and Jacques-Joseph Fabry made their way to Paris, where they sought to influence French policy. There they joined others such as Jean-Joseph Fyon, P.-J. Henkart and Pierre Lebrun-Tondu, a French-born journalist who had lived in Liège since 1785.[113]

Foreign exiles quickly understood that they were more likely to win the sympathy of the French revolutionaries if they echoed their principles and aspirations. They did not, however, blindly adopt French ideology and language. As foreign patriots, they viewed the Revolution in the light of their experience and aspirations for their own countries. This standpoint is echoed in the works of foreign, patriotic visitors (as opposed to exiles) such as Christie and Paine, for whom the Revolution offered a new standard by which the British constitution could be examined and judged.[114] Exiles, whose situation was more desperate and whose experience had already involved open resistance to their sovereigns, were more likely to adapt French ideas more directly in order to secure French sympathy for their aims. The address drawn up by the Fribourgeois for the release of their compatriots from the galleys at Brest in May 1790 stressed their loyalty to the French Revolution. Their invitation to all Fribourgeois in Paris to sign the address referred to the French Revolution as an example for them to follow. When Castella had plucked up the courage to enter France and to take over leadership of the *Club helvétique* with Roullier, a new petition described the Fribourg uprising of 1781 as a precursor to 1789.[115] The Fribourgeois petitions are an example as to how foreign radicals in France sought to adopt the French Revolution to further their own, specific ends. They did not abandon their appeals to their national ancestry and their own political traditions, but tried to fit them in with the whirlwind of the French Revolution, by explaining it as part of a chain of events which included their own struggle.

For this reason, the whole course of relations between the revolutionaries and foreign radicals in France was based on pragmatism accompanied by cosmopolitan flourishes. Obviously, where unadulterated cosmopolitanism could do no harm to French interests, the revolutionaries were willing to accept and encourage even its more eccentric manifestations. On 19 June 1790, Anacharsis Cloots (who had dropped his Christian name of Jean-Baptiste only weeks before) styled himself 'l'Orateur du genre humain' and

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[113]Delange-Janson, *Ambroise*, 24 - 25; Raxhon, P., 'Les Réfugiés Liégeois à Paris: un état de la question', Vovelle, M. (ed.), *Paris et la Révolution* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 215.
[114]See, for example, Christie's *Letters on the Revolution of France*, 61.
[115]Méautis, *Le Club helvétique*, 34 - 35, 227, 229.

led a delegation of people claiming to be Arabs, Chaldeans, Prussians, Poles, Britons, Germans, Dutch, Swedes, Italians, Spaniards, Americans, Indians, Syrians, Brabançons, Liégeois, Avignonnais, Genevans, Sardinians, Grisons and Sicilians to the National Assembly.[116] Cloots asked that they be allowed to join the procession in the Fête de la Fédération on the Champ de Mars on 14 July: 'cette solemnité civique ne sera pas seulement la fête des Français mais encore la fête du genre humain' (a sentiment shared by Helen Maria Williams). The President, Menou, replied that 'les progrès que fait une nation dans la philosophie et dans la connaissance des droits de l'homme, appartiennent également à toutes les nations' and he called on the foreigners who would attend the festival to tell their governors 'que s'ils sont jaloux de faire passer leur mémoire à la postérité la plus reculée, dites-leurs qu'ils n'ont qu'à suivre l'exemple de Louis XVI, le restaurateur de la liberté française.'[117]

If it was up to rulers to follow the French example, then the message of the baron de Menou was not a call for international revolution. Furthermore, there was some doubt in the Assembly itself that Cloots' deputation would ever be taken seriously by anyone anyway. For their part, the deputies in the National Assembly either laughed the affair off as eccentric or they saw no harm in accepting the flattery of the deputation and acting as little more than moral and intellectual leaders in a world which was still mostly ruled by tyrannical governments. As bizarre or ridiculous as Cloots' deputation may have seemed to many deputies, it gave the revolutionaries the opportunity to express their often sincere cosmopolitan aspirations without offending neighbouring sovereigns.[118]

For all the cosmopolitan implications of revolutionary ideology, the relationship between the French and foreign patriots were governed by pragmatic considerations. Both sides had concrete problems and aspirations of their own. Many foreign radicals, having tasted the bitterness of defeat and persecution, sought revenge and, like most exiles, to return home safely. For their part the French had no desire to alienate people who were manifestly their admirers and friends, but on the other hand, they did not want to encourage the radicals so far that they provoked a diplomatic incident at a time when the country needed peace and stability in its foreign relations. Consequently, beneath the

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[116]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 51 - 52. A bitter critic of Cloots, Mathiez - writing in 1918 - makes constant references to Cloots' 'teutonic' origins.
[117]AP, xvi, 373.
[118]As Simon Schama puts it, the revolutionaries 'remained extremely reluctant to express their support for the liberation of France's neighbours beyond carrying wheatsheaves to the Champ de Mars' (*Patriots and Liberators*, 149).

veneer of international fraternity lay a tug-of-war in which the foreigners tried to pull the revolutionaries further than their international political concerns would allow.

When the Constituent released the two Fribourgeois *forçats* on 20 May and refused to extradite nine members of the *Club helvétique* in October that same year, this was not because it put the rights of man over French international interests.[119] There were other principles at stake which outweighed the risk of diplomatic fallout. As much as some deputies deployed the rhetoric of the rights of man, the National Assembly was determined to show that the sovereignty of the French nation over its internal laws was immutable. They would have no part in executing the sentences handed down by foreign courts.[120] In the revolutionaries' response to the affairs relating to the Fribourgeois, their perceptions of national interest and their universalist pretensions coincided happily and allowed them to brave the potential diplomatic difficulties.

The very fact that the French appeared to be encouraging the activities of exiles none the less brought some minor tremors in their foreign relations. From Soleure, the French ambassador to the Swiss cantons, de Vérac (no sympathiser to political radicalism) warned that the behaviour of Swiss patriots sheltered in France 'ne peuvent que nuire infiniment à nos intérêts politiques et militaires'. On 22 July 1791 the abbé de Raze, Paris agent of the prince-bishop of Basel, reminded Montmorin of French obligations under its centuries-old alliance with the cantons. He expressed particular concern over the activities of 'le club des Suisses déportés', among whom were four Bâlois who, he claimed, were 'les principaux auteurs des troubles qui ont désolé jusqu'ici l'Evêché de Bâle.'[121]

To these complaints, Montmorin could do little more than press the *comité diplomatique* to try to persuade the National Assembly to take measures against the Swiss radicals in France, while assuring the Swiss that the French government wished to satisfy its allies. At the same time he warned that he was obliged to tread with caution because,

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[119]AP, xv, 630; AN, F/7/4400 (Petition of the *Club helvétique* to the *comité diplomatique*, 23 February 1791).

[120]Dupont de Nemours neatly combined cosmopolitan ideals with both national pride and a rejection of foreign interference in French law when he wrote to the *comité des rapports* shortly before 20 May: 'il est clair que ce métier de geôlier, qui n'est pas digne de nous, ne doit certainement pas exercé par la nation française contre des hommes qui n'ont commis d'autre délit que de chérir et de défendre leur liberté' (quoted in Méautis, *Le Club helvétique*, 35).

[121]AN, F/7/4400 (de Vérac to Montmorin, Soleure 28 May 1791; de Raze to Montmorin, Paris 22 July 1791).

as he told de Vérac, 'il s'agit d'attaquer la liberté individuelle.'[122] Montmorin was in effect quietly reminding the ambassador of the fine balance between diplomatic necessity and the principles of the French Revolution.

The revolutionaries themselves trod this balance with even greater care when they were dealing with governments which could cause difficulties greater than those threatened by the Swiss cantons. While the Swiss could withdraw their regiments in protest over French tolerance of the *Club helvétique*, powers such as Austria could do far worse. For this reason, the Constituent either proceeded with extreme caution when it dealt with representations from the Belgian patriots, or else it split between the right, who urged such caution, and the left, who sought to encourage the Brabançons and the Liégeois. On 10 December 1789, the President of the Assembly announced that he had received a package from van der Noot, which included the Brabançon manifesto for independence. At the same time Montmorin informed the National Assembly that he had received a similar package from the Statists, but that he had sent it back unopened because 'Sa Majesté a jugé qu'il n'était ni de sa justice, ni de sa dignité, ni de sa prudence d'accueillir une semblable démarche.'[123] There were no howls of protest at Montmorin's action and the question as to what to do with the package was adjourned. Van der Noot relaunched his initiative in March 1790, sending two delegates from the Brabant Estates to deliver a new manifesto to Paris. The foreign minister returned it unopened on 11 March. The Statists made a simultaneous approach to the National Assembly, but the President, Rabaut de Saint-Etienne, announced on 17 March that these letters had not been opened either. Lafayette claimed that the Belgian Estates 'ne paraît pas avoir tous les caractères qui émanent de la puissance souveraine du peuple',[124] but there was a pragmatic dimension to the rebuff. The French could not afford to risk diplomatic difficulties with Austria by appearing to encourage an open rebellion in one of the Habsburg territories. On the other hand, on 18 September 1790 the left and the right clashed dramatically over the admittance of two Liégeois exiles, Fyon and Rasquinet, to the bar of the Assembly. While the two men were permitted to read their petition, the right heckled them.[125] Until the summer of 1791, however, most revolutionaries usually accepted the need for discretion in their relations with foreign radicals.

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[122]AN, F/7/4400 (Montmorin to de Vérac, 22 June 1791).
[123]AP, x, 493.
[124]AP, xii, 205.
[125]AP, xix, 63 - 64.

Such caution also dictated the reluctance of the revolutionaries to go much beyond the limits set by the absolute monarchy in its assistance to foreign patriots in exile. On 28 November 1789, the Consituent's *comité des finances* allocated 120,000 *livres* for a two-month period to be paid from the state finances to the Dutch refugees. On 26 July 1790, a petition drawn up by the Valckenisten successfully secured further funds, this time to the tune of 829,000 *livres*, to go not only towards maintenance, but also towards the establishment of manufactures and workshops, including a fishery at Gravelines. Of course the Dutch had claimed not only that such industries would soften their dependence on handouts in the long run, but also be useful to France by encouraging industry.[126] This was the extent of the revolutionaries' departure from the policies of the absolute monarchy in its treatment of the Dutch fugitives. The very nature of the innovation showed that the revolutionaries believed that the Patriots would be in France for a considerable amount of time, with the implication that the French would offer no practical political help in the short term. Furthermore, the wording of the decree which granted this funding implied that it was applicable only to those refugees already in France before the end of 1788, a deadline imposed by the Ancien Régime minister, Lambert. The Patriots complained meanwhile that their request to the French ambassador to the United Provinces to grant asylum to a new wave of refugees had gone unanswered. In January 1791, in response to a query from baron van Capellen tot den Pol, the foreign minister Antoine Delessart suggested that recent arrivals might be allowed to take over the pensions of those refugees who died in France. This did not imply that any funds would be made available on top of those already being paid out since 1788.[127]

The treatment of the Dutch Patriots in France showed that the revolutionaries were willing to accept the responsiblities bequeathed to them by the Ancien Régime, but that they were unable, for both financial and diplomatic reasons, to extend such assistance. Their innovations showed that that they did not perceive the Patriot refugees as an immediate threat to the Stadholder, and therefore to the diplomatic relations between Paris and The Hague. Outside the National Assembly, revolutionary opinion echoed this caution on the whole. The Jacobins, for example, were unwilling to promise anything to the Dutch Patriots other than moral support. On 15 May 1791, they politely rebutted a Patriot appeal for a French invasion of the Netherlands.[128]

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[126]AP, x, 321 - 322; xvii, 377; Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 148.
[127]AP, xvii, 353, 378; AN, D/X/1 (Delessart to the *comité des pensions*, 10 January 1791).
[128]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 59 - 60; Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 150.

The pragmatism of the revolutionaries placed diplomatic concerns - in other words, the interests of France - far above cosmopolitan idealism. Revolutionary support for foreign radicals in France was limited to public rhetorical flourishes which signified moral support and little else. The revolutionaries were usually moved to take concrete measures or to snub foreign governments only when other principles, such as French sovereignty, were at stake. Should the foreign radicals themselves have done anything to upset French interests, the revolutionaries themselves were willing to act vigorously. On 14 September 1790, François Roullier's son was arrested for trying to distribute propaganda from the *Club helvétique* among the Swiss Guards. When the Constituent was informed of this affair five days later, de Noailles persuaded the Assembly to forbid all political clubs from corresponding with French, foreign or Swiss regiments, or for soldiers to participate in political societies.[129] For the revolutionaries, subversive activity by foreign patriots not only undermined French relations with the cantons, but also further compromised discipline in the army.

Some radicals were more fortunate than those in the Swiss club because they had influential contacts among the revolutionaries and could hope to influence French policy from within. The Genevans, for example, had long developed a symbiotic relationship with the comte de Mirabeau, whose reputation as a publicist and orator in the National Assembly they hoped to harness for their own aims. For his part Mirabeau tapped the financial expertise of Clavière in order to attack Necker, while Dumont, Du Roverary and, occasionally, Reybaz, wrote both his speeches and his journal, *Le Courrier de Provence*. The Genevan exiles hoped to influence the reconstruction of France in such a way that Genevans in general would see in revolutionary France not a threat, but an inspiration for the reforms proposed by their own *Représentants*.[130] Such meddling in French affairs by foreigners gave rise to some hostility among the revolutionaries. Some particularly resented the Genevans because they acted as a channel for British ideas, namely those emanating from Lord Lansdowne's Bowood set, including Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Romilly.[131]

In contrast to the Genevans, the Liégeois sought to remedy their exile by measures which, in the period of 1789 - 1791, were too radical for the revolutionaries to consider

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[129]AP, xix, 67; Méautis, *Le Club helvétique*, 68.
[130]Dumont, *Souvenirs sur Mirabeau*, 60 - 61; Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 186 - 188.
[131]See, for example, Bentham's proposals for legal reform in the *Courrier de Provence*: 'Variété: suite du Numéro CXXXVII' (28 - 29 April 1790), 49 - 56 and 'Variété' (n.d.), 123 - 128.

seriously. Their recent defeat led them to run ahead of events and their leaders declared themselves in favour of nothing less than annexation of the bishopric by France. On 7 July 1791, admittedly in the wake of Varennes, Fabry wrote to Jarbe, the minister of *contributions publiques*, that 'nous voulons être le 84è [*département*] en dépit des Français même.'[132] He proposed the formation of Liégeois units which would be sent to the frontier in preparation for an invasion. Given the caution of the Constituent, Fabry would have to wait for nine months before his ideas would be taken seriously, but he was probably acting on signs, encouraging for those foreign exiles who hoped to return with the aid of French military muscle, that the international situation was deteriorating with the royal flight to Varennes and the sabre-rattling in the French left-wing press.

By far the largest group of refugees, however, learnt quickly that the best tactics to gain French sympathy were to attach themselves as closely as possible to already existing political currents in the French Revolution. The problem for the Dutch Patriots was to identify which political colouring it was best to assume. Personal political conscience undoubtedly played a part in their choice, but they tended to associate with those groups or personalities whose policies best suited their aims and methods. This was complicated by personal rivalries within the Patriot camp, particularly between Valckenaer and van Beijma, who led different factions which associated with conflicting currents in French revolutionary politics, although this situation did not become fratricidal until the Terror.[133]

The Valckenisten had taken the initiative in attaching their cause to the French Revolution. While van Beijma continued to defy the French government's demands for inspection of the cash registers until 1790, Valckenaer recognised that there would be no success in the United Provinces for the Patriots without the help - diplomatic or otherwise - of the new people running France. He also realised that the French were unlikely to help the Dutch if their principles, like those of the Liégeois, were too far astray from the needs and aspirations of the French revolutionaries. Valckenaer therefore proposed that the Dutch immerse themselves in the political life of the Revolution. In 1790 Valckenaer himself took a commission in the Watten National Guard, with Patriots filling the rank and file. He founded a Jacobin club - *Les Amis de la Constitution* - at Watten, becoming its first president. The Dutch Patriot press endorsed the French Revolution and its course in the journals and pamphlets published in places such as Dunkirk, Gravelines and Arras. Among such endorsements was Valckenaer's own plan for a new Netherlands

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[132]Quoted in Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liègeois', 217.
[133]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 145 - 146

constitution: it rejected republicanism and envisaged instead the raising of the Stadholder to the status of King, while most of the legislative power would lie with an elected assembly ruling over seventeen provinces. Written in 1791, this project owed much to the example of the emergent French document ratified later that same year.[134]

Although Valckenaer's plan was greeted with horror by most of his fellow Patriots, who could bear no thought of compromise with the Stadholder, Valckenaer scored some success in winning the sympathy of the revolutionaries. He secured funding from the National Assembly to help the efforts of the Patriots to support themselves economically while in France. He even managed to persuade some of the van Beijmanisten to sign the petition presented to the Constituent on 26 July 1790.[135] The true strength of the address to the Constituent, however, was the tailoring of its language to suit the principles and interests of the revolutionaries. The Patriots expressed their political aims in French terms, rejecting the past (a trusty weapon of Patriot politics) as a precedent, speaking in terms of inalienable rights, meritocracy, opposition to aristocracy and the abolition of 'feudalism'.[136] In the 1780s, the Patriots had been far more likely to refer to their historical and legal rights and customs as 'free Batavians', combined with some references to natural rights. Even in 1790 their publications had overwhelmingly expressed themselves in terms of reshaping extant Dutch institutions into forms more acceptable to the Patriots.[137] Seen in this light, the petition's rejection of the Dutch past as a justification was a deliberate effort to echo French revolutionary ideas and to stress the universal cause. Valckenaer was adapting Dutch Patriot politics to suit French forms. For their part, the revolutionaries could reject the wilder schemes for a war of liberation, but they could not brush aside foreign radicals who seemed to speak the same political language as the French.

The association of the Swiss patriots with the French Revolution was also split along ideological lines, aggravated by clashes of personality. Roullier, *père et fils*, were both considered too extreme in their methods by other leading members such as Castella. The older Roullier was a friend to Marat and was accused of setting the entire right-wing of the Constituent against the *Club helvétique* after the arrest of his son at Courbevoie in

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[134]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 142, 147 - 148, 152.
[135]Simon Schama describes this petition as 'the work of a group composed exclusively of "Valckenisten"' (*Patriots and Liberators*, 148), but the signatures included those of Jan Lambertus Huber, Johan de Kock and J. A. van Hoey, all outspoken members of the van Beijmanisten clique (AP, xvii, 374).
[136]AP, xvii, 374 - 375, 377.
[137]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 67, 142.

September 1790. Roullier's radical connections led him and his supporters to join the Cordelier Club. On top of financial problems, these divisions contributed to the club's early demise in August 1791.[138]

The problem with affiliating one's cause to the French Revolution, however, was that the shifting sands of political alignments could often leave stranded those not adept enough to move with the tide. As political orthodoxy became necessary for actual as well as political survival in 1793 - 1794, fluidity in one's political allegiances would be literally vital for foreign radicals. No one could have been expected to predict such developments, and at the end of the Constituent Assembly, it looked as if the orthodoxy might be swinging rightwards rather than leftwards. In 1791, this trend threatened to leave many foreign patriots without political influence, because many had associated with French radicals discredited in the wake of the Champ de Mars massacre. In July 1791, French revolutionaries and foreign radicals alike were suddenly faced with hard political choices. For those, such as Roullier and his followers who were evidently Cordeliers, there was little question that they would take the republican line. After 17 July 1791 they were watched closely by the authorities. So, too, was James Rutledge, the son of a Jacobite exile who had joined the Cordeliers and who had supported the admission of inactive citizens to the militia.[139] Thomas Paine was a founding member of the *Société Républicaine* which placarded Paris on 1 July calling for a republic. In the Constituent, Malouet demanded his arrest and prosecution. After the Champ de Mars massacre, Paine and other foreigners such as John Oswald and Etta Palm d'Aelders, who were affiliates of the *Cercle Social* which had joined the Cordeliers in drafting the republican petition, were now suspect. Paine had left for Britain on 9 July, but d'Aelders and Oswald remained in Paris, to see the *Cercle Social* (or, more accurately, the *Confédération des Amis de la Vérité*) close down after the massacre. D'Aelders was arrested on 19 July.[140] These foreign radicals suffered for their opinions and their activities when, briefly, a rightward shift in revolutionary politics left them exposed to surveillance and arrest. The wake of the Champ de Mars massacre was the first time in which foreigners' political attachments left them open to attack when the political orthodoxy became narrower. As it turned out,

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[138]Méautis, *Le Club helvétique*, 47, 49, 54.

[139]*Journal du Club des Cordeliers*, No. 2 (*Séance* of 29 June); Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 19.

[140]Conway, M. D., *The Life of Thomas Paine with a history of his literary, political and religious career in America, France, and England* (2 vols.) (New York & London, 1892), i, 308 - 310; Philp, *Paine*, 15; Kates, *The* Cercle Social, 162 - 163, 170; Erdman, *Commerce des Lumières*, 124 - 125.

those beached for the time being would be rescued when the revolutionary tide resumed its leftward course, but not all foreigners had made the same associations as Oswald, Roullier, Etta Palm, Rutledge and Paine.

A number of foreigners associated with the Jacobins, such as the Dutch Patriot Daverhoult and the former Prussian von Archenholz, joined the Feuillants. Daverhoult had the support of other Dutch Patriots, either because Lafayette had spoken out for them in 1787, or because they believed sincerely in constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, Oelsner and his friend, Schlabrendorff, remained with the Jacobins, as did Clavière, Cloots and others. While he disliked the radicalisation of the Jacobins, Oelsner's decision was based on his belief that the king's flight had made it impossible for the monarchy to be reconciled with the Revolution.[141] In Bordeaux, Karl Reinhard, who up to now had remained ambivalent in his identity as an adoptive French citizen or as a German, took his choice on the news of the king's flight. He enrolled in the National Guard: 'I recorded my resolve to live and die a Frenchman.'[142]

For as long as a relative freedom of political debate was allowed in France, the continued activities of foreign radicals were under no threat from the French authorities provided they were legal. If the surveillance of those caught out in the reaction after the Champ de Mars massacre was brief, it was however an ominous sign that orthodoxy in political language and behaviour was not merely a means of obtaining French sympathy, but that it could also be a matter of political and even personal survival.

V

The problems of such vacillations in politics also faced those foreign financiers who got involved in the politics of the French Revolution. If they remained outside such activity, which was no easy task given the underlying causes of the Revolution, foreign financiers in France remained more or less unmolested under the Consitituent Assembly. This was not for want of suspicions about their motives. While some orators such as Barère saw in foreign investment a source of prosperity and fiscal stability, a number of revolutionaries believed that financial speculation by foreigners, including investment in *biens nationaux*,

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[141]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 45; Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 151; Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 258.
[142]Quoted in Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 328.

sapped French financial and economic well-being. There was also suspicion that foreign investors had no real concern for the long-term future of France. Perhaps because they did not want to frighten away capital, however, the revolutionaries did little to protect private French economic interests. Commercial treaties, including the controversial one with Britain, were not reviewed. The fact that most foreign financiers and manufacturers kept a cautious distance from politics probably prevented the revolutionaries from circumscribing their activities despite some deeply-entrenched suspicions dating to the Ancien Régime. A number of foreigners entered the thick of the debates over French finances, however, which gave occasion for their opponents to raise the spectre of the self-interested foreign speculator feeding off French indebtedness.

The image was a familiar one to those who had taken an interest in the finance of the old regime. 'Agiotage', or speculation on the markets, was a theme which had recurred (with some justice) in the pamphlet wars between different interests tied up with French government finances in the 1780s. The fear of the entanglement of foreigners in business which came close to the affairs of the French state became a useful weapon in the hands of politicians in the debates on finance under the Constituent Assembly.

Some deputies complained that the lifetime, interest-bearing bonds, or *rentes viagères*, held by foreigners were an unproductive expense on government finances, depleting advantages in the balance of trade and representing a loss of currency and even a form of 'tribute' to foreign powers. It was estimated on 21 November 1789 that *rentes viagères* ate up between 20 to 25 million *livres* in interest a year, which provoked a proposal to repay the capital on all such bonds.[143] It is possible that the ulterior target of this suggestion were the two rival Genevans, Etienne Clavière and Jacques Necker. Necker had been one of those responsible for establishing *rentes viagères* which a group of Genevan moneymen had bought and attributed to thirty young Genevan girls who had survived smallpox. Dupont de Nemours sarcastically spoke of 'ces immortelles demoiselles de Genève' whose youth and resistence to illness ensured a long return on the investment in the bonds.[144] Clavière had been a major investor in these *rentes viagères* himself and, as such, was perceived to be linked to the same consortium of Genevan financiers. Necker, meanwhile, proposed to repay the capital on the bonds by offering the Genevans nationalised church lands. Opponents of either Necker or Mirabeau (through

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[143]See the opinions of the bishop of Limoges, d'Argentré and of the baron de Cormeré (AP, ix, 282 - 283; x, 172).

[144]Quoted in Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 115.

Clavière) could therefore chose their ammunition from this arsenal of apparent sell-outs to foreign speculators. On 25 June 1790, the abbé Maury, taking delight in attacking both the Protestant 'usuriers de la ville de Genève' and Necker himself, used the scandal to denounce the sale of *biens nationaux*.[145]

It is therefore little wonder that some deputies sought to exclude foreign investors from certain opportunities in France. In the long debate on Necker's proposal to promote the *Caisse d'Escompte* to the status of a National Bank, Custine reminded the Assembly on 20 November 1789 that foreigners had profited from France's financial misfortune through speculation in the very paper money which the *Caisse d'Escompte* had created. He proposed stringent conditions and regulations for anyone who wished to make deposits with the Naitonal Bank. They were aimed specifically at excluding all but naturalised foreigners, who even then would have to wait fifteen years after their initial deposit before receiving interest payments.[146] The Assembly was not convinced about the commercial or financial wisdom of these suggestions, not least because two notable financiers involved in the debate over French finances were Genevan.

The clash between Necker and Clavière showed how foreign financiers could influence French reform at the highest level. The origins of the protagonists meant that neither side could consider using the bogey of foreign *agioteurs* enslaving France to debt. Both sides had to paint foreign investors as a positive force in the restoration of French finances and they could both argue with some justice that the confidence of foreign investors was a crucial factor in stemming the flight of capital and specie from France. The difference between the two sides was how to remedy this faltering confidence. Ultimately, it was Necker who lost the argument, when the decrees of 19 - 21 December 1789 rejected the plan to create a National Bank from the *Caisse d'Escompte*.[147] The course of this long debate was peppered with references to foreign financiers. Clavière made sure that on 6 November Mirabeau drove home the point that it was Necker's beloved *Caisse d'Escompte* which frightened off foreign investors because under the finance minister's proposals, it was claimed, the *Caisse* would be able to issue paper money without accountability to the state. Eight days later Necker retorted that the crisis of confidence among foreigners was merely to do with the political troubles and civil unrest in France.[148]

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[145]AP, xvi, 457.
[146]AP, x, 146, 153, 154.
[147]Details on the struggle between Mirabeau and Necker over the *Caisse d'Escompte* in Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 233 - 246.
[148]AP, ix, 705; AP, x, 57.

Not nine months after the decrees of 19 - 21 December, Mirabeau was pressing for the dismissal of Necker and the appointment in his place of none other than Clavière. By that time, however, Mirabeau was collaborating with the Court, and he regarded his Genevan collaborator as a malleable tool who was a 'victime sans conséquence s'il ne réussit pas; assez enfoncé dans les Jacobins pour en être toléré, les connaissant trop bien pour se dévouer à eux.' He also recommended him as the man who invented the *assignats*.[149] On 3 September, two days after this communication with the Court, Necker resigned, his credibility destroyed by his clashes with Mirabeau and by his failure to staunch the mounting tide of debt. He left France for Geneva.

The revolutionaries, however, resisted the exclusion of foreigners from engagement in French finances at even the highest level. Few deputies in the Constituent would have opposed efforts to relieve France of the burden of indebtedness to foreign creditors, but many could not accept the means proposed. They were aware that a France isolated from the main sources of international finance would do long-term damage to the economy. Consequently, the Dutch banker and Patriot Balthasar-Elie Abbema could quietly take over the Parisian bank of the English Catholic John-Francis Lambert in 1788 and go about his business as the absolute monarchy collapsed. Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver, another Dutchman, steered clear of politics and his bank, one of the largest in Paris, continued unmolested under the Constituent, even though he had been closely associated with the financial affairs of both Necker and Calonne, with agents of the treasury and the *Caisse d'Escompte* since 1778. In fact, Vandenyver seems to have benefited from the changes brought by the Revolution, being appointed an administrator of the new *Compagnie des Indes* in 1790.[150] Nonetheless, the image of foreign financial adventurers out to make a fast profit without any sense of civic obligation to France was a potent and persistent one which would re-emerge with a vengeance a few years later.

Foreign manufacturers and merchants, like their French counterparts, tended to hold themselves aloof from politics and appear to have continued undisturbed under the Constituent. Oberkampf, who had avoided politics before 1789, appears to have been the exception, being elected mayor of Jouy in February 1790. His nephew, Samuel, took

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[149]Letter of 1 September 1790, quoted in Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 294. Mirabeau's claim about Clavière's role in the creation of the Revolution's paper money was not entirely unfounded: Mirabeau's proposal to issue paper money based not on silver but on national property was written by the Genevan. Bénétruy writes that if the *assignats* were, as Jaurès claimed, 'l'âme de la Révolution', 'il est juste d'en restituer la paternité au Genevois Clavière' (304).

[150]Lüthy, *La Banque Protestante en France*, ii, 320, 322.

command of the local National Guard.[151] Their status in the community as the chief employers no doubt accounted for their political success. Oberkampf certainly believed that entering politics was a means of protecting his business interests. In November 1789 he wrote to his former collaborator, Maraise, that he was going to give 50,000 *livres* to the *contribution patriotique* because 'il importe à mes intérêts que je paye à la menusipallitat [*sic*] de Jouy'.[152] None the less, the entrepreneur also wrote to his sister that he sincerely wanted to be relieved of his public duties, which shows that he was not involved in local politics out of a desire to serve the local community.

The abolition of privileges accorded to industry by the state on 2 March 1791 did not elicit any protests from the foreign manufacturers who had originally relied so heavily on state subsidies. This was possibly because the most notable foreign manufactures had been long established by 1789 and were beginning to stand on their own feet. They may also have seen benefits in the abolition of such privileges, as the reverse side of the coin was the abolition of guilds and the subsequent Le Chapelier law which forbade combinations of workers.

One foreign manufacturer, at least, saw an opportunity in the Revolution. An aptly-named British porcelain manufacturer, Christopher Potter, had moved to France in 1789 after an unsuccessful career as a parliamentary candidate in East Anglia. The decline in the demand for luxury goods in the economic crisis of the late 1780s had forced the closure of the prince de Condé's porcelain manufacture at Chantilly. Potter reopened the works and by January 1791 was employing fifty workers in experiments with new methods of colouring.[153] The French remained painfully aware that they still lagged behind the British in industrial technology: a memorandum in the foreign ministry spoke of the need to have an 'industrial revolution' as well as a political one if France's global influence was not to be eclipsed by her old rival.[154] Attempts by manufacturers to recruit

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[151]Chapman & Chassagne, *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century*, 121 - 122. Chassagne suggests that Oberkampf entered politics only when circumstances seemed to threaten the future of his business and he felt the need to develop the skills of a political manipulator, but that he also showed some genuine sympathy for the Revolution (190 - 191).

[152]Quoted in Chassagne, *Oberkampf: un entrepreneur capitaliste au Siècle des Lumières* (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1980), 155 - 156.

[153]AP, xxii, 279; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 56 - 57.

[154]According to François Crouzet, this is the first known use of the term (cited in Harris, J., 'The Transfer of Technology between Britain and France and the French Revolution', Crossley, C., & Small, I., *The French Revolution and British Culture* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 182).

foreign skills through the tried and trusted methods therefore continued, if not with government backing, then on private initiative. In 1791, Charles Albert, from Alsace, visited Britain for the Toulouse textile manufacturers Boyer-Fonfrède and Le Comte in order to secure skilled artisans and technology. In December, he was arrested in Britain, fined and imprisoned.[155]

In France's primary industries, the outbreak of the Revolution seems to have actually encouraged a dramatic increase in the numbers of Nantucket whalers established at Dunkirk: by 1790, there were six or seven owners, all with largely foreign crews, mainly from Nantucket and Boston, but also from other maritime cities in the United States, Britain and Scandinavia. The reason behind this increase of interest from Nantucket whalers may be explained by the strong Quaker influence among them: although the absolute monarchy had guaranteed them their freedom to worship as they pleased, the extension of full civil equality to all citizens regardless of religion may well have removed any remaining misgivings.[156]

In the south, the French fishermen at Marseille seized the opportunity provided by the change of régime to seek redress on their long-standing grievances against the Catalan fishermen who used the port. The Catalans, said the Marseillais, had long refused to pay the same dues as French fishermen, they were not liable to service in the navy and their fishing methods destroyed stocks to such a degree that they could barely reproduce themselves. The *prud'hommes* of Marseille petitioned the National Assembly on 28 October 1790 asking that either the Catalans be submitted to the same dues, practices and jurisdictions as the Marseillais, or else they be expelled from the port. In their own memorandum, the *patrons-pêcheurs* claimed that the Spanish fishermen often arrived in Marseille without bothering to declare themselves to the *bureau de santé*. These foreigners could consequently 'jeter dans le royaume le fléau de la peste.' While the Catalans 'ne présentent à l'Etat ni espérances ni ressources', the French fishermen formed 'la pépinière et l'école permanente des matelots' for the navy and mounted guard at Marseille free of charge. 'Nous n'avons cessé de demander contre les pêcheurs étrangers *égalité de droit, égalité d'obligation*', the *patrons-pêcheurs* declared. They solicited a decree by which no one could run a fishing boat without French citizenship, without registering all their crew at the relevant *bureaux* and without both the owner and the crew declaring their intention to remain in France as French citizens. The Catalans replied that

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[155]Henderson, *Britain and Industrial Europe*, 25, 46.
[156]Pfister-Langanay, *Ports, Navires et Négociants*, 270 - 272.

they merely provided healthy competition for the French, which kept prices low, and that they spent most of their profits in Marseille, supporting the local economy.[157]

The Marseillais expressed in these petitions a combination of patriotic and egalitarian language, a sense of usefulness to the state and xenophobia. The master-fishermen presented the Catalans as a privileged group who undermined the French fishing industry while their French counterparts both fulfilled their civic obligations and struggled against unfair competion. The Marseillais, whether consciously or not, adopted the exclusive implications in revolutionary egalitarianism: those who refused to abandon their privileges relinquished those rights which the *patrie* offered. In this case, the Spanish fishermen ought to be banned from Marseille unless they sacrificed their special treatment. As ever, the Constituent Assembly compromised and sought not to bar the Catalans from fishing out of Marseille, but rather to 'protect' the French fishermen by levelling the playing field. The regulations for both French and Catalans would henceforth be the same. On 8 December 1790, the National Assembly decreed that the Catalans were to be permitted to fish along the French coast, to sell their fish in French ports and to harbour there. The condition attached to these concessions was that they follow the same rules and regulations and pay the same fees as their French counterparts, but they were also eligible for the same representation in the council of *prud'hommes*.[158] This decision had diplomatic motives, as the Assembly had, in the wake of the Nootka Sound crisis, renamed the *pacte de famille* between France and Spain the *pacte nationale*. By refusing to side with the French fishermen and by imposing parity on both parties, the revolutionaries were both adhering to the destruction of privilege and enforcing the terms of the Spanish alliance. The *pacte de famille* guaranteed the rights of French and Spanish subjects to fish in the waters of both monarchs, provided that they submitted to the same regulations and statutes as the fishermen of the host country. The Constituent gave a pragmatic solution to an economic dispute which had potentially difficult diplomatic consequences.

In its treatment of foreigners at the bottom end of the economic scale, the Revolution had no more to fear from diplomatic fallout than the Ancien Régime. For the poorest foreigners in France the Revolution meant little more than business as usual. The seasonal migration of the Savoyards continued and even intensified owing to the economic crisis which had caused so much misery in 1789. The fear caused by rumours of hordes of

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[157]AP, xxi, 323 - 324, 327, 330, 334.
[158]AP, xxi, 324.

foreign vagrants was nothing new, but the complaints were sometimes expressed in terms of exclusion. On 15 April 1790, the *curé* of Chaillot led a deputation from the commune of Paris to the National Assembly, complaining about the number of beggars teeming in the capital, including 'une multitude des mendiants étrangers enhardis par leur nombre'. The curate asked that the National Assembly expel all foreign beggars from the country for good measure, on the grounds that it was not for the city to bear the cost of their upkeep. The president agreed. While he expressed sympathy for the beggars, saying that 'une bienfaisance éclairée en est le seul remède', he agreed that French charitable resources should be applied only to French indigents.[159] No measures were taken, but the case shows that the cosmopolitanism of the Constituent Assembly was limited in its application to those who could contribute something to the economic or political well-being of the state. In these attitudes, the revolutionaries had much in common with their predecessors in the Ancien Régime.

VI

Foreign enthusiasts saw in the French Revolution an event for all mankind, from which to draw inspiration, from which to learn and in which all people, regardless of nationality, were able to participate. The revolutionaries themselves did little to discourage this impression, partly because they sincerely believed it themselves and also because they were encouraged by the flattery of their admirers. As politicians, however, the revolutionaries were faced with the reality of the financial crisis, the diplomatic uncertainty in their relations with foreign powers and the breakdown of French institutions. In trying to resolve these problems, the revolutionaries had to take hard, political facts into consideration, which often meant shelving or compromising their principles. Sometimes, this meant not applying the abolition of privilege to foreigners, as it did in the reform of the army and the clergy. On other occasions, it meant reining in their cosmopolitan impulses, as it did in their dealings with foreign patriots. Ultimately, every decision taken by the Constituent over the status of foreigners was dictated by a pragmatic weighing of the diplomatic, financial, political and economic interests of France. Their decisions may have been couched in the cosmopolitan terms of natural rights or in the nationalising, exclusive terms of an order based on citizenship, but beneath the

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[159]AP, xiii, 67 - 68.

rhetoric there was always a careful calculation of what the circumstances implied for French needs.

This is not to suggest that the revolutionaries were insincere in their expressions of cosmopolitanism. The enthusiasm when they abolished the *droit d'aubaine* seems genuine enough. But they were also patriots, which meant putting the interests of the nation as a whole above those of individuals and groups. An egalitarian civic order implied the levelling of all privileges - including those of foreigners. The apparent conflict between the desire to welcome foreigners to France, to allow them to contribute to and participate in the life of the nation on one hand, and the desire to abolish their privileges on the other was resolved by the same careful balancing of the practical factors involved. In general, the revolutionaries seem to have been able to strike a satisfactory balance between conflicting interests. Although there were variations, the balance reached was one whereby foreigners could serve in the army and the clergy, they could fish in French waters, run banks and manufactures, provided they played by the new rules and accepted the new order. Occasionally, diplomatic, political or economic considerations led the revolutionaries to reserve special treatment for certain categories of foreigners. The Swiss regiments remained as they were, even after other foreign regiments were ordered to take French pay and regulations. The foreign clergy kept all their religious houses even though French contemplative orders were abolished. Such exceptions did not appear as inconsistencies, as the revolutionaries did not have any general formula to apply to all foreigners in France. In some cases, the revolutionaries were often driven by circumstances to follow the implications of their ideology through, as in the case of the abolition of distinct foreign regiments (except for the Swiss) in July 1791. The balance which emerged in each specific case evolved from a weighing of diplomatic, economic, political and financial considerations.

If cosmopolitan idealism played a very small part in the decision-making of the revolutionaries, then any retreat from such ideas would have relatively little impact on the conditions of foreigners in France. More important was the balance of factors which made it possible for the French to welcome or to tolerate certain types of foreigners in their midst. During war and civil strife, the conditions by which foreigners were allowed to contribute to the life of the Revolution became more exacting as political loyalty to the new order was at a premium. Under the Constituent Assembly, there was no political orthodoxy except a willingness to accept the reforms and to live under the law. Circumstances were such in the period 1789 - 1791 that most foreigners found ample

scope for their activities within the conditions laid down by the reforms of the Revolution. It was only in the wake of the Champ de Mars massacre that the net of political orthodoxy was pulled in tighter and a number of foreigners found themselves outside it. Although the reaction was brief, it was a taste of what was to come during the Terror. It had little to do with any retreat from cosmopolitanism, but the rules as to what was legitimate behaviour became more restrictive. Whenever political orthodoxy became more exclusive, it became easier for foreigners in pursuit of their own special needs and aspirations to fall foul of the revolutionaries.

Chapter Four. Foreigners, War and the coming of the Republic, October 1791 - March 1793.

The period between the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the beginning of the series of defeats in March 1793 was a time of transition for the conditions of foreigners living in France. The frictions between the political needs of the revolutionaries and the aspirations of the foreigners began to heat up in a bellicose atmosphere which was sometimes characterised by fear or even panic. These rapidly changing circumstances ensured that the relatively broad net of political orthodoxy familiar under the Constituent would begin to shrink. Although there was still room for dissent within that net, it was becoming easier to appear as an enemy to the Revolution. This was especially true of foreigners. Those who retained any special privileges under the Constituent, such as the Swiss regiments and the foreign clergy, looked increasingly like survivals from the Ancien Régime, and therefore suspect. On the other hand, the revolutionaries abandoned the caution and political pragmatism of the Constituent and loudly proclaimed their support for foreign patriots, as allies in the war against European 'despotism'. As the overriding concerns of the revolutionaries no longer entailed the retention of peaceful diplomatic relations with other powers, so new factors emerged which dictated their policies towards foreigners. The political attitudes of foreigners and the role they played in French society became the most important factors in determining their fate.

I

Despite the war fever which broke out in the wake of the flight to Varennes, the general conditions in which foreigners lived changed little until the actual outbreak of war and, more importantly, the second wave of defeats early in 1793. Until then and even afterwards it was hoped that foreigners with aspirations similar to those of the revolutionaries would associate themselves with the French struggle. This attitude can be seen in the revolutionaries' approach to the notion of citizenship, naturalisation and the political rights of foreigners. The underlying concern of the revolutionaries was not nationality on its own, but rather an adherence to the principles of the Revolution, particularly after the overthrow of the monarchy. Indeed, there were some suggestions that those foreigners who advanced the cause of 'humanity' were thereby French citizens. While the first military defeats in the summer of 1792 led the revolutionaries to impose

restrictions on the movement of foreigners through passports, it was only when the international situation of the French Republic deteriorated by March 1793 that the revolutionaries seriously considered concerted measures of surveillance.

French citizenship was not only to remain open to all foreigners who fulfilled the conditions laid down by the Constitution of 1791, but it was also a propaganda tool. This was particularly true during the war when, denied the easy victory which they had been led to expect, the revolutionaries took solace in demonstrating that the French cause was that of all humanity. Empowered by the Constitution to naturalise any foreigner it saw fit, on 8 June 1792 the Legislative Assembly granted French citizenship to the son of Joseph Priestley, William, in recognition of his father's sacrifices in the name of liberty.[1]

A sense of diplomatic isolation after the overthrow of the monarchy led the revolutionaries to seek a further morale-boosting endorsement of their actions by adopting foreign thinkers and radicals as French citizens. The acceptance of the honour by such luminaries, it was hoped, would provide proof that some of the most enlightened figures not only associated with France's struggle, but also accepted the Republic. In this sense, the decree of 26 August 1792, which naturalised eighteen prominent publicists, politicians, reformers and radicals,[2] was both an expression of the universalist principles of the rights of man and a nationalist statement of France as the fountainhead of those principles. Chabot neatly combined this sense of the universality of the French people when he described Joseph Priestley as 'cet homme cosmopolite *et par conséquent* Français'. This implied that the 'family of free men' (to use Guadet's phrase) was French in spirit and would soon be in fact. Nationality was not a matter of birth or culture, but a state of mind. On the other hand, such a proposal had its risks, as Lasource pointed out: if acceptance of French citizenship could be interpreted as an endorsement of the Revolution, then how would a refusal be interpreted? To give the title of French citizen to those who had not asked for it was to run the risk of humiliation in the case of a refusal.[3] In the event, none of those named actually turned down the offer,[4] although some, such as Wilberforce, never bothered to reply. The revolutionaries were unfortunate

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[1]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 73 - 74.
[2]Those honoured with French citizenship were Joseph Priestley, Thomas Paine, Jeremy Bentham, William Wilberforce, Thomas Clarkson, James Mackintosh, David Williams, N. Gorani, Anacharsis Cloots, Cornelius Pauw, Joachim-Heinrich Campe, N. Pestalozzi, George Washington, John Hamilton, James Madison, H. Klopstock and Thaddeus Kosciusko. The Alsatian deputy Rühl had Schiller added to the list (AP, xlix, 10).
[3]AP, xlviii, 689 - 691.
[4]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 77.

enough, however, to have their measure upstaged by the September massacres less than a week later. Consequently, some of those who accepted French citizenship, like Joseph Priestley, took the opportunity to condemn the atrocities as an aberration, while endorsing the Revolution and the Republic in general.[5]

The collapse of the constitutional monarchy raised the question as to whether or not the usual provisions for naturalisation in the Constitution of 1791 still applied. Petitions for French citizenship were forwarded to the Convention's *comités de législation et de féodalité*. On 8 November 1792, the suggestion that these requests be shelved until a new constitution was drawn up was rejected by the committees on the grounds that 'il Etoit politique de ne pas Refuser d'admettre dans nôtre société, des Etrangers amis de la liberté qui Desiroient en Devenir Membres'.[6]

When the new constitution was finally discussed, the revolutionaries' own militant cosmopolitanism, as well as the extension of the suffrage to almost all adult males, encouraged a lowering of the formal barriers to naturalisation. The Girondin Constitution of 15 - 16 February 1793 brought down from five years to one the residence requirement for naturalisation.[7] As before, the process of naturalisation itself implied an acceptance of the new regime and the duties which it might impose. This contract had a new urgency, because the overthrow and execution of Louis XVI had brought both domestic and international opinion to question the legitimacy of the Revolution as never before. To accept French citizenship meant an implicit acceptance of the new Republic, symbolised by the civic oath. The radicalisation of the Revolution did not exclude foreigners on the basis of their nationality, but brought some foreigners to exclude themselves because they refused to accept the new order.

Naturalisation in France remained assimilationist, but limited by the narrowing boundaries of political orthodoxy. The inclusive definition of French citizenship is illustrated by the elections to the Convention of the newly-naturalised citizens, Thomas Paine and Anacharsis Cloots. Priestley, also elected, turned down his seat in the Convention on the grounds that both his knowledge of French and of local circumstances was limited.[8] On the other hand, the exclusive tendencies of political orthodoxy are

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[5]*Moniteur*, 30 September 1792.
[6]AN, D/III/368 - 370 ('Extrait du Procès-Verbal de la Séance du Comité de Législation Civile et Criminelle et de Féodalité de la Convention Ntle du jeudi huit novembre 1792').
[7]Portemer, 'L'Etranger dans le Droit de la Révolution française', 544.
[8]*Moniteur*, 30 September 1792.

demonstrated by the fact that all three foreigners were elected on the basis of their revolutionary or radical notoriety.

Even more than their general adherence to revolutionary principles, Priestley, Paine and Cloots arguably owed their election to their connections with the Brissotins. While Cloots soon attacked them in his writings, his advocacy of war had brought him into an alliance with them in late 1791 and early 1792. Paine, meanwhile, had long been associated with Brissot and Condorcet. Priestley was a scientific colleague and correspondent of the latter and also tended towards the Brissotin side. Significantly, Priestley's candidature for Paris was vociferously and successfully opposed by Marat and popular militants.[9] He was eventually elected by the Puy-de-Dôme. That elections of foreigners with honorary French citizenship may have been a partisan move by the Brissotins is suggested by the experience of David Williams, who was on friendly terms with Brissot and Pétion. On being naturalised, he was approached by a Brissotin agent in London prior to the nomination of candidates for the Convention. They discussed ' the consequences of my being nominated and elected ... if I checked the rapidity of the revolution or commenced hostilities on the Jacobin Club.' As it was, Williams refused to stand because he felt he had little knowledge of French affairs.[10] The election of foreigners may have been intended to increase the prestige of the Brissotins by demonstrating that they were the group endorsed by the greatest libertarian minds in Europe. By implication, they were also the group most able to lead the Republic to victory in the crusade for universal liberty.

'Cosmopolitanism' in the old sense, of fitting chameleon-like into élite society across Europe, was, however, becoming increasingly unacceptable. Lally-Tollendal's claims to Irish and French 'dual nationality' was rebuffed by the Legislative Assembly on 22 August 1792. None the less, there was a political side to the refusal to recognise him as a foreign subject, because of his liaisons with 'des personnes trop fameuses dans notre Révolution'.[11] The revolutionaries, however, had no objection to *cosmopolites* such as Paine travelling the world as a British subject, or as an American or French citizen, provided that they served the cause of the French Revolution. When the Legislative granted the foreign radicals and reformers French citizenship, they assumed that acceptance meant a

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[9]Coquard, O., 'Le Paris de Marat', Vovelle, M. (ed.), *Paris et la Révolution* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 179.
[10]Williams, D. (ed. France, P.), *Incidents in my Own Life which have been thought of some importance* (Brighton: University of Sussex Library, 1980), 26 - 27.
[11]AP, xlviii, 616.

commitment to France and to the Revolution, while in the case of Lally-Tollendal an individual who had exercised full political rights in France now claimed to be a foreigner. For a Frenchman to claim foreign nationality implied a rejection of the new order. For a foreigner to request French nationality was an endorsement of it, particularly if the foreigner then used his acquired political rights in the service of the nation.

The naturalised Dutch Patriot refugee Jan-Antonie Daverhoult sat in the Legislative Assembly.[12] The Genevan Etienne Clavière managed to secure his political rise by obtaining French nationality. While he failed to get elected to the Legislative Assembly except as a substitute, between 10 March and 13 June 1792 he served in the Brissotin government as finance minister.[13] These people, although legally French, could not be expected to shed all their concerns for their mother countries. Both Clavière and Lebrun, a French citizen who had participated in the Liégeois revolution, associated with the Brissotins because their policies seemed the most likely to achieve political change in Geneva and Liège. In May 1792, Daverhoult joined the Fayettists in the Legislative,[14] because of the possibility that Lafayette would be a most useful ally in any 'liberation' of the United Provinces.

In practice, even non-naturalised foreigners could play a part in French politics. On 21 August 1792, John Moore was ushered into the Hôtel de Ville in Paris by a patrol of National Guards, one of whom was 'English'.[15] Doppet, the exile from Savoy, was briefly employed as a secretary by Aubert de Bayet, deputy to the Legislative for the Isère. In Paris, he joined the National Guard, the Jacobins and the Cordeliers.[16] From Bordeaux Karl Reinhard accompanied his friends Vergniaud and Ducos when they took their seats in the Legislative Assembly. He joined the Jacobin club and was secretary to the French embassy in London until the outbreak of war with Britain, when he was transferred to Naples.[17] The French sometimes used foreigners, or people with foreign background, on diplomatic missions because of their local connections. It was for this reason that in early March 1792 Talleyrand specifically requested the Genevan Duroveray for his mission to ensure British neutrality in the coming war.[18] When the French sought to avoid a final

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[12]Rosendaal, J., 'Qui était l'être suprême pour les réfugiés bataves?', *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, lxi (1989), 201.
[13]Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 392, 415 - 416, 419.
[14]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 151.
[15]Moore, *A Journal during a Residence in France*, i, 129.
[16]Doppet, *Mémoires Politiques et Militaires*, 23, 34.
[17]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 328, 330.
[18]Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 406.

breach with Britain after the execution of Louis XVI, David Williams was sent over the Channel, although by the time he arrived in London, it was too late.[19] Foreigners could still find outlets for their political energies and could therefore still exercise influence in revolutionary politics.[20] The revolutionaries accepted these foreigners' efforts on behalf of their own countries provided they coincided with French interests and for as long as they were ideologically committed to the Revolution.

A measure of the continuing desire to assimilate foreigners in French life was a further reform in French civil law at the very moment when the Republic was plunging into its first major military crisis. The *contrainte par corps* for debts was abolished, without any specific mention of foreigners, on 9 March 1793. The reasons behind the abolition of imprisonment for debt are unclear, although Danton, who proposed the decree, described it as 'la destruction de la tyrannie, de la richesse sur la misère'. On contracting debts, no one should have to give their person as collateral.[21]

This was the only permanent legal reform affecting foreigners in this period. The imminence of war and then the conflict itself, ensured that the year and a half after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly would be characterised instead by measures which were intended as temporary expedients. On 31 January 1792 the Legislative reintroduced passports for those crossing the frontiers. While passports were nothing new for foreigners travelling within and leaving France, they were now needed to *enter* the country. Deputies of the left stressed the dangers of indiscriminately allowing foreigners to enter France, while others argued that passports represented an assault on individual liberty.[22] Besides this measure, however, few precautions were taken against the possibility that some foreigners might genuinely attempt to subvert the Revolution.[23]

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[19]Williams, D., *Incidents in my Own Life*, 29 - 30.

[20]Mathiez noted his disapproval of this openess on the part of the Revolution: 'Confiante dans la puissance irrésistible de ses doctrines, elle avait regardé comme des frères les étrangers qui les professaient et l'état de guerre ne l'avait pas fait changer d'avis.' (*La Révolution et les étrangers*, 81).

[21]AP, lx, 13 - 14; Portemer, 'L'Etranger dans le Droit de la Révolution française', 549.

[22]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 72. Mathiez found the measure 'fort anodine', but to eighteenth-century minds the idea of needing a passport to cross international boundaries, if not unfamiliar, was still an anathema. If the eighteenth century threw up plenty of obstacles to the movement of goods, it was less obstructive to the movement of people.

[23]Albert Mathiez wrote disapprovingly that 'les étrangers n'ont jamais été plus choyés, plus exaltés qu'à ce moment de notre histoire où nous engagions un combat à mort contre leurs patries d'origine.' (*La Révolution et les étrangers*, 72).

None the less, the ominous signs were emerging. When on 4 July 1792 the death penalty was proposed for those who wore 'toute cocarde, autre que celle de trois couleurs', only foreign ambassadors were made exempt. Discussing the *patrie en danger* decree, the revolutionaries were in no mood to respect the individual rights of foreigners. When a deputy asked that a foreigner who arrived in France wearing the cockade of his own country be spared, he was greeted by murmurs on the left.[24]

Circumstances soon drove the revolutionaries to impose more restrictions on foreigners' freedom of movement. The day after the overthrow of the monarchy, all people were forbidden to leave Paris without a passport, and these could only be obtained with a *certificat de civisme* from the surveillance committees. In the fraught atmosphere which followed the *journée* of 10 August, it was clear that such passports were hard to come by. Gouverneur Morris was bombarded with panicked requests for the precious documents from people of all nationalities. John Moore recognised on 21 August that: 'it is difficult at this time to obtain passports: they have been refused to many strangers'. The predicament of British subjects was more difficult because Lord Gower had been recalled by London in response to the overthrow of the monarchy. While Pétion, the mayor of Paris, refused to issue Moore and Lauderdale with passports on the grounds that such a refusal was temporary and for their own safety, it was Moore's own letter of introduction from Duroveray to Clavière which secured them.[25]

On 23 August, the Assembly restricted the issue of passports by the foreign ministry to foreign diplomatic personnel. This represented the greatest restriction on the movement of foreigners since the beginning of the Revolution. While it was mainly aimed at preventing emigration from France, the deputies were under no illusions that it would also restrict the movement of foreigners. When Guyton-Moreau of the *comité diplomatique* objected that 'vous ne pouvez pas sans injustice retenir des étrangers pour partager les dangers d'une patrie qui n'est pas la leur', he provoked widespread murmurs. Thuriot rejoined by insisting that the refusal of passports was a necessary, but temporary expedient: 'cet état ne peut pas durer assez longtemps pour devenir à l'égard des étrangers un état d'oppression.'[26] If it is possible to trace the mentality and rhetoric of the Terror to before 1793, the revolutionaries' own familiarity with concepts such as *droit des gens* and their ideals of individual liberty exerted a force in the opposite direction. Foreigners still

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[24]AP, xlvi, 116.
[25]Morris, *A Diary of the French Revolution*, ii, 490; Moore, *A Journal during a Residence in France*, i, 127 - 137.
[26]AP, xlviii, 661 - 662.

succeeded in procuring passports despite the legislation. Heinrich Meister, the Swiss tutor and writer, understandably feared for his safety after the massacre of his compatriots on 10 August. After sweating for a few weeks, it was as news of the September massacres was spreading around Paris that he decided to flee. There were still wide loopholes which the law of 23 August left open, as Meister managed to persuade the officials of the Commune to issue him passport.[27] If the law had forbidden the issue of passports by the foreign ministry, it did not explicitly rescind the authority of the Commune to do so.

Despite the loopholes and the evident reluctance of some revolutionaries to apply nothing more than the law as it stood, it was becoming clear that hostile attitudes towards foreigners were running ahead of legislation, which was evolving piecemeal. Foreigners were merely being subjected to the same laws on passports and mobility as French citizens. None the less, the structures of surveillance and control associated with the Terror were beginning to take a tentative, haphazard shape. From 11 August, Parisian sections had elected *comités de surveillance*, whose duties included hearing reports on suspect individuals and foreigners. From 19 September, foreigners arriving in Paris were required to declare themselves at the local section.[28]

These measures were however regarded as temporary. Like the proclamation of the 'Patrie en Danger' itself, they were to remain in force only during the crisis. The exchanges between Pétion and Moore and Guyton-Moreau's reluctance suggests that some revolutionaries, immersed in their legal and intellectual inheritance from the eighteenth-century, were embarrassed by the restrictions. Although foreigners were being regarded with increasing suspicion, as befits the period known as the 'First Terror', there was not, as yet, any general legal measure taken against them.

Even with the obvious reluctance of the Belgians and the Rhinelanders to accept the French version of liberty after the victories of Valmy and Jemappes, the revolutionaries did not single out foreigners for any special repressive measures. In fact, when the Convention declared war on Britain and the United Provinces on 1 February 1793, the issue of how *droit des gens* related to the treatment of enemy subjects was raised. Fabre d'Églantine secured considerable support for a proclamation which would have placed British and Dutch subjects in France 'sous la protection de la loi'. While this measure was

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[27]Meister, H. (ed. Usteri, P. & Ritter, E.), *Souvenirs de Mon Dernier Voyage à Paris (1795)* (Paris, 1910), 209 - 212.
[28]Portemer, 'L'Etranger dans le Droit de la Révolution française', 546.

not voted, the Convention did name a commission, which included Thomas Paine, to draw up an address to the British people and dismissed a further call, by Marat, to prohibit all foreigners from staying in maritime towns.[29]

Further measures against foreigners were not, however, long in coming. On 26 February the Convention ordered all landlords, hoteliers, and hosts to appear before their local section or commune and declare within twenty-four hours, under pain of three months' imprisonment, any foreigners and strangers who were staying in their accommodation. Once those declarations were made, they were to be posted up at the door of the local section or municipality, with an invitation to all citizens to denounce any omissions or mistakes on the lists.[30] The immediate spark for this decree was a particular domestic crisis, in which food riots swept the capital the day before. None the less, the xenophobic manner in which the unrest was interpreted can only be explained by the war, in which the Revolution was once more facing a military crisis. The explanation offered for the disturbances was therefore not simply economic grievance, but agitation by foreigners.[31] The law of 26 February was a knee-jerk response to a domestic crisis behind which, in the midst of defeat on almost all fronts, the revolutionaries saw the machinations of foreign agents. Rumours of foreign complicity led to more intense surveillance of foreigners.

The pattern of 25 - 26 February was almost repeated when a crowd smashed the Girondin presses at the instigation of the Cordeliers and Hébert on 10 March. Lasource declared that behind this violence lay 'les agents de Pitt, de Guillaume ou de François: ... les fuyards de la Savoie, de Mayence et de la Belgique qui affluent dans Paris où ils ne sont jetés pour conspirer'.[32] Three days later, the Montagnard Duquesnoy seemed to agree with the Girondin Lasource, speaking of a *comité d'insurrection* in Paris led by foreign agents. His proposal that foreigners be ordered to leave Paris in twenty-four hours, unless they were vouched for by 'deux bons citoyens', still went too far for the Convention, even though he presented it as a measure of reprisal for the way French citizens were treated by enemy governments. Prieur de la Marne reminded his colleagues that the Alien Act was one of France's official motives for declaring war on the king of Britain in the first place. He insisted that those who loved liberty 'ont dû se rendre au sein de la France pour jouir de son heureuse révolution.' The Convention's reluctance to pass

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[29]AP, lviii, 120 - 122.
[30]AP, lix, 283 - 284.
[31]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 122.
[32]Quoted in Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 123.

a blanket law against foreigners implies that it did not wish to follow the traditional path of the *droit de représailles*, which paid no regard to the universal rights of man. In fact, not to implement such measures might be a propaganda coup, showing France to be a true land of liberty. Prieur and most of his colleagues in the Convention were not so concerned with the surveillance of foreigners as with vigilance against 'ces hommes qu'il est utile de mettre sous les yeux de leurs concitoyens' - French and foreign alike. The manichean struggle between the Republic and despotism still cut across lines of nationality.[33]

None the less, for as long as the war exerted its weight on the economic crisis and the political opposition it caused, so xenophobia would continue to rear its ugly head. On 18 March Barère appeared before the Convention on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety and proposed that the Republic expel 'ces hommes sans aveu qui ne vivent que de l'or étranger, qui ont des relations avec nos ennemis, qui alimentent les troubles et les conjurations, alors Paris sera tranquille'. Barère's proposal was greeted enthusiastically and the Convention adopted the proposal that 'les étrangers, sans aveu, seront chassés des terres de la République.'[34] In fact, the revolutionaries may have recognised specific individuals in Barère's description. The Belgian financier Proli and the Spanish financial speculator Andrès Maria de Guzman did frequent the haunt of the militant sectional leaders in Paris, the café Corazza, and both men were involved in radical politics.[35] The expulsion of such people, it was hoped, would weaken the militant Parisian movement. This law was not yet a general measure aimed at all foreigners, but only those 'sans aveu', who could not satisfactorily explain their purpose in France.

None the less, the identification of foreigners 'sans aveu' required discriminatory surveillance against foreigners in general. Such surveillance, when it came, legitimised xenophobia by giving it an official channel. It made all foreigners legal targets of suspicion and denunciation. The implications of this logic were not lost when, the next day, the Convention discussed the Vendée uprising. Cambon warned of the dangers of allowing France's external enemies to correspond with those in the interior and demanded that 'tous les étrangers soient tenus de sortir du territoire de la République'. He claimed the old *droit de représailles* against enemy powers which punished French citizens because only six days previously the Convention had heard a report on the expulsion from

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[33]AP, lx, 222 - 223.
[34]AP, lx, 294.
[35]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 105, 111, 123.

Spain of French citizens. Cambon's motion therefore drew vocal support but while the Convention agreed in broad terms that something had to be done with potentially hostile foreigners, it did not go as far as expel them all. Lasource and Boyer-Fonfrède argued that there were plenty of foreigners who were useful to the Republic and took up Prieur de la Marne's notion that it would be wrong for the Republic to imitate its enemies. Boyer-Fonfrède proposed that, instead of expulsion, surveillance committees be established to watch over foreigners.[36]

Two days later, the decree 'sur les étrangers' gave legal recognition to the *comités de surveillance*. They were charged with receiving the declarations of all foreigners within their jurisdiction, both residents and new arrivals, who would register within eight days. Those who failed to do so would be immediately expelled from the commune and from France within eight days. Significantly, these rules applied to all foreigners, not just those from countries at war with France. Those from enemy countries also had to prove either that they had a useful occupation or property in France, or that they had 'sentiments civiques' confirmed by six citizens. Those who failed to show such commitment were to be expelled. Foreigners who passed the test were granted 'un certificat d'autorisation de résidence'. In Paris, from 26 March, such *cartes de sûreté*, as they were also called, were to be red for foreigners and white for French citizens. A foreigner who received such a certificate only on the basis of his *civisme* supported by six citizens was also bound to furnish a deposit of half his presumed wealth. The most draconian clause stemmed from the 'lessons' of 25 February and 10 March: 'tout étranger saisi dans une émeute, ou qui serait convaincu de l'avoir provoquée ou entretenue, par voie d'argent ou de conseil, sera puni de mort'.[37]

It must be said of the *comités de surveillance* that all French citizens aged eighteen or over were also meant to make declarations similar to those of foreigners.[38] The law, in short, may have reserved its harshest measures for enemy subjects, but its basic provisions applied equally to French citizens. As onerous and as sinister as the procedure must have been for people almost unaccustomed to such bureaucracy, it fell far short of the general expulsion committed by the Spanish government and proposed by Cambon. On the whole the revolutionaries still believed that some, if not most, foreigners were innocent and even useful to the Republic. While they would watch enemy subjects, they were still unwilling

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[36]AP, lx, 318 - 319; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 124.
[37]AP, lx, 389 - 390; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 126.
[38]AP, lx, 390.

to punish with expulsion or arrest those who had committed no obvious crime. Furthermore, they still saw both practical and propaganda value in retaining the services of those whom they saw as useful or as their ideological kindred.

The xenophobia of some revolutionaries began to reach very shrill notes, apparently because of the sluggishness with which the law was enforced. On 27 March Duquesnoy urged the Convention to apply it quickly, crying 'tous les jours il arrive des étrangers à Paris' and that he himself had narrowly missed assassination.[39] Despite such outbursts, those foreigners who were actually arrested had long been suspected of links either with the recent Paris riots, or with the counter-revolution. The Commune put seals on the papers of certain foreigners and even arrested those who were deemed to be highly suspect, including Guzman and the Italian poet, Alfieri.[40] Grace Dalrymple Elliott was also arrested at her home in the dead of night. Her correspondence included a letter addressed to Charles James Fox. This was enough to incriminate her as a courier for enemy correspondence. None the less, the section visited her not simply because she was British, but because she had long been suspected of 'correspondence with the enemies of the Republic' and because of her ties with d'Orléans. She was released within a few days after the Fox letter was found to be full of praise and admiration for the French nation.[41]

The cases of Guzman, Alfieri and Elliott suggest it was not enough at this stage simply to be foreign to be harassed by the authorities. One had to have come to the attention of the authorities for suspicious activities or views, which was the whole purpose of the *comités de surveillance*. Guzman was believed to have been behind the disturbances of February and March. Alfieri's poetic sympathies were increasingly with the counter-revolution (and the experience of arrest would more than confirm him in these views). Elliott was suspected because of her relations with d'Orléans.[42] While such treatment did not say much for the revolutionaries' tolerance of opposition, the authorities did release the prisoners once they were reassured that they posed no great threat. Moreover, the vast majority of foreigners remained at liberty.

The surveillance and arrests of foreigners were due as much to a desire to weaken the domestic opposition as it was a product of xenophobia. While xenophobia was

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[39]AP, lx, 603.
[40]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 125 & n..
[41]Elliott, G. D., *Journal of My Life during the French Revolution* (n.p.: Rodale Press, 1955), 97 - 108.
[42]Gerbod, P., 'Visiteurs et Résidents: Britanniques dans le Paris révolutionnaire de 1789 à 1799', Vovelle, M. (ed.), *Paris et la Révolution* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 139.

strengthened by military defeat, it was the unrest in the interior of France which provoked its expression in legislation, because foreigners within the frontiers posed, it was thought, a more immediate threat than the defeats beyond them. The very fact that suspicion was institutionalised in the form of *comités de surveillance* and *cartes de sûreté* was ominous for both French and foreigners alike. In this bureaucratisation of xenophobia it is possible to discern the first negative, discriminatory legislation against foreigners. Enemy subjects were subject to additional clauses in the law of 21 March, while foreigners carried a different colour of identity card from French citizens. Militant, revolutionary cosmopolitanism had been irretrievably damaged by the combination of defeat and civil unrest, and hostility to foreigners intensified in this period, but some revolutionaries did not relinquish the vision of a manichean struggle which cut across nationalities.

While foreigners were singled out for particular attention by the revolutionaries in their rhetoric and their decrees, in practice the authorities were reluctant to do much more than interrogate and, if necessary, detain for a few days at the most. What mattered more, therefore, than nationality in the revolutionaries' approach to foreigners were their political loyalties. It was the radicalisation of revolutionary politics which excluded foreigners from France, as much as the response to military defeat. The foundation of the Republic made both the Revolution less acceptable to many foreigners and the activities of certain foreigners less acceptable to the revolutionaries.

The extent to which foreigners were affected by changes in revolutionary politics depended to a great degree on their specific role in French life. An ability to contribute to the war effort through military service, economic activity or propaganda might have helped, but very often the two factors of political orthodoxy and usefulness were not mutually inclusive. The revolutionaries were sometimes faced with the awkward choice of either keeping in France those foreigners who provided useful services, but whose political commitment was suspect, or of expelling them, and then lose their skills.

II

Among no other group of foreigners was this dilemma more pressing than with foreign soldiers in France. This period saw the demise of the Swiss infantry, but the rise of new foreign units, the legions. The difference was that the Swiss regiments were survivals of the Ancien Régime whose commitment to the Revolution was suspect, while the foreign legions were made up of foreigners who were, in theory, ideologically committed to the

Revolution. The fall of the former and the rise of latter show that the revolutionaries, albeit with some misgivings, were still willing to accept foreigners within a branch of the French state, but that conformity to a narrowing set of political values was increasingly important. Yet there still remained the pragmatism which had dictated the maintenance of foreign regiments under the Constituent. Unwilling to lose the manpower and skills of highly-trained and seasoned troops, the revolutionaries quietly permitted some of the soldiers from the disbanded foreign regiments to join the legions or French regular units.

Even as war approached, and despite the assumption by most foreign regiments of French pay and regulations, relations between French civilians and foreigners in the army were still strained. For many civilians, the changes brought by the law of 21 July 1791 were cosmetic: they were still aware as to who the foreign troops were and they still feared their counter-revolutionary potential and their iron discipline. In fact, it is not altogether clear that the foreign units obeyed the decree immediately. In April 1792, the 77th (La Marck) Infantry was in Lyon en route from Avignon to Brest when their colonel, described by one of his men as 'un aristocrate', provoked a mutiny because he had failed to issue the regiment with French uniforms.[43] That the officers of the foreign regiments seemed so reluctant to forsake the foreign status of their units naturally put them under suspicion. These popular fears were compounded by the behaviour of foreign regiments. In March 1792 the La Marck regiment supported the royalist 'Chiffonistes' against the radical 'Monnediers' in Arles, with the blessing of both the municipality and of Narbonne. At Neufchâtel in January 1792, seven or eight officers of the 87th (Dillon) Infantry seized a billiard cue from a café and beat the *limonadier*'s dog. Officers and soldiers were also accused of damaging hotel property.[44]

It was the Swiss regiments, however, who were the most despised for their discipline, for the fact that they were the most exclusively foreign in membership and retained their separate identity from French regiments. Fights broke out between soldiers of the Courten regiment and French soldiers in Douai in January 1792, over allegations that the Swiss were counter-revolutionaries. The worst incident before the outbreak of war, however, involved the Ernst regiment in Marseille. Isolated within a sea of popular hostility since 1790, the regiment became increasingly a target of loathing in the city. By February 1792, when the regiment's barracks were besieged by a crowd of Marseillais, the

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[43]Pardiellan, P. de, *Mémoires d'un Vieux Déserteur. Aventures de J. Steininger* (Paris: 1898), 181.

[44]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 146; Scott, 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 20.

commander was persuaded to pull out of the city. The canton of Berne recalled the regiment to Switzerland on 16 March and the Ernst regiment left France on 26 May.[45]

Such an affair naturally had diplomatic repercussions in French relations with the Swiss cantons. The Senate of Berne protested against the shoddy treatment of the soldiers and the failure of the authorities to respect the treaties signed under the Ancien Régime.[46] For their part, the revolutionaries realised that the treatment of the Swiss sorely tried the alliance with the cantons. The author of a memorandum to the *comité diplomatique* of the Legislative Assembly, dated 3 April 1792, feared that the 'malheureuse affaire' would lead to a break with Switzerland. With war against Austria now inevitable, such a situation would simply compound France's difficulties. The author urged that other Swiss regiments be treated with special care.[47]

The needs of diplomacy should not be overstated. The *Gardes-suisses* were denied their traditional role of guarding the king on 13 November 1791. The decree stated that while the regiment's regulations would otherwise be unaffected, the role of royal bodyguard would be taken up by a French force. Moreover, when the constitutional guard took up its duties on 16 March 1792, the élite *Cent-Suisses* company was made obsolete and was disbanded. These changes were dictated by a need to ensure that the king would be guarded by troops who were not bound by loyalty to him alone. None the less, it did contradict the capitulations of the Swiss Guards and this grievance was compounded by the arrears in pay which followed the change of paymaster from the civil list to the war office. In January and February 1792 no pay had been forwarded to the Swiss, a state of affairs which Narbonne was quick to take up with the Legislative.[48] In a political atmosphere more sensitive than under the first two years of the Constituent Assembly, a balance between the demands of the Revolution's internal security and of the approaching conflict would be harder to achieve without breaking some Ancien Régime agreements.

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[45]Haas, *Un Régiment Suisse au Service de France*, 18 - 20; Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 141; Bodin, *Les Suisses au Service de la France*, 257 - 258; Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, i, 388.
[46]Haas, *Un Régiment Suisse au Service de France*, 19; Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, i, 388.
[47]AN, F/7/4401 (*Mémoire sur la malheureuse affaire du Régiment d'Ernest*, 3 April 1792).
[48]AN, F/7/4401 (Letter of Louis XVI and Narbonne to the National Assembly, 11 February 1792); Hardman, J., *Louis XVI* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1993), 202; Bodin, *Les Suisses au Service de la France*, 258.

The approach of war and the slave rebellion in Haiti required every ounce of military muscle and the more seasoned the better. Successive ministries up to August 1792 therefore tended towards the retention of foreign units rather than their disbandment. They sent the former Irish regiments to the colonies which was a continuation of an Ancien Régime tradition.[49] The Swiss regiments, meanwhile, were deployed mostly along the frontiers or in major provincial towns.[50] The fear that foreign powers would recruit those mercenaries relinquished by France made the revolutionaries still more determined to retain their services. The author of the memorandum on the Ernst regiment warned that 'l'or de l'espagne pourra alors tourner facilement leurs armes contre nous.'[51] France could not afford to fritter away its military strength under the pressure of hostility to foreign troops.

The possibility of war therefore encouraged the Legislative Assembly to make gestures to consolidate the loyalty of foreign troops as against the dubious faith of their officers. In the case of the Swiss regiments, however, this policy brought new sources of tension between France and the cantons. While the forty-one Swiss soldiers imprisoned since the Nancy mutiny were increasingly regarded as the victims of aristocratic oppression by the revolutionaries, the cantons saw them as insubordinate soldiers who had failed in their duty to the king and, possibly, as subversives as well. On 26 December 1791 the cantons refused their consent to a request by the Legislative to secure the mutineers' release from the galleys. In March 1792 they were freed anyway.[52] The revolutionaries had swept aside the objections of the cantons and enforced the policy which they considered to be in the national interest. Revolutionary faith in the loyalty of the Châteauvieux soldiers was severely misplaced: days after the disbandment of the Swiss regiments in France in August, the men of Châteauvieux considered desertion to the émigré army.[53]

The outbreak of war presented a new test of loyalty to the Revolution for foreign troops: they had to chose to fight for or against the new regime. In some foreign units, the hostility of the French population ensured a cohesion between officers and the ranks lacking in many other units in the French army. Such solidarity meant that when their officers chose to emigrate, their men followed, as was the case with the 15th (Royal-

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[49]Scott, 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 20.
[50]Bodin, *Les Suisses au Service de la France*, 257.
[51]AN, F/7/4401 (*Mémoire sur la malheureuse affaire du Régiment d'Ernest*, 3 April 1792).
[52]Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, i, 365 - 368.
[53]AN, F/7/4401 (Lebrun to the president of the Commission of Twenty-One, 13 September 1792).

Allemand) Cavalry regiment and the 1st (Berchény) and 4th (Saxe) Hussars in May 1792. Only in the Berchény regiment was opinion seriously divided and it took a bitter fight before eighty hussars followed most of the officers to join the enemy in Germany. Sixteen officers of the 92nd (Walsh) regiment deserted in the same month.[54]

The war not only forced foreign troops to express their loyalties, but also gave new cause for concern for their officers. The slaughter of General Théobald Dillon (himself of Irish descent) on 28 April showed that even commanders of the highest rank were not immune from the indiscipline of their troops.[55] Furthermore, the rhetoric of patriotism aimed at inspiring French troops to fight for the new order may also have had implications of exclusion for foreign regiments. It certainly strained relations between French soldiers and troops of the Swiss Vigier regiment in Alsace in May and June 1792. The Swiss were involved in brawls with their French counterparts after being baited as 'mercenaries'.[56] Such aspersions cast on the patriotism of Swiss troops had some foundation in fact. On 28 May, the Legislative Assembly heard from the municipality of Neuilly that Swiss Guards barracked there had been seen sporting white cockades.[57]

Despite such ominous signals, foreign troops were too good an asset to lose in wartime. In July, a worried French envoy to Switzerland reported that the Spanish were trying to raise a Swiss regiment.[58] As conditions for the Swiss worsened in France, so Spain would appear proportionately more attractive for them. None the less, the revolutionaries were determined to ensure the loyalty of the army during the first disastrous months of the war and they prescribed a new oath. Although it was no more radical than any of the earlier oaths, the officers of the Swiss Sonnenberg and the Castella regiments were worried enough to ask for guidance from their home cantons in June. In the event, they took the required oath on Bastille Day, as prescribed, because they had little choice.[59] The cantons still insisted on the capitulations, while the Swiss soldiers could not appear treasonous in wartime.

Some Swiss officers did not make such compromises without a fight. The next day, the Legislative Assembly decreed that all regular troops remain at least thirty-six and a

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[54]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 114 - 116; Scott, 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 21.
[55]Scott, 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 20 - 21; Weygand, J., 'Le Régiment de Dillon', 53.
[56]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 148.
[57]AP, xliv, 190 - 191.
[58]AN, F/7/4401 (Note of Chambouay, foreign minister, 26 July 1792).
[59]Zurich, 'Les derniers serments des troupes suisses au service de France', 266 - 267.

half miles from Paris. Colonel d'Affry of the Swiss Guards protested to Lajard, the minister of war, that his regiment ought not to be included in the order, claiming that according to their conditions of service a third of the regiment should remain close to the king. Although Lajard suggested to the Legislative that the Swiss ought to be subject to the decree, the Assembly demurred, perhaps thinking of further diplomatic repercussions, and allowed a third of the regiment to remain in the Paris area.[60] The battalion which remained perished on 10 August.

The Swiss insistence on old régime regulations and a privileged status within the French army, their deference to orders from the cantons and their loyalty to the king all jarred with the revolutionary vision of a citizen army dedicated to the national cause. Moreover, the French ambassador to Switzerland, Barthélemy, suggested that although the capitulations were nearly due for renewal, the cantons would prefer to maintain their troops in the French service under the same conditions as before, rather than adjust to the new order.[61] Such issues were merely aggravated by the more militant, egalitarian atmosphere of the summer of 1792. With relations between the French authorities and the Swiss regiments already strained, they finally snapped on 10 August.

On that day 650 Swiss were killed, 100 wounded and in all 250 officers and men were eventually imprisoned in the Abbaye, La Force and the Conciergerie. A further 200 were killed in the carnage of September.[62] The role of the Swiss Guards in defending the monarchy even as they were massacred sealed the fate of all Swiss regiments in France. Popular hostility boiled over with the claims that the Swiss had fired on the patriots after luring them into negotiations. That night, for example, all but one of seven Swiss captured by citizens on the Champs-Elysées were shot by the orders of the committee of the section du Roule. The next day, the nervous municipal authorities in Neuilly were confronted by a mob demanding that two Swiss being held prisoner be handed over to the 'people'. When it was decided to hold the Swiss prisoners in the Abbaye, it was promptly attacked by a crowd.[63]

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[60]AN, F/7/4401 (letter of Lajard to National Assembly, 17 July 1792; letter of d'Affry to National Assembly, 16 July 1792); AP, xlvi, 574 - 576.
[61]AN, F/7/4401 (letter of Barthélemy to Chambouay, 9 July 1792).
[62]Bodin, *Les Suisses au Service de la France*, 269, 270.
[63]AN, F/7/4401 ('Réclamations du Citoyen Jouïs, tailleur d'habits Ruë Ville l'Evêque Section de la Republique'); AP, xlviii, 2, 15, 16. See also the stories told by Moore and an American merchant, James Price (Moore, *A Journal during a Residence in France*, i, 62, 69 - 70; Chew, W. J., III, (ed.), *A Bostonian Merchant Witnesses the Second French Revolution: James Price, A Voyage and a Visit to France in 1792* (Brussels: Center for American Studies, 1992), 26).

Official treatment of the Swiss Guards, while less bloodthirsty than that of the crowd, was no less dictated by hostility. On 11 August, the National Assembly imprisoned the officers and ordered their immediate trial, along with that of their surviving men. The jury was chosen from delegates of the forty-eight sections, which would hardly guarantee a fair hearing. Major Bachmann was condemned to death and guillotined on 3 September. D'Affry was acquitted in October because he was at home ill on the fateful day. At the end of the year, he returned to Switzerland, where he died soon after on his estate.[64] On the other hand, both the American merchant James Price and Dr. Moore witnessed on 11 August revolutionaries such as Pétion and Gorsas haranguing the crowds to prevent them from indulging in the slaughter of yet more Swiss victims. The imprisonment of the Swiss was as much for their own protection as it was to prevent their escape. The Commune sent National Guards to defend those Swiss held at the Feuillants. Danton personally led fifty Swiss from the National Assembly to the Abbaye; the *fédérés*, declaring that they no longer saw the Swiss as enemies (and perhaps trying to ease their own consciences) offered to carry out similar duties.[65]

10 August eliminated what little confidence the revolutionaries had left in the Swiss regiments. All the Swiss regiments were unofficially charged with complicity in the sinister projects of the king and the Swiss Guards.[66] Rumours of a broader conspiracy involving the king and the Swiss appeared to have been believed by some deputies and were reinforced by the 'unpatriotic' behaviour, understandable in the circumstances, of officers of the Salis-Samade regiment in Rouen.[67]

Despite the diplomatic ramifications, the Legislative disbanded the Swiss regiments on 20 August. The decree simply stated that it was necessary to deal promptly with the fate of the Swiss regiments and that most of their capitulations had expired anyway. There were of course other motives behind the decision. Brissot, who presented the decree on behalf of the Commission of Twelve, stated that the diplomatic committee had already written a report on the renegotiation of the capitulations, but that 10 August had changed all that. French blood had been spilled by the iron of the Swiss Guards. Besides, the treaties with the cantons were intended as much to defend the king against the French

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[64]AP, xlviii, 1, 15, 134; Bodin, *Les Suisses au Service de la France*, 270, 272 - 273.
[65]Chew, *A Bostonian Merchant Witnesses the Second French Revolution*, 29, 32; Moore, *A Journal during a Residence in France*, i, 63, 66 - 67; AP, xlviii, 2, 14, 16, 17, 24, 25, 40.
[66]See, for example, the rumour heard by James Price (Chew, *A Bostonian Merchant Witnesses the Second French Revolution*, 27).
[67]AP, xlviii, 103 - 104, 121.

people as to ensure the defence of the nation. Clearly the loyalty of the Swiss regiments to the king and their cantons now weighed more heavily against them. As well-trained and seasoned as they may have been, they were now too much of a danger to remain in France. This fear made the arguments for a citizen army more compelling. 'L'armée d'un peuple libre,' declared Brissot, 'c'est lui-même.'[68]

Brissot none the less told the Assembly that he and Servan, the minister of war, were worried about the possible collapse of the alliance with Switzerland.[69] On 17 October, Servan wrote to general Biron, commanding the army of the Rhine, warning him to be very sensitive to the manner in which the Swiss regiments were allowed to return home, so that it could not be cited as a cause for hostility by the cantons.[70] Biron and other generals none the less had their hands tied by the decree of 20 August, which had insisted that Swiss returning home could only do so without arms and in detachments of no more than twenty men. In September Palavicini, lieutenant-colonel of the Vigier regiment, protested to Biron against this condition, likening it to the treatment given to criminals. The Swiss diet defiantly ordered their regiments to ignore the law and to return in a style compatible with 'l'honneur Militaire', with their arms and their colours. Lebrun replied on 14 September, insisting that the blame for the slaughter on 10 August lay with the Swiss officers and so the privileges of the Swiss regiments could no longer apply.[71]

The fall of the monarchy and the disbandment of their units certainly led some Swiss troops to rebel. A hundred Swiss Guards who had been sent to Dieppe days before 10 August eventually enrolled in the rebel army in the Vendée under a non-commissioned officer named Keller.[72] Officers of the Châteauvieux regiment flirted with the attentions of the comte d'Artois, who was attempting to seduce them into joining the *émigré* army. On 25 August the regiment crossed the frontier into the duchy of Zweibrücken, but on 3 September the Bâle government angrily ordered its subjects to return home without delay.[73]

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[68]AP, xlviii, 417 - 418.
[69]AP, xlviii, 418, 419.
[70]Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre (hereafter SHAT), $X^{g}30$ (letter of Servan to Biron, 17 October 1792).
[71]AN, F/7/4401 (Letter of Biron to Servan, 11 September 1792; Letter of Lebrun to the National Assembly, 14 September 1792).
[72]Bodin, *Les Suisses au Service de la France*, 270 - 271.
[73]AN, F/7/4401 (Copy of the order of Artois to the Châteauvieux regiment, 29 July 1792; letter of Artois to the Châteauvieux regiment, 27 August 1792; letter of the État de Bâle to the *compagnies Baloises* of the Châteauvieux regiment, 3 September 1792; letter of Lebrun to the president of the Commission of Twenty-One, 13 September 1792).

Now that the capitulations were broken and the diplomatic furore was unleashed, the revolutionaries had more freedom for manoeuvre over the way they treated the Swiss troops, short of doing anything which might provoke the outright hostility of the cantons. In his letter to the Swiss diet, Lebrun could now explicitly place the sovereign rights and interests of the French nation over the privileges of the Swiss regiments. To the complaint that the imprisonment of the (now massacred) Swiss Guards was a breach of their special judicial rights, he replied curtly that 'on ne contestera jamais à une nation le droit d'arrestation et de jugement sur des étrangers prévenus de conspiration contr'elle.' The diplomatic dispute did not amount to much beyond the straining of relations between France and the cantons. Servan, while not entirely optimistic about the outcome, believed that the Swiss diet was as worried about incurring French wrath as the revolutionaries were about the military and diplomatic consequences of the loss of the Swiss regiments. Such optimism proved well-founded, because in November Barthélemy wrote of the failure of Spanish efforts to recruit a Swiss regiment.[74]

The details of the disbandment continued to dog the French authorities in the autumn and the presence of hundreds of disgruntled Swiss troops in towns across France was naturally a cause of concern.[75] By the end of October all those Swiss troops who had chosen to return to Switzerland had done so and were eligible for French pensions. The loose ends, such as the return of the regiments' papers and funds, were still being tied well into 1793.[76] On the other hand, the revolutionaries were reluctant to lose such good soldiers and were willing to retain their services, provided they could be assured of their loyalty to the new order. Some Swiss provided evidence of that loyalty. As early as 11 August some Swiss Guards were greeted with applause in the Legislative when they offered to fight on the frontiers. That same month in the Seine-Inférieure soldiers and

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[74]AN, F/7/4400 (Letter of Lebrun, 14 September 1792; 'Extrait d'une lettre de Lucerne', 15 November 1792); SHAT, X^g30 (Letter of Servan to Biron, 17 October 1792).
[75]SHAT, X^g30 (Letters of the provisional executive council to the department of the Seine-Inférieure and the municipality of Cuny, 17 September 1792; letter of Servan to Biron, 17 October 1792; letter of Servan to lieutenant-colonel of the Sonnenberg regiment, 12 October 1792); AN, F/7/4401 (Letter of Biron to Servan, 11 September 1792; 'Notte presentée a messieurs les Commissaires de l'Assemblée nationalle par le Regiment Suisse de Sonnenberg, et conformes au Decret qui en ordonne le Licentiement', 2 September 1792).
[76]SHAT, X^g30 (dossier for 1793); Bodin, *Les Suisses au Service de la France*, 271.

non-commissioned officers of the Salis-Samade regiment deserted rather than return to Switzerland because they had 'l'intention de Continuer leurs Services en France'.[77]

The decree of 20 August accordingly offered a bounty of 150 - 300 *livres* to any Swiss soldier who joined a regular French unit. Naturally, the soldiers were required to take the new civic oath of 10 August. Even before the precise regulations for incorporation were lain down, however, Dumouriez formed *compagnies franches* out of the Swiss Diesbach regiment.[78] On 12 September, the Swiss were allowed to join any of the fourteen light infantry battalions under the same conditions as their French counterparts.[79] Sixty-seven Swiss enlisted with a French regiment in Strasbourg, just a fraction of the 3,000 to 4,000 Swiss soldiers who joined the French army between 20 August and the beginning of October.[80] By November, Barthélemy was already proposing the recruitment of 'compagnies franches' in Switzerland from officers and men who were dedicated to the principles of the French Revolution, but no Swiss units were to be raised for French service until November 1798.[81]

The Swiss regiments were not the only foreign units to suffer from the crisis of the summer and early autumn of 1792. With the fall of the monarchy, the 6th (Lauzun) Hussars suffered the loss of seventy hussars who followed some of their officers into emigration. The entire 92nd (Walsh) Infantry was arrested by a battalion of *gendarmes* after the capitulation of Verdun in September and were held until their patriotic credentials were verified. On 9 September, the 101st (Royal-Liégeois) regiment was disbanded after general Montesquiou complained of its 'mauvais esprit' and 'conduit incivique'. The dismissal of the Royal-Liégeois brought to twelve the number of foreign regiments disbanded in 1792, a strength of 12,000 men in all.[82]

With the additional loss through emigration, the year was not a good one in terms of the retention of foreign military muscle. The revolutionaries, however, offset such losses by allowing those who remained to join French units and, above all, by recruitment of French soldiers, either into the ranks of the line army or by enrolling volunteers in separate

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[77]AP, xlviii, 25; SHAT, $X^{g}30$ (Letter of the provisional executive council to the directory of the Seine-Inférieure, 10 September 1792).
[78]AP, xlviii, 419; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 69.
[79]AP, xlviii, 677 - 678.
[80]SHAT, $X^{g}30$ (Letter of Servan to colonel Baur, 25 October 1792); Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 166 - 167.
[81]AN, F/7/4400 ('Note relative à la levée de $N^{elles.}$ Compagnies par le service d'Espagne', 7 November 1792); Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 36.
[82]AP, xlix, 492 - 493; Scott, 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 21; Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 114 - 116, 148.

battalions. Although they would have preferred not to let them go, by August 1792 the revolutionaries could afford to dismiss foreign regiments because what they lost in quality and experience could be made up for in numbers. The recruitment of large numbers of French citizens together with the dismissal and emigration of foreign troops diluted the importance of the latter. In the surviving foreign regiments such as the Irish, death, desertion and emigration of foreign troops further reduced their number, as they were replaced by French recruits. By February 1793 only 4% of the manpower in the line army was foreign, a substantial reduction from the 15% in 1789.[83]

The dilution of the foreign element in the regular army was enhanced by the creation of legions for foreign 'patriots' and deserters who sought to fight for the Revolution. The idea of foreign legions predated the outbreak of war. As early as December 1791 Liégeois, Belgian and Dutch patriots made separate requests to the Legislative Assembly to form legions. The issue was adjourned, but the Liégeois and the Belgians began to organise their units anyway, with the unofficial compliance of the Brissotin ministry appointed in March 1792. Dumouriez, as foreign minister, released secret funds to arm and equip both a Liégeois legion, which was ready a mere eight days after the declaration of war, and a Belgian *corps francs*. Both legions, numbering 1,150 men in all, were formally recognised with the decrees of 20 July providing equipment and 28 July granting half a million *livres* for their expenses.[84] A Dutch legion was also decreed on 26 July. Dumouriez had already released 700,000 *livres* from his ministerial funds to a 'comité hollandais' charged with its organisation. The decree now provided additional funds from the treasury to pay for its first year of recruitment, equipment and upkeep.[85] The first Dutch legion was joined by a second seven months later, while Dumouriez was engaged in his doomed invasion of the Netherlands. This second *légion batave*, officially known as the *corps de chasseurs-tirailleurs nationaux bataves*, was established on 5 March 1793, under the command of the Dutch Patriot Makketros.[86]

What the three first legions had in common was, firstly, that they were initially recruited from those groups of political refugees who had substantial reserves of men with

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[83]Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution*, 185; Scott, 'The French Revolution and the Irish Regiments in France', 23.
[84]Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 10; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 64; Delange-Janson, L., *Ambroise. Chronique d'un Liégeois de France* (Brussels: La Renaissance de Livre, 1959), 27.
[85]AP, xlvii, 147 - 152; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 64 - 65.
[86]Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 20.

military experience and who had tasted the bitterness of defeat. These groups would naturally be the first to respond to the crusading rhetoric aired by bellicose revolutionaries. Secondly, they were all initially funded by money released by Dumouriez when he was minister of foreign affairs, which raised doubts among some revolutionaries. When Dumouriez's formation of a Batavian legion was made public on 8 July, Brissot expressed astonishment that the general should have raised troops without consulting the National Assembly. Marat explained that Dumouriez wished to become the duke of Brabant.[87] About a month later the government's agent to Belgium, Rutteau, proposed that the funds forwarded to the legions be investigated.[88]

Despite these suspicions, the notion of foreign legions spread. The *Club des Patriotes étrangers*, organised in the first days of 1792 from both Swiss and Savoyards in Paris, sought to recruit their compatriots as well as Piedmontese for a *Légion des Allobroges*. It was decreed and provided with funds on 1 August.[89] There were plenty of Savoyard migrant workers in Paris and Swiss soldiers who, after 10 August, found themselves despised and without a regiment. Ironically enough, the legion fought alongside the *fédérés* on 10 August, yet some surviving Swiss soldiers did join the unit, which left for Grenoble on 22 August.[90] In July 1792 Anacharsis Cloots and the Saxon doctor, Freymuth Saiffert, mooted the idea of the *légion prussienne* for German and Austrian patriots and deserters. They organised a steering committee which included themselves; Dambach, a Prussian colonel who had fought under Frederick the Great; an Austrian, Schwartz, and two others.[91] On 12 August, Cloots petitioned the Assembly for a German legion, which was finally decreed on 4 September.[92]

Unlike the other legions, the *Légion germanique* did not have the same pool of refugees or immigrants from which to draw recruits, which meant that it reluctantly made up its numbers with Frenchmen. By 17 December 1792 it had 1071 men under arms, many of whom appeared to have been French. Nonetheless, it certainly enrolled career

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[87]AP, xlvi, 246; Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 151.
[88]*Le défenseur de la constitution* (Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, iv, 339).
[89]Doppet, F.-A., *Mémoires Politiques et Militaires du Général Doppet* (Carouge: an V-1797), 48 - 50; AP, xlvii, 376 - 377.
[90]Doppet, *Mémoires*, 50 - 52.
[91]SHAT, X^k3 ('Capitulation pour la Legion Germanique'; 'Note rélativement aux Promotions ou changemens a faire dans le Corps des officiers de la Legion Germanique', n.d.); Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 67.
[92]AP, xlviii, 72; xlix, 349 - 350.

soldiers who had served in the former 'German' regiments of the old regime, or in the armies of the Empire.[93]

The idea of legions of foreign patriots did have some appeal among the French revolutionaries in 1792. The declaration of war on 20 April included an invitation to foreign sympathisers to range themselves under French banners. On 27 August, Lasource supported Cloots' request for a German Legion, drawing parallels with the granting of honorary French citizenship the previous day. Just as foreign philosophers fought tyranny with reason, so foreign soldiers fought it with bayonets.[94] There were equally practical reasons behind the appeal for foreign patriots to join the struggle. On 8 July the war minister Lajard stressed 'la nécessité instante d'augmenter nos forces' and the avantages 'de faire une nouvelle levée aux dépens d'une puissance étrangère'. These arguments were identical to those used by Ancien Régime generals for raising foreign troops. This time, however, there would be no question of their loyalty because they had fled persecution in their own countries.[95]

The recruitment of foreign legions raised some diplomatic problems. When Lajard proposed the recognition of the first Batavian legion on 8 July, Brissot poured cold water onto his enthusiasm. The United Provinces were still neutral and, he said in a masterful understatement, it would be 'very impolitic' for the French to recognise the Dutch legion.[96] None the less, the proposal was voted in its entirety by the National Assembly when it was re-presented on 26 July. With the *patrie* being declared *en danger* only four days previously, the deputies were in no mood to consider the diplomatic ramifications of raising a Dutch legion if it could help plug the widening holes in the French army. The only concession to diplomatic sensibilities was in the change of name from *légion des bataves* to the *légion franche étrangère*. The *conseil d'administration* of the legion, however, left no doubt as to who was intended to fill its ranks: its leaders were the Dutch Patriots Abbema, de Witt, de Boetzelaer, Huber, de Kock and van Hoey.[97]

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[93]SHAT, $X^{k}3$ ('Légion Germanique: Etat de Situation au 17 $X.^{bre}$ 1792; Christian Velauer's 'demande d'officier dans la Legion Germanique'; reference of the mayor and municipality of Nancy, 29 January 1793; reference of the Gendarmerie Nationale; 'Legion Germanique: Etat de mutation et de remplacement des Officiers pour l'expédition des Brevets', 7 March 1793; 'Note rélativement aux Promotions ou changemens a faire dans le Corps des officiers de la Legion Germanique', n.d.).
[94]AP, xlix, 41.
[95]AP, xlvi, 246.
[96]AP, xlvi, 246.
[97]AP, xlvii, 146 - 152.

Beyond diplomatic difficulties, there was still much hostility to the recruitment of foreigners in the French army. Foreign legions, no matter how ideologically motivated, were still too reminiscent of Ancien Régime foreign regiments. If diplomatic and military necessity had originally persuaded the revolutionaries to retain their services, it seemed foolish to make the eventual task of 'nationalising' the army still more difficult by recruiting yet more foreign units. On 21 April, Carnot opposed the recruitment of foreigners on these very grounds.[98] There was also a suspicion that foreigners would not be the most dedicated of recruits to the cause of the Revolution. When on 29 May Coustard proposed the adoption of four foreign officers who would raise a corps of British soldiers, Servan cautiously suggested to the Assembly that these officers be permitted to recruit only French citizens.[99] On 29 January 1793 Bréard bitterly observed that 'des émigrés sont venus s'y engager; vous les avez payés, habillés, equipés, et ils ont ensuite déserté."[100] Attempts to forestall these problems had been made. Recruits to the German Legion were screened for ideological suitability. All officers had to be 'munis de bons repondans' and were subject to approval by the minister of war, who could also propose people 'qu'il croiroit digne de la confiance Nationale."[101]

No doubt there was an element of national pride in the caution of Carnot, Servan and Bréard. They were breathing life into the questions raised in the *cahiers de doléances* and the Constituent: could those who were not French citizens seriously be asked to defend a nation which was not theirs? Should non-citizens defend the *patrie* when they did not have the same stake as citizens in the national community?

For the time being, the foreign legions were accepted as useful tools in the war of propaganda and as welcome additions to the hard-pressed French forces. While foreign, they were also the antithesis of the Ancien Régime's foreign regiments, being in theory supporters of the Revolution. The problem was that the aspirations of those who formed the foreign legions led them to associate with particular political groups. In the shifting sands of revolutionary politics, such ties could be perilous. The Batavian, Belgian and Liégeois legions were closely associated with Dumouriez because his personal ambitions made him their most sympathetic protector and the one man the most likely to support their national claims.[102] Having been established with the considerable assistance of the

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[98]AP, xlii, 256.
[99]AP, xliv, 47.
[100]AP, lviii, 10 - 11.
[101]SHAT, X^k3 ('Capitulation pour la Legion Germanique').
[102]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 153 - 154.

general, however, Dumouriez's desertion early in April 1793 tainted the legions with suspicion. Furthermore, all legions relied on the continuing faith of French politicians in the revolutionary potential of France's European neighbours. Once both Dumouriez and the 'war of propaganda' were discredited, so too the whole purpose and even the good faith of the legions were called into question. The Belgian and Liégeois legions disappeared as independent units precisely because of the apparent success of the 'crusade for universal liberty'. On 26 January 1793, they were subsumed into the French army in anticipation of the absorption of Belgium by the French Republic.[103] The others, however, were disbanded under a cloud of suspicion during the Terror.

A further difficulty which the legions faced was that, although meant to be destined for specific nationalities, they often found that to make up numbers they had to draw on others, including Frenchmen. Such a mix of nationalities could cause problems. A French government agent claimed at the end of July 1792 that the 'aristocratic' members of the Belgian committee in Lille imposed 'un despotisme affreux' on the Belgian legion barracked at Los, 'notamment contre les français qui s'y sont enrôlés'.[104] The German Legion included Dutch and Frenchmen, among whom was Augereau who later became a *maréchal de France*.[105] On 10 December 1792, Dambach angrily wrote to Pache, saying that among the cavalry officers 'presque tous sont françois, tandis que la capitulation dit expressément que les officiers seront étrangers ou de père étranger'.[106]

The recruitment of French officers and soldiers into the *légion germanique* may have been the cause of internal divisions. In the spring of 1793 Saiffert claimed that French officers sought to seize control of the legion by encouraging insubordination in the ranks. He accused Marat of encouraging two French officers to denounce their comrades - French and German alike - as aristocrats.[107] The two French officers in question told a different story, complaining of financial corruption in the *Conseil d'administration*.[108] They were not alone in bearing grievances, as the rejoinder to this accusation secured only thirty-one signatures, mainly of German officers, which was far from the majority of the

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[103]Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 13.
[104]*Le défenseur de la constitution* (Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, iv, 339).
[105]Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 21.
[106]SHAT, X^k3 (letter of Dambach to Pache, 10 December 1792).
[107]SHAT, X^k3 ('Faits justificatifs pour la légion germanique'). G. P. Gooch makes a similar suggestion (*Germany and the French Revolution*, 334).
[108]SHAT, X^k3 ('Pétition faite à la barre de la Convention Nationale par des Officiers de la Légion Germanique', 2 April 1793).

officer corps.[109] The dispute continued into the spring and summer of 1793, when the legion was disbanded. It appears, therefore, that this schism played an important part in the early demise of the *légion germanique*.

The same cosmopolitan rhetoric applied to the adoption of foreign soldiers was also used when the revolutionaries discussed the treatment of foreign deserters and prisoners of war. On 4 May 1792, the National Assembly's decree on prisoners of war stressed the human rights of those captured and the 'principes de la justice et de l'humanité'. Prisoners would live in district *chefs-lieux* and fortresses at least twenty miles from the frontier. There, they would receive the same pay as their French counterparts in the army. They would be entitled to take an *engagement d'honneur* before the municipal officers whereby they undertook not leave the town, 'et dans ce cas ils auront la ville pour prison' and would only be submitted to roll-calls three times a day. Such prisoners 'jouiront ... du droit commun des Français', which meant that they could engage in any profession and were subject to the same laws as French citizens, including, as the decree said pointedly, those applied against revolt.[110]

Such relatively liberal terms had causes other than cosmopolitan ideals. First of all, they were intended to undermine the discipline and strength of enemy forces. Secondly, they were meant to show that the French fought for humane principles. The Brunswick manifesto provided the revolutionaries with a coup in this respect. When the duke's declaration had been read to the Assembly on 1 August, the principles behind the law voted on 4 May were reasserted by the deputies, but with one exception. The new decree added that while enemy soldiers from the ranks would always be well-treated, 'dans les cas où les lois ordinaires de la guerre seraient violées par les puissances ennemies', their nobles and officers would be treated in the same manner as the enemy treated French prisoners.[111] The decree served as a warning to their officers not to carry out the threats in Brunswick's declaration, but it was also meant to reassure the men who made up the phalanxes of the Austrian and Prussian armies that it would still be safe to surrender.

To stress this last point, and to encourage desertion, the Legislative put into practice an idea which had been mooted immediately after the outbreak of war.[112] On 2 August, enemy soldiers and NCOs - and not commissioned officers - who defected to the French

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[109]SHAT, X^k3 ('Légion Germanique', petition dated Philippeville, 27 March 1793).
[110]AP, xlii, 743 - 744; xlvii, 412 - 414.
[111]AP, xlvii, 359 - 360.
[112]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 63.

would receive a tricolour cockade as a symbol of adoption. Once they had declared their intention 'de vouloir embrasser la cause de la liberté', they would immediately receive a bounty of fifty *livres*, followed by a life pension worth a hundred *livres* a year.[113] The decree was translated into German and Latin to seduce the Prussians, Austrians and Hungarians and was posted on walls and trees along the Rhine and on roads near the frontier.[114] The cosmopolitan rhetoric and intentions were not always applied in the field. The officers of the Mauconseil battalion of Parisian volunteers reported that on 15 September 1792, some of their men at Château-Thierry 'ont voulu égorger cinq prisonniers'.[115] On 5 October, men of that very same battalion were implicated in the massacre of four deserters from the Imperial army, who enlisted in the 10th Dragoon Regiment at Rethel.[116]

Moreover just before Valmy the revolutionaries had already seemed to admit defeat by resorting to the traditional practice of exchanges of prisoners of war.[117] The unfavourable tide of war, where more French troops were surrendering to the invaders than vice versa, and the failure to persuade hordes of Austrians and Prussians to give themselves up willingly probably stood behind this change of direction. Besides, the cost of the upkeep of prisoners was high, an expense which could be eliminated with their exchange for French prisoners. Finally, the decision to enact such exchanges also shows that, despite the revolutionaries' claims of a war based on new principles, the old practices persisted. That the revolutionaries could still believe that the enemy forces would keep to their word and not reincorporate their returned prisoners into combat units suggests that eighteenth-century rules of warfare were yet to mutate beyond recognition. Distrust between revolutionary France and the European monarchies was perhaps not as wide as the rhetoric might suggest.

The first exchanges also resurrected another Ancien Régime concept, the *droit de représailles*. On 5 January 1793, the Convention heard complaints of bad treatment from returned French prisoners. Bréard argued that there should be reprisals, but limited to enemy officers. Even now, however, the Convention was reluctant to condone the

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[113]AP, xlvii, 395 - 396.
[114]AP, xlix, 336; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 63 - 64.
[115]AN, F/7/4445 - 4550[1] (Copy of the *procès-verbal* and declaration of the officers of the Mauconseil battalion, 12 October 1792).
[116]AN, F/7/4445 - 4550[1] ('Copie de l'Extrait du Registre des Délibérations du Conseil permanent de la Municipalité de Rethel du 5. 8[bre] 1792'; 'Copie de la Lettre du Général Chazot au Général Dumouriez', Sedan, 7 October 1792).
[117]AP, l, 139 - 140.

practice. Instead, the issue was exploited for propaganda purposes. The complaint of the soldiers was printed and Pache seized the opportunity to show that the French retained the moral high ground. He told the Convention that he would write to the generals asking them to remind the enemy 'que leur propre intérêt exige qu'ils aient pour nos prisonniers l'humanité dont nous leur donnons l'exemple."[118]

The approach and outbreak of war put the French army under pressure to increase its strength and to stop the haemorrhaging of its best troops through emigration. Despite any desire to the contrary, the revolutionaries found that these new considerations demanded that they retain the foreign regiments. On the other hand, the maintenance of these units became increasingly hard to justify as they failed to meet the tests of loyalty posed by the outbreak of war and the fall of the monarchy. Exactly four months into the conflict, the revolutionaries dismissed by far the largest foreign contribution to the French army, the Swiss regiments. Fear of the counter-revolutionary potential of the Swiss now outweighed reluctance to upset diplomatic relations with the cantons. The demise of the foreign regiments came not from any impulse to nationalise the army, as potent as it may have been, but rather because at last the revolutionaries decided that whatever the advantages of foreign troops, they were now outweighed by the threat which they posed to the internal safety of the Revolution.

None the less, if the Revolution could not tolerate foreigners who were clearly hostile to the cause, such was the need for troops that the revolutionaries overcame their misgivings about creating new foreign units and permitted the establishment of legions. This decision sat uneasily with the protests, heard since 1789, that the French nation should only be defended by French citizens. The adoption of foreign patriots to fight for the Revolution could be justified, however, in cosmopolitan terms: the recruits were men dedicated to the cause of liberty. They underscored that the French cause was just and universal. Moreover, they had practical use as the spearhead when revolutionary forces began to liberate France's neighbours. The problem with such a justification was that when the crusade for universal liberty and the people who stood to gain from it were discredited, so the use and even the desirability of foreign legions were open to question. The legions of foreign patriots were therefore as vulnerable to shifts in revolutionary politics as the older foreign regiments.

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[118]AP, lvi, 223 - 224.

In other respects, the revolutionaries' adoption of foreign troops had similarities with the practices of the Ancien Régime. Ideological differences aside, the revolutionaries saw similar advantages in recruiting foreign legions as generals under the absolute monarchy saw in raising foreign regiments. They increased French strength at the expense of foreign powers. Much the same reasoning underpinned the revolutionaries' attempts to encourage surrender and desertion. The continuity in practices from the absolute monarchy were disguised by the cosmopolitan pretences of the Revolution.

III

Anticlericalism increasingly found support in official circles after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. With the outbreak of war animosity against those clerics whose commitment to the Revolution was already suspect became more acute. The privileged position of the English, Scottish and Irish clergy made that hostility still sharper. The fear among the foreign clergy may have been acute, and justifiably so, but until official measures were actually taken against their institutions, or against British subjects, the question of legal survival still remained uncertain, but not hopeless. In this period, therefore, the most pressing problem remained that of finance.

The upturn in anticlericalism made life unpleasant for the foreign clergy, although it is hard to tell from the evidence whether the antagonism was due more to their profession or to their nationality. By March 1792 John Naylor, confessor to the English Benedictine nuns in Paris, had complained of harrassment by the inhabitants of the Faubourg Saint-Marcel.[119] The situation only got worse when the main obstacle to legislation against refractory clergy, the king, was overthrown in August. With the decree against non-jurors and the arrests of priests by Parisian militants, the foreign clergy felt very vulnerable. Their structures and activities had remained almost immune from the reforms of the Constituent, but that sharpened their appearance as privileged survivals from the Ancien Régime. MacSheehy, an Irish student at the college in Paris, stated that after 10 August 'tous les eleves ont eté obligés de sortir furtivement de leurs maisons parce que l'indignation publique l'avait designé a la Vengeance du peuple.'[120] In the climate of fear which enveloped Paris towards September, Mary Ursula Stafford, an English

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[119]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Marsh to Naylor, 4 March 1792).
[120]AN, BB/3/70 ('Dénonciaton contre Maÿer, Walch et Kearney pretres Irlandais a la tete du College de ce nom comme des hommes suspects et contrerevolutionnaires').

Conceptionist nun in Paris, wrote to Naylor that 'our Nuns, at least some of them, are affraid they will soon be killed'.[121] The September massacres ensured that fear would linger. On 3 October, she proposed to visit Naylor, saying that she could 'put on a coulourd Peticoat, & a Capote over our Habit' when walking through the streets. She soon considered fleeing France for good.[122]

Until the overthrow of the monarchy the relevant ecclesiastical authorities were unsympathetic to plans for flight. In a meeting in February 1792, the Scottish bishops Geddes and Hay and some leading French clergymen reviewed Alexander Gordon's suggestion that the Scots College in Paris sell all its property and effects and move to another country. Far from accepting the need to flee, the meeting admonished the bishops to send as many students to the college as its finances allowed.[123] In the spring, Mary Kirby, an English Benedictine in Paris, applied to a sister convent in Ypres for a refuge 'in these dismal times of persecution', but from the safety of the Low Countries the abbess rejected her request, saying that such a refuge 'can only be sought for in the last extremity'.[124]

It was only after August, with the first harsh measures against the refractory clergy that the situation became pressing. For the many foreigners among the secular clergy, the decree against refractory priests on 26 August 1792 signalled the end of their ecclesiastical career in France, as it did for their French counterparts. Foreigners naturally responded to the measures in the same way as their French colleagues. At Dieulouard, Richard Marsh pragmatically decided of the new oath that 'in my opinion it has nothing at all against Religion'.[125] In Bordeaux, Irish non-jurors fled to Spain, like their French colleagues, their integration into the fabric of church and society probably dictating their decision, although a minority did embark for Ireland. Some refractories took their chances: Martin Glynn, of the cathedral chapter of Saint-André, remained in Bordeaux, eventually being executed for his non-compliance with the law. For the time being, those who did take the oath developed their careers: by 1793 George Jennings was the constutional curate at Saint-Seurin; Baptiste O'Hennessy became the constitutional priest of Saint-Germain du Puch and Myler Prendergast received the prestigious parish of Saint-

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[121]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Mary Ursula Stafford to Naylor, 30 August 1792).
[122]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Mary Ursula Stafford to Naylor, 3 October 1792).
[123]SCA, CA1/24 ('Résultat d'une Conférence qui a eu lieu à Paris le 22 fevrier 1792').
[124]AN, S//4619 (Copy of the letter of Mary Bernard Lynch to Mary Elizabeth Kirby, 3 May 1792).
[125]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Marsh to Naylor, 17 December 1792).

Dominique in Bordeaux.[126] In the autumn of 1793, these constitutional priests would suffer, less for their profession, than for the fact that they were subjects of the king of Great Britain and Ireland.

The approach of war with Britain intensified fears of persecution. Daniel O'Connell and his brother, attending the English College at Douai, were called home by their uncle in late January 1793 after Daniel had written that reprisals would be 'almost inevitable' should war break out between the two countries.[127] With the actual outbreak of war, official persecution became more likely and flight naturally became a more attractive option. Naylor wrote to his agent in Britain, asking him to find a suitable position for him.[128] Until any measures were actually taken specifically against British subjects, however, the foreign orders were allowed to subsist in a manner which French orders had been denied since 1790. They were only subject to the whole panoply of laws regarding the clergy if they wished to minister to French citizens. This at least is what the municipality of Bordeaux advised Dr. Everard, the vice-rector of the Irish seminary, on 12 February 1792.[129]

The greatest threat to the continued existence of foreign clergy in France was not legal, but financial. Admittedly, the Revolution contributed greatly to the difficulties of the foreign clergy: the uncertainty of the future discouraged people from giving money and from attending the religious houses. On 22 February 1792, Gordon complained that there were merely two students at the Scots College in Paris, which severely affected its revenue.[130] Eleven days later, Richard Marsh fretted that it was almost impossible to get people to forward funds for *rentes viagères* because 'they seem afraid of the consequences of the Revolution'. Many of the houses had already been in difficulties before 1789, but religious policies since the Constituent Assembly had aggravated them further. Marsh complained of the *imposition foncière* on the land held by the English Benedictines at Dieulouard. No tax relief could be granted, because the local commune had a tax quota

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[126]Loupès, P., 'Les Ecclésiastiques Irlandais dans le Diocèse de Bordeaux sous l'Ancien Régime', 95; 'The Irish Clergy of the Diocese of Bordeaux during the Revolution', 32 - 33, 38 n.12.
[127]*Correspondence of Daniel O'Connell* (ed. Fitzpatrick, W. J.) (London, 1888), 7.
[128]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Doughty to Naylor, 29 March 1793).
[129]Preston, C., 'Le Collège Irlandais de Bordeaux', Hayes, R., Preston, C., Weygand, J., *Les Irlandais en Aquitaine* (Bordeaux: Héritiers E.-F. Miailhe, 1971), 24.
[130]SCA, CA1/24 ('Résultat d'une Conférence qui a eu lieu à Paris le 22 fevrier 1792').

to reach. By the time war had broken out between Britain and France, inflation had wiped out any economising made by the clerics.[131]

The response of these houses to the ever-increasing financial pressures soon involved measures which, to Catholic clergymen, were unpalatable. Initially the administrators of the establishments tried to tap existing resources, or tried and trusted methods. Naylor suggested that the monastery at Dieulouard, for example, contract *rentes viagères*, but owing to the uncertainty over the future, no one was willing to risk such an investment. The brewery at the same house suffered from low prices and competition. A few friends of the establishments did give donations as before and some orders, such as the English Benedictines, had funds in Britain which could be transferred to France. With the fall in value of the *assignats* and consequently the favourable exchange rate, this last resort could be a cheap way to pay off some debts for those houses which had the available funds in Britain.[132]

On the whole, however, these existing sources of revenue were not sufficient to keep the foreign establishments afloat. Some administrators even began to think about buying nationalised church lands, a step which they were naturally loath to take. Marsh was aware of their potential value, but was equally aware that 'the purchasers are look'd upon with an evil eye'. By December, however, Marsh was overcoming his scruples, particularly when the opportunity for consolidation of existing holdings arose. He had his eye on a small farm which would consolidate the monastery's current holdings, but the plan brought little fruit because the Benedictines were easily outbid in the sale of the *biens nationaux*. They managed to salvage something from the set back when the successful bidder immediate sold off the farm in smaller parcels, some of which went to the monastery.[133]

When war broke out between Britain and France, the fate of the foreign religious houses was not sealed, as no laws were passed against British subjects until the autumn. Moreover, the revolutionaries themselves were still reluctant to close down institutions which might yet have been of some public use. On 9 February 1793, Fouché presented a report for the *comité d'instruction publique*, suggesting that the law suppressing secular orders should not include those establishments which were involved in education. On 14

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[131]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Marsh to Naylor, 4 March 1792; letter of Marsh to Naylor, 4 April 1792; letter of Marsh to Naylor, 23 March 1793)).
[132]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Marsh to Naylor, 4 March 1792).
[133]AN, S//4619 (Letter of Marsh to Naylor, 4 April 1792; letter of Marsh to Naylor, 17 December 1792; letter of Marsh to Naylor, 23 March 1793).

February, the Convention adopted this proposal without discussion.[134] This decision applied to the foreign insitutions, because the Convention also decreed that all English, Irish and Scots colleges would continue to receive the revenues due to them for the first six months of 1793.[135] The decrees of 8 - 12 March 1793 confirmed the foreign colleges in the possession of their property, with management remaining in the hands of the college administrators.[136] If the Convention was still reluctant to seize foreign property, this did not stop local authorities from confiscating what they could. Daniel O'Connell described how the municipality of Douai swooped on the college and seized the silver.[137]

The situation of the foreign clergy became more exposed and more precarious in the period between the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the two months after the outbreak of war between Britain and France. For many secular priests, the legislation of 26 August 1792 signalled either the end of a career, or continued defiance of the revolutionary authorities. The position of those who were willing to take the clerical oath was, for the time being, secure. In other words, the fate of the foreign secular clergy in this period mirrored exactly that of their French colleagues. It was their status as priests, rather than as foreigners, which mattered. On the other hand, for the foreign regulars it was the very fact that they were foreign which ensured the continued existence of their institutions long after French houses had been closed down. The main condition for the authorities' tolerance was that they restricted their activities to people of their own nationality. As they were protected by the revolutionaries' respect both for the property and for their role as educators, the foreign clerical establishments were in reality threatened more by their financial problems, which admittedly emanated in large part, but not exclusively, from the Revolution. General anticlerical measures not aimed specifically at foreign clergy none the less discouraged recruitment and investment. By the spring of 1793 the Convention had recognised the legitimacy of the property and activities of the foreign establishments, but the outbreak of war with Britain created an atmosphere which made their continued existence increasingly precarious. None the less at the end of March 1793, neither the ecclesiastics nor the revolutionaries had decided to end their uneasy co-existence.

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[134]AP, lviii, 395 - 396, 522 - 523.
[135]AP, lviii, 523.
[136]AN, H/3/2561/A (Letter of the administrators of the *Prytanée français* to the Minister of Finance, 31 August 1799/14 Fructidor VII).
[137]*Correspondence of Daniel O'Connell*, 7 - 8.

IV

Those foreign radicals who had tried to conform to French revolutionary ideology faced new challenges in republicanism and the leftward march of revolutionary politics. Some who were attached to specific French political groupings could find themselves stranded once the revolutionary tide had passed over them. Others were disgusted or disenchanted by the course of the Revolution and consciously abandoned the cause. Some found their hopes rekindled with the outbreak of war, while others found their position made more precarious by the conflict. From the French revolutionaries' point of view, foreign 'patriots' could be of some use in their diplomatic and propaganda efforts during the war, but in some instances proved to be more of a liability than a help.

The period saw new arrivals, or the return, of foreign radicals, some driven out of their own countries for their activities. Three patriots from Lausanne, Karpe de Gers, J. J. Cart and Ferdinand Rosset were proscribed in March 1792 for their role in Bastille Day celebrations the previous year. While Rosset and Cart later moved on to the United States, Karpe was commanding a battalion of volunteers at Bitche by November.[138] Thomas Paine fled Britain for good in mid-September 1792 because his trial for seditious libel had been postponed until December, and because he continued to express his views publicly, leading William Blake to advise him to flee to avoid yet more confrontations with the authorities. There were also good reasons to go to France, as Paine was elected to the Convention and Pinckney, the American minister in London, suggested that he might be of some use to the United States as a French deputy.[139] Mary Wollstonecraft may have decided to leave for France because of the mounting difficulties faced by radicals in Britain towards the end of 1792. Like Paine, Sampson Perry fled prosecution for seditious libel in Britain, arriving in Paris in January 1793.[140] Georg Forster, the librarian of the Elector of Mainz, arrived in Paris in March with Adam Lux and Potocki, not as refugees, but as the delegates from the Rhineland Convention which requested

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[138]AN, F/7/4400 (Letter of *sieur* Cart to directory of the department of the Ain, 14 November 1792; letter of the directory of the department of the Ain to the diplomatic committee of the Convention, 27 November 1792; copy of the minutes of the *Petit* and *Grand Conseils* of Berne, 19 March 1792); Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, ii, 403.

[139]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, i, 350 - 351; Claeys, *Thomas Paine*, 26 - 28.

[140]Tomalin, C., *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), 120; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 97 - 98.

annexation by France. They were stranded when the tide turned once more and the coalition forces drove the French from Germany.[141]

The first major development to affect foreign radicals in this period was the radicalisation of revolutionary politics. Opposition to the monarchy, only temporarily suppressed after Varennes, left the aspirations of some foreign patriots looking distinctly conservative. While Camille Desmouslins had given the Belgian Statists his support in 1789 and 1790, by the spring of 1792 the Statists were considered unworthy of such backing, composed as they were, in the words of Robespierre in May that year, 'du clergé, de la noblesse et de la bourgeoisie aristocratique'. French principles corresponded more, he argued, with those of the rival Vonckist party.[142] With the establishment of the first Girondin ministry in March 1792, the fate of the Statists in France was sealed. More sympathetic to the Vonckists, the government scattered the Statists from their refuge in Douai.[143]

The outbreak of war provided the next challenge. For the Liégeois, the war was an opportunity to achieve their aims of a democratic republic, either through absorption by France or the formation of an independent state under French protection. The Vonckist Belgians began to think in the latter terms and they entered into negotiations with the Liégeois to form a common policy. As they all sought to be treated as equals by the French, however, they realised that they would have to play an active part in their own liberation. For this reason Pierre Lebrun embarked on a political career in Paris and Liégeois and Brabançons alike formed their own legions which would march in the van of the French armies.[144] For those German radicals who accepted the crusading rhetoric of the Brissotins, the war was also an opportunity, the trumpet call for a general uprising. Doctor Saiffert, Eulogius Schneider, Friedrich Cotta and the Prussian lawyer Karl Clauer all launched propaganda tracts, pamphlets, leaflets, songs and poems from Alsace into Germany, with Strasbourg as the most important centre of activity.[145]

A few of the Genevan exiles also saw the war as an opportunity to bring the blessings of the French Revolution to their city, but they were a minority. After the fall of the monarchy Clavière and Grenus were almost alone among the exiles in envisaging the

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[141]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 312.
[142]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, iv, 17.
[143]Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, ii, 75.
[144]Harsin, P., *La Révolution Liégeoise de 1789* (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1954), 150 - 152; Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liégeois à Paris', 218.
[145]Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 260 - 262.

annexation of Geneva to France. This plan put them at odds with the other Genevan exiles, such as Reybaz. In fact, Clavière seems to have 'gone native'. His political career in France offered more possibilities than Geneva ever could and he lost sight of the original goals of the Genevan exiles.[146] Rather more Swiss radicals from the cantons anticipated opportunities in the war ahead. If the *Club helvétique* had collapsed, they found willing allies among the Savoyards. The Savoyard club was founded by Doppet and Desaix, one of the editors of the *Correspondance des Nations*, early in 1792. Originally called the *Club de Propagande des Alpes*, the club's aim was 'de porter la liberté en Savoie', although before long Swiss patriots were admitted and so its name was changed to the *Club des Patriotes étrangers*. The title was also sufficiently vague not to cause too many diplomatic problems for the French authorities. It was however from this society that sprang the *Légion des Allobroges* and propaganda aimed at Savoy. With the downfall of the monarchy and the first victories of the French Republic, times seemed auspicious enough to merit a change to a more explicit name and the club became known as the *Club des Allobroges*.[147]

For their part, the revolutionaries not only hoped that foreign radicals would spread propaganda abroad, but that they would also provide a ringing endorsement of the French Revolution at home. It was for the second reason that on 13 April 1792 the Jacobin club in Paris invited James Watt, son of the steam innovator, and the pharmacist Thomas Cooper to attend all the meetings of the society for as long as they remained in Paris. Despite the onset of the 'crusade for universal liberty', however, the Jacobins were still cautious enough towards neutral powers to resist the alarmist blandishments of John Oswald, who on 4 June claimed that Cooper had been imprisoned on his return to Britain. In a blistering attack on the British government, Oswald demanded an address of support to the Manchester Constitutional Society.[148]

Such caution was cast aside, however, firstly with the overthrow of the monarchy and then with the triumph of the French armies in the autumn of 1792. The first event further radicalised revolutionary politics and challenged the basis of foreign patriots' loyalty to the Revolution. This change in attitude towards foreign radicals is illustrated by the warmer reception given by the Jacobins to another of Oswald's proposals. On 22 August, the Jacobins accepted his idea to send all the radical societies in Britain an address explaining

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[146]Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 415, 418 - 419, 421 - 424.
[147]Doppet, *Mémoires*, 48 - 50, 57; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 35 - 37.
[148]Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins*, iii, 496, 499 - 502, 653 - 655.

'la conspiration du traître Louis XVI, et tous les outrages qui ont provoqué la sainte insurrection du 10 août'.[149]

For some foreign radicals, the transition to a republic was smoothly made. Thomas Paine's republican credentials were already well-established and on 11 October he joined the Convention's constitutional committee, while David Williams presented his observations in January 1793.[150] Mary Wollstonecraft arrived in France in December 1792. That autumn she had told a friend that she approved of the idea of a truly democratic republic and nor was she dissuaded by the September massacres, drawing a line between the 'immutable principles' of the Revolution and the elements in the Paris crowd who were 'too sharp'.[151] The German Oelsner believed that Louis' flight in 1791 made the monarchy irreconcilable to the Revolution. He declared for a republic as the only alternative to anarchy as early as April 1792, even though he withdrew from the Jacobin club a month later out of revulsion for Robespierre. Like Oelsner, Reinhard was repulsed by what he saw as the demagogy of the Jacobins, but since the flight to Varennes had made little secret of his desire to see the throne overturned.[152] Among the Genevan exiles, Clavière was among the few who did not appear to undergo any soul-searching as Louis XVI teetered on the brink of a second revolution in 1792.[153]

The radicals who as a group were the most able to overcome the first challenges of the Republic were the Liégeois, because their aims, ideology and methods were already radical for the time, and those Belgians who joined them in the *Comité des Belges et Liégeois Unis*. As early as January 1792 this organisation was thinking in terms of a united Belgian republic, while Lebrun attacked hereditary monarchy in his *Manifeste des Belges et Liégeois Unis*. The constitution eventually drafted by the committee anticipated the 'Jacobin' Constitution of 1793 by over fifteen months, with provisions for universal manhood suffrage, for the recall of deputies by the people, for progressive taxation and the duty of a people to rebel against oppression.[154]

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[149]Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins*, iv, 230 - 231, 356 - 359.
[150]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, i, 357; Williams, *Incidents in my Own Life*, 27, 119.
[151]Tomalin, *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*, 94, 96, 114, 116 - 117, 119, 124 - 125.
[152]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 328, 338 - 339; Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 258, 259 - 260.
[153]Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 420.
[154]Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liégeois à Paris', 217 - 218.

For other foreign patriots the challenge was how far they could remain transfixed by the liberating example of the French Revolution without tarnishing themselves with republicanism and popular violence. In November 1792 the Lausanne patriot Cart revealed the painful discrepancy between the aims of his colleagues and the ideology of the French Republic. While Cart and his friends wanted to restore the Estates as a legal barrier to the aristocracy of Lausanne, the French would not even countenance the existence of such a traditional institution.[155]

Failure to adapt to the new political orthodoxy in France forced foreign patriots out of revolutionary politics. Duroveray, for example, had been reintegrated in the Genevan Council of Two Hundred in November 1790, from where he vehemently opposed Jacques Grenus' *égalisateurs*. While Talleyrand secured his services in the French diplomatic mission to London in March 1792 Duroveray was recalled on 12 October because of 'des observations et des dénonciations très pressantes', some of which had been made by his compatriot, Clavière. Dumont also fell out of step with the Revolution because of the overthrow of the monarchy and the September massacres, despite his friendship with leading republicans such as Brissot. After a brief return to Geneva, he settled in Britain in March 1793.[156]

Archenholz of the Paris *Minerva* was a supporter of Lafayette, became affiliated to the Feuillants and made no secret of his dislike of the Jacobins. After the overthrow of the monarchy, he was persecuted by Anacharsis Cloots, who denounced him as an agent of counter-revolution, and he fled the country for Hamburg.[157] Dutch exiles with Feuillant or Fayettist sympathies such as Daverhoult and Marie-Antoine Cérisier likewise found their revolutionary careers abruptly cut short.[158] Daverhoult fought with the palace guard on 10 August and committed suicide when he was arrested as he tried to follow Lafayette into exile.[159] A German supporter of the constitutional monarchy, Georg Kerner flew to the Tuileries on 10 August in order to defend the king. Escaping unscathed, he became further disenchanted by the September massacres and the execution of Louis. On the other hand, he separated the ideals of 1789 from the people and the events who, in his

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[155]AN, F/7/4400 (Letter of *sieur* Cart to directory of the department of the Ain, 14 November 1792).
[156]Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 380 - 382, 385, 391 - 392, 398 - 399, 406 - 408, 411 - 412, 427, 429 - 431.
[157]Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 259.
[158]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 44.
[159]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 151; Rosendaal, 'Qui était l'être suprême pour les réfugiés bataves?', 201.

eyes, twisted and abused them. For that reason, he could not renounce the French Revolution altogether, chosing to remain loyal to a Revolution which had good principles, even if the power to implement them was in the hands of those he detested.[160]

Those radicals who survived the shock from the tumbling edifice of the monarchy and the September massacres were rapidly confronted with new choices with the apparently complete victories of the revolutionary armies. Not all patriots from Brabant and Liège sought 'réunion' with the French Republic, but the French feared that an independent Belgium would be too vulnerable to counterattack from Austria. The patriots therefore faced the uncomfortable choice between bowing to the strategic interests of the French and turning their backs on the French Revolution. While Liégeois patriots persuaded their fellow-citizens to vote for 'réunion' with France, the Brabançons were less keen. The Vonckist Walckiers, for example, envisaged an independent federal republic of Belgium and Liège.[161] Those who sought independence had to concede to the superior strength of the French and go along with the votes for annexation. The representatives from the Rhine Convention in Mainz, Forster, Lux and Potocki, had fewer doubts. Although Forster knew that the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen resented the French invaders, he and his colleagues rejected the goal of independence on the grounds that a small state could not defend itself. At the end of March 1793, Forster presented the Convention with the request for annexation.[162]

Although their country was still at peace with France, British and Irish radicals established in Paris were affected by the French victories and the two 'Propagandist Decrees'. On 24 November fifty-two of these radicals signed an address which was presented to the Convention four days later. It encouraged the French in their feats of arms and, in the wake of the Edict of Fraternity, its ambiguous language could be read as an invitation to the French to provide 'fraternity and help' to their neighbours across the Channel.[163] There can be little doubt that some of the signatories were willing to call for measures which their counterparts actually in Britain or Ireland dared not, or would not, countenance for the time being. John and Henry Sheares, who were later closely associated with the United Irishmen, were members of the Paris Jacobins. Both had joined the National Guard. Edward Fitzgerald, also in Paris, discussed with Paine the

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[160]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 340 - 342.
[161]Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liégeois à Paris', 217 - 219.
[162]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 312.
[163]Address reproduced in Alger, J. G., 'The British Colony in Paris, 1792 - 1793', *English Historical Review* xiii (1898), 673 - 674.

possibility of French support for a revolution in Ireland even before the United Irishmen accepted violent means. Paine passed on Fitzgerald's views to Lebrun.[164] Thomas Christie, the radical Scottish Unitarian minister, had moved to Paris in the early autumn of 1792. Although not a signatory of the address, he hoped that widespread local protests in Britain would coincide with the peaceful establishment of a Convention by the radical organisations.[165] The impact of these radicals in exile on French revolutionary policy was out of all proportion to their scanty numbers. Along with other addresses from societies in Britain, the French were given the impression that the British people were quivering on the edge of insurrection.[166] Such an interpretation erroneously strengthened the case for a declaration of war on Britain.[167]

The final test of loyalty to the Revolution in this period was the execution of Louis XVI, particularly for the British radicals in Paris, for whom the problem was compounded by the outbreak of war between France and Britain. This problem was of less concern to the Dutch, who had already rebelled against the Stadholder. Not all British patriots in France were as radical as Fitzgerald, Sheares or Oswald. Captain George Monro, an unofficial British agent in Paris, reported to the Foreign Office on 27 December that many of the exiles had become 'friends of royalty', which probably meant they were opposed to the execution of Louis XVI. Paine, Helen Maria Williams and the Scottish radical Thomas Muir all exerted themselves in trying to save Louis's life. Under pressure of the pace of events, the society began to split up. On 11 January 1793 Paine and John Frost came to blows over the question of sending a second address to the Convention. Paine was in favour, Frost passionately against.[168] For the majority of the society members, the watershed was the outbreak of war on 1 February. A large number of British radicals were not willing to appear as traitors, particularly when, for all their support of the French Revolution, their main concern was the cause of reform in Britain, not France. Among those who suffered from such divided loyalties was John Hurford Stone, president of the

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[164]Elliott, M., *Partners in Revolution. The United Irishmen and France* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 54, 60 - 61, 63, 73 - 74.
[165]Tomalin, *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*, 118, 126; Alger, 'The British Colony in Paris, 1792 - 1793', 674.
[166]Goodwin, *The Friends of Liberty*, 244 - 252.
[167]See, for example, Kersaint's speech reproduced in the *Moniteur*, 3 January 1793.
[168]*Moniteur*, 22 November 1792; Claeys, *Thomas Paine*, 28; Tomalin, *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*, 132 - 133; Erdman, *Commerce des Lumières*, 242; Alger, 'The British Colony in Paris, 1792 - 1793', 675.

British club. When France went to war with Britain, he and forty other British sailed for home.[169]

Despite their claims of unity of purpose with the Revolution, all foreign 'patriots' had their own agenda to follow, which naturally meant that they would fall in with those revolutionaries whose interests or aims would best serve their own. Symbiotic relationships developed between groups of foreign radicals and French politicians. Early in 1792 tensions within the *Comité des Belges et Liégeois unis* led to a split between moderates, such as Lebrun, Bassenge, Fabry and the Belgian Walckiers, who forged ties with the Brissotins, and extremists who after the fall of the monarchy would associate closely with the Montagnards.[170] Those Dutch Patriots who sought the assistance of French military muscle to liberate the United Provinces from the Stadholder also made associations similar to the Liégeois moderates. Joannes de Kock, for example, cultivated links with Lebrun and Dumouriez.[171] Such ties would put these radicals under suspicion after the general's treason. The moderate Dutch, Belgian and Liégeois patriots in Paris were left open to attack from their extremist rivals, who like the Montagnards suspected the general's motives towards the Low Countries.

After the fall of the monarchy, with exceptions such as Oswald who supported the Mountain, those British radicals who remained in Paris were drawn to the Girondins.[172] Drawing on a tradition of constitutionalism, the British admired the Girondins because they appeared to be less willing than the Mountain and the Jacobins to appeal to the mob. Moreover, many of the exiles had personal ties to the Girondins. Helen Maria Williams, returning to Paris in August 1792, attended the *salons* of Manon Roland. In turn, Williams introduced Mary Wollstonecraft to her Girondin friends.[173] Paine had long collaborated with Brissot and Condorcet in the *Cercle Social*. His political association with the Girondins did not appear to be sealed until, having voted for the guilty verdict on Louis XVI, he then opposed the death penalty. His position in these debates brought him

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[169]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 65; Alger, 'The British Colony in Paris, 1792 - 1793', 675 - 676.
[170]Delange-Janson, *Ambroise*, 25 - 26; Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 213.
[171]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 45; Rosendaal, 'Qui était l'être suprême pour les réfugiés bataves?', 201 - 202.
[172]Gerbod, 'Résidents Britanniques dans le Paris Révolutionnaire', 344.
[173]Gerbod, 'Résidents Britanniques dans le Paris Révolutionnaire', 344 - 345; Tomalin, *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*, 134 - 135.

into conflict with Marat, against whom he testified in his trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal in April 1793.[174]

Among the German patriots in France, Anacharsis Cloots did not think of himself as a Girondin, but those who heard him describe the war in his expansive, internationalist way certainly associated him with them. The Girondin journalist Gorsas recommended him during the elections to the Convention as worthy of the confidence of the nation. In response, Marat described Cloots on 30 August 1792 as a 'Mouchard Berlinois' who sought to 'servir la faction des ennemis de la liberté'.[175] Karl Reinhard had known Vergniaud, Guadet and Ducos since his days in Bordeaux. Ultimately, Kerner supported the Girondins, possibly because of his friendship Reinhard, but also because he saw them as the lesser of two evils when the alternative was the Jacobins.[176] Among the Genevans, Clavière unambiguously associated with the Girondins, being the Brissotin finance minister between March and June 1792 and again after the fall of the monarchy. On 8 September, he was the target of Marat's venom, as 'dévoué à la faction Brissot, qui l'a remis en place'.[177]

Some foreign radicals came to be associated not with the Girondins, but with the other extreme - the Cordeliers. Doppet, the Savoyard exile, was a member of both the Jacobin and Cordelier clubs, so there were times when he could not win either way. While serving as president of the former, he praised Dumouriez after his appointment as foreign minister in March 1792. On the other hand, just before 10 August, he was accused in the Jacobins of extremism, of being overly influenced by the Cordeliers club and of preaching 'democracy'.[178] The defeat of the French in the Alps in December 1792 led him to believe that the Girondins were incapable of protecting the Republic, which by now included Savoy, and he became a Montagnard. It was to prove a wise choice for his military career.[179]

The defeats of early 1793 and the hostility or indifference with which 'liberated' peoples met the French invaders discredited Brissot's 'crusade for universal liberty'. For the time being, however, the foreign radicals who remained in France were not yet treated with the

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[174]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, ii, 7 - 9, 48 - 49; Claeys, *Thomas Paine*, 26 - 27.
[175]'Marat, L'Ami du Peuple, aux amis de la Patrie' (30 August 1792), Vellay, C. (ed.), *Les Pamphlets de Marat* (Paris: 1911), 310 - 311.
[176]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 328, 342.
[177]'Marat, L'Ami du Peuple, aux Bons Français' (8 September 1792), Vellay, *Les Pamphlets de Marat*, 322.
[178]Doppet, *Mémoires Politiques et Militaires*, 45 - 46, 48.
[179]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 47.

same disdain as their indifferent countrymen. They were the enlightened spirits who might still spread the gospel. Between October 1791 and March 1793, foreign patriots were faced with a series of rapid political changes which presented them with some stark choices. While the decisions they made in the face of the outbreak of war, the overthrow of the monarchy, the first French victories and the execution of Louis XVI were determined in a large part by their own principles, interests and aspirations, they were also aware that the choices they made might affect their political survival in France itself. As the net of political orthodoxy was pulled tighter, foreign patriots could not remain aloof from the internal political battles in France. Their association with particular political groups were determined by their specific aims and aspirations, but revolutionary politics were still in flux. The choices made in this period would come back to haunt foreign radicals in the Terror.

V

The greatest single challenge to those foreigners who participated in French economic life in this period was the war. For some, the conflict presented no immediate problems, particularly if they were neutrals or engaged in trades which were deemed vital to the war effort. The American merchant James Price successfully completed a business trip in August 1792.[180] None the less, merchants of all nationalities found, as always, that even if they were not enemy subjects, the war was disruptive of their trade and their livelihood. This was particularly the case when France went to war with the two major maritime powers of Europe, Britain and the United Provinces. It was not until the autumn of 1793 that the Convention decreed the confiscation of enemy property and a navigation act excluding all enemy ships from carrying goods into and out of French ports, but the conflict could present other problems. The maritime tradition of arming corsairs which would seize enemy shipping naturally did not disappear because the war was meant to be 'revolutionary'. The rules of maritime prizes still applied and this was a feature of warfare used against the British and the Dutch as it was in conflicts before 1789.

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[180]Chew, *A Bostonian Merchant Witnesses the Second French Revolution*, 12 - 13. He was possibly the same 'Mr. Price' to whom Gouverneur Morris issued a passport on 13 August (Morris, *A Diary of the French Revolution*, ii, 490).

Furthermore, an embargo on British and Dutch goods was imposed early in the war. On 1 March 1793, the Convention received from the Jacobins in Bordeaux a donation from British and Dutch merchants who offered their thanks for the exemptions for vessels loaded with grain and other vital commodities.[181] None the less, other British and Dutch ships were seen as fair game. At the *tribunal de commerce* at Dunkirk later that month, the proprietors of four British ships, apparently used for smuggling goods from France across the Channel, unsuccessfully brought legal action against the owners of a Gravelines corsair which had seized their vessels.[182]

The welfare of foreign merchants was not necessarily jeopardised by the behaviour of the revolutionaries, but by the response of foreign governments to the Revolution and the war. Britain, Spain and Russia each made proclamations and laws which, while intended as prophylactics against the contagion of revolutionary propaganda, also made trade and commerce between their subjects and French citizens highly suspect if not actually illegal. Like the more moderate foreign radicals, merchants who found their governments hostile to France found in these measures a test of loyalty to their sovereigns.

While foreign merchants could relocate with relative ease by finding new ports and new trading partners, manufacturers, with their workshops, factories and labour forces, were more inert. The radicalisation of revolutionary politics, the war and the economic crisis presented foreign manufacturers with extraordinary pressures. Oberkampf, for example, was faced with the problems of growing militancy. While the organised action by his workforce in March 1792 had purely economic origins, as owner of a former *manufacture royale* with foreign origins and with nine percent of his workers recruited from abroad, Oberkampf was understandably keen to maintain his revolutionary credentials. He had to preclude any insinuations about his patriotism, both as a foreigner and as a one-time beneficiary of royal favour. The difficulties of balancing these pressures of political conformity with his private business interests are made clear by his response to the decree of the *patrie en danger*. When ten of his workers enrolled as volunteers, Oberkampf gave them 300 *livres* each and promised them as much again on their return. By September 1792, however, he was grumbling privately that labour was becoming scarce because of the war.[183]

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[181]AP, lix, 500 - 501.
[182]AP, lx, 223 - 224.
[183]Chassage, *Oberkampf*, 171; Chapman & Chassagne, *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century*, 122 - 123, 178.

Unlike Oberkampf, the Dutch banker Vandenyver and his two sons did not show political tact in the running of their business. When Madame du Barry visited London between 1791 and 1793, he underwrote the letters of credit which ensured her stay there was comfortable. The Vandenyvers would come to regret this association.[184] He was not alone among foreign bankers to draw venom from revolutionaries who feared the influence of foreign money. On 15 December 1792, taking up an attack by Marat, Carra wrote in his *Annales patriotiques* that the Belgian Walckiers was an agent of Austria. Nine days later, he accused him of handling the money and gold 'que Marie-Antoinette volait à la nation française' and that, while pretending to be a Belgian patriot, he was using Austrian funds to ensure that Brabant would be returned to the Habsburgs.[185] Such attacks on foreign bankers were to become more commonplace in the following year.

If the Revolution disrupted the lives of foreign merchants in France it was due to a combination of the embargo against Dutch and British goods, the activities of corsairs and the response of foreign governments to the perceived threat of revolution. While foreign merchants could respond to these conditions with some flexibility, manufacturers and bankers could not. If they were to protect their investments and business in France, they, like other types of foreigners, had to show increasingly that their patriotic credentials were sound. While Oberkampf, long established in the community of Jouy, easily immersed himself in local politics to protect his livelihood, bankers such as Vandenyver and Walckiers did so less easily. As the Revolution and the war intensified, they found it hard to explain both their relations with some of their existing clients and their financial ties with foreign banking houses, many of which may have had dealings with enemy governments. With the deepening political crisis in 1793, such associations would become still more compromising.

VI

The period between October 1791 and March 1793 saw, on one hand, the increasing militancy of revolutionary cosmopolitanism and, on the other, the development of the more exclusive implications of revolutionary patriotism. The former encouraged foreigners to participate in the political life of the Revolution through naturalisation,

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[184]Lüthy, *La Banque Protestante en France*, ii, 323.
[185]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 109 - 110.

membership of political societies, consultation on the new republican constitution, employment in diplomatic missions and in government departments and even election to the Convention. It also permitted foreigners to fight alongside their French brothers in specially-organised legions and encouraged foreign patriots to take on a propaganda role in the war which, by the end of March 1793, had engulfed all of western Europe. Such militant cosmopolitanism represented the abandonment of the diplomatic caution shown by the Constituent, but this was due less to the revolutionaries' attachment to abstract principles than their assessment of their own political interests. Until the first victories in the autumn of 1792, it was hoped that the success of French arms would be assisted by peoples who would welcome the French as liberators. For those like the Girondins and Dumouriez who pinned their political careers and their personal aspirations on such a triumph, the use of foreigners in most branches of the revolutionary state was not only a propaganda tool, but also a viable means of achieving their aims.

On the other hand, as the Revolution became increasingly radical, the political credentials of those foreigners had to be screened if their role in French life was not to be counter-productive. The Swiss troops were finally cast aside, not because the revolutionaries sought to exclude foreigners from the armed forces, but because after 10 August their skills, discipline and experience were offset by the apparent threat they posed to the internal safety of the nation. Such political failings, and not foreign nationality, were becoming the criteria for the exclusion of foreigners from the life of the Revolution. As the revolutionaries alienated more strands of political opinion, and as the fortunes of war fluctuated, so they became increasingly worried about their own security. Such concerns began to override diplomatic considerations in their treatment of foreigners. The general measures enacted against foreigners, such as the imposition of passports and surveillance, reflected this shift and gave xenophobia both legal form and official channels through which it could be expressed. None the less, French citizens were subjected to similar infringements on their civil liberties and, for the time being, the political associations and activities of foreigners and French people alike were of primary concern. If this does not say much for the revolutionaries' tolerance of political dissent, it does suggest that they did not regard civic virtue as an exclusively French trait.

If the revolutionaries' concern for domestic stability made them more willing to err from the early diplomatic caution of the Revolution, they were not yet ready to repudiate measures taken by their forerunners in the Constituent Assembly if there was no urgent need to do so. While the dismissal of the Swiss regiments was dictated by fears of their

counter-revolutionary potential, the foreign clergy remained a privileged group, with their property intact and their institutions remaining independent of state control. Their status as foreigners still protected them from revolutionary legislation out of diplomatic necessity, until Britain entered the war, and because the Constituent had recognised the legitimacy of their property. To have rejected this decision would have been to repudiate this founding principle of the Revolution. Yet this period witnessed the exile of foreign secular priests who refused to take the oath. With Irish priests as with other foreigners, it was failure of loyalty to the Revolution - and not nationality - which led to their exclusion.

If the fate of foreigners in France was increasingly linked to their political reliability, so they would be at the mercy of the political tides which swept through the Revolution. Not only were revolutionary politics still fluid at the end of March 1793, but for fifteen months thereafter the Republic would be fighting for its very survival in the international conflict. Patriotism was to become increasingly focused on the survival of France itself, but foreigners would still be able to pursue their activities provided they remained politically orthodox. The problem was that many foreigners in France had already become associated with specific factions who seemed to serve their interests best. In the case of foreign legions and foreign patriots, such politicians were the very people whose policies and behaviour were to be discredited by defeat and betrayal, namely the Girondins and Dumouriez. Those foreigners who had set much in store with them would themselves be tarnished with defeat and treason. As the crisis deepened over the course of the following year, the circle of political orthodoxy would be drawn narrower still, increasing the variety of proscribed ideals and activities. In turn, foreigners who subscribed to them and participated in them would be excluded from the life of the Republic.

Chapter Five. The Terror.

On 28 December 1793, at three o'clock in the morning, Thomas Paine was disturbed in White's Hotel in the passage des Petits-Pères. Two commissioners, three officials and a witness from the section Guillaume Tell, all escorted by a squad of four National Guardsmen and a corporal, had come to arrest him. He was expecting them, as he had been scribbling desperately only six hours before in his permanent lodgings in the faubourg Saint-Denis, finishing the first part of his next work, the *Age of Reason*. He deliberately left the manuscript in his quiet, suburban apartment for fear that it would otherwise be destroyed. He had then walked to the passage des Petits-Pères because that was still his listed address in the Convention's almanach. It was there that he knew they would look for him. Now that they had arrived, the officials searched White's Hotel. The day was already well advanced by the time this alarming group of people marched up to No. 63, rue du Faubourg Saint-Denis where they finished their search and inspection of Paine's papers at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Nothing suspicious was found and Paine was allowed to entrust his manuscript to the American radical Joel Barlow. After the gruelling process of the search, Paine was marched through the darkened and cluttered city streets to the Luxembourg prison. There he stayed incarcerated for over ten months. If the guillotine did not kill him, the illness contracted in the squalor almost did. He was finally released on 4 November 1794.[1]

Thomas Paine's predicament neatly symbolises that of many foreigners during the Terror. The legal motive for his arrest was that his original British nationality made him an enemy subject. He himself was certain that it was because he was a foreigner, despite his honorary naturalisation as a French citizen in August 1792. Significantly, Paine was only released when his United States citizenship was acknowledged by James Monroe, the American ambassador to Paris.[2] Paine may have suffered therefore from the retreat of the Revolution from its earlier cosmopolitanism and the development of a xenophobic, exclusive patriotism. The Thermidorians certainly explained that Paine had aroused Robespierre's hostility because 'il avait travaillé à fonder la liberté dans les deux mondes.'[3]

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[1]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, ii, 101 - 110.
[2]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, ii, 136 - 138.
[3]Courtois, E. B., *Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l'examen des papiers trouvés chez Robespierre et ses complices, par E. B. Courtois, député du département de l'Aube, dans la séance du 16 nivôse; an IIIe de la République française, une et indivisible* (Paris, an III), 39.

Subsequent historians have also suggested, in a more balanced fashion, that foreigners suffered during the Terror because the revolutionaries began to regard with suspicion the cosmopolitanism represented by the likes of Paine.[4]

On the other hand, the statements of the revolutionaries themselves suggest that two political motives lay behind the arrest. On 25 December Bourdon de l'Oise remarked that Paine had not set foot in the Convention since the Brissotins had been expelled, which suggests that Paine was both denied his seat as a deputy and arrested because of his sympathy for the Girondins. The next day, Thuriot cited Paine's opposition to the death penalty for Louis XVI and the fact that he voted 'toujours avec les hommes reconnus traîtres à la patrie'. When a deputation of Americans led by Joel Barlow sought his freedom in the Convention on 27 January, the president, Vadier, paid tribute to Paine's achievements, but 'son génie n'a point aperçu celle qui a régénéré la France; il n'en a aperçu le système que d'après les prestiges dont les faux amis de notre révolution l'ont environné.' In other words, it was not his nationality which mattered, but the fact that his conformity to the current political orthodoxy was suspect.[5]

On 25 December Bourdon, also added that 'je sais qu'il intrigue avec un ancien agent du bureau des affaires étrangères'.[6] This was the hidden but probably the most potent reason behind Paine's arrest. It was a misguided attempt by the government to control any damage which Paine might have caused to France's relations with the United States. The American ambassador to Paris, Gouverneur Morris, was hostile to Paine's democratic republicanism and suggested that Paine supported the efforts of France's wayward envoy to the United States, Edmond Genêt, to 'revolutionise' the Mississippi valley. Genêt was the agent referred to by Bourdon and so it was implied that Paine was severely damaging relations with France's only ally.[7] After Paine had been incarcerated, Robespierre wrote in his notebook, 'Demander que Thomas Payne soit décrété d'accusation, pour les intérêts de l'Amérique autant que de la France'.[8] Paine, it seems, did not only fall foul of the

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[4]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 137; Soboul, *Les Sans-Culottes*, 208; Cobb, R., *The Police and the People. French Popular Protest 1789 - 1820* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 130.
[5]AP, lxxxii, 303, 339; *Moniteur* No. 130 (10 Pluviôse II/29 January 1794).
[6]AP, lxxxii, 303.
[7]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, ii, 80 - 96. Morris's personal enmity for Paine went back to the War of American Independence. He did not hide from Paine the fact that it was he who was responsible for Paine's dismissal from the continental Committee of Foreign Affairs in 1779 (Morris, *A Diary of the French Revolution*, ii, 159).
[8]Courtois, *Papiers trouvés chez Robespierre*, 211.

government because of his associations with the Girondins, but also because it was apparently expedient for France's diplomatic relations.

The period from April 1793 to July 1794 witnessed the most acute measures taken against foreigners. They can be explained by a decline of revolutionary cosmopolitanism and the heated expansion of a xenophobic patriotism, but they were not the only ingredients in the pot. Paine's experience suggests that the revolutionaries' treatment of foreigners was not always dictated by xenophobia, but, firstly, by considerations of their loyalty to an increasingly demanding political regime and, secondly, by pragmatic concerns about the potential benefits or damage a particular foreigner or group of foreigners could bring to the Republic. Just as Paine's arrest seems to have been dictated by diplomatic motives, so conversely the revolutionaries were practical enough to protect foreigners whose liberty would not threaten the government, but whose skills and services might be of use in the war effort.

I

The renunciation of the two 'Propagandist Decrees' on 13 April and the overthrow of the Girondins on 2 June had potentially sinister implications for foreigners in France. The first represented a retreat from the militant cosmopolitanism of the previous year and a patriotism focused more exclusively on the nation itself. The second narrowed the scope of what was regarded by the revolutionaries as legitimate political opinion. Yet initially under the Montagnards, foreigners in France were still encouraged to adopt France as their *patrie*. The fundamental principles which defined citizens as French and which permitted the assimilation of foreigners into the national community remained almost unaltered. The Montagnard constitution voted through on 24 June 1793 reduced the residence requirement from five years to one, like its Girondin predecessor. Economic barriers to naturalisation were lowered with the stipulation that a foreigner must simply live in France by the fruits of his own labour, in marked contrast to the more demanding provisions of the Constitution of 1791. Marriage to a French citizen and the acquisition of property remained as optional conditions, but broader social contributions by foreigners were also encouraged with the additional alternatives of the adoption of a child or the support of an elderly citizen. The cosmopolitan pretensions attached to French nationality were retained in a clause which would allow the legislature to grant citizenship to any

foreigner who had 'bien mérité de l'humanité'. It also offered 'asile aux étrangers bannis de leur patrie pour la cause de la liberté'.[9] There was some opposition from Mazuyer, who saw perils in giving away French citizenship in such a profligate manner,[10] but for the time being most revolutionaries clearly thought that an assimilationist approach to naturalisation was to be one of the building blocks of the Republic.[11]

Such openness to foreigners was however regarded as something to enact once the immediate military and political dangers had been destroyed. The spectacular and apparently complete reversal of French military fortunes, the desertion of Dumouriez and renewed domestic troubles inspired paranoid fears that collusion with the enemy was to blame. The coup against the Girondins on 2 June expelled from the scope of revolutionary orthodoxy a substantial body of opinion, which made vigilance and surveillance more necessary than before. On 6 June the Convention discussed a general law against foreigners, but the proposal was sent to the Committee of Public Safety for further consideration.[12] Most revolutionaries still believed that the foreigners responsible for disorders in France were a minority identifiable through the existing system of surveillance and that a general expulsion would be counter-productive. They had already resurrected the Ancien Régime practice of holding 'hostages' when French commissioners fell into the hands of the coalition and certain prisoners of war were designated as the guarantee for their safety.[13] The broadest measure of hostage-taking came after the surrender of Toulon to the British. From 9 September, all British subjects arrested in France were to be considered hostages who would answer for the conduct of Admiral Hood. Workers, artists 'et autres citoyens utiles' would be exempt from this law.[14]

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[9]AP, lxvii, 145, 150.
[10]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 135 - 136.
[11]The Constitution of 1793 provided the most generous conditions for naturalisation France has seen since 1789. See, by way of comparison, Schnapper, B., 'La Naturalisation française au XIX[e] siècle: les variations d'une politique', *La Condition Juridique de l'Etranger Hier et Aujourd'hui: actes du colloque organisé à Nimègue les 9 - 11 mai 1988 par les Facultés de Droit de Poitiers et de Nimègue* (Nijmegen: Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen,1988), 209 - 221; Guademet, J., 'L'étranger: de l'image au statut', Lequin, Y. (ed.), *Histoire des étrangers et de l'immigration en France* (Paris: Larousse, 1992), 47 - 53.
[12]AP, lxvi, 109 - 112, 173 - 179.
[13]AP, lxiv, 707. On 8 September, a dozen 'femmes de distinction' from Mainz were arrested in France as hostages until the wives of the Rhenish patriot exiles were allowed to join their husbands (AP, lxxiii, 526).
[14]AP, lxxiii, 573, 600.

The Convention was finally persuaded to overcome its initial squeamishness about overstepping traditional practices by the mysterious activities of a British agent in Lille in the summer of 1793. The Convention voted on 1 August to arrest all subjects of enemy powers, and not just the British, who had arrived in France since 1789.[15] The law went beyond the reprisals traditionally accepted as part of the *droit des gens*. For this reason, doubts were raised about the applicability of such a sweeping measure only days after it had been voted, although such backpedalling was not popular with some deputies.[16] Local authorities meanwhile immediately implemented the law, but took on board the objections expressed in the Convention, as the Observatoire section in Paris did between 3 August and 21 October. The section arrested twenty-four foreigners and left five at large. Of those arrested, three were subsequently released. Leniency was shown to enemy subjects who did not appear to pose any serious threat to domestic security, such as an Irish cleric from Douai who was vouched for locally and two Piedmontese residents of a *hospice venérien*. The *comité de surveillance* proved even more reluctant to arrest foreign patriots and allowed seven British subjects to live under house arrest because an inspection of their papers 'n'a offert que des preuves du plus pur civisme'.[17]

Elsewhere, authorities took similar initiatives to soften the impact of the law. On 19 August, two *représentants en mission* to Alsace issued an *arrêt* which exempted from arrest all foreigners who worked in manufactures useful for the war effort, provided they were not suspected of *incivisme* and were vouched for by two good citizens in their municipality.[18] When the Convention reviewed its measures with the decree of 6 September,[19] Garnier-Saintes persuaded his colleagues to pass precisely the same exceptions as permitted in Alsace. In the Observatoire section, Nicholas Joyce and Christopher White, both associates in a cotton manufacture, were denounced as British subjects on 16 September, but left at liberty by the *comité de surveillance* because of their occupation.[20] Foreigners in France for their education were also exempt, provided the people with whom they lodged vouched for their civic virtue, as one of Jacques-Louis David's pupils found early in October.[21] The new law also protected from arrest any foreigner who could provide evidence of 'civisme et d'attachement à la Révolution

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[15]AP, lxx, 90 - 109.
[16]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 145 - 146.
[17]AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance, procès-verbaux').
[18]AP, lxxiii, 119.
[19]AP, lxxiii, 462 - 463.
[20]AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance, procès-verbaux').
[21]AP, lxxvi, 131 - 132.

française'. These wide loopholes were remarkable because only days earlier news of Toulon's surrender to the British on 27 August had arrived in Paris.

As many as the exemptions were, the new law went further than that of 1 August, as neutral subjects were required to prove their *civisme*. Those who did so received a *certificat d'hospitalité*, while those who failed were to be expelled as suspects. In practice, some were imprisoned, because on 7 June 1794 the Committee of Public Safety had to order the release of neutrals who had been arrested under this law, on the grounds that they should have been expelled instead.[22] Institutionalised suspicion was now aimed at foreigners of all nationalities, and not just at enemy subjects. The law of 6 September also permitted French citizens to challenge any declarations or proofs of *civisme* submitted on behalf of foreigners and to denounce those they believed suspect. The new decree encapsulated a blend of pragmatism which recognised that many foreigners were useful to the economy and the war effort, but also of the growing phobia of foreign subversion. Revolutionary rhetoric was increasingly identifying certain nationalities, namely the Spanish and the British, as the nemesis of the Revolution.

Even so, the first measure aimed at a specific nationality was less a step towards 'nationalising' the war than a resort to *représailles*. The first seizures of property were inflicted on the Spanish in reprisal for the behaviour of their government. The expulsion of French citizens from Spain, the Spanish government's confiscation of their property and sale 'au profit des Espagnols qui ont souffert de la Révolution française' and stories of the relentlessness with which Spanish creditors were pursuing their expelled French debtors, all combined to persuade the revolutionaries to overcome their reluctance to seize Spanish property. Expulsion of enemy subjects and the confiscation of their property were employed in wars prior to the Revolution. None the less the revolutionaries believed that the coalition powers took such measures with more abandon than they might have done if they were waging war against a 'legitimate' European sovereign. The French response on 16 August 1793 was a deliberate mirroring of the Spanish measures. All property belonging to Spanish subjects in France would be seized and sold for the benefit of those French citizens who had been expelled from Spain and lost wealth in the process. All debts owed by these individuals to Spanish creditors would be frozen until further notice.[23] What followed, however, was certainly a departure from past practice. On 7

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[22]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 8 ('Rapport pour le Comité de Salut Public Concernant les Etrangers Neutres arrêtés somme suspects d'incivisme', 19 Prairial II).
[23]AP, lxxii, 249 - 250.

September sequestration was extended to include the property of all enemy subjects. None the less, the revolutionaries were uncertain about the legitimacy and consequences of this measure, which was repealed on 13 September, only to be reimposed the next day after protests from the Paris Jacobins.[24]

The contrast between the revolutionaries' resolve over the decree of 16 August and their wavering over that of 7 September is revealing. While the one could be justified on the traditional basis of *représailles*, the other was more novel. The revolutionaries were reluctant both to abandon their cosmopolitan pretensions and to take unprecedented measures whose commercial and political consequences were unpredictable. When Delaunay d'Angers of the Finance Commission reported back on the confiscation of property on 20 September, he said that the committees of finance, commerce and Public Safety were reluctant to implement the law against all enemy subjects because it would be contrary to the Revolution's own principles of the sanctity of property. British and Dutch subjects who had acquired property in France tended to be 'des véritables amis de notre révolution'. The Convention was clearly given food for thought, as it delayed discussion for three days.[25]

By the time they reconsidered the measure, however, events had outpaced Delaunay's considerations. Frustration at British tactics in the war had been mounting since the summer when, on 8 June, the British government's Orders in Council allowed the Royal Navy to seize any ship bound for France. On 9 October, news arrived in Paris that Beauvais, the captured *représentant en mission* to Toulon, had been executed. The rumour was false, but it hardened attitudes towards the British, who were by law already considered hostages. On the same day, the Convention decreed the arrest of British and Hanoverian subjects and the seizure of their property in France.[26] The fact that both measures had already been decreed on 1 August and 6 - 7 September suggests that the revolutionaries believed that the earlier decrees had been only partially enforced and that they wanted no exceptions to the law. Among the victims was Walter Boyd, the banker, who had fled the country and whose house at Boulogne was searched and sealed, while all food and livestock found on the property were seized by the commune on 19 October.[27]

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[24]AP, lxxiii, 491; lxxiv, 46; lxxiv, 106 - 108.
[25]AP, lxxv, 362 - 365.
[26]AP, lxxvi, 286 - 288.
[27]AN, BB/3/72, dossier 14 ('Comité de Surveillance de la Commune de Boulogne près Paris: Procès Verbal de visitte et autres chez le C. Boyde', 28 Vendémiaire II, 19 October 1793).

Even those whose credentials suggested loyalty to the Revolution suffered. Thomas Clarke, from Limerick, had served in the French navy during the War of American Independence, though he was never formally naturalised. His sons were serving revolutionary France, one in the army, the other as a corsair. Nonetheless, his commercial establishment at Bordeaux was confiscated. Other British subjects therefore had no chance of escaping the seizure of their property, whether they were merchants like James MacCulloch at Roscoff and the Galway brothers at Nantes, or landowners such as the Irish peer Lord Trimbleton, whose house in Toulouse and land in the Haute-Garonne and the Lot were seized.[28]

Arrests began promptly, too. As Sir William Codrington put it, he was arrested because 'it was taken much amiss that my countrymen should accept of a town that was very kindly offered to them'.[29] For the first time, the students at the English, Scots and Irish Colleges, who up to now had been explicitly exempted from laws against foreigners, were incarcerated. In the Observatoire section of Paris, nine students, a doctor and a tutor of the Irish College were arrested on 10 October. Artisans who had been working in France for at least six months were however exempt. In Le Havre on 12 October, *représentants en mission* supervised armed citizens who scoured the city and arrested all British subjects who remained there. The next day the *comité de surveillance* of Boulogne, near Paris, arrested all British subjects living in the commune. In Paris at least 160 and perhaps as many as 250 British subjects were arrested by virtue of the law of 9 October.[30] Even those Britons whose politics had previously protected them were now exposed. John Hurford Stone was arrested and held for seventeen days in the Luxembourg before being released. The seven British subjects who in the Observatoire section had been placed under house arrest in August because of their 'patriotism' were now sent to the former English Benedictine monastery.[31] As even those Britons who repudiated their government were affected by this law, accident of birth became more important than individual virtues.

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[28]Vidalenc, J., 'Quelques cas particuliers du cosmopolitisme en France au XVIIIe siècle', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, xxxv (1963), 203 - 204.
[29]Quoted in Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 292.
[30]AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance, procès-verbaux'); BB/3/72 ('Comité de Surveillance', Boulogne, 22 Vendémiaire II, 12 October 1793); AP, lxxvi, 286 - 288, 318 - 319, 599; Gerbod, 'Visiteurs et résidents britanniques dans le Paris révolutionnaire', 339; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 334 - 349.
[31]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 65; AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance, procès-verbaux').

Such a development did not go unopposed. Pons de Verdun suggested on 13 October that the British were ready to overthrow their government and so the measure would be counterproductive.[32] Saint-Just none the less returned three days later to defend the policy of the committees. Rather than revoke the law, he proposed to extend the arrests to all enemy aliens, but at least restricted the sequestration of foreigners' property to Spanish and British subjects. The property of all other nationalities remained untouched, as the government sought to maintain commercial relations at a time when France was otherwise dangerously isolated. Numerous demands for exemptions from arrest for foreign patriots were however brushed aside by Robespierre and Barère. The latter replied that the arrest of such victims of tyranny would be temporary and for the security of the Republic. Moreover, 'beaucoup d'étrangers sont venus précisément sous le masque de patriote persécutés, afin de mieux nous tromper et par là s'introduire partout. Ainsi, point d'exception!' None the less, the Convention charged the Committee with considering just that.[33]

The government's determination might have stemmed from an urge to lock up anyone who might have posed a danger of conspiracy in the wake of Fabre d'Églantine's denunciation of a 'foreign plot' on 12 October. One exemption admitted was that on workers and artisans who had been in France for more than six months, a rule which could be very widely interpreted. On 17 October, a Dutch shipbuilder, Matther, protested his patriotism and his usefulness to the Republic to secure exemption from arrest.[34] John Hurford Stone and his wife secured their freedom because they both worked as printers. James White, who was working on navigation methods for river boats, was also set free.[35] On 3 November, Desmoulins persuaded the Convention to vote that doctors were not liable to arrest 'comme ouvriers de la santé'.[36] The Observatoire section therefore released an Irish doctor named MacSheehy, who was given a *carte d'hospitalité*. The same section had also lent its support to the petition of his son, Roland, and Bartholomew Murray, both students at the Irish College, for their release in order to join the French navy.[37] Such

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[32]AP, lxxvi, 491; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 156.
[33]AP, lxxvi, 638 - 639; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 157 - 159.
[34]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 447 (Petition of Matther to the Committee of Public Safety, 26 Vendémiaire II, 17 October 1793).
[35]AP, lxxxi, 704; lxxxiii, 48.
[36]AP, lxxviii, .
[37]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 447 (Revolutionary Committee of the Section de l'Observatoire to the Committee of Public Safety, 29 Pluviôse II, 17 February 1794); AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance, procès-verbaux').

initiative by local authorities reflects the lethargy with which the Committee of Public Safety approached the task of considering general exemptions to the law. The Convention issued it with a reminder on 10 December, which went unheeded.[38]

That foreigners may have been increasingly regarded as incapable of the kind of patriotic virtue required to serve the Republic is suggested by the decree of 25 December. This law excluded all foreigners from the right to 'représenter le peuple français', which sealed the fate of Thomas Paine and Anarcharsis Cloots.[39] Denied their immunity as deputies, they were arrested soon afterwards. None the less, more important than an exclusive patriotism may have been an urge to reduce to impotence those whose political views and associations were regarded as dangerous. Paine, of course, was considered a Girondin and his other activities seemed to harm France's relations with the United States. Meanwhile, Cloots provided a very different political target. It was his presence in the Jacobins which had also provoked the expulsion of foreigners, bankers, priests and nobles from the club on 12 December. Robespierre instigated what appeared to be a general measure, but the real target was Cloots for his role in dechristianisation and for his association with political extremists.[40] The foreign nationality of Paine and Cloots was arguably an excuse for the exclusion of two potentially damaging opponents of the revolutionary government.

Otherwise foreigners retained positions in French administration at all levels. In Paris, a Neapolitan teacher of Italian named Tosi was president of the *comité révolutionnaire* of the Bonnet-Rouge section, on which the Milanese Piccini also served. Italians were still more numerous on the committee of the La Fontaine-de-Grenelle section. The Genevan Sandoz was active in politics in the section de l'Unité, while the Swede Lindberg was closely associated with Vincent and Momoro in the section Marat. Outside Paris, the *commissaire de subsistances* of Saint-Denis was an Englishman named Devonshire and in Cahors, the mayor who held office throughout the Year II was Swedish.[41] The Irishman Nicholas Madgett, a former student of the Irish College in Paris, was head of the *bureau de traduction* attached to the Committee of Public Safety.[42] Those foreigners still considered patriotically sound by the government were protected. As the law of 25

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[38]Mathiez explains the Committee's silence by suggesting that, for the time being, it had got what it wanted: a breach of commercial relations with Britain, but the maintenance of them with the rest of Europe (*La Révolution et les étrangers*, 160).
[39]AP, lxxxii, 303.
[40]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 247 - 250.
[41]Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire', 109.
[42]Elliott, *Partners in Revolution*, 60.

December was passed, Robespierre spoke out for those Belgians and Liégeois who performed their public duties honourably.[43]

Once it had destroyed the Dantonists and the Hébertists, the Committee of Public Safety presented a decree on 'police générale' to consolidate its hold on the country. Among its main targets were foreigners and the ex-nobility. The law of 27 Germinal II (16 April 1794) included in its provisions the expulsion of enemy subjects from Paris, frontier towns and ports for the duration of the war. They were forbidden to attend political clubs, to sit on *comités de surveillance* or in the assemblies of communes and sections. Nonetheless workers employed in the manufacture of arms, women who had married French patriots, foreign retailers and those aged below fifteen and above seventy years old were exempt from the law. Furthermore, the Committee of Public Safety was empowered to 'requistion' whomever it saw fit, which entailed exceptions from the rules. Immediately, the Committee used this power to exempt all soldiers from the law. The next day, Couthon secured further exemptions for those foreigners who had lived in France for twenty years, or for six years if they had married a French citizen. On 25 April, the Committee informed the Convention that it had also exempted patriot refugees from Belgium, Liège, Mainz and the United Provinces. The next day, it bowed to commercial motives and exempted citizens of all Hanseatic towns. Trumpeting its own humanitarianism, it also forbade officials from separating women and children from their husbands and fathers and exempted pregnant women.[44]

The Committee also used its powers of requisition to exempt a wider range of foreigners. There were those who were not engaged in the manufacture of arms, as the strict letter of the law required, but whose work still contributed to the war effort, such as manufacturers of sails. A British manufacturer of soap in Calais named Rush and his workers were requistioned. Eventually the Committee took under its wing any merchant or manufacturer who had practised their trade for at least six months in a list of ports and frontier towns from Saint-Omer and Sedan in the north to Agde and Marseille in the south. When it was discovered that the printer and his workers responsible for the publication of the General Maximum prices in Calais were Dutch, the Committee promptly requisitioned them.[45] Far from any direct involvement in the war effort were the Italian and German musicians of the *Théâtre du Lycée des Arts* and Lazzari, the Italian

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[43]AP, lxxxii, 303.
[44]AP, lxxxviii, 649, 711; lxxxix, 347, 401 - 402.
[45]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 445 (*Réquisitions* of 29 Germinal II, 18 April 1794; 10 Floréal II, 29 April; 19 Floréal II, 8 May 1794; 22 Floréal II, 11 May 1794).

owner of the *Théâtre des Variétés Amusantes* on the boulevard du Temple, whose petition was supported by eighty-seven signatures.[46] Foreigners who had the backing of their sections could make a strong case, as the Italian Piccini found when his colleagues on the *comité de surveillance* of the Section du Bonnet-Rouge defended him as 'un républicain sans-culotte'.[47] Other individuals were given special dispensation to live in Paris for a limited period while they concluded their affairs.[48]

The exemptions suggest that the decree of 27 Germinal was not applied as widely as its sweeping provisions at first suggest.[49] It was limited in effect by the two factors which made the Terror less exclusive and less xenophobic than the rhetoric might imply. Firstly, foreigners who showed a clear commitment to the Revolution and, more precisely, to the government, were sheltered from the law. Secondly, the revolutionaries were reluctant to expel from its main centres of manufacturing and commerce all those foreigners who could contribute to the war effort.

The legislation aimed at foreigners during the Terror cannot be explained only by a retreat from cosmopolitanism. The 'nationalisation' of the war certainly owed much to the evolution of a more exclusive patriotism and the decree of 1 August 1793, placing all enemy subjects under arrest, went beyond traditions of *représailles*. The law suggested that the war was being waged against whole peoples, and not just against their governments. This seemed to be confirmed by the still more uncompromising law of 16 October, which admitted no exceptions except for artisans.

The reasons for this development might be explained by developments in revolutionary ideology, which, focusing increasingly on the survival of France itself, implied that patriotism could only be the reserve of French people. None the less, more traditional prejudices were also at play. Revolutionary ideology gave novel expression to fears of foreign subversion and xenophobia but it did not create these anxieties. What brought them to a new pitch was the unprecedented intensity and adversity of the war combined with the internal political conflict and civil strife. These circumstances brought out some of the exclusive tendencies in revolutionary ideology and more traditional phobias. The

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[46]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 448 ('Théâtre du Lycée des arts, Jardin Egalité', 3 Floréal II, 22 April 1794; Lazzari to the Committee of Public Safety, n.d.).
[47]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 447 ('Section du Bonnet-Rouge, comité de surveillance révolutionnaire', 2 Floréal II, 21 April 1794).
[48]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 445 (*Arrêtés* of 20 Floréal II, 9 May 1794).
[49]Mathiez, however, says that with the law of 27 Germinal, 'la législation répressive est complète' (*La Révolution et les étrangers*, 181).

measures against foreigners were therefore responses to the various political and military crises, but responses conditioned by ideological developments and deep-rooted prejudices.

However serious the implications of a retreat from the expansive cosmopolitanism of 1792 were, some revolutionaries were reluctant to abandon altogether the universalist claims of their ideology. If during the Terror patriotism increasingly meant loyalty focused on the government, in much of the rhetoric the work of the Committees still represented the best hope of mankind to enjoy liberty. If only for purposes of motivation and propaganda, some revolutionaries still implied that the rights of man - and therefore patriotism - were not the reserve of any specific nationality. So foreign individuals and groups whose loyalty to the government was unquestioned were protected from the laws against foreigners.

The problem was that such demands for loyalty made the circle of true patriots, French or foreign, an increasingly exclusive club, even though it cut across lines of nationality. Far more important, therefore, than exemptions based on political ideology were those based on more pragmatic grounds. Most revolutionaries were not blind ideologues led only by their principles or prejudices. The Terror was increasingly justified by an appeal to unbending revolutionary ideals, but some revolutionaries were painfully aware of the scale of the difficulties faced by the government. In need of the skills and commerce which foreigners offered, the authorities at all levels sought to protect those who were of some use to the war effort. A similar pragmatism ensured that the confiscation of property was limited to use either as a reprisal, as in the case of the Spanish, or from economic calculation, as in the case of the British. As in every regime since 1789, pragmatism ensured that the revolutionaries did not always live up to the implications of their rhetoric.

II

Pragmatic as some revolutionaries were in their approach to foreigners, the war and domestic political confrontations led many to be extremely sensitive to evidence, no matter how spurious, of enemy subversion. Fear of conspiracy was present in revolutionary thinking as early as 1789 (and even before that), but it was the intensity of the war and of revolutionary politics, both of which were life-and-death struggles in the Year II, which made revolutionaries so ready to believe - and to use - the allegations of a

'foreign plot' which emerged in the autumn of 1793. The conspiracy was denounced on separate occasions by two deputies: by Fabre d'Églantine around 12 October 1793, and by François Chabot a month later. It gave rise to some of the most bitter feuding among the revolutionaries during the Terror. It eventually provided the revolutionary government, and Robespierre and Saint-Just in particular, with the spurious evidence necessary to condemn both wings of the opposition, the Hébertists and the Indulgents, with complicity in a wide-ranging plot inspired and funded by Austria and, in particular, by William Pitt.

At the core of the 'conspiracy' was the attempt by five deputies to the National Convention to blackmail the East India Company. They allegedly threatened its closure on ruinous terms unless the company directors were willing to pay substantial bribes in order to secure a more favourable decree of liquidation. It has been suggested that there was more to the conspiracy than just financial corruption and that there was also a political dimension behind the behaviour of those involved.[50] Fabre certainly claimed that the plot was a political one against the republic by extremist revolutionaries who were in the pay of foreign agents. The extremists involved were the Hébertists Desfieux, Dubuisson and Pereira, while the foreign agents were three Belgian bankers, the Swiss radical Grenus and, above all, the Belgian financier Proli and the Austrian Frey brothers. In addition, Fabre claimed that the foreigners involved were being protected by the deputies Chabot, Julien de Toulouse (both until 14 September on the Committee of General Security) and Hérault de Séchelles (who was also a member of the Committee of

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[50]Mathiez claims that 'l'affaire d'agiotage se doublait d'une intrigue royaliste', behind which were the British and Austrian governments ('Le Comité de Salut Public et le Complot de l'Etranger (octobre - novembre 1793)', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, iii (1926), 318). Norman Hampson accepts that there was more to the plot than the false decree, but is more cautious than Mathiez in his approach to the evidence. He merely suggests that Chabot's description of a 'vast double plot ... was probably largely fictitious', but that its ramifications went further than Chabot himself imagined. ('François Chabot and his Plot', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, xxvi (1976), 13 - 14). Michel Eude, however, separated the East India Company scandal from other 'conpiracies', implying that it should be treated strictly as an affair of financial corruption, in isolation from any 'foreign plot' or royalist intrigue ('Une Interprétation "non-Mathiézienne" de l'affaire de la Compagnie des Indes', *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, liii (1981), 239 n.). This, however, is to ignore some of the strange behaviour of the denouncers, the denounced and the revolutionary government alike during the inquiries into the allegations, behaviour which has been carefully considered by Hampson. Hampson suggests, tentatively, that some members of the government were protecting the royalist baron de Batz; that certain members of the government may have been involved in corruption of their own; and that Hébert, the vocal, extreme left-wing journalist, kept 'surprising company', including that of royalists and foreign agents ('François Chabot and his Plot', 6, 8, 13).

Public Safety). The foreign agents were paying these people to hand over government secrets to the enemy.[51]

In Chabot's version, given on 14 November to Robespierre personally and then to the Committee of General Security, there were two branches of the plot, one involving the corruption of deputies and the other entailing the slander of those who could not be bribed. Ultimately, the objective was to destroy the Convention through internal purges and bring about the restoration of the monarchy. The mastermind of the plot was the baron de Batz, a known royalist who had made a daring attempt to rescue Louis XVI on his way to execution, and behind him was British gold obligingly supplied by Pitt. According to Chabot, those involved in the corruption side of the plot were the deputies Delaunay d'Angers and Amar, a member of the Committee of General Security; the duchess de Rochechouart, another known royalist, and Benoît, an agent of the baron de Batz. Those involved in the slanderous side were the artist Jacques-Louis David, who was also a member of the Committee of General Security; Hébert and his wife; Lulier, the procurator of the Department of Paris. Most sensationally of all the defamatory side of the plot also included men in the Commune, the ministry of war and the 'revolutionary army', in other words, the sources of Hébertist influence and power, which, claimed Chabot, were ridden with British agents. As evidence to support his accusations, Chabot deposited 100,000 *livres* with the Committee of General Security, money which Chabot claimed was intended to bribe Fabre for his signature.[52]

The evidence substantiating both men's claims is flimsy indeed and it seems that Fabre and Chabot both made their denunciations to throw up smokescreens behind which they could hide their own financial speculations involving the East India Company. At the same time, they sought to discredit their individual political opponents, some of whom had been violently persecuting Chabot in particular. Three things are certain. Firstly, five deputies, including Fabre, Chabot, Delaunay d'Angers, Julien de Toulouse and Basire were implicated in the falsification of a decree which would be published as the definitive version of a law made by the Convention. What these deputies, except Basire, had in common was that they were members of the Convention's Commission of Finances, established in July 1793 to examine the state of the Republic's finances. Secondly, on the suggestion of this Commission, the Convention voted on 8 October 1793 to liquidate the

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[51]Details of Fabre's denunciation may be found in Mathiez, A., *La Conspiration de l'Étranger* (Paris, 1918), 1 - 13; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 164; Mathiez, 'Le Comité de Salut Public et le Complot de l'Etranger', 319 - 320.

[52]Details of Chabot's denunciation in Hampson, 'François Chabot and his Plot', 4 - 6.

East India Company. Delaunay d'Angers, who presented the bill, suggested that the Company would be responsible for its own liquidation. Fabre d'Églantine and Robespierre, however, persuaded the Convention to vote an amendment so that the Company would be wound up under the supervision of government representatives, to ensure fair play with the remaining funds. Cambon, another member of the Commission of Finances, had a further amendment passed which would ensure that the government would not have to take responsibility for the debts of the Company. These two amendments made the law less favourable to the Company than Delaunay's original bill. Thirdly, when the decree voted by the Convention was published, it was not the amended version voted by the Convention, but one which suppressed the essence of Fabre's amendment, although it retained Cambon's. It also added two provisions favourable to the East India Company.[53]

There is absolutely no concrete evidence of foreign involvement in the scandal and it may have been no more than a case of financial corruption. This, at least, was what Amar, who was put in charge of the investigation by the Committee of General Security, concluded in his reports to the Convention on 13 January 1794, after Fabre's own arrest, and on 16 March, after the arrest of the Hébertists. Amar may have had his own personal reasons for skirting around the issue, but on 16 March, Robespierre had the Convention send Amar's report back for amendment to include 'l'ouvrage de l'étranger'.[54] The 'proof' of the involvement of foreign agents was provided only by Fabre in his denunciation and by the circumstantial evidence which surrounded the characters implicated. Even fewer details of foreign influence were provided by Chabot. None the less, circumstances worked in at least four ways to make their denunciations believable to the government and to the people at large.

First of all, the main foreign protagonists mentioned by Fabre had already given cause for suspicion. Proli had a chequered background. Believed to be the illegitimate son of the Austrian chancellor, Kaunitz, he had acted as an agent for the Emperor until the French Revolution, where he had hurled himself into radical politics to such an extent that by 1793 he was closely associated with the Hébertists. Along with the Spanish adventurer Guzman, he met with militants from the Parisian sections in the café Corazza in the first few months of 1793. After the riots of 10 March, both Proli and Guzman were

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[53]AN, W/342 (plaquette 648[3], pièce 14), reproduced in Eude, 'Une Interprétation "non-Mathiézienne" de l'affaire de la Compagnie des Indes', 259 - 261.
[54]AP, lxxxiii, 289 - 292; lxxxvi, 553 - 557; Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 379 - 380.

denounced for their roles by Girondins and Montagnards alike. The Frey brothers were born Siegmund and Emmanuel Dobruska in Moravia, had been agents of the Emperor Joseph II and were ennobled under the title Schönfeld. They arrived in France in April 1792 with their sister, Léopoldine (whom Chabot married), changing their name to Frey. Like Proli, they associated themselves with left-wing politics.[55] Fabre was therefore believed by the government, and by Robespierre in particular, not least because his claims seemed to confirm that the extremist opponents of the government and the militant leadership were acting with sinister, ulterior motives.

Secondly, Fabre's charges against the extremists were merely confirmed by the subsequent behaviour of some of those he had denounced. Proli and Pereira, for example, joined that other foreigner, Cloots, in the Parisian dechristianisation campaign in the last months of 1793. When Fabre's denunciation was apparently confirmed by Chabot's on 14 November, the involvement of these foreigners in dechristianisation suggested that there was a movement by the enemies of the Revolution to alienate the vast majority of French citizens by attacking their religious beliefs. Dechristianisation, Robespierre and his closest colleagues assumed, threatened to broaden the Vendée into a more generalised revolt. For some members of the government, dechristianisation was therefore bound up with the foreign plot. On 21 November, Robespierre denounced dechristianisation as 'le piège que nous tendent les ennemis de la République et les lâches émissaires des tyrans étrangers'. He named some of these agents, including Dubuisson, Proli ('le véritable chef de la clique'), Desfieux and Pereira.[56] These were the very people whom Fabre had denounced in October, but who also happened to be both leading Hébertists and involved in dechristianisation. There was no concrete evidence that they were the agents of foreign powers and it does seem that Fabre was merely using this accusation as a device to weaken his opponents. If these were his intentions, he was for the time being successful. Robespierre secured the expulsion of all foreigners from the Jacobin club on 12 December, although the main target was Cloots himself.[57]

Thirdly, there *were* genuine enemy agents at work in France, such as d'Antraigues and the baron de Batz, the latter of whom Chabot implied was the mastermind of the whole scheme.[58] If Chabot's evidence is of dubious value, the British themselves were certainly

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[55]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 101 - 106, 111 - 117, 123, 157; Hampson, N., *Danton* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 101 - 103.
[56]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 197, 199 - 200.
[57]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 248.
[58]Hampson, 'François Chabot and his Plot', 4.

engaged in admittedly limited activity. The Lille portfolio allegedly belonging to a British spy and presented to the Convention on 1 August was probably a fake. The period of the Terror witnessed only the small beginnings of operations of the British secret service in France. None the less, by October 1793 the British secret service, for all its limited funds, had developed a weekly mail service between Jersey and royalist rebels on the Breton coast.[59] Revolutionary phobia about foreign espionage during the Terror was not entirely unfounded.[60] As the government knew something, if only rumour, of genuine intrigue by the royalists and the British, they were more likely to accept that there was some substance to the accusations of both Fabre and Chabot.

Fourthly, the Committee of Public Safety had independent, if spurious, evidence that Hérault de Séchelles was, as Fabre claimed, handing secrets over to the enemy. From 2 September 1793 to 22 June 1794, an alleged secret agent sent twenty-eight bulletins to Francis Drake, Grenville's agent in Genoa. They claimed to be reports on the deliberations of the Committee of Public Safety and Drake forwarded these bulletins to Grenville in London. The French government was aware of them through its agent in Constantinople, Henin, who was given copies of two of the reports by his friend, Las Cazas, Spanish ambassador to Venice.[61] The reports are riddled with obvious inaccuracies, and should not have alarmed the government.[62] None the less, Hérault de Séchelles had already been accused by Fabre in October as one of those selling secrets to the enemy. As a Committee member he had employed as agents none other than Dubuisson, Proli, Desfieux and Péreira, all of whom were also denounced by Fabre. The seeds of suspicion were already sown among his colleagues on the Committee. The government was not above using such equivocal evidence as the bulletins to support their case against him, particularly when it believed him to be guilty anyway. Las Cazas's first

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[59]Cobban, A., 'The British Secret Service in France 1784 - 92', *Aspects of the French Revolution* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), 227; Mitchell, H., *The Underground War Against Revolutionary France. The Missions of William Wickham 1794 - 1800* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 36 - 39, 43; Hutt, M., 'Spies in France 1793 - 1808', *History Today* xii (1962), 160 - 162.

[60]See also the letter addressed to the Swiss banker Perregaux, discussed in Hampson, *The Life and Opinions of Maximilien Robespierre*, 214 - 215 and Hampson, *Danton*, 173.

[61]Mathiez, *La Conspiration de l'Étranger*, 158 - 162.

[62]See, for example, the description of a meeting of the Committee of Public Safety in the second bulletin, dated 11 November (Historical Manuscripts Commission, *The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore* (10 vols.) (London: 1892 - 1927) (hereafter Dropmore Papers), ii, 462 - 463).

letter to Henin, incorporating the first bulletin, was read before the Revolutionary Tribunal when Hérault was tried along with the Dantonists.[63]

These four factors provided what passed for substance to the 'foreign' dimension of the conspiracy. After hearing Chabot's denunciation on 14 November, the government put Fabre himself and Amar in charge of the enquiry. Arrest warrants were issued for three members of the Commission des Finances, Chabot, Basire and Julien de Toulouse; for Chabot's friends Proli, the Frey brothers and their Danish secretary Diedrichsen; for the baron de Batz; for the Belgian bankers Simon and Duroy; and for the Hébertists Desfieux, Péreira, Dubuisson and Du Busscher, who had of course also worked as agents abroad for Hérault de Séchelles. All but Batz, Proli and Julien de Toulouse, who escaped, were imprisoned.[64] When the false decree itself was examined by the Committee of the General Security on 4 January 1794, Fabre's part in the falsification became known and his turn for arrest arrived eight days later. Hérault de Séchelles himself was not arrested until 17 March, after the Hébertists and before the Dantonists, probably because he was too powerful a figure to touch any earlier.

In the end, both wings of the opposition suffered for the 'foreign plot'. While this affair provided the justification for the government's destruction of both the Hébertists and the Dantonists, the actual confrontations were still trials of political strength. On both occasions, the Committees struck only when they felt strong enough to do so: the rhetoric of conspiracy was not enough to dispatch their opponents. It was only when the government had successfully destroyed its most vociferous critics that conspiracy could became the tool by which the government sought to impose its own authority on the Revolution. It could cow the surviving revolutionaries by linking all opposition into the same, overarching plot, implying that to criticise the government was to tread down the same dangerous path to oblivion as the Hébertists and the Dantonists. The law of 'police générale' of 27 Germinal, for example, targeted foreigners and aristocrats in particular, implying that if France still faced a severe crisis, it was not due to the shortcomings of the government, but of hidden conspirators. In turn, this stressed the continuing need for the Committees and the system of centralised Terror. In was also in this atmosphere of paranoia, made all the more pressing owing to the apparent abundance of evidence justifying it, that the infamous laws of 7 and 22 Prairial (26 May and 1 June) were passed.

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[63]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 168; Mathiez, 'Le Comité de Salut Public et le Complot de l'Etranger', 320.
[64]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 166.

In urging the Convention to pass the second decree without delay, Robespierre again painted a sinister picture of foreign conspiracy in France: 'cette multitude innombrable d'agens étrangers qui abondent sur sa surface'.[65] The foreign conspiracy therefore came to justify not only the elimination of identifiable opposition, but also the intensification of the Terror.

The obsession with foreign conspiracy cannot be laid solely at the door of revolutionary ideology. In the first place, the fears both of foreign interference in French politics and of conspiracy itself can be traced back to the political culture of the Ancien Régime. Nor was the evidence available, however circumstantial, entirely the product of the paranoid imaginations of the revolutionaries. Furthermore, if the vagueness of conspiracy theories allowed them to be amorphous and therefore all-embracing, the foreign conspiracy of the Year II was murky not because it was imaginary, but because there *was* corruption which its protagonists did their best to hide. That revolutionary politics were accompanied by such hidden, backroom dealings suggests that recent historiographical trends in examining the Revolution in terms of the very public sphere of ideology, 'discourse' and other forms of 'political culture' may only provide part of the explanation as to what happened and why. To explain the Revolution's radicalisation, its descent into Terror and the nature of the Terror solely in terms of the public world assumes that we know everything needed to explain the course of the Revolution. If the foreign conspiracy of 1793 - 1794 tells us anything, it is that we do not.

III

The same suspicions which had confronted regular foreign regiments in 1789 now shadowed foreign generals and legions in the Republic's service. Generals as a whole had long been considered warily by civilian politicians in Paris and Robespierre demanded the expulsion from the Jacobins of all foreign generals 'auxquels nous avons imprudemment confié le commandement de nos armées'.[66] Without much evidence to support mistrust of foreign generals, nothing came of this request for the time being. It did not take long, however, for respectability to be lent to Robespierre's suggestions. When general Dumouriez slipped away into the night and across the lines to the Austrians on 6 April

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[65]Robespierre, *Oeuvres,* x, 485.
[66]Quoted in Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 127.

1793, two foreign generals were implicated. Count Joseph Miaczinsky, who had fled Poland in the summer of 1792, was charged with complicity and Francisco del Miranda with misconduct during the entire campaign in the Low Countries. Miaczinsky was executed on 22 May 1793, but Francisco del Miranda was more fortunate. Paine, Joel Barlow, Thomas Christie and John Hurford Stone testified in his favour before the revolutionary tribunal and he was acquitted on 16 May. Nonetheless, he was rearrested on 9 July, suspected of being one of Pitt's agents because of his friendship with Stone. In the spring of 1794, he was accused of complicity in a 'prison conspiracy' to free the Dantonists, allegedly hatched by Arthur Dillon, for which that Berkshire-born general was executed on 14 April.[67] At the other end of the political spectrum, Karl von Hesse-Rheinfels, who boasted of the title 'General Marat' during the siege of Lyon, was relieved of his command on 13 October 1793 for his aristocratic background. He was imprisoned on 11 November for his ties with the Hébertists and there he remained for more than a year.[68]

Miaczinsky, Miranda, Dillon and Hesse-Rheinfels all fell foul of the government for their failure to keep in step with the narrowing political orthodoxy in this period of the Revolution. It was this, rather than their foreign origins, which condemned them to death or imprisonment. In the desperate climate of the Terror, military failure could also be defined as treason, as Miranda had discovered and which Dublin-born general Charles Jennings Kilmaine, general James O'Moran from Elphin and the aged marshal Luckner discovered to their cost. Military reverses brought a long spell in prison for Kilmaine and his wife from August 1793 to July 1795, while Luckner was executed at the end of 1793, with O'Moran following in his footsteps on 6 March 1794.[69] Foreign generals suffered for the same failings as their French counterparts, such as alleged betrayal, their lack of zeal and their failures.

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[67]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 63; Coratini, R., *Dictionnaire des Personnages de la Révolution* (Paris: Belfond-Pré aux Clercs, 1988), 414; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 127; Robertson, W. S., *The Life of Miranda* (1929) (2 vols.) (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1969), i, 134 - 138, 143; Erdman, *Commerce des Lumières*, 231, 264; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 171 - 175; Hampson, *Danton*, 172.

[68]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 174; Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 332.

[69]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 62; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 152 - 153, 177; Weygand, J., 'Le Régiment de Dillon', Hayes, R., Preston, C., Weygand, J., *Les Irlandais en Aquitaine* (Bordeaux: Héritiers E.-F. Miailhe, 1971), 53; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 174; Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 331.

Xenophobia also was only one of many factors which led to the demise of foreign legions. Reports of confrontations between these troops and the local French citizenry, allegations of financial mismanagement and, worst of all, of lack of political zeal if not of outright counter-revolutionary intent dogged these units. These problems, piled on top of logistical issues such as recruitment and desertion, led the revolutionaries to believe, as they had done with the Swiss regiments not a year before, that having foreigners in separate units was more of a liability than an advantage. They were made obsolete as the vanguard of liberating French armies when the Propagandist decrees were revoked on 13 April 1793. Worse, this militant crusade had been associated with Dumouriez and the Girondins and their links to both reinforced the impression that they were politically suspect. Dumouriez had been one of the prime movers in the recruitment and supply of the legions and his personal ambitions in the Low Countries made the Dutch, Belgian and Liégeois legions seem a party to them. His defection naturally left their commanders embarrassed. Matters were to get worse with the fall of the Girondins. The explicit role of the legions to help 'revolutionise' neighbouring peoples bound them irrevocably to 'Girondin' war policies. After 2 June, the legions were not only irrelevant to the defensive war now being fought, but highly suspect because in both their conception and their purpose, the legions could be regarded as the creatures of the discredited Dumouriez, the Girondins and the foreign policy which they espoused.

These suspicions were promptly acted upon. Marat supported a campaign by French officers serving in the *Légion germanique* against the commanders and twenty-four officers who were arrested and imprisoned in Tours on 1 May. The official reason was that they had creamed off the legion's funds into their own pockets, but it was not long before political elements were added to the charges.[70] The German officers were accused of mistreating 'patriot' soldiers. The Jacobins of Troyes and Montargis had already joined their voices to the chorus by accusing them of *incivisme*. Prieur de la Marne, the war commissioner at Tours, added his own ingredients to this incriminating cocktail by saying that the legion recruited German-speaking prisoners of war: 'Des Français peuvent-ils se reposer sur des capitulations faites avec des hommes pris les armes à la main contre la

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[70]SHAT, $X^{k}3$ ('Rapport Général à la Convention Nationale ainsi qu'à ses Comités de Salut Public et Militaire réuni concernant l'Affaire de la Légion Germanique Présenté officiellement par Capitaine Schoënbourg Commissaire Général de la d^{te}. Legion', 22 Frimaire II; 'Réclamation de la Légion Germanique au Comité de Salut Public', 21 Vendémiaire III).

République?' The Convention decreed an investigation on the recruitment and finances of the legion.[71] Matters were made worse when the Vendéans took Saumur on 9 June and footsoldiers in the legion deserted to the rebels.[72] On 26 June, the brigade commander, general Fabrefond, was ordered to disband the *Légion germanique*.[73]

Lack of faith over their political commitment led the revolutionaries to imply that the foreign legions did not have the patriotic fervour required to fight for the *patrie*. On 10 November 1793 Gossuin, speaking for the *comité de la guerre*, advised that the legions henceforth be used solely in the interior 'afin de rendre la désertion moins facile'.[74] As foreigners, they were unlikely to be squeamish about deployment against the French population and in fact most legions had been used since the summer not at the front, but in the provinces. The Liégeois, Savoyard, Dutch and German legions were variously used for requistioning grain, repressing the Federalist revolts in Lyon, Marseille and Toulon and against the Vendée.[75] Such a use of foreign troops in a counter-insurgency and policing role led to accusations of brutality towards the French population. Immediately after Prieur had made his damning report on the *Légion germanique* on 3 May, Couthon rose and denounced the *Légion Kellermann*, 'où se trouvent bien peu de Français', for murder and pillage. The Convention ordered the Committee of Public Safety to gather information on all foreign legions with a view to taking relevant security measures.[76] The legions were rapidly stimulating the same hostility and distrust as the old foreign regiments.

Besides the questions of loyalty and discipline, there were difficulties of recruitment which made questionable the viability of the legions as independent units. Many of them were incapable of recruiting enough men from among the nationalities for whom they were intended and had to resort to recruiting French citizens. The *Deuxième Légion batave* reviewed at Saint Omer on 31 May 1793 had a total strength of ninety-nine men, of whom six were absent without leave. While eleven of its thirteen officers clearly owed

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[71]AP, lxiv, 64 - 66.
[72]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 334.
[73]SHAT, X^k3 ('Les officiers de Cuirassiers de la Légion de la fraternité Cidevant Germanique, aux Citoyens Jacobins de Paris, amis de la République et protecteurs des Opprimés', 8 September 1793).
[74]AP, lxxviii, 702.
[75]Delange-Janson, *Ambroise. Chronique d'un Liégeois de France*, 39, 41, 46 - 47; Doppet, *Mémoires Politiques et Militaires*, 110 - 141, 164 - 180; SHAT, X^k46 (Dossier: Légion Batave ou Corps de chasseurs tirailleurs nationaux Bataves); X^k3 (Légion Germanique).
[76]AP, lxiv, 66 - 67.

their origins to the Low Countries, the nationality of the sixty-four riflemen is not clear. None the less, it was not disbanded until after the Terror.[77] Makketros' *chasseurs-tirailleurs nationaux bataves* were not so fortunate and were disbanded on 12 October. When the Convention abolished the first *Légion batave* on 6 November, there were precious few Dutch Patriots swelling its ranks, but substantial numbers of French, Prussians, Austrians and Britons.[78] Four days later, Gossuin told the Convention that a regular Belgian regiment raised during the French invasion of the Low Countries had merely thirteen men in the ranks.[79]

If the revolutionaries were suspicious of the legions as autonomous units, they were reluctant simply to get rid of soldiers whose experience and numbers, however small, might still prove useful. A decree of 1 August 1793 had already provided for the incorporation of depleted Belgian regiments into regular French corps. Now the law was implemented. The decree of 10 November suppressed all Belgian and Liégeois units, but ordered all troops from the Low Countries to assemble at Péronne by 25 November. There they would be reorganised into new *bataillons de tirailleurs* and identified by numbers. In other words, there were to be no references to their separate nationality and the foreign element would be gradually diluted by French recruits.[80] In the event, five battalions were raised, each commanded by a Belgian or a Liégeois and composed of Dutch, Belgian and Liégeois troops.[81] Even the disgraced *Légion germanique* was not washed off the hands of the revolutionaries. The infantry were redesignated as the 22nd Light Infantry and the cavalry as the 11th Hussars, but they were no longer to recruit only German-speakers.

As the Terror progressed, so the demands for the right political loyalties became even more urgent. Any officer whose political orthodoxy was in doubt was refused a position. Since its disbandment in June, those officers of the German Legion who were not actually arrested were dismissed and found it difficult to obtain new positions.[82] When on 4 October 1793 Makketros presented a list of seventeen officers to be approved by the

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[77]SHAT, $X^{k}46$ ('Infanterie: 2^{eme} Légion Batave. Extrait de la Revue faite à Saint Omer ce jourd'hui 31 May 1793').
[78]AP, lxxviii, 455.
[79]AP, lxxviii, 702.
[80]AP, lxx, 82; lxxviii, 702.
[81]Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 14 - 15.
[82]SHAT, $X^{k}3$ (Letter of Bertholde, Valder, Piet and Aznaur to Bouchotte, 21 August 1793; 'Les officiers de Cuirassiers de la Légion de la fraternité Cidevant Germanique, aux Citoyens Jacobins de Paris, amis de la République et protecteurs des Opprimés', 8 September 1793).

ministry of war for commands in the Dutch *chasseurs-tirailleurs*, the ministry disapproved of every one of them, quite possibly because Bouchotte saw in them the protegés of Dumouriez and the Girondins. Eight days before the legion was actually disbanded, the officers were still protesting 'du patriottisme [*sic*] le plus pur'.[83] A few days after the disbandment the legion, Makketros was suspended, which elicited protests from nine of his officers who attested to their colonel's credentials as a 'brave Patriote hollandais, qui meritait un meilleur sort'.[84] In fact, Makketros had already been denounced to the Committee of General Security as an 'homme de mauvaise foi' by the *comité de surveillance* of the Paris Bonconseil section on 16 September for his lack of zeal in suppressing brigandage in the Meaux area.[85] The problem was that a good republican to the Hébertist war ministry was not likely to coincide with the government's view, particularly when Robespierre and his allies began to lash out against extremism towards the end of 1793. Those who survived the ideological screening of the ministry were less likely to meet with the same success once the government had decided to curb the Hébertists. On 20 January two of the leading officers of the 11th Hussars, Avice and Haindel, were dismissed by the Committee of Public Safety. More than two and a half months after his patron Ronsin was guillotined along with other Hébertists on 24 March, Avice was still asking the Committee for his position back.[86]

As with the regular foreign regiments, the revolutionaries were concerned less about the foreign nationality of the legions than about their loyalty to the cause. Some of the evidence certainly suggests that the revolutionaries believed foreign troops incapable of the same patriotism required of French soldiers. None the less, the use of foreign legions in the interior and their redistribution into new units once they were disbanded shows that the revolutionaries were still not opposed to the use of foreign troops. The Convention naturally remained reluctant to shed experienced troops and the French army was always in need of numbers. The government was willing to retain foreign officers and foreign

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[83]SHAT, X^k46 (Letter of Makketros to Bouchotte, 4 October 1793; reply of Bouchotte, n.d.).
[84]SHAT, X^k46 (Letter of 'les Officiers formateurs du Corps des Chasseurs N^X Bataves' to Bouchotte, 20 Brumaire II).
[85]AN, BB/3/70, dossier 318 ('Dénonciation Contre Makketrot hollandais colonel de la légion Batave, Commes Suspect').
[86]SHAT, X^k3 ('Bureau des Nominations dans les Troupes à Cheval: rapport: 11^{me} Régiment de Hussards', 1 Pluviôse II; 'Commission de l'organisation et du $Mouv^t$. des Armées', 9 Floréal II; 'Commission de l'organisation et mouvement des armées de terre, rapport au Comité de Salut Public sur l'organisation des officiers: 11^e Régiment d'Hussards', 24 Prairial II).

soldiers provided that their revolutionary credentials remained unimpeachable. The disbandment of the foreign legions occured less because of revolutionary xenophobia (the continued use of foreign officers, generals and troops distributed among French units testifies to that), but because their leadership and their purpose were associated with the Girondins. Their credibility as independent units was shattered by their inability to recruit enough foreigners of the relevant nationality. With the war of propaganda now discredited, their main function as the vanguard of the liberating French armies was now irrelevant. The war now focused on the defense of the *patrie* and to ensure that the remaining foreign troops identified with that struggle, they were denied separate units with a foreign identity.

The suppression of foreign legions raised the question as to what to do with foreign deserters. Foreign deserters had been allowed to join the French army, and the legions in particular. It was becoming clear, however, that many enemy deserters had crossed the lines less out love of the French Revolution than because of an understandable desire to escape military discipline, mutilation and death. German and Austrian deserters sent to fight in the *Légion de la Moselle* were accused of indiscipline and bad behaviour by general Custine in May 1793.[87] Robespierre went so far as to suggest that deserters might have been planted in France by enemy powers as spies and saboteurs. On 29 July, he persuaded the Jacobins to reject the appeal of an Austrian officer to obtain permission for him and his comrades to march on the Vendée.[88]

The behaviour of deserters, the cost and the problems of dealing with them ensured that the bounties offered when they joined the French army began to grate with the revolutionaries, who were well aware that French volunteers were given no such enticement. On 2 December Gossuin reported on the daily abuses caused by the 'affluence des déserteurs dans nos armées, et des avantages qui leur sont accordés'. The Convention not only withdrew the bounties offered in the decree of 2 August 1792, but also denied deserters the right to enrol in the French army. Instead, they were to be employed in some other useful task.[89]

On 20 December, the Executive Council issued instructions to the commanders of each army to march the foreign deserters serving at the front to the rear, disarmed and under

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[87]AP, lxv, 53 - 54.
[88]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 43 - 45.
[89]AP, lxxx, 562.

escort if necessary. There, departmental and municipal authorities were asked to 'établir un régime qui puisse empêcher que la chose publique ne reçoive aucune atteinte de l'hospitalité accordée aux déserteurs.'[90] What this meant was that the freedom which deserters had been given was severely curtailed, although conditions varied from place to place because of the latitude which the order gave to local authorities. In Poligny in the Jura, foreign deserters were simply locked up in a *maison d'arrêt* on 21 December and were still there twenty months later. Henceforth, even if deserters were to be allowed to wander freely in their allocated town, there is clear evidence of hardening attitudes. Before the law of 2 December, only two Spanish deserters had been imprisoned in Quigney in the Doubs, and they were only held overnight. Between 24 January and 22 September 1794, however, no less than 105 deserters were held, before being conducted elsewhere.[91]

Deserters were to be employed in public or private works because 'le produit servirait à défrayer de leur entretien'.[92] In practice, work was not always found, especially when they were sent to live in small, agricultural villages: two deserters who arrived in the commune of Villedommange near Rheims on 19 July 1794 did not find work until the grape harvest began on 22 September. None the less, the Committee of Public Safety ordered on 17 July 1794 that those deserters or prisoners of war who refused to work would be imprisoned until the end of the war.[93] Those who could not fend for themselves through illness, injury or want of opportunities were, however, to be given ten *sous* a day for their subsistence, and a 24-ounce ration of bread, which was the standard ration for the French army.[94] The freedom allowed to foreign deserters since 1792 had certainly been reduced

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[90]Cochin, A. (ed.), *Les Actes du Gouvernement Révolutionnaire (23 août 1793 - 27 juillet 1794)* (3 vols.) (Paris, 1935), ii, 71 - 76.

[91]AN, F/9/137 (Déserteurs étrangers: Jura: Letter of the Commission des administrations civiles, police et tribunaux to the Commission des secours publics, 17 Messidor III; letter of the Commission des administrations civiles, police et tribunaux to the Commission des secours publics, 8 Messidor III; Déserteurs étrangers: Doubs: Letter of the municipality of Quigney to the Commissioner of the Sixth Military Division at Besançon, 27 Prairial III; 'Etat de la fourniture du pain faite par Pierre Claude Lebeau ... aux déserteurs Etrangers constitués prisonnier en la maison d'arrêt de la Commune de Quingey').

[92]Cochin, A., *Les Actes du Gouvernement Révolutionnaire*, ii, 76.

[93]AN, F/9/137 (Déserteurs étrangers: Marne: Commission des secours publics to the bureau des prisonniers de guerre et des déserteurs étrangers, 24 Floréal III).

[94]AN, F/9/137 (Déserteurs étrangers: Marne: 'Etat general du travail que les deserteurs ennemys ont fait depuis qu'il sont arrivé dans la commune de Villedommange', 16 Germinal III; letter of the Bureau des prisonniers de guerre et des déserteurs étrangers to the Commission des secours publics, section des hôpitaux, 27 Germinal II; Déserteurs étrangers: Eure: 'Réplique du Citoyen Pellezer, chargé du détail des prisonniers de Guerre

by the beginning of 1794, but the order of 17 July 1794 meant that in monetary terms deserters who could not work were actually better off than before, as the daily allowance amounted to 182 *livres* 10 *sous* a year. None the less, the conditions in which they lived now converged with those of prisoners of war.

The original freedoms offered to prisoners of war were circumscribed. They were now held in depots designated by the local authorities and penned in by National Guardsmen or the *gendarmerie*. They still received subsistence money according to rank and offered the same rations of bread as soldiers in the French army.[95] In some localities, they were allowed some freedom to roam. In Moulins, the *comité de surveillance* gave money and thanks to some Prussian prisoners who played music during local *bals patriotiques*. The authorities at Montpellier may have feared that Spanish prisoners were sowing the seeds of 'fanaticism' amongst local women, and at Valence a British captive may have got into hot water for 'des propos tendant à semer la terreur et le découragement', but these fears are no less an indication of the freedom allowed to prisoners of war in the Year II.[96]

Exchanges of prisoners continued as before, and new guidelines for French commanders were set down on 25 May 1793. The law still allowed prisoners surplus to those exchanged to be repatriated provided they gave their word of honour that they would not rejoin the enemy army. Their names would be recorded by both sides and counted against any future exchanges. Despite their public rhetoric, therefore, the revolutionaries still retained a belief - at least until the summer of 1794 - that certain rules of war would be followed by the opposition's generals. The urgency for such exchanges was voiced in terms of the expense of keeping prisoners of war: on 2 December, Merlin de Thionville warned that serious delays in repatriating enemy prisoners had its toll on the war effort. He reported that the administration of the Seine-et-Marne had complained of these 'nombreux esclaves' who 'consomment aux environs de Paris des subsistances qui sont nécessaires aux défenseurs de la patrie'.[97]

Economic motives, however, were not the prime mover behind the terrible decree of 7 Prairial II (26 May 1794) which ordered that 'Il ne sera fait aucun prisonnier anglais ou

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et déserteurs Etrangers en depot à Louviers, a la plainte portée contre lui, par quatre déserteurs', 13 Nivôse III; Déserteurs étrangers: Ardèche: 'Etat des Effets fournis et des sommes avancées par la Municipalité de Privat à differents Déserteurs étrangers ... ', 6 Prairial II - 5 Brumaire III).

[95]AP, lxv, 297 - 299.

[96]Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire', 110.

[97]AP, lxxx, 525.

hanovrien'.[98] The British had long been accused of violating the conventions of eighteenth-century warfare - and with some good reason. They had been the first to forge French currency and prevent food from reaching French ports. The Convention had heard stories of British atrocities: on 11 September 1793, after the first French victory of the year at Hondschoote, Bentabole, the commissioner attached to the army of the North, wrote to his colleagues of the massacre of French prisoners of war by the British and of the killing of a child near Lille. 'Hâtons-nous donc', Bentabole concluded, 'd'employer tous les moyens pour exterminer ces barbares indignes du nom d'hommes'.[99] Such rhetoric attempted to dehumanise the enemy by placing them outside the human race and therefore beyond the rules of normal warfare, in much the same way that political opposition in France was coming to be regarded by some revolutionaries as outside the nation and therefore not protected by the usual legal guarantees. The law of 7 Prairial sprang from the same logic as that of the equally notorious law of 22 Prairial.[100]

There was not, however, a natural or inevitable line of development and continuity from Bentabole's letter of September 1793 and the decree ordering the murder of surrendering British and Hanoverian troops, for two reasons. Firstly, many revolutionaries still clung to the belief that the British people were mostly opposed to Pitt and the war. This changed in February 1794 when Robespierre brought the Jacobins to their feet by condemning the British people as well as their government. Conformity now demanded the use of similar language from all revolutionaries, although the response of the Jacobins also suggests that a deep-rooted anglophobia was being tapped. From then on, the sort of language employed by Bentabole months earlier was given more respectability. Secondly, anglophobia was turned from words into deeds with the assassination attempts on Collot d'Herbois and Robespierre on 20 and 23 May. On 26 May Barère tied these attempts to the British and drove the Convention into a frenzy by listing atrocity after atrocity committed by the British government and armed forces. Some deputies began to cry out 'Guerre à mort à tout soldat anglais ou hanovrien!' Barère had no difficulty in having the decree voted through.[101]

The enthusiasm with which civilians received the decree is, however, no indication as to how far the order was actually carried out. Fear of reprisals no doubt weighed on the

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[98]AP, xci, 41.
[99]Hampson, 'The idea of the nation in Revolutionary France', 18; AP, lxxiv, 225.
[100]For a similar argument see Hampson, *Saint-Just*, 85 - 86 and Hampson, 'The idea of the nation in Revolutionary France', 19 - 20.
[101]AP, xci, 32 - 41.

troops in the field, but so too did a revulsion at killing men who had thrown down their arms. The effectiveness of the decree was limited, therefore, with the army ignoring it. The law was certainly carried out at least once, when the frigate *La Boudeuse* captured a British merchantman - in other words, a civilian vessel. The captain reported that he had transferred the crew to his ship and had them shot.[102] This appears to have been the only recorded instance of the law being literally executed.

In the period of the Terror, official revolutionary attitudes towards foreign troops swayed between pragmatism and the depths of nihilistic xenophobia. The cosmopolitan appeal of 20 April 1792 for foreigners to range themselves under the banners of the French Revolution had been all but forgotten. The repudiation of the Edict of Fraternity rendered separate foreign legions obsolete and problems of recruitment and desertion underscored their impracticality. Some revolutionaries even suggested that foreign troops were not capable of the ideological commitment to the *patrie* which was demanded in such trying times. It was perhaps in answer to this suspicion that the political loyalties of the officers were closely monitored. If such scrutiny signalled the end of a career for many foreign officers, it did imply that patriotism, meaning loyalty to a particular republican orthodoxy, was still not an exclusively French virtue even if it was restricted to a select few. At one and the same time, such surveillance allowed the revolutionaries to calm their own fears about foreign counter-revolutionaries in the army, while justifying the retention of some foreign troops and officers on the grounds that they were politically reliable. A certain pragmatism underlay this logic, as the war demanded supplies of cannon-fodder as well as experienced troops. The revolutionaries did not, therefore, dogmatically exclude foreigners from service in the French army simply because they were foreign. Even after they disbanded the legions, they distributed the remaining troops among regular units. Officers, however, needed political credentials which fitted the exacting demands of political orthodoxy. It was this last factor, more than the ideological retreat from the universal pretensions of revolutionary principles, which determined the fate of many foreign troops. If it was not incompetence or failure, what doomed certain foreign soldiers to death, imprisonment or inactivity was their failure to show loyalty to the government. Those officers and units who were tied too closely to patrons such as Dumouriez, the Girondins and then the Hébertists were cast under suspicion.

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[102]Hampson, 'The idea of the nation in Revolutionary France', 25.

On the other hand the revolutionaries gave more expression to xenophobia when they dealt with foreign deserters and prisoners of war. This can be seen in the ban on foreign deserters from joining the ranks and in the law of 7 Prairial. The dangers of disorder in the countryside and in frontier towns lay behind the decision to demobilise foreign deserters, march them to the rear and closely guard them in the interior. This obsession with security was driven by a fear of foreign spies and conspiracies. The withdrawal of deserters from the front was a repudiation of the optimistic invitation given in 1792 to enemy troops to taste the fruits of liberty in France and to support her cause. The intensity of xenophobia was not the exclusive product of revolutionary ideology, but ideology gave it an expression peculiar to the Revolution. The tendency to regard the war as a manichean conflict between reason and darkness suggested that those who ought to have known better - the relatively enlightened British - were guilty of betraying the legitimate aspirations of the human race. None the less, xenophobia - and particularly anglophobia - also grew from more traditional attitudes dating to long before 1789. If revolutionary ideology lay behind the law of 7 Prairial, the power and acceptability of its logic (if it can be called that in this context) was provided by anglophobia which stemmed from deeper cultural and political roots. Whatever its origins, the law of 7 Prairial was the negation of revolutionary cosmopolitanism.

IV

Before any laws were passed to change their increasingly isolated status as aberrant remnants of the old regime in France, the foreign clergy remained in the uneasy situation of not knowing whether they would survive either as an institution or as individuals in France. While their clerical status made them targets for hostility and harrassment it was their nationality which, in total contrast to most foreigners, decided their fate. None the less, certain clergymen and seminary students could still escape imprisonment and persecution if they had the right political credentials. For the revolutionaries even a foreign clergyman was capable of patriotism, if only very rarely.

The law of 6 September 1793 decreeing the arrest of the subjects of enemy powers exempted all students under sixteen years old. Those over that age had to prove their *civisme* by the testimony of one good citizen.[103] The students of the Irish College in Paris

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[103]AP, lxxiii, 463.

took no chances, however, and two days later petitioned the Convention for exception to the law anyway. They argued that Irish Catholics had suffered proscription for many years, which was enough to be treated in the same way as Dutch and Belgian refugees. They added that the Irish people wished to follow the example of the French Republic. The Convention waved the petitioners away by saying that the law had already provided the exemption they requested.[104]

The pressure was not off, however, because when the Convention decreed the confiscation of enemy property on 7 September, Rühl (who would later lead anti-clerical festivities in Rheims) suggested that the property of the foreign clergy in France be included in the decree.[105] The proposal was sent to the Committee of Public Safety for consideration, but any relief which the British and Irish clergy may have felt was shortlived, because on 15 September a bitter assault on the University of Paris and the Paris colleges was launched by the department of Paris. While it did not name the Irish or Scots colleges, both of which were affiliated to the university, it denounced all the colleges as barbaric remnants of the Middle Ages, 'le repaire des préjugés entassés depuis des siècles'.[106] The more positive aim of the petition was to have the Convention adopt the plans for *éducation publique* mooted by the *comité d'instruction publique*. Both elements of the petition came close to a direct attack on the Scots and Irish colleges. Both sent students to study in the university and both were religious establishments which would have no place in a secular, national education system.

In the end, it was not their clerical status which destroyed the foreign colleges, monasteries and convents, but their nationality. The irony was that it was precisely this same factor which had protected them from the measures which had radically changed the French clergy since 1789. On 9 October the Convention ordered the arrest of all British and Irish subjects and the confiscation of their property.[107] The arrests began immediately, but many of the foreign houses were simply placed under guard in their own buildings rather than marched off to prison, as the students of the Irish College on the rue du Cheval-Vert and the English Augustinian, Conceptionist and Benedictine nuns in Paris discovered.[108] Elsewhere, however, British and Irish clerics and students were faced with

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[104]AP, lxxiii, 526.
[105]AP, lxxiii, 497.
[106]AP, lxxiv, 233 - 234.
[107]AP, lxxvi, 286, 319.
[108]AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance'); Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 156, 162.

squalid conditions in capitivity. The English Benedictines of Cambrai suffered the deaths of four nuns and their confessor in January 1794 while being held at Compiègne.[109] The students and staff of the English College of Saint-Omer, which was closed down on 10 October 1793, joined their colleagues from Douai in the citadel of Doullens in May 1794, where they lived without fuel, sleeping on straw and eating the daily ration of bread provided by the authorities. Some died in this state.[110] The Irish clergy were treated with more leniency by the authorities, possibly because they were thought to be hostile to the British goverment. The students and clerics of the Irish College in Bordeaux were not arrested until December 1793, while the students and staff at the Irish College of Nantes were repatriated to Ireland. On 24 April 1794, ten of the remaining Irish students from the college in Paris were released from custody and given 500 *livres* each to defray the cost of their journey home. When they arrived at Dunkirk, however, the government had second thoughts and they were imprisoned in Arras for five months instead.[111]

It was no longer enough to be a constitutional priest to be protected from arrest as a British or Irish subject. In the diocese of Bordeaux, the decree of 9 October hurt even those who had taken the oath. In other words, nationality became the prime determinant of their fate. None the less, political orthodoxy could still protect even those who broke the law from the harshest penalties. Alexander MacDonald, a juror priest from the parish of Audenge, found himself hiding in Bordeaux to avoid arrest, but was captured and deported. He owed his arrest to his nationality and his deportation to his profession as a priest. The fact that he had been a constitutional priest probably saved his life, as Martin Glynn, a non-juror, also went into hiding, but was arrested and brought before the military commission of Bordeaux. On 7 July 1794, he was sentenced to death and guillotined.[112] The contrast between the fates of the two priests who had broken the same law shows that signs of adhesion to the Revolution could still mitigate the worst penalties.

This point is underscored by the experience of James Burke who had not only taken the ecclesiastical oath but had publicly expressed enthusiasm for the Republic and even

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[109]'Narrative of English Benedictine Nuns of Cambray', printed in Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 310 - 328.
[110]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, dossier 233 (Letter of Stapleton, superior of the 'ci-devant college Anglois de la Commune de St. Omer', 25 Brumaire III; Letter of the students and masters of the English College of Douai, 14 Nivôse III).
[111]AN, H/3/2561[A] ('Burke a sauvé la Maison de Bordeaux: Révue des Faits'); Simms, 'The Irish on the Continent', 652; AP, lxxxix, 339 - 340; MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, dossier 233 (Report of the comité des secours public to the Committee of Public Safety, 12 Ventôse III; letter of Walsh to Convention, n.d.).
[112]Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy of the Diocese of Bordeaux', 34 - 35.

bought *biens nationaux* at Saint-Jacques d'Ambès. As politically sound as he may have been, he could not change the original sin of his birth as an Irish subject and was duly arrested on 19 October 1793. Nonetheless, he was released twelve days later by the *comité de surveillance*, probably for two reasons: his function as a farmer and evidence of his civic virtue. The former was clearly important for economic reasons, while the latter provided a guarantee of his good behaviour. Burke was shrewd enough, and perhaps sincere enough, to strike up a friendship with the *représentant en mission* Ysabeau and he was not rearrested until after 9 Thermidor.[113] Two Irish students in Paris, Bernard MacSheehy and Murray, were released on 13 October 1793 so that they could join the French navy, 'considérant que le Patriotisme et le Républicanisme de ces jeunes Citoyens ne sauroit paroître douteux d'après la correspondance trouvée dans leurs papiers lors de leur arrestation."[114] Even a priest and seminary students who were subjects of an enemy monarch could remain at liberty if they showed enough civic virtue and had some luck with the authorities. It was no longer enough, however, merely to have taken the clerical oath for foreign clergy to escape persecution as British or Irish subjects. They had to demonstrate active enthusiasm for the Republic.

If the arrests and imprisonment of foreign clergy provided the drama of persecution and suffering on a human scale, the real threat to the long-term survival of their institutions was the confiscation and sale of their property. The first steps coincided with the fever of dechristianisation in Paris. In October and November, the Commune sent its delegates from its commission of *biens nationaux* to take inventory of the property and *rentes* of the foreign establishments.[115] The actual confiscation of property followed. Movable property as well as real estate was seized. In November 1793, sometime after

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[113]Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy of the Diocese of Bordeaux', 35 - 36.

[114]AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance'). Perhaps other evidence of their civic virtue was provided by the *comité de surveillance* of the department of Paris, which had received a denunciation of the Irish superiors, Walsh and Kearney, a copy of which had already been sent to the Committee of General Security. The author of the denunciation was none other than a student at the Irish College named MacSheehy, living on the rue d'Enfer, in the section de l'Observatoire. MacSheehy would later undertake a mission to Dublin by Hoche in November 1796 to gather information on the balance of forces in Ireland, shortly before the ill-fated expedition to Bantry Bay (AN, BB/3/70 ('Dénonciaton contre Maÿer, Walch et Kearney pretres Irlandais a la tete du College de ce nom comme des hommes suspects et contrerevolutionnaires'); Elliott, *Partners in Revolution*, 104 - 106).

[115]AN, M/250/18, dossiers 1, 2 ('Extrait des titres de Biens appartenants au Collège des écossais à Paris', 23 Vendémiaire II); S//4616 ('Commune de Paris: Commission de l'administration des biens nationaux', 16 Brumaire II; note of Louis Aimé Deperther, section de Bonconseil).

their convent had been converted into a prison, the English Benedictine nuns of the Faubourg Saint-Marcel saw their *rentes* stopped and their silverware confiscated by the section. At the end of the month, their copper and brass followed and the church was stripped of its fittings and furnishings. Apparently joining the fervour of dechristianisation, the militia 'with joy mixed with fury ... kicked up and down the church what they threw down.'[116] At Saint-Omer, the English College saw all its property, including its buildings, *rentes*, furniture, silver and linen confiscated on 10 October 1793.[117] The Scots College library was confiscated, although the principal Alexander Gordon had spirited some volumes back to Scotland in 1792. The college buildings and its farm at Grisy were seized.[118] In December 1793, the buildings of the Irish College of Bordeaux were taken over by the president of the military commission, Jean-Baptiste Lacombe, for use as his offices and home. The right wing became a boarding school for children.[119]

The next phase was the actual sale of the confiscated property as *biens nationaux*, which was decreed on 1 February 1794. The principals of both the Irish and Scots colleges protested, but for the time being the sale did not go ahead.[120] The fact that, like many former French convents and monasteries, some of the foreign clergy's buildings were being used as prisons and government offices may have been instrumental, but once the sales did go ahead, as they certainly did under the Thermidorians and the Directory, the re-establishment of the institutions was an uphill struggle for the foreign clergy.

The fate of the foreign clergy under the Terror was determined by their nationality. As subjects of the king of Britain and Ireland they were liable to arrest and the confiscation of their property. The same factor which had shielded them from the force of revolutionary legislation now ironically made them doubly condemned to imprisonment and penury. The sin of their birth as British or Irish subjects made the fact of being a juror or non-juror almost irrelevant as far as the authorities were concerned, although the penalties imposed on a juror who broke the law might be less harsh than those which struck non-jurors. To avoid imprisonment, however, it was no longer sufficient simply to have taken the clerical

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[116]'Narrative of the English Benedictine Nuns, rue de l'Alouette, Paris', printed in Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 305, 309.
[117]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, dossier 233 (Letter of Stapleton, superior of the 'ci-devant college Anglois de la Commune de St. Omer', 25 Brumaire III).
[118]Cherry, A., 'The Scots College books in Paris', *Innes Review*, xliv (1993), 70; Moran, P. A., 'Grisy, the Scots College Farm near Paris', *Innes Review*, xliii (1992), 62.
[119]AN, H/3/2561[A] ('Burke a sauvé la Maison de Bordeaux: Révue des Faits').
[120]AN, H/3/2561[A] ('Au Ministre de l'interieur', Year VIII).

oath. To win their freedom, foreign clerics had to contribute actively to the political, economic or even military life of the Republic. These were the proofs of civic virtue which purchased certain clergymen and students their liberty. Otherwise the experience of imprisonment and the loss of their property led the foreign clergy to feel an acute sense of alienation from a country and a people which had formerly offered them asylum, but which had turned hostile. Such an experience certainly contributed to the failure of the foreign clergy to re-open their institutions in France, but even those who attempted to salvage something from the debris failed, with a few exceptions. Dramatic and terrible as the Terror was for the foreign clergy, what actually destroyed their institutions was the confiscation of their property. In the Year II, this sequestration was not irreversible, because most of the buildings were used by the revolutionaries for official purposes. Once the Terror was dismantled, however, there was less need for these buildings and so their sale as *biens nationaux* became more likely. For the survival of their houses in France, the worst was yet to come for the foreign clergy.

V

On 13 April 1793, the Convention revoked its Propagandist decrees and on 17 November, Robespierre spoke on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety to outline its foreign policy. He confirmed the renunciation of revolutionary expansion and wars of liberation. The period between the end of March 1793 and 9 Thermidor II has therefore been characterised as the dark period for foreign patriots in France, in which the government was hostile to them and persecuted them because of the retreat from cosmopolitanism to a more exclusive nationalism. The revolutionary government, it is suggested, blamed foreign radicals for dictating an expansive foreign policy which had led to the over-extension of revolutionary forces and their disastrous defeats early in 1793. Their interests in such policies had led them into suspect if not treasonous associations with Dumouriez and the Girondins. When the crusade for universal liberty and the people who espoused it were discredited, it is argued, foreign patriots were left exposed to persecution by the revolutionary government.[121]

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[121]For variants of this point of view, see, for example, Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 162, 177; Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 78; O'Brien, 'Nationalism and the French Revolution', 41.

There is much to this viewpoint, but it begs the question as to whether foreign patriots suffered because of the retreat from cosmopolitanism or because of their political loyalties. In fact, behind the rhetoric, the treatment of foreign radicals by the authorities suggests that the revolutionaries' approach was a pragmatic one. While publicly disavowing the policies in which foreign radicals had set so much in store, there is evidence to suggest that both the Convention and the government recognised some obligation to the foreign refugees and envisaged some future use for them. Foreign patriots certainly suffered imprisonment and even execution, but usually for the same reasons as French citizens. They fell out of the ever-tightening net of political orthodoxy, because they failed to show sufficient loyalty to the revolutionary government. Those who had associated with the Girondins, with Dumouriez and later with the Hébertists were in trouble if they failed to renounce them in time. Even then, some could be protected by powerful figures, including Robespierre. Despite the 'nationalisation' of the war, the important factor determining such protection seems to have been loyalty or usefulness to the government.

It is certainly true that their environment was becoming increasingly hostile. The arrest of British subjects decreed on 9 October 1793, extended to all enemy subjects a week later, made no exception of foreign radicals. Nationality now threatened to cut across considerations of loyalty to the Revolution. This did not prevent some individuals from appealing to the revolutionaries' sense of universal values in order to secure exemptions, as four British patriots did in vain on 10 October in a petition to the Convention.[122]

Among those arrested under this law was Samson Perry, who spent fifteen months between the Madelonnettes and the Luxembourg. Helen Maria Williams, arrested with her mother and sister on 11 October 1793, was held in the same prisons until her release two months later. Henry Stevens, author of *Les Crimes des Rois d'Angleterre*, found that his work did not ingratiate himself to the authorities and he was arrested on 10 October 1793 and held until 27 January 1795.[123] Mary Wollstonecraft escaped imprisonment because her American lover, Gilbert Imlay, registered her as his wife and, therefore, as an American citizen.[124] On 21 October, the landlord of British patriots under house arrest in

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[122]AP, lxxvi, 325.

[123]Williams, H. M., *Letters containing a Sketch of the Politics of France, from 31 May 1793 till 28 July 1794* (2 vols.) (London: 1795), i, 6 - 13, 204 - 205; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 71 - 72, 97 - 98, 150 - 152, 347, 349.

[124]Tomalin, *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*, 165.

the Observatoire section of Paris complained that they could no longer pay their guard and so they were transferred to the English Benedictine convent.[125]

These arrests show that nationality was beginning to count for more than political loyalty. When the law was extended to include all enemy subjects on 16 October, Robespierre accepted that 'elle pourra atteindre quelques philosophes amis de l'humanité; mais cette espèce est si rare, que le nombre des victimes ne sera pas grand.'[126] In practice the revolutionaries backpedalled from the 'nationalisation' of the war, even if the rhetoric and the letter of the law suggested otherwise. The authorities, including Robespierre himself, protected some foreign radicals, particularly those whose sympathies were not obviously with the Girondins or with opponents of the revolutionary government. Helen Maria Williams was released after two months on the orders of Chaumette, *procureur* of the Paris Commune, despite her known Girondin sympathies. It is possible that she, her mother and her sister were not regarded as a danger.[127] John Hurford Stone, who had returned to France in May 1793 to act as a witness in favour of general Miranda, was arrested as a British subject on 13 October, but was released with his wife after seventeen days, which suggests that political celebrity of the right kind could still ensure some Britons their freedom. Moreover, foreign patriots from the continent seem to have been treated with less rigour than their British counterparts. Throughout the Terror, there were German, Dutch, Belgian and Liégeois patriots at large in the capital and the provinces. While the Belgians, Liégeois and Mainz patriots were theoretically French citizens by virtue of the annexations decreed earlier that year, that Dutch Patriots such as Joannes de Kock and Johan Valckenaer should remain at liberty for months after the decree shows that even radicals of unequivocally enemy nationality were not harrassed simply on the basis of their country of origin.

Despite the rhetoric and the letter of the law, the government was willing to harbour foreign exiles provided they were loyal and of some use. Although some were undoubtedly arrested and harrassed for their nationality, others found that the real problem was proving their fidelity and their usefulness to the cause. That meant matching up to the increasingly stringent demands of conformity. It was failure to meet this challenge, rather than their nationality, which brought the harshest penalties onto certain foreign patriots. The revolutionary government did not persecute foreign patriots on

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[125]AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance').
[126]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 155.
[127]Williams, *Letters containing a Sketch of the Politics of France*, i, 205.

principle. In fact, throughout the Year II the authorities provided subsidies or employment to six to seven thousand Belgian and Liégeois refugees and to six hundred German patriots, while maintaining the subsidies granted the Dutch Patriots since before 1789.[128] Far from being reduced as the Terror developed, subsistence payments were systematised on 4 March 1794. The Convention put twenty million *livres* at the disposition of the *commission des secours* for those patriots forced out of communes invaded by the allies.[129] Most of the handouts were given to French refugees but from 15 March until 9 Thermidor, Liégeois, Belgian and Rhenish refugees received a total of 220,620 *livres*, of which the vast majority (just under 98%) were given to Belgians and Liégeois, with the remainder going to Germans.[130]

The exiles were also encouraged to find positions in the French civil administration or the military. On 14 June 1793 the Convention had asked the Committee of Public Safety to provide a list of civil or military posts which the refugees might usefully have filled.[131] In September 1793 the department of the Meurthe gave several Mainz patriots jobs as guards in a *maison nationale* in Nancy.[132] When on 25 December 1793, foreigners were excluded from representing the French people, Robespierre reminded the Convention that 'vous avez ici des Belges et des Liègeois qui exercent avec honneur les fonctions publiques, il serait peut-être injuste de les déplacer'.[133] The salaries of the administrators of the department of Jemappes, taking refuge in Paris, were drawn from the subsidies voted on 4 March 1794.[134]

This suggests that despite the repudiation of the Propagandist decrees on 13 April 1793, the French still felt obliged to those refugees who had stood up and welcomed their armies in 1792. Both the refugees and the Convention's own committees claimed that the foreign patriots remained victims of their response to the French promise of fraternity, even if now that promise had been rescinded.[135] The sense of obligation to political refugees remained a heavy weight on the consciences of the revolutionaries, who kept paying the subsidies up to 9 Thermidor and beyond. Such support also implies that the

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[128]AP, lxvi, 516; lxix, 143 - 144; lxxiv, 33 - 34, 230; lxxx, 88; Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liégeois à Paris', 220.
[129]AN, F/15*/17 ('Commission des Secours. Comptabilité: Réfugiés').
[130]AP, lxxxvi, 509; AN, F/15*/17 ('Commission des Secours. Comptabilité: Réfugiés').
[131]AP, lxvi, 516; lxix, 143 - 144.
[132]AP, lxxiv, 33 - 34.
[133]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 283.
[134]AN, F/15*/17 ('Commission des Secours. Comptabilité: Réfugiés').
[135]AP, lxix, 143 - 144.

revolutionary government, despite its official statements on foreign policy, envisaged some future use for the foreign radicals. If 'Robespierrist' foreign policy publicly entailed the abandonment of any plans to liberate other peoples, this may well have been because it was forced upon the government by defeat. None the less, the revolutionaries certainly retained the hope that fresh victories might bring, if not a return of the over-zealous crusade for universal liberty, at least tremors within the political structures of enemy powers.[136] Once the French reoccupied neighbouring territories, the foreign radicals who had been sheltered in France might provide a core of administrators and suppliers who knew the locality better than the invading French, but who might also be suitably grateful for their refuge during their exile. The government made use of foreign patriots in this way long before Thermidor. The Pisan radical Filippo Buonarroti met Robespierre and Saint-Just in Paris in 1793 and on 22 April 1794 he was appointed commissioner to Oneglia by the representatives on mission, Augustin Robespierre and Saliceti. Oneglia, where Piedmont had its outlet on the Mediterranean, had been invaded by the French and Buonarroti was chosen for his knowledge of Italian affairs and for his revolutionary sympathies.[137]

The revolutionary government did not, therefore, persecute foreign patriots as such, but rather struck at those whom it deemed suspect, which was admittedly an increasingly broad category. While some foreign radicals, especially the British, were certainly arrested for their nationality, some were released within weeks, while others remained at large. Radicals who were also enemy subjects were certainly still living freely in Paris by the spring and thereafter because the Committee of Public Safety issued exemptions from the law of 27 Germinal to Dutch, Belgian, Liégeois and Mainz patriots.[138] When Helen Maria Williams and her mother were expelled from Paris by that same law, they were promptly recalled to the capital by the *commissaires* of their section. These officials had vouched for their *civisme* before the Committee of Public Safety, who requisitioned them for the Republic.[139]

These foreigners owed their freedom either to their usefulness to the revolutionary government or to the fact that their political ideas and activities did not appear to

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[136]See, for example, Deforgues' reply to the Dutch Patriots on 25 February 1794 (Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 78).
[137]Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 220 - 221; Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars*, 171.
[138]AP, lxxxix, 347.
[139]Williams, *Letters containing a Sketch of the Politics of France*, ii, 11.

challenge its authority. The goverment's urge to impose orthodoxy in turn engendered a need to appear orthodox on the part of the foreign patriots, a need which had been developing since the spring of 1793 with the defection of Dumouriez. The Dutch Patriots Jan van Hooff had defied Dumouriez's orders to surrender at Breda in March 1793, but was arrested on his return to France for his ties to the general and was not released until 9 Thermidor.[140] The pressure to conform became more acute when the Girondins were purged. When on 17 July Georg Forster penned a petition from the 'Convention rhéno-germanique', asking for 'reunion' with France, he sought to underline the republican orthodoxy of the Mainz patriots by promising that when the city was relieved and the Prussians driven back the *mayençais* would send a deputation to Paris to celebrate the first anniversary of the overthrow of the monarchy.[141] Although his sympathies lay with the Girondins, he showed enough acumen to run missions to the provinces for the new government, staying in Arras between August and November 1793. He died in Paris, disillusioned, on 10 January 1794.[142] Adam Lux, an academic who accompanied Forster to Paris as part of the Mainz delegation, was less circumspect. After his horrified friends dissuaded him from committing suicide at the bar of the Convention as a means of bringing it to its senses, he published a pamphlet in which he accused the Jacobins of being responsible for the September Massacres and the downfall of the Girondins. He then pushed his luck too far when, despite Forster's advice to the contrary, he refused to destroy his manuscript eulogising Charlotte Corday, which was found when he was arrested. Lux was executed early in November 1793.[143]

To be associated with the Girondins was to court the enmity of the purged Convention and the government. Paine's connections and the reasons for his arrest have already been discussed.[144] Count von Schlabrendorff and Paul-Jeremie Bitaubé, both known for their

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[140]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 159 - 160.
[141]AP, lxix, 175 - 176.
[142]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 313 - 314; Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 263.
[143]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 343 - 344.
[144]See the beginning of this chapter. Also of interest in his fall from grace is the letter received on 18 June 1793 by the Convention from the citizens of Arras, which amounted to a timely renunciation of their 'Girondin' deputies for the Pas-de-Calais, among whom was Thomas Paine. The instigator of this move against Paine may well have been Joseph Lebon, who was Paine's *suppléant*, which meant that should anything have happend to the deputy, Lebon would take his seat (AP, lxvi, 664; Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, ii, 79 - 80). On 5 August, he was denounced in the Jacobins for 'des corespondances trais grandes [*sic*] en angleterre' and for being among the 'agens de Pitt' (AN, BB/3/72, dossier

friendships with leading Girondins, were arrested and held until after 9 Thermidor. Karl Reinhard, who owed his position in the ministry of foreign affairs to the Girondins, was fortunate enough to have been overlooked and was not arrested until days before the fall of Robespierre and his associates.[145] Etienne Clavière, the Girondins' minister of finance, was among those arrested by order of the *comité insurrectionnel* on 2 June. He remained in the Conciergerie until 8 December, when he was formally accused of financial corruption. That night, he committed suicide. His friend, Reybaz, was protected by diplomatic immunity, as he was now minister of the Republic of Geneva in Paris and he remained in that position until 1796.[146] The few Spanish patriots in France, including Marchena, Hevia and Santiváñez, were too closely associated with the Girondins to escape arrest. They had hoped join the two *comités d'espagnols d'instruction publique* organised by Lebrun to spread propaganda in Spain on 25 April 1793. With Lebrun's arrest, all were discredited and spent time in French prisons, where Santiváñez died.[147]

Organised groups of foreign radicals mirrored the Montagnard-Girondin divide. With Pierre Lebrun at the ministry of foreign affairs, the Liégeois naturally found the easiest corridors of communication leading to the Girondins, who along with Dumouriez had been the champions of their interests. None the less, in Paris twenty-three exiles from Franchimont were more radical than the rest - and had been since 1789. When Lebrun was purged from his office on 2 June, the Franchimontois minority celebrated by declaring their 'entière adhésion aux principes révolutionnaires de la Montagne'. Although the moderate Henkart wrote a letter protesting against Lebrun's arrest, from 6 June, the Liégeois tactfully disavowed their ties with the Girondins. Those members of their assembly who had publicly declared their support for Lebrun were purged. Now led by the radicals, the Liégeois effected a reconciliation with the Franchimontois in July, creating the *Assemblée générale populaire des ci-devants pays de Liège, Franchimont, Stavelot et Logne*. They proceded to denounce 'les Brissotins, Rolandins, girondins-Liégeois brulans partisans de l'Ex-ministre Lebrun' for 'leurs sentimens perfides, inciviques et anti-Republicains'. The thirty-eight strong 'Gironde liégeoise', as the moderates were known in Paris, were denied allocations of French subsidies. Henkart, the Fabrys and

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16 ('Extrait du procès verbal de la Société fraternelle seante au jacobins St Honnoré seance du 5 aoust 1793')).
[145]Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 271 n. 42.
[146]Bénétruy, *L'Atelier de Mirabeau*, 436, 438 - 439, 442 - 443.
[147]Herr, *The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain*, 283.

Lesoinne felt threatened enough to leave Paris with other moderates, leaving only Bassenge in the capital.[148]

Like their Liégeois counterparts, the Belgians sought to wash their hands of the Girondins. On 18 July 1793, the *Assemblée des Belges* in Paris declared its 'adhésion solemnelle ... à la Sainte insurrection du 31 may'. On 9 August, it declared its hatred of aristocracy and federalism, swore to defend to the death the new constitution and wept 'des Larmes Sinceres à la mémoire des Lepelletier et Marat'. Between 19 October and 17 December, the assembly also underwent a *scrutin épuratoire*, in which four of ninety-five members were arrested, one rejected, two suspended and six simply declined to attend. The eighty-two orthodox members and the eighteen new members who subsequently enrolled received *certificats de capacité*, which followed a format proposed by the ministry of the interior. The club was also obliged to submit its list of members to the municipality's department of police.[149] The Belgians were not only striving to conform to the dominant orthodoxy, but were being encouraged to do so under pressure from the authorities.

The moderates and radicals among the Dutch Patriots were literally miles apart. The *société populaire des sans-culottes hollandais* at Saint-Omer denounced the *comité révolutionnaire batave* at Boulogne to Deforgues as 'des modérés, des hommes d'État et des caméléons' on 27 October 1793.[150] Deforgues became distinctly icy towards the latter, claiming on 6 November when approached by its members that he had not even heard of the *comité révolutionnaire batave*. The secretary, Dumont-Pigalle, wrote to his colleagues that it was dangerous for that committee to meet when the government did not even recognise its existence.[151] It was fear, as much as arrest and execution, which paralyzed the activities of foreign patriots in France.

Remaining within the net of political orthodoxy was not an easy feat in the autumn and winter of 1793 - 1794, as revolutionary politics remained fluid. Foreign patriots were left trying to anticipate where the current might flow, while at the same time certain revolutionaries and factions seemed to offer them more hope than others. Some patriots,

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[148]AN, BB/3/72, dossier 99 ('Du ci-devant Palais Cardinal ce 7 7bre 1793'); Harsin, *La Révolution Liégeoise de 1789*, 173; Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liégeois à Paris', 219 - 22; Delange-Janson, *Ambroise*, 36 - 37.

[149]AN, F/7/4420 ('Profession civique des Belges refugiés', 9 August 1793; 'Scrutin Epuratoire des Membres de l'Assemblée generale des Belges refugiés en France'; 'Procès Verbaux de l'Assemblée des Belges à Paris').

[150]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 38.

[151]Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 79.

in their zeal to shed the blemishes left on their credentials by relations with Dumouriez or the Girondins, went to extremes. Anacharsis Cloots, for example, associated increasingly with the Hébertists. Joannes de Kock had maintained, as a founder of the *comité révolutionnaire batave*, close relations with Dumouriez and Lebrun. After 2 June, he swung all the way over to Hébert, Cloots, Vincent and Ronsin.[152] The Belgian financier Proli, who had been close to Danton and Dumouriez until the spring of 1793, was drawn increasingly to extreme left-wing politics and was associated with the Hébertists by the time the Girondins were purged on 2 June 1793.[153] The *Assemblée des Belges*, seeing in Cloots a vocal ally in the Convention who might keep the ideological war on the agenda, praised him highly in their meeting on 6 October 1793. Two members were sent to thank Cloots 'et serrer avec lui des noeuds d'amitié & de fraternité'. The Assembly was also affiliated to the *Comité central des sociétés populaires*, one of the nerve centres of the popular movement in Paris. The Belgian assembly therefore placed itself on the radical, popular edge of revolutionary politics. On 29 October it subscribed to the dechristianisation which was blowing through the capital when, by acclamation, it adopted the *arrêté* of the *Comité central* which expelled all priests unless they formally retracted 'les Erreurs qu'ils ont enseignés jusqu'aujourd'hui.'[154]

Such associations proved increasingly difficult to sustain as political orthodoxy came to be focused more on loyalty to the government. When the fracture of revolutionary politics between Indulgents and Hébertists culminated in the revolutionary government asserting its authority in a double bout of political trials and executions, those associated, however tentatively, with one or other faction were exposed to persecution. Foreign radicals were particularly vulnerable because to some in the government, the struggle between the factions was tied to the mysterious 'foreign plot'. The first foreign victim of the backlash against dechristianisation and the foreign conspiracy was Eulogius Schneider, a leading member of the Strasbourg Jacobin club and now the public prosecutor at the local revolutionary tribunal. He was only one of many German radicals who had settled in Alsace, but he was the most notorious. As bishop Brendel's vicar, he abjured the priesthood in the cathedral on 20 November and adopted extreme policies akin to those of the Hébertists in Paris. When the government condemned dechristianisation, Saint-Just and his colleague Lebas, on mission in Alsace, had Schneider arrested, exposed on the

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[152]Rosendaal, 'Qui était l'être suprême pour les réfugiés bataves?', 202.
[153]Mathiez, A., *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 101 - 106; Hampson, *Danton*, 101 - 103.
[154]AN, F/7/4420 ('Procès Verbaux de l'Assemblée des Belges à Paris').

scaffold next to the guillotine and dispatched to the revolutionary tribunal in Paris, where he was executed on 1 April 1794. He was accused by Robespierre of being 'l'âme du complot d'étranger' in Alsace. One of his followers, Johann Friedrich Butenschön from Holstein, followed him to the Conciergerie in July, but was saved from the guillotine by the coup of 9 Thermidor.[155]

It was never more dangerous to be a foreign patriot involved in revolutionary politics than at this time. None the less, those such as de Kock and Proli who were actually executed died less because they were foreign, than because they were too implicated in opposition to the government. The xenophobic language engendered by the 'foreign plot' certainly contributed greatly to the sense of unease among foreign radicals: Helen Maria Williams felt plagued by a fear of rearrest and in the spring of 1794 she left France for Switzerland, returning only after 9 Thermidor.[156] Those who had connections with the two 'factions' fell over themselves in an effort to disavow them. On 18 March, five days after the arrest of the Hébertists, the Liégeois radicals congratulated the Convention 'd'avoir encore une fois sauvé la patrie', protested their 'coeurs républicains' and expelled from their assembly their extremist leadership.[157] The Belgians had also indulged in their own factional struggles and were silenced by the arrests.[158]

With the destruction of the opposition, the pressure on foreign patriots to appear as orthodox supporters of the government was greater than ever before. In June, the Dutch *Société des Montagnards* organised a Festival of the Supreme Being, despite the misgivings of the Dutch Patriots. Johann Valckenaer, who had fled Paris to Bièvres to avoid the possibility of persecution in the capital, withdrew from the Jacobin club there when the mother society in Paris expelled foreigners. In April he none the less obtained a testimony to his *civisme* from the local Jacobin club which applauded his manufacture of saltpetre and stated that his speeches were 'remplis du plus ardent patriotisme, de la morale la plus saine' and urged 'l'adoration d'un Être Suprême'. It certainly helped that eighteenth-century Dutch Protestants frequently used the term 'Supreme Being' in reference to the Christian God.[159] There were some who could not keep up the

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[155]Mathiez, 'Les Citra et les Ultra', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, iii (1926), 515; Hampson, *Saint-Just*, 155 - 157; Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 264 - 265.
[156]Williams, *Letters containing a Sketch of the Politics of France*, i, 174 - 175, 206.
[157]AP, lxxxvi, 627; Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liégeois à Paris', 221.
[158]AN, F/7/4420 ('Procès Verbaux de l'Assemblée des Belges à Paris').
[159]Rosendaal, 'Qui était l'être suprême pour les réfugiés bataves?', 203 - 205; Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 160.

appearances of loyalty. The Dutch Patriots Abbema and Jan Bicker fled France, to Hamburg and Switzerland respectively.[160] In May 1794, Oelsner fled Paris after a tip-off that he had been denounced. Georg Kerner, whose sympathies for the Girondins earned him a place on a proscription list in the summer of 1794, escaped to Switzerland with a passport issued through the good offices of Karl Reinhard at the foreign ministry.[161]

With its authority consolidated, however, the government could protect those foreign patriots whose credentials were not impeccable but for whom the government may have had some use. The moderate Liégeois officers Fyon and general Ransonnet were released from captivity in January and February respectively and remained at large throughout the spring and into the summer. When Fyon was accused by the Liégeois extremist Briart of 'modératisme', it was Robespierre who rose to Fyon's defence in the Jacobins on 7 April.[162] On 25 April, the Committee of Public Safety exempted Belgian, Liégeois and Mainz patriots from the law of 27 Germinal expelling enemy subjects from Paris. That same date, Dutch Patriots were given a similar exception, provided they had arrived in France before 1790.[163] The United Irishman Archibald Hamilton Rowan, escaped from prison in Dublin and sailed into Roscoff in Brittany, where he was promptly arrested. He was eventually released in June on the orders of the Committee of Public Safety, his credentials as a fugitive from an enemy power firmly established. Conducted to Paris, he was lodged at the expense of the Republic while he was questioned on the political state of the British Isles.[164] John Hurford Stone, who had remained free since the end of October 1793, was rearrested on 24 April 1794, but released on condition that he left France, whereupon he joined Helen Williams in Switzerland. It was Robespierre who obtained him a passport, despite his alleged links to Julien de Toulouse, who was implicated in the financial side of the 'foreign plot'.[165] When Benjamin Vaughan fled Britain in May 1794 his identity was initially protected by a handful of revolutionaries, including Grégoire. When the Committee of Public Safety discovered his true identity, he

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[160]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 160.
[161]Gooch, *Germany in the French Revolution*, 339, 342.
[162]Robespierre, *Oeuvres*, x, 430; Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liègeois à Paris', 222; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les Etrangers*, 40 - 41.
[163]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 445 ('Résidences et réquisitions arrêtées Vendémiaire - Prairial an II'); AP, lxxxix, 347.
[164]Rowan, A. H. (ed. Drummond, W. H.), *The Autobiography of Archibald Hamilton Rowan* (1840) (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1972), 218 - 236.
[165]AN, W//47, dossier 3148 ('L'Accusateur Public contre Stone, anglais imprimeur ... prevenu d'être un agent de Pitt', 26 Messidor II); Mathiez, *La Révolution et les Etrangers*, 182; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 65 - 66, 346.

was arrested on 2 June and held in the Carmes until the end of the month. Like Stone, Vaughan was released on condition that he left France and he took the road to Geneva. Both men had been cited by the British government for their connections with France. Herman, after interrogating Vaughan twice on the Committee's orders, accepted that Vaughan was threatened with a charge of high treason in Britain and recommended his release.[166]

As news from the front at last became brighter in the summer, some members of the government may have been more convinced of the use of foreign patriots. While Fyon was re-arrested on 18 July 1794, Bassenge, who was imprisoned in June, was released after pressure from Robespierre. Bassenge was due to meet with Robespierre on 8 Thermidor to discuss the French liberation of Liège and Belgium. After Fleurus, members of the Committee of Public Safety actually opened discussions with Dutch Patriots, whose committee the government had refused to recognise only six months previously.[167]

While the retreat of revolutionary cosmopolitanism and the corresponding nationalisation of the war certainly led to the arrest of foreign patriots for their nationality, and particularly the British, many were subsequently released and large numbers remained at large. Those who did suffer on the scaffold were not executed simply because they were foreign patriots, but because of their compromising political connections. Rightly or wrongly, they were perceived as threats to the stability of the government.

Despite the rhetoric which made all enemy subjects suspect, the revolutionary government remained surprisingly pragmatic in its approach to foreign patriots. The government supported foreign refugees throughout the period of the Terror, with subsidies and positions in the administration and army. Despite the uncompromising terms of the law of 16 October, most foreign radicals remained at large. They were explicitly exempted from the decree of 27 Germinal. It was as if the revolutionaries recognised an obligation to those who had declared themselves in favour of French principles and who were now suffering for that. More importantly, the government itself seems to have realised that, once the French armies triumphed again, they would need these people to help in the supervision of those territories which were occupied anew. The main condition for their freedom and for financial support was that their loyalties focused on the government alone. Those who successfully disavowed their former

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[166]Mathiez, *La Conspiration de l'étranger*, 262 - 264.
[167]Raxhon, 'Les Réfugiés Liègeois à Paris', 222; Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 79.

connections with discredited revolutionaries remained at liberty. Even those who were arrested and who were deemed to be of no threat, or of some use, could be released. The Liégeois Fyon, Ransonnet and Bassenge, all with links to the Girondins and Dumouriez, benefited from this clemency in 1794, as did the British radicals John Hurford Stone, Benjamin Vaughan and Helen Maria Williams. Those patriots such as the Dutch, the Belgians and the Liégeois who successfully changed political colour apace with political developments, however, stored up problems for the future. If their ideology and their aspirations had to conform strictly to those of the Paris government, then foreign patriots were now more distant than ever from their native political culture and traditions. When they returned home, they might be aliens in their own land.

VI

For as long as the revolutionaries regarded the war as being one of the French people against despotic governments, foreigners who engaged in economic activity in France would remain unmolested. The declaration of 1 February, which placed British and Dutch subjects and their property under the protection of the law, remained in force until August. Gradually, however, the revolutionaries overcame their misgivings about disrupting trade. By the late summer of 1793 suspicion that foreign merchants and bankers were profiting from the decline in value of the *assignats*, speculating on exchange rates and exporting primary produce, either to make money or to destroy the French economy, led the government and the Convention to take measures to restrict their activities. Among the people who found their livelihood most disrupted were foreign merchants.

For much of the summer of 1793 the plunging value of the *assignat* encouraged merchants to head for French ports to acquire cheap exports. As the vast majority of deputies to the Convention believed in the freedom of commerce, a controlled economy emerged only gradually in response to the crisis and under pressure from the Paris crowd.[168] The revolutionaries had to decide, firstly, whether or not the war was still one of peoples against governments, or one of nation against nation. In the former case, they could not make foreign merchants suffer for their nationality. In the latter case, the

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[168]Lefebvre, G., 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', *Etudes sur la Révolution française* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 241 - 242.

revolutionaries had to decide if disruption of trade was economically viable and of benefit to the war effort.

At first, the revolutionaries sought to distinguish themselves from their enemies by stressing the freedom of commerce. When a British merchant named William Trollope was seized by a French corsair and taken to La Rochelle, he was released by order of the municipality on 20 March 1793 and given a passport by the Convention on 8 April. On 4 May the Convention ordered the return of three Dutch vessels taken by the *Sans-Culotte de Jemappe*. The revolutionaries were particularly sensitive to the treatment of neutral merchants. When, ten days later, a Danish ship was seized, the Convention agreed to 'réparer et à punir toute atteinte portée au droit des gens par des citoyens français ... et à donner au commerce des nations neutres un témoignage de son respect pour les droits des peuples'. On 10 April, the tribunal of Le Havre declared that the American merchantman *Lawrence* had been unjustly seized by a French corsair and the captors were ordered to pay compensation and a fine of 3,000 *livres*.[169]

The increasing scale of the war and pressure from certain militants led the revolutionaries to consider measures which slowly embraced economic warfare. When the losers in the *Lawrence* case appealed to the Convention's *comité de marine*, the decree of 9 May permitted French corsairs to seize neutral ships which carried cargo to or from enemy countries. American vessels were eventually made exempt from this provision on 1 July after vehement protests by the United States ambassador.[170]

The revolutionaries were unclear as to how far they wanted to restrict overseas trade. On one hand, they understood that poor treatment of neutral merchants was both politically and economically damaging. On the other hand, French trade was being hurt by the embargo imposed by the British on war materials. On 8 June, they extended their blockade to include foodstuffs and other essential produce and she received the support of Russia and Prussia, and put neutral powers such as Denmark and Genoa under pressure to conform.[171] Moreover, with exchange rates favourable to exports, merchants and manufacturers in enemy countries might benefit from the purchase, resale or finishing of cheap French merchandise. The self-proclaimed leaders of the popular movement in Paris, particularly Hébert in his *Père Duchesne*, thundered against foreign merchants,

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[169]AP, lxi, 421; lxv, 238; lxx, 69.
[170]AP, lxv, 238, 489; lxxxv, 155 - 156.
[171]Lefebvre, 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', 244.

including neutrals, who were exporting food from France while *sans-culottes* went hungry.[172]

Foreign merchants, especially those who were enemy subjects, were among those who were not always able to do business without being denounced or suspected of correspondence with the enemy. In August 1793, three Belgian merchants were interrogated by the department of Paris's committee of public safety on being denounced for 'correspondance avec nos ennemis'. One of them was further 'soubsonné [*sic*] d'en être l'espion'. They were arrested and sent to the Sainte-Pélagie. These three men had been suppliers to the French army and were in Paris to claim payment from the government. As subjects of the Austrian emperor who were not refugees but businessmen, they could easily be pictured as enemy agents. While suspicion of this kind was not enough to arrest them, the discovery of a blank passport was.[173] In the atmosphere produced by the intense international conflict, what might have been normal behaviour in peacetime now seemed highly suspicious.

The Convention, however, remained reluctant to stifle trade, especially when foreign vessels were bringing vital goods into French ports. The revolutionaries tried to restrict enemy shipping and to prevent the export of necessary produce, while keeping channels open for imports. On 1 August, the Convention revoked its order for the release of the three Dutch ships taken by the *Sans-Culotte de Jemappe* and banned foreign merchants from exporting of basic foodstuffs, fuels and fabrics a fortnight later. Meanwhile, on 3 September the Convention allowed neutral ships which imported essential goods to leave with certain cargoes originally banned from export. A navigation act was adopted on 21 September, which permitted foreign vessels only to import cargo which came from the ship's country of origin. The law was strictly applied, even to neutrals. On 9 October, the Convention heard a complaint from foreign merchants who had chartered a Danish ship to deliver wine and olive oil - clearly not Danish products - to a French trading company in Cette. It was seized by a French ship which disregarded its neutral status. The cargo was declared *bonne prise* and confiscated.[174] While the seizure of Spanish property decreed on 16 August was intended mainly as a reprisal, a similar measure aimed against the British on 9 October was also motivated by a desire to stifle British trade in France. A week

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[172]Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire', 104.
[173]AN, BB/3/70, dossier 362 ('Affaire de Rombard, Van Heron, et Van Rotterdam denoncés comme suspects, et envoyés a Ste Pelagie').
[174]AP, lxx, 69; lxxii, 350; lxxiii, 263 - 264; lxxvi, 265; Portemer, 'L'Étranger dans le Droit de la Révolution française', 548.

later, Saint-Just defended these measures, pointing out that the British had already imposed a food blockade and were printing forged *assignats* to undermine the French economy. None the less, he recommended an embargo on Spanish and British goods, but rejected the extension of property seizures to other enemy subjects. Trade with Britain, he argued, brought in British manufactured goods and luxuries, imports which France could do without. Meanwhile, an embargo on British imports would protect French industry. On the other hand, trade with the rest of Europe provided essential materials for the war.[175]

Much as the revolutionaries hoped to maintain the flow of vital imports, in practice the combined effect of the French restrictions on exports, the seizure of enemy property and the British naval blockade scared off foreign merchants who envisaged little gain for high risk. Up to 9 October 1793, decrees against foreigners had exempted foreign merchants, but now British merchandise was barred and British merchants were liable to arrest. Thomas Collow, a Scot who had moved to Le Havre in 1785 to set up a trading company, was arrested despite his record over recent years for importing much-needed foreign grain. The municipal officers of the town signed his petition to the Convention for his release on 24 November. They reminded the deputies that such a sweeping law as that of 9 October meant that there were plenty of British people 'dont le civisme est généralement reconnu' who languished in irons and that Collow's own merchandise, destined for North America, was festering in his warehouses.[176] Similarly, a Dutch timber merchant from Delft named Matther petitioned the Committee of Public Safety for an exemption to the law when it was briefly extended to all enemy subjects. His Parisian section vouched for his conduct.[177] Moreover, the General Maximum of 29 September 1793 destroyed any incentive to foreign merchants to import produce into France, as they could not sell at a profit.[178] If at Bordeaux neutral merchants never seemed to be in short supply, at Marseille, Italians were understandably reluctant to run the British blockade, especially when the enemy held Toulon and Corsica. Neutral merchants from southern Europe also appear to have been discouraged by news of the excesses of dechristianisation.[179]

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[175]Hampson, *Saint-Just*, 137 - 139; Lefebvre, 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', 245; AP, lxxvi, 638 - 639.

[176]Collow, T., *Le Citoyen Thomas Collow à la Convention Nationale* (Paris, An II).

[177]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 447 (Petition of Matther to the Committee of Public Safety, 26 Vendémiaire II, 17 October 1793).

[178]Lefebvre, 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', 245.

[179]Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire', 104; Lefebvre, 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', 261, 264 - 265.

In the end, foreign merchants proved too useful to the French to be excluded from French commerce. Those based in French ports proved to be one of the most important means by which imports still flowed into the country. In Bordeaux towards the end of October, a *Commission des approvisionnements et du commerce* was established, of which fifteen members had German names. That these individuals had abstained from local politics, both Federalist and Jacobin, probably helped the German mercantile community in the city to maintain an important hold on its commercial activity throughout the Terror. Moreover, their personal and trading ties with northern Europe were invaluable to Tallien and Ysabeau, the two *représentants en mission* to Bordeaux, who sent German merchants as contacts with neutral trading powers. One Zimmermann was sent to Paris to obtain the blessing and collaboration of the *Commission des subsistances* in the search for imports of prime necessity. Another, Pohls, was dispatched to Hamburg. Merchants with English names were also used, including the American Jonas Jones, who accompanied Zimmermann to Paris, and the American Gernon, who was sent to the United States. Nantes and Le Havre followed Bordeaux's example. Such localised initiatives did not last long, as the Committee of Public Safety was alarmed at their lack of co-ordination. On 18 November, it forbade any such missions without its permission. In some cases this centralisation of commercial initiative simply meant that foreign merchants thus employed were now accredited by the Committee rather than the municipality. Pohls continued his work in Hamburg and was given credit on 11 January 1794 to make his purchases on behalf of the government. This development did not prevent continued localised initiatives, however, as on 5 December Tallien and Ysabeau established a *Comité des neutres* with the blessing of the *Commission des subsistances*. With three merchants representing the interest of neutrals, the committee was to deal with foreign merchants willing to import food and raw materials into France. Marseille appointed a similar committee on 4 May 1794.[180]

The importance of the role of merchants, and particularly neutrals, in maintaining French commerce and imports was recognised by the Convention in a series of decisions which protected their interests. On 17 January 1794 a deputation of Americans claimed compensation for losses during the embargo and were promised an investigation. Indemnities for all neutral merchants who had suffered confiscation of their cargoes were finally decreed on 3 April. Meanwhile, the curtain of restrictions on exports was lifted slightly in a series of measures. On 26 February, neutral consuls succeeded in having the

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[180]Lefebvre, 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', 247 - 248, 251, 266.

embargo on exports lifted at Bordeaux. On 11 March the Convention decreed that all merchandise which the *Commission des subsistances* had decided was not of prime necessity could be exported by French, neutral or allied merchants. The Commission accordingly revised its list of primary goods and issued export certificates to individual merchants. Commercial agencies were set up by the Commission in the major ports to oversee the issue of certificates. The Bordeaux agency included Zimmermann and Jonas Jones. On 17 May, Garnier de Saintes, who had replaced Ysabeau at Bordeaux, established a committee of twelve merchants who would organise exports so that they could be shipped *en masse*. Not only would this make the cost of carrying the produce cheaper, but also the flow of exports would be easier to control. Most importantly, the merchantmen could travel in convoy and with a naval escort. To make its task easier, the committee appointed twenty *chefs d'exportation*, most whom came from the German colony.[181]

The combined effects of the war, popular hostility and economic laws and measures against foreigners certainly put foreign merchants under pressure during the Terror. Some suffered because the very nature of their business aroused suspicion or anger. On the other hand, the Convention showed that it was reluctant to restrict trade. While they arrested enemy merchants and broke off trade with Britain, the revolutionaries remained sensitive to the needs of neutral merchants, for both political and economic reasons, and were pragmatic enough not to disrupt commerce with other enemy countries. Neutrals, in particular, often provided France's most secure links to the outside world and the Convention was receptive to their complaints. The services and goods which foreign merchants offered prevented the revolutionaries from pursuing the policies of autarky which would have excluded foreigners from French commerce.

Like merchants, bankers and financiers suffered from popular hostility and suspicion on one hand, while being saved by the services which they might offer to the government on the other. The flight of capital and the low value of *assignats* brought much suspicion to bear on foreign moneymen.[182] Many were believed to have disproportionate political influence, for which there was some evidence: the Dutchman de Kock and the Belgian Proli were in league with the Hébertists, while the Dutch Vandenyvers were bankers to Madame du Barry and Anacharsis Cloots. Others, such as Walckiers and Boyd, were

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[181]AP, lxxxiii, 410; Lefebvre, 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', 250 - 251, 253 - 254, 260.
[182]Lefebvre, 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', 244.

implicated in the 'foreign plot', with the latter having ties to both Chabot and William Pitt. Jean-François Perregaux from Neuchâtel furnished Proli with money when he fled to Boulogne in November 1793.[183] Bankers and financiers were sometimes suspected of speculating on exchange rates on behalf of enemy governments and of being the channels for their subversive funds. Boyd was arrested in June 1793 after being accused of being in correspondence with Pitt and of distributing money for the counter-revolution, but he was released within a month.[184] Such fears about the machinations of bankers and their international network were not produced by the Terror, but were already of a ripe age and could trace their roots deep into the eighteenth century.[185]

The problem for financiers and bankers, foreign and French alike, was similar to that of merchants. Foreign connections and correspondence were an integral part of their activities. Perregaux's main operations were in Paris, but for a long time he had lines of credit extending across western Europe, including London banking houses. Swiss and Genevan bankers almost monopolised the role of financial intermediary between London and Paris, with Boyd, Ker and the Vandenyvers sharing in this lucrative business.[186] Boyd was banker to the British government. In April 1790 Walckiers, although apparently a Vonckist, undertook missions to London on behalf of Marie-Christine, sister to Leopold II and regent of the Austrian Netherlands.[187] In peacetime, and even in the early months of the war, such relations were considered perfectly legitimate and desirable. By the autumn of 1793 they seemed subversive. They would become increasingly incriminating as the war, the Terror and the political conflict in Paris intensified. Not all of the revolutionaries' suspicions were mere fantasies, for there is evidence to suggest that some foreign bankers, such as Boyd, Ker and Perregaux, did use their connections for subversive means.[188]

By the autumn of 1793, the developing revolutionary phobia for foreign financiers was finding expression in legislation. On 7 September, during discussion of the decree confiscating the property of enemy subjects, Danton asked for a measure which would 'atteindre les banquiers résidant en France qui, par les plus criminelles manoeuvres, n'ont

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[183]Hampson, *The Life and Opinions of Maximilien Robespierre*, 239.
[184]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 142.
[185]See, for example, Jarrett, *The begetters of Revolution*, 197, 203, 211 - 212.
[186]Lüthy, *La banque protestante en France*, ii, 318; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 102.
[187]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 107.
[188]Hampson, *The Life and Opinions of Maximilien Robespierre*, 214 - 215; Hampson, *Danton*, 173; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 100, 152 - 153.

cessé de conspirer contre la patrie et de travailler à la contre-révolution."[189] That night the governing committees placed seals on the papers of all foreign bankers.[190] Two days later the Convention lifted the seals and released into house arrest those being held in *maisons d'arrêt*.[191] This about-turn was based on arguments presented on 8 September by Ramel of the *Commission des Finances*, who warned that foreign businessmen owed more to French citizens than vice versa, so that to freeze the accounts held by foreign bankers in France would be to deprive French manufacturers and merchants of the payment of their debts.[192] This wavering by the Convention was not surprising, because the revolutionaries remained unclear about the economic and political effects of the unprecedented measures they were taking. None the less, the suspicion towards foreign financiers was deep-rooted, as the Vandenyvers discovered.

On 8 December, Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver was sent to the guillotine with his sons and associates, Edme-Jean-Baptiste and Antoine-Augustin. The most sensational part of the charges was their association with Madame du Barry, who had been their client since 1771 and to whom they had extended some substantial credit during her four journeys to London between 1791 and 1793. Although the Vandenyvers may simply have been doing their job as her bankers, they were accused of correspondence both with an *émigré* and with the enemy. None the less, they could not control what du Barry did with the money while she was in London. She was entertained by Forth, a British agent known to the French government, she met William Pitt and lent the *émigré* cardinal de la Rochefoucauld 200,000 *livres*. These indiscretions were enough to condemn the Vandenyvers to death.[193]

Suspicion of bankers finally gelled into more general action on 25 December 1793, when Robespierre persuaded the Convention to put on trial those bankers, many of whom were foreign, who were charged with treason or conspiracy with the enemy.[194] This was clearly in response to the thickening foreign plot, but can also be seen as the extreme

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[189]AP, lxxiii, 491.
[190]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 149 - 150.
[191]AP, lxxiii, 598.
[192]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 150.
[193]Wallon, *Histoire du tribunal révolutionnaire*, ii, 221 - 230; Lüthy, *La banque protestante en France*, ii, 323; Hampson, *The Life and Opinions of Maximilien Robespierre*, 213 - 214.
[194]AP, lxxxii, 299.

outcome of suspicions towards foreign financiers which had existed since before 1789. It was at this time that Perregaux had his papers seized and inspected.[195]

Foreign bankers whose dealings did not incriminate them were safe from persecution if they could be of service. Lack of foreign exchange dogged the government in the Year II and on 26 February 1794 all Parisian bankers were obliged to subscribe to a banker's draft which permitted the government to exchange 50 million *livres* for foreign currency. The chairman of the committee overseeing the subscription was Perregaux, whose contacts with Switzerland were useful in this exercise.[196]

As with merchants, foreign bankers were cast under suspicion for connections which might have been considered uncontroversial outside the extraordinary circumstances of war and Terror, but which now seemed suspect. The Vandenyvers paid the ultimate penalty for serving one of their clients. Others, such as de Kock and Proli, were embroiled in revolutionary politics and died because they were on the losing side. Bankers as a whole suffered for the specific animosity which was directed in the Year II against financiers. This was nothing particularly new, as *agiotage* and international banking networks had long aroused hostility, particularly for their alleged influence in French domestic politics. What was new were the circumstances, in which hostility and suspicion could be translated into charges of subversion, and where such charges could lead to the scaffold. On the other hand, the revolutionary government like all others needed money and credit, which dictated a certain pragmatism. For all their shady transactions, Walckiers and Perregaux remained at liberty. Perregaux probably survived because his connections with international money markets were useful to the French government in securing foreign exchange.

Pragmatism also ensured that those foreigners employed in manufacturing were the most sheltered from revolutionary legislation. It was not even necessary to have skills which were directly related to the war effort in order to be protected. When in 1793 a group of clockmakers from Neuchâtel arrived in Besançon, the representatives on mission to the Doubs sold the craftsmen a *maison nationale* and paid them indemnities for the travel costs incurred by their apprentices. The hope that these foreign artisans would disseminate clockmaking skills throughout France was shared by the central government. As more foreign workers arrived over the course of the Year II, the Besançon

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[195]Hampson, *The Life and Opinions of Maximilien Robespierre*, 213.
[196]Lefebvre, 'Le commerce extérieur en l'an II', 253, 264.

manufacture was offered 60,000 *livres*, a concession for fifteen years, another *maison nationale* to house fifty artisans rent free and a three-year promise by the government to buy the clocks at a price set by experts. The practices of the Ancien Régime in attracting foreign technology and craftsmen into France were still being used by the Republic of Virtue.[197]

Those already in France were protected from the worst of the legislation aimed against foreigners. On 28 August 1793, the commissioners at the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle exempted all foreign workers manufacturing arms and military equipment from the law of 1 August 1793 ordering the arrest of all enemy subjects.[198] Such workers were not easily replaced. In response to the same law,[199] the Unité section in Paris sent out commissioners to list those to whom it may have applied. If the fifty-eight names crossed out from the 266 entries can be considered to have left the section, of the remaining 208 enemy subjects, the nationalities of 143 are known:

Place of origin	Quantity	%[200]
Empire[201]	76	53
Belgium and Liège	14	9.8
Prussia	11	7.6
Britain and Ireland	10	7
United Provinces	8	6
Piedmont and Sardinia	7	5
Austria	6	4
Others[202]	11	7.6
Total	143	100

The majority of enemy subjects living in the section therefore came from the smaller German states, but a substantial minority (42, or approximately 29.6%) came from the

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[197]*Moniteur*, No. 98 (8 Nivôse III/28 December 1794).
[198]AP, lxxiii, 119.
[199]AN, F/7/4779 ('Section de l'Unité: liste des Etrangers domiciliés dans l'étendue de la section', n.d.). The dossier includes a list of French citizens willing to act as guardians over the seals placed on foreigners' papers. The law of 1 August provided for seals to be placed on the papers of foreigners arrested. Those of 6 September and 16 October, which also pronounced the arrest of enemy subjects, and the law of 27 Germinal, which expelled foreigners from Paris, did not.
[200]Percentages are approximate.
[201]Excluding Prussia and Austria.
[202]Italy (apart from Piedmont and Sardinia), Spain, Peru and Poland (this last was hardly an enemy power).

main belligerent powers in Europe. By the application of most laws between 1 August and 27 Germinal, most of those enemy subjects who remained stood a good chance of remaining at liberty because even the sweeping terms of the laws of 9 and 16 October were only vigorously applied to the British and Irish, who made up only 7% of foreigners in the section.

By far the most important factor in their survival, however, was not their nationality, but their occupation. Of the 208 enemy subjects listed, the occupations of 135 are known:

Occupation	Quantity	%[203]
Tailor	57	42
Shoemaker	33	24
Bootmaker	4	3
Cabinetmaker	4	3
Mason	4	3
Saddler	3	2.2
Hatter	3	2.2
Furrier	3	2.2
Locksmith	3	2.2
Joiner	3	2.2
Goldsmith	2	1.4
Watchmaker	2	1.4
Cane-maker	1	0.8
Stocking-maker	1	0.8
Broom-maker	1	0.8
Carpet-maker	1	0.8
Engraver	1	0.8
Wig-maker	1	0.8
Cutler	1	0.8
Pinmaker	1	0.8
Currier	1	0.8
Apprentice tinmaker	1	0.8
Skinner	1	0.8
Printer	1	0.8
Apothecary	1	0.8
'Marchand'	1	0.8
Total	135	100

If the tailors, shoe-makers, boot-makers and saddlers could all make direct contributions to the equipping of the army, then almost three-quarters (approximately 71.2%) of artisans who were enemy subjects performed tasks which might plausibly have

[203]Percentages are approximate.

contributed to the war effort. Another twenty-three (approximately 17.4%) might also have had potential, either because their skills may have been of direct relevance, or because they were transferable to military use: the cabinetmakers, masons, hatters, locksmiths, joiners, the cutler, currier, apprentice tinmaker, skinner, printer and apothecary. In all, 120 (about 88.6%) of the artisans had skills which might have been useful to the war effort. The fifteen others (around 11.4%) worked in those luxury trades which appear to have been difficult to put to use for the war (it is not clear what product the 'marchand' was selling). This small proportion might be explained mainly by the collapse in demand for their services which the Revolution and the war brought.[204]

What these figures suggest is that, up to August 1793 at the earliest, many enemy subjects in Paris had chosen to stay where they were and to continue in their profession rather than migrate elsewhere. Secondly, the skills which the vast majority of foreign artisans offered suggested that they stood a very good chance of surviving the decrees against foreigners because of their usefulness to the war effort. Those foreigners making their contribution in workshops and manufactures were exempt from the law of 7 September, provided their sound principles and behaviour were vouched for by two worthy citizens of their commune.[205] Among those who benefited from this exception were Nicholas Joyce and Christopher White, both merchants and manufacturers of cotton. Denounced to the *comité de surveillance* of the Paris Observatoire section as British subjects on 16 September, they were allowed to remain free because of their occupation.[206]

Even with the uncompromising decrees of 9 and 16 October, which admitted of few or no exceptions, such foreigners had a reasonable chance of remaining at liberty because of their skills. Ramel criticised the decree of 16 October because 'on n'y a pas distingué les ouvriers occupés dans les ateliers et vivant du près de leur travail'.[207] The law of 9 October excepted those British subjects working in manufactures, which could be loosely or strictly interpreted by local authorities. In Toulouse, the brother of the Girondin deputy, Boyer-Fonfrède, was deprived of his prized Manchester weavers who had been introducing new looms into his manufacture since 1791.[208] In Choisy-sur-Seine, however,

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[204]AN, F/7/4779 ('Section de l'Unité: liste des Etrangers domiciliés dans l'étendue de la section', n.d.).
[205]AP, lxxiii, 463.
[206]AN, F/7*/2514 ('Section de l'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance').
[207]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 446 ('Résidences et réquisitions: Messidor - Fructidor II').
[208]Lyons, *France under the Directory*, 187.

James White was released by an order of the Convention, dated 6 January 1794, because of his occupation. He was employed by two American citizens developing a means of making French rivers more navigable.[209] In Normandy, where small colonies of British artisans in textiles had remained largely unmolested, municipal authorities protected them by citing clauses which exempted those who worked in industry.[210] Such evidence ought to be balanced by the observations of Meister, who returning to Paris in 1795, noticed the change in the capital's working population: there were fewer foreign craftsmen, most of whom had fled in order to work in the peace and plenty of their homelands.[211] In Paris, the personal well-being of foreign artisans probably varied from section to section and, in the provinces, from one municipality or commune to the next.

It is, however, clear that substantial numbers of foreign artisans and manufacturers, even those from countries at war with France, remained at liberty because they were craftsmen. Of 7810 *cartes de sûreté* issued by three of the four sections of the Faubourg Saint-Marcel in the Year II, those given to foreigners remained a small proportion of the total, but what is significant is the nationalities represented. Among the most numerous were people of unequivocally enemy nationality, including the Netherlands, Austria and some of the Italian and Imperial states. Naturally, there was also a heavy presence of those who might be considered French, the Belgians in particular, and those from neutral countries such as Switzerland.[212] In Tarare, an Irish prisoner of war who had once worked under a Glasgow weaver introduced local muslin-weavers to more advancd looms. These machines were gradually adopted in the region.[213]

The law of 27 Germinal explicitly excluded from its provisions workers employed in arms manufactures and 'les étrangers ouvriers vivant du travail de leurs mains', provided they had worked at their trade since before August 1793, and 'les marchands détaillans', provided they had been established in France since May 1789.[214] The Committee of Public Safety also exempted any foreigner involved in the manufacturing of sails and all 'marchands, fabricants, chefs de manufactures, d'atteliers, d'usines, les citoyens employés dans les fabriques manufactures et usines' in nineteen different towns, mostly on the coast

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[209]AP, lxxxiii, 48 - 49.
[210]Cobb, 'Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire', 110.
[211]Meister, *Souvenirs de mon dernier voyage à Paris*, 78 - 79.
[212]Burstin, H., *Le Faubourg Saint-Marcel à l'époque révolutionnaire. Structure économique et composition sociale* (Paris: Société des Études Robespierristes/CNRS, 1983), 81 - 82, 318 - 319.
[213]Henderson, *Britain and Industrial Europe*, 26.
[214]AP, lxxxviii, 649; lxxxix, 29 - 30.

or the frontiers, provided they had worked there for at least six months. There was, however, one condition attached: representatives on mission were to keep track of their *civisme* and their utility.[215] The committee also placed under its wing individual manufacturers and artisans whom it considered to be of use, because they provided employment or because their products were of benefit to the public at large. In Calais, among the foreigners who enjoyed such exemptions were a British soap manufacturer and the Dutch printers whose tasks included the publication of the maximum prices. In Paris, the government requisitioned a Dutch or German printer charged with the work emanating from the Committee of Public Safety.[216]

Some still thought it prudent to show that they had patriotic credentials. Oberkampf used his money and his position as the largest employer in Jouy-en-Josas to maintain an image of political orthodoxy. In May 1794 he bought *biens nationaux*, showing a personal, economic commitment to the Revolution. He also gave or loaned large sums of money for the war effort, including 160,000 *livres* to the first forced loan, decreed on 20 May 1793. Late in February 1794, he was summoned by Perregaux's *Commission du commerce et des approvisionnements* aimed at buying foreign currency. Oberkampf added his signature to those of forty-one merchants and bankers to raise 50 million *livres* for this purpose. A month later, he presented a full set of equipment for a cavalryman to the local Jacobin club, at a cost of 3,192 *livres* which came from his own pocket. His status as a large employer alone brought him recognition from the revolutionary government. On 23 June 1794, Couthon visited the manufacture and gave him a title of recognition on behalf of the Nation, 'd'avoir entretenu 1,100 ouvriers des deux sexes'. The number was an exaggeration, but Oberkampf was not about to argue with the Committee of Public Safety when it was congratulating him.[217]

His engagement with local politics was also a means of protecting himself and his business. He joined the Jacobins of Jouy-en-Josas on 30 December 1793, one month after the club had been established. With his patronage as a large employer Oberkampf soon controlled the society. Oberkampf and his employees made impressive patriotic

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[215]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 445 ('Résidences et réquisitions arrêtés Vendémiaire - Prairial an II', arrêtés of 29 Germinal, 19 Floréal). The towns included in the general exemption were Marseille, Cette, Agde, Bayonne, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes, L'Orient, Saint Malo, Le Havre, Rouen, Boulogne, Abbeville, Amiens, Calais, Dunc-Libre (Dunkirk), Saint Quentin, Sedan and Saint-Omer.
[216]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 445 ('Résidences et réquisitions arrêtés Vendémiaire - Prairial an II', arrêtés of 10 Floréal, 22 Floréal, 26 Floréal).
[217]Chassagne, *Oberkampf*, 171, 174 - 175, 176, 184 n.65.

contributions at the meetings. His nephew Samuel Widmer used his skills as a chemist to extract elements which could be used to make saltpetre from ferns collected by young citizens in the forests. Every *décade*, Oberkampf funded the club's distribution of 400 *livres*' worth of bread to the town's poor and sick. While such activities might be regarded as the paternalism of a great manufacturer, it was paternalism with a political face. By behaving as a good patriot Oberkampf effaced the sins of his recent ennoblement and, perhaps, shielded himself and his associates from suspicion over his foreign origins. If it was merely a ploy, it paid off. When Christian-Henry Voët, a Prussian engraver who worked at Oberkampf's plant and who was also an *agent national*, denounced his employer to the Committee of General Security, it was his reputation, and not that of Oberkampf, which was ruined. The Committee could not believe that he was 'entâché de modérantisme, de royalisme et suspect d'accaparement' and in May 1794, Voët was expelled from the Jacobin club. Oberkampf himself gave him his old job back.[218] Some were not as shrewd or as fortunate as Oberkampf. Pierre and Louis Badger, two silk weavers and sons of the British entrepreneur who had set up a weaving operation in Lyon, were shot in the city on 28 November and 4 December 1793, condemned for their part in the Federalist uprising.[219] As with other foreigners in France, artisans and manufacturers who fell from the net of political orthodoxy paid the ultimate price.

The treatment of foreign artisans, manufacturers, bankers and merchants shows that the revolutionaries were pragmatic when they dealt with the economy during the war. It is true that hostility to foreign merchants and bankers created an atmosphere in which many of their activities suddenly seemed suspicious and treasonous. Some merchants and financiers certainly fell foul of the authorities for no other reason than their everyday activities involved foreign correspondence, which could be construed as contact with the enemy. For the most part, however, the revolutionaries recognised the importance of foreigners in the French economy and were reluctant, for both economic and political reasons, to exclude them totally. Just as they developed price and wage controls under pressure and with much reluctance, so the revolutionaries dallied when it came to cutting off commercial and financial ties.

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[218]Chassagne, *Oberkampf*, 173 - 175; Chapman & Chassagne, *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century*, 122.
[219]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 350.

Not only did they adhere to the principles of free trade, but they were also uncertain about the economic and political consequences of protectionism. Foreign merchants brought cargoes which fed, clothed and supplied the French armed forces and which ensured some social stability in the larger cities. The networks of foreign bankers opened lines of credit and allowed the purchase of foreign currency. Foreign artisans and manufacturers created employment and produced the uniforms and equipment needed to wage the war. Reluctance to close the door on these contributions explains the exemptions offered to foreigners and the indecision with which the Convention and the authorities often approached the role of foreigners in the French economy.

In the end, the revolutionaries did not establish a 'commerce national' or subsribe to a 'nationalisme économique', because they never entirely excluded foreigners from French commercial and economic life. It is true that British merchants were prevented from trading in France because they were subjects of an enemy government, but this was the furthest the French economy excluded on the basis of nationality alone. The revolutionaries were pragmatic enough not to break off commercial relations with other enemy countries, including the Dutch. Above all, neutral merchants were treated with sensitivity as the Convention sought to encourage them to import vital supplies. It is true that trade was 'nationalised' in the sense that the government sought to control and co-ordinate it, but foreign merchants and bankers played a part in the administration of this control because the revolutionaries recognised their potential in attracting capital and merchandise. Other enemy subjects, including some British, continued their activities as artisans and manufacturers in France. Most of the laws against foreigners excluded them from imprisonment or expulsion because the revolutionaries assumed that they had something to contribute to the war effort. Where the law did not explicitly exempt them, local authorities often demanded protection for them and vouched for their usefulness, or else the revolutionary government itself used its powers to requistion them for the Republic.

All this was done, however, on the understanding that foreign merchants, bankers, manufacturers and artisans did not abuse their freedom. The Badgers were executed for their part in the Federalist revolt in Lyons. The Vandenyvers were unfortunate enough to have as their client an indiscreet, if generous, former royal mistress. De Kock and Proli died not because they were bankers, but because they were associated with a political faction which dared to oppose the revolutionary government. As so many other foreigners discovered, failure to remain within the increasingly exclusive club of the

politically orthodox had a high price. Oberkampf therefore went out of his way to prove his *civisme* and enjoyed the confidence of the government, but for the vast majority of merchants, manufacturers and artisans, the safest policy was to avoid revolutionary politics altogether.

VII

The period of the Terror was marked by xenophobia, with the fear of spies and of malign foreign influence producing sweeping measures against foreigners. The fears and suspicion of foreigners were certainly produced in part by revolutionary ideology. Some rhetoric did equate patriotism with the exclusion or even the death of certain foreigners. The decree of 7 Prairial, for example, stemmed in part from the logic which placed all opposition to the government *hors la nation* and even *hors nature*. Xenophobia, however, was not the exclusive product of revolutionary ideology. Distrust and scorn of the British, Austrians and Spanish, in particular, were rooted in prejudices which predated the Revolution. Revolutionary ideology merely gave novel, immediate expression to these hatreds, which in turn were intensified by the unprecedented scale of war and internal crisis.

Many of the measures taken against foreigners were however dictated less by xenophobia or patriotic ideology than by practical concerns. The disbandment of foreign legions may finally have realised Dubois-Crancé's vision of a citizen army, but the actual reasons behind the measure, such as concerns over their loyalty and their viability, were more pragmatic. Likewise the first general measures against foreigners were taken either as reprisals or, however misguided, for the domestic security of the Republic. Revolutionary pragmatism, however, tended to limit most of the laws against foreigners. The treatment of foreign radicals, for example, showed that despite the sweeping terms of the decrees against enemy subjects, ideological conformity could still cut across nationality. Those foreign troops who were arrested and denied postings fell into that predicament not because they were foreign, but because their political loyalties and competence were suspect. Even a few clergymen and seminary students escaped arrest when there was unequivocal proof of their republican credentials and their usefulness.

As well as political orthodoxy, utility was an important criterion for the survival and freedom of foreigners during the Terror. Soldiers disbanded from the legions were

distributed to regular units rather than sent away, potentially to the enemy. Foreign patriots remained at liberty, unless they were too embroiled with the losing sides in revolutionary politics, because the revolutionary government envisaged a future use for them once the French armies advanced across the frontiers again. If certain foreign bankers and merchants could fall foul of the authorities because the very nature their activities entailed 'correspondence with the enemy', the revolutionaries also realised that they had important potential in supplying the beleaguered Republic with foreign exchange, materials and food. Above all, artisans were protected from every law on foreigners, and these exemptions were sometimes loosely interpreted to include even those whose contributions to the war effort were not immediately apparent. The pragmatism of the revolutionaries limited the translation of both xenophobia and ideology into the exclusion of foreigners.

Chapter Six. Foreigners between Thermidor and Campo Formio.

Si vous rapportez le séquestre, vous rendrez aux étrangers, et les étrangers ne vous rendront pas. C'est donner à nos ennemis obérés les moyens de faire la campagne prochaine. Il existe, pendant la guerre comme pendant la paix, un droit des gens. Il faut qu'on nous rende écu pour écu, prisonnier pour prisonnier, million pour million.

- Thirion, deputy to the Convention, 9 Nivôse III.[1]

Huit jours après la proclamation de la loi, soixante & deux mille étrangers s'étaient présentés devant le bureau de la Police & le Directoire, pour en être exemptés, & avoir la permission de rester à Paris. Mais après un examen sévere, il n'y eut pas la dixieme partie de ces solliciteurs qui obtient une réponse favorable.

- Friedrich Meyer, witnessing repressive laws against foreigners in May 1796.[2]

The period after the Terror has been described as a period in which conditions for foreigners in France improved. Cosmopolitanism flourished once more and the repressive measures against foreigners, and enemy subjects in particular, were steadily repealed. The assumption has been that the more draconian measures taken against foreigners were related to the system of the Terror. Once the Terror was dismantled, so too, the laws against foreigners would be lifted.[3] The repeal of the law of suspects, the law of 22 Prairial and the reduction in number of the *comités de surveillance* benefited foreigners as well as French people. The Thermidorians, however, proved more reluctant to repeal the specific laws against enemy subjects than they were those which pressed down on French citizens and foreigners alike. Thirion was not an isolated politician in stressing the need for caution. The very fact that he cited older precedents of reciprocity and the *droit des gens* suggests that some revolutionaries were yet not ready to accept a return to the cosmopolitan ideas associated with the earlier years of the French Revolution.

If the Thermidorians decided not to take Thirion's advice and repealed the decree ordering the sequestration of foreigners' property, along with other laws such as that of 27 Germinal and 7 Prairial II, there was no guarantee that they would not re-emerge in a new

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[1]*Moniteur*, No. 101 (11 Nivôse/31 January 1794).
[2]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, i, 276.
[3]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 183.

form, as Friedrich Meyer discovered in 1796. This was because the laws against foreigners were bound up less with the Terror than with the same force which had lain beneath the Terror, the war. Despite the success of the French armies, the Thermidorians and the Directory retained the same fears about foreign conspiracy and espionage as before. This was less because of any logic inherent in revolutionary ideology (the period actually witnessed a return of cosmopolitan rhetoric) but for the very fact that for as long as the war continued, the domestic pressures it aggravated still threatened the stability of the Republic. When real 'conspiracies' with some foreign involvement such as the royalist landings at Quiberon and the Babouvist plot actually emerged, the reflex of the post-Thermidor regimes was to enact measures controlling foreigners in France, naturally using as their model the laws of the Year II. The return of cosmopolitan rhetoric did not in reality herald the return of the civil freedom which foreigners had enjoyed before the war. Instead, it shrouded in attractive packaging the expansionist and exploitative policies of the post-Thermidor revolutionaries towards their neighbours. This pragmatism was also turned inwards and applied to foreigners inside France. Whenever the authorities felt threatened by foreigners, they naturally reverted to the practices of the Year II.

I

If the measures taken against foreigners in the years 1793 - 1794 were intimately bound up with the Terror, then the laws could be expected to have been razed as the Terror itself was dismantled. This did not happen: if the machinery of the Terror was disassembled, most of the measures against foreigners remained in place for longer. The revolutionaries sometimes allowed their residual cosmopolitanism some expression, but the xenophobia which had flourished in the acidic soil of the Terror never disappeared. The revolutionaries were still too likely to see foreign agents behind internal upheavals, but at least they seem to have regarded the measures taken against foreigners as temporary. Looking forward to more tranquil times, the Thermidorian civil code guaranteed foreigners the same civil rights as French citizens.[4]

French suspects were released from the beginning of August, but foreigners were freed only in a trickle. The contrast is neatly illustrated by Sir William Codrington, who wrote to a friend that 'my habitation became so thinned of its inhabitants that they transferred us

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[4]*Moniteur*, No. 79 (19 Frimaire III/9 December 1794).

to another prison'. He was released on 2 December 1794 only because a friend secured him an apprenticeship with a French printer, officially making him an artisan.[5] The three Belgian army suppliers arrested in Paris in August 1793 were not freed until 30 September.[6] Thomas Paine was only released on 4 November because his American citizenship was recognised by James Monroe, Morris's more sympathetic replacement as ambassador of the United States.[7] The decrees arresting all enemy subjects were never formally repealed and British subjects, in particular, only gained their freedom on an arbitrary basis, depending upon how much of a threat they were thought to pose. Guards were not withdrawn from the English Conceptionist and Benedictine nuns in Paris until March 1795. The unfortunate Elizabeth Pitt, believed, wrongly, to be the niece of the British Prime Minister, was not freed until June 1795. Henry Stevens, a British radical, was more fortunate, leaving the Luxembourg at the end of January that year. Most British subjects, however, seem to have been released between September 1794 and July 1795, unless, like Edward Barnston, they had been arrested for additional reasons. Barnston had been charged with possession of counter-revolutionary drawings and was not freed until November 1795.[8] Once released, large numbers of British and Irish subjects understandably applied for passports to leave the country.[9]

It was not just British subjects who were affected by Thermidorian reluctance to release foreigners from captivity. Karl von Hesse-Rheinfels had to wait until 13 November 1794 for his freedom while Miranda, despite his former ties to the Girondins, was not freed until 16 January, by decree of the Convention.[10] Meanwhile, enemy subjects newly arrived in France could still be arrested. Mathieu Ivanovich, a Hungarian subject, was arrested on 10 June 1795 shortly after his arrival in Paris.[11]

The law of 27 Germinal was not repealed until 8 December 1794. Until then, it was rigorously enforced. On 4 August 1794 William Stone had to petition for permission to

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[5]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 298 - 299.
[6]AN, BB/3/79 (Note of François von Héron, n.d.).
[7]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, ii, 142 - 149.
[8]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 150, 152, 160, 162, 163, 334 - 349.
[9]AN, D/III/368 - 370 ('Comité de Sûreté Générale et de Surveillance de la Convention Nationale aux Représentants du Peuple, Composant le Comité de Législation', 25 Floréal III).
[10]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 186 - 187; Robertson, *The Life of Miranda*, i, 148 - 149.
[11]AN, D/III/368 - 370 ('Aux Citoyens Représentans, Membres du Comité de Législation', 6 Messidor III).

live in a commune unaffected by the decree.[12] The Committee of Public Safety reiterated its commitment to executing the law on 19 September, although it still used its powers of requistion to protect certain foreigners, just as the 'Terrorist' Committee did.[13]

The Thermidorians were keener to release property from sequestration than foreigners from imprisonment, exile or surveillance. The motives appear to have been less any benevolence towards foreigners than the revolutionaries' beliefs in free trade and economic individualism, which they believed would be a better means of supplying the Republic with the goods it needed than the controlled economy of the Terror. On 29 December, the Convention lifted the sequestration on all foreign property save that of enemy princes, but only after intense debate.[14] Once enemy property was decreed free from confiscation, the way was open for a shower of claims for compensation from aggrieved foreigners.[15] The repeal of sequestration was also driven by a belief that French merchants and businessmen were on the whole the creditors, not the debtors, of foreigners. To release foreign property from confiscation could therefore only benefit the Republic's balance of trade. That the revolutionaries were motivated by French economic interests rather than any belief in the global benefits of free trade is shown by the restoration on 14 March 1797 of *contrainte par corps* for debt. The terms of the new law made no specific mention of foreigners, but the preamble spoke of giving 'au commerce de la République la splendeur et la Supériorité qu'il doit avoir'. Imprisonment for debt was to be applied in civil matters in precisely the same way as was before its abolition. In other words, foreigners were liable.[16]

If there were any illusions immediately after Thermidor that the revolutionaries were becoming more lax in their surveillance of foreigners, they were soon shattered in the bitter winter of 1794 - 1795. In the killing cold of *nonante-cinq*, food prices spiralled upwards to unprecedented levels. Anticipating trouble, Armand warned the Convention on behalf of the Committee of General Security on 16 January 1795 that 'les étrangers et les intrigans' had obtained *cartes de surêté*. In response, the Convention decreed the issue

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[12]AP, xciv, 176.
[13]AN, AF/II/61, plaquette 446 ('Résidences et réquisitions: Messidor - Fructidor II'). A poverty-stricken and blind foreign musician named Fridzery who had a family to feed was exempted from the law after a recommendation from the *comité d'instruction publique*.
[14]*Moniteur*, Nos. 95 (5 Nivôse III/25 December 1794), 99 (9 Nivôse III/29 December 1794), 101 (11 Nivôse III/31 December 1794), 102 (12 Nivôse III/1 January 1795).
[15]AN, D/III/368 - 370 ('Comité de Législation: Étrangers: Demandes de Mainlevée de Sequestre et Réclamations particulières').
[16]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 7, Dossier 167 ('Extrait du Bulletin des Loix, No. 112, an V').

of new *cartes de surêté* for everyone living or arriving in Paris. Those who arrived henceforth had to go to the *comité civil* of their section within twenty-four hours, where their passports would be given a visa after a brief questioning. If the committee's suspicions were aroused, they could arrest the newcomers. This was not much different from the surveillance imposed on foreigners during the Year II. Some of the Thermidorians objected on grounds of individual liberties, but the Convention chose to put order and stability before such considerations.[17] In his travelogue of his journey to Paris in 1796, Friedrich Meyer described at great length the inconvenience and time involved in complying with the law.[18] In the summer of 1798 another German traveller more sympathetic to the Revolution, Johann Heinzmann, noted that without a *carte de sûreté*, a foreigner could be arrested, but that this was necessary because of the possibility of disturbances.[19]

It was precisely this reasoning that led both the Thermidorian Convention and the Directory to enact laws of surveillance and even expulsion against foreigners. The insurrection in Paris during 1 - 4 Prairial III (20 - 23 May 1795) and the royalist landing at Quiberon on 27 June combined to stir the old fears of espionage and of foreign subversion. On 11 July 1795, ten days before the royalist bridgehead was crushed by Hoche, Mariette had the Convention decree that all enemy subjects who had arrived since 1 January 1792 were obliged to leave within eight days. Neutrals were required to stay at their port of entry while their passport was sent to the Committee of General Security to be stamped, which could mean a long wait. In an attempt to nullify any ill-effects such a provision might have had on trade, the decree permitted communes to issue temporary authorisations for merchants. Any foreigner found in a seditious meeting would be tried and punished as a spy, with the maximum penalty of death (a provision reiterated after the royalist uprisings of Vendémiaire III).[20] When it appeared that this, the law of 23 Messidor III, had not been executed, the Convention decreed that any foreigners found in contravention of the decree would also be punished as spies.[21] If the provisions of the law

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[17]*Moniteur*, Nos. 119 (29 Nivôse III/18 January 1795).
[18]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, i, 3 - 7.
[19]Heinzmann, J. G., *Voyage d'un Allemand à Paris, et retour par la Suisse* (Lausanne, Paris, Strasbourg, 1800), 14.
[20]*Moniteur*, No. 19 (19 Vendémiaire IV/11 October 1795).
[21]*Procès-Verbal de la Convention Nationale* (72 vols.) (Paris, 1792 - an IV/1795), lxv, 85; *Moniteur*, Nos. 297 (27 Messidor III/15 July 1795), 320 (20 Thermidor III/7 August 1795); Mathiez suggests that the law was never put into operation (*La Révolution et les étrangers*, 184n.).

were not relaxed even with the defeat of the royalists at Quiberon and the apparent triumph of revolutionary arms on the continent, it suggests that the revolutionaries regarded the measure as temporary only in the sense that it would be repealed when the Republic had achieved complete victory over all its opponents, foreign and domestic. If this is so, then in respect to foreigners at least the ghost of the Terror lived on long after its corpse had been buried by the Thermidorians.

The *feuilles de travail* of the minister of police, Cochon de Lapparent, between 27 March and 1 May 1796 reveal the law at work. On different occasions, he issued the district police commissioners or the *bureau central* of Paris with orders which included, firstly, the investigation of specific foreigners to see if they had obeyed the law of 23 Messidor; secondly, the surveillance of those who had, but who had aroused the suspicion of the authorities and, thirdly, the expulsion of others. On 1 May, he wrote to the *bureau central* 'pour l'inviter à redoubler de zèle dans l'ex^{on}. des lois contre les Etrangers qui affluent à Paris'. Meanwhile, every three days the *bureau central* addressed to the minister lists of foreigners lodging in *hôtels garnis*. Occasionally, the *bureau central* reminded certain hoteliers of their obligation to inform foreigners that they had to have their passports endorsed. The minister was helped, as before, by denunciations. On 27 April 1796, Cochon received word of 'beaucoup d'anglais qui dinent tous les jours à l'écu d'Orléans, rue d'enfer, et qu'on soupçonne d'être des aventuriers et des ennemis de la République'. Such surveillance only failed to reach the intensity of the Year II because the institutions were not so localised as they were during the Terror.[22]

As with much legislation during the Terror, however, the bark of the law was often worse than its bite. The passports belonging to neutral or allied citizens were, on the whole, endorsed by the ministry with little or no investigation. Only those whose behaviour or reputation aroused suspicion were treated with wariness. Cochon granted exemptions based on their individual merits, particularly to foreign radicals and refugees (mainly from Italy) and even to British subjects who appeared to be harmless. As before, a degree of republican commitment ensured that some foreigners escaped the vigour of the laws.[23]

Suspicion of foreigners was even carried into the debates on naturalisation and citizenship in the Constitution of the Year III. Pierre Daunou proposed that foreigners

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[22]AN, F/7/3081, dossier 1 ('Passeports et Étrangers: Analyse du Travail: Germinal - Messidor, an IV').
[23]AN, F/7/3081, dossier 1 ('Passeports et Étrangers: Analyse du Travail: Germinal - Messidor, an IV').

over twenty-one years of age, who had lived in France for seven years, paid direct taxation and in addition possessed property, a farm, or a commercial establishment could be naturalised once they had declared their intention to spend the rest of their lives in the country.[24] Like the civic oath required in the Consitution of 1791, this last declaration showed a commitment to France. With their more restrictive conditions, the terms of naturalisation of 1795 owed more to the Constitution of 1791 than to that of 1793. Stress on property ownership showed that the Thermidorians, like the Constituants, were determined that foreigners have a stake in the country before being admitted to citizenship. The only concession to those who were not wealthy enough to own property was, as in the Constitution of 1791, the alternative of marriage to a French citizen. Moreover, the Thermidorians omitted a clause which allowed the legislature to award citizenship to any foreigner deserving the honour. This decision reflected an absence of cosmopolitan idealism in the revolutionary application of citizenship.

The residence period of seven years was a reaction against the year-long requirement of the Constitution of 1793, but it was still longer than the five-year period prescribed by the Constituent Assembly. Behind this was a will to be absolutely certain that no ill-intentioned foreigner could easily gain the rights of citizenship. On 14 July 1795, Mailhe, criticising the new law for not going far enough to restrict access to naturalisation, said that the Constituent Assembly had made it easy to be naturalised because 'elle n'avait pas appris à connaître toute la perfidie des gouvernements qui nous environnent'. As for the 'anarchists' who wrote the Constitution of 1793, 'ils étaient d'accord avec les étrangers pour rendre odieux, avilir et dissoudre le gouvernement républicain'. He was especially dismissive of marriage to a French citizen as a precondition, as that made naturalisation too easy. Lakanal agreed, saying that a long period of residence was required because political rights could only be given to a foreigner once 'la république a acquis l'entière certitude de leur amour pour elle' and when those concerned had acquired a profound knowledge of French laws, customs and government 'or, cette étude est le fruit du temps et de l'expérience'.[25] Thermidorian stringency in the assimilation of foreigners into French citizenship reflected a sense that foreigners were to be watched. They were no longer the 'pilgrims of liberty' of 1789. No matter how much they sought to avoid a return to the Terror, both the Thermidorians and the Directory remained alert to foreigners. The

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[24]*Moniteur*, Nos. 298 (28 Messidor III/16 July 1795), 340 (10 Fructidor III/27 August 1795, suppl.).
[25]*Moniteur*, No. 298 (28 Messidor III/16 July 1795).

continuing war combined with the dual threat of Jacobinism and counter-revolution ensured that xenophobia never lurked far from the surface.

That legislation and attitudes towards foreigners were linked to political circumstances is shown by the law of 25 February 1796. Foreigners already needed the permission of the *bureau central* of Paris in order to live in the capital, but a resurgence of Jacobinism alarmed the government. Although fed in part by a drift into Paris of French Jacobins fleeing harassment in the provinces, the revival was regarded as the product of more sinister, alien forces by some in the Directory. Three days before the government closed down the Club du Panthéon, a Directorial edict bemoaned the number of foreigners who wandered freely in Paris, despite the laws against them, and called upon the laws on passports to be 'rappelées à leur première exécution'. It revoked all the resident permits issued beforehand by the *bureau central* or the *commission de police*. Although the foreigners affected could obtain renewals, they would only be for 'des délais fort brefs'. Those who were refused new permits were ordered to leave Paris. In a reinforcement of surveillance, the *bureau central* 'déploiera la plus grande vigilance sur toute l'étendue du canton de Paris' and was commanded to arrest any foreigners who were found breaking the law. Without the sectional *comités de surveillance* of old, such a task was probably not as vigorously prosecuted as the Directory may have wished. Moreover, there remained a degree of pragmatic flexibility, for the edict exempted those who could show 'des causes d'utilité et justice'.[26]

Once the Club du Panthéon was suppressed, the fear inspired by the pushing of opposition underground led the Directory to reinvigorate the laws of surveillance when it returned to the issue on 1 March. In a message to the Council of Five Hundred, the Directors requested a special law to allow the police to keep an eye on foreigners staying in private homes and not just in inns and *maisons garnies*, whose obligatory registers were already open to official inspection. It was convinced that 'les plus dangereux ont évité ces domiciles'.[27] In other words, the Directory sought a return to the intrusive vigilance of the Terror, at least against foreigners. Moreover, unlike most legislation during the Year II, no distinction was made between enemy subjects, neutrals or allies, possibly because the government imagined that foreign Jacobins dedicated to the overthrow of the constitution were unlikely to be only from enemy countries.

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[26]*Moniteur*, No. 166 (16 Ventôse IV/6 March 1796).
[27]*Moniteur*, No. 166 (16 Ventôse IV/6 March 1796).

On 12 March, the Council of Five Hundred addressed the Directory's concerns by adopting a bill concerned both with French citizens who were not normally domiciled in Paris and with foreigners. It declared that 'l'affluence des étrangers qui se rendent dans la commune de Paris exige des mesures qui activent la surveillance du gouvernement'. All those who had arrived in Paris since 1 Fructidor III (18 August 1795) were required to present themselves at their arrondissement, to state the address of their lodgings in Paris and to present their passports, all within three days. In addition, those citizens putting up foreigners in any way were responsible for making a similar declaration.[28]

Some revolutionaries shared the Directory's fears of foreign influence in Paris, while others suggested that such police measures were not only counter-productive, but a dangerous extension to the powers of central government. The fears inflamed by the Jacobin revival divided the revolutionaries between those who sought to exclude foreigners and those who did not. Both sides of the argument, however, revealed a fear of popular uprising and Jacobin-inspired Terror. Showing his nervousness about the insurrectionary potential offered by a combination of hunger and political radicalism, Ludot claimed that foreigners should not be tolerated in France at all, because they were 'bouches inutiles' when there was a *disette de subsistances* and depreciation of the *assignats*. Echoing Robespierre, he warned that foreigners had always played a part in the Revolution and that 'la France a retenti du parti de l'étranger'. Others such as Cadroy argued that foreigners were not a threat to the Republic, but brought benefits to the country. To limit their freedom would be to deny France the wealth and skills which they brought. If Cadroy and Ludot shared a fear of Jacobinism, the former was enlisting the cosmopolitan principles of the early Revolution to support his arguments. He also suggested that while the government had targeted the Club du Panthéon, the proposed law was wrong to assume that other unknown people also had hostile intentions. 'En parlant vaguement des étrangers dans Paris, de leurs intentions présumées et de la suspicion,' he warned, 'ne craignons nous-mêmes de ne poursuivre que l'ombre.' Above all, he feared that the extension of powers to the police over foreigners and new arrivals to Paris would not be the end of the story, that the revolutionaries stood once more at the top of the slippery slope which led down to the police state of the Terror.[29] Despite such

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[28]*Moniteur*, Nos. 172 (22 Ventôse IV/12 March 1796), 177 (27 Ventôse IV/17 March 1796).

[29]*Moniteur*, No. 176 (26 Ventôse IV/16 March 1796).

views, the Council of Five Hundred adopted the proposals and they passed through the Council of Elders on 17 March.[30]

Nine days later the same council rejected a proposal which obliged neutrals and allies to renew their passport visas every three months. Its members were not opposed to the idea of passport controls, but they believed the law to be inexecutable. Deputies in both chambers certainly saw a need for surveillance of foreigners, and it remained tied to fear of Jacobin conspiracy in the wake of the ban on the Club du Panthéon. On 21 March, the Council of Five Hundred heard that while circumstances demanded 'une plus grande surveillance à l'égard des voyageurs français', it was still more important to keep a strict watch over foreigners. The continuing conflict also convinced the revolutionaries of the need for strict controls over foreigners. Dumas told the Council of Elders that 'ce n'est qu'à la paix que vous pourrez vous débarrasser de vos lois de police'. Until then, France must maintain these measures which restricted individual liberties in order to defend liberty. None the less, Dumas gave the first indication that passports and visas might become a permanent part of the bureaucratic paraphernalia which cluttered the lives of travellers. Travel documents should become, he suggested, 'un principe de droit public ... vous poserez ainsi les bases d'une police respective entre les nations'.[31]

Despite the rejection of this particular measure, existing legislation - such as the law of 17 March - proved onerous enough for some visitors. Friedrich Meyer arrived in Paris in the night of 31 March and early next morning the law-abiding *hôtelier* warned Meyer and his fellow-travellers that their first duty was to exchange their passports for what he called *cartes d'étrangers*. Likewise the host had to declare his guests and he accompanied all five, including servants, to the committee of the Mont-Blanc arrondissement, where they had to get their visas. Besides complaining about the filth in the offices, he complained that the law was so vague that the officials were confused over its execution. They were passed from one office to another, in the manner still familiar to those who have had occasion to deal with state bureaucracy. They finished up at the *bureau central* of the municipality at the Palais de Justice, where, over the course of an hour and a half, their documents were stamped, signed and exchanged in three different offices for 'les cartes, le palladium de la sûreté de Paris'.[32]

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[30]*Moniteur*, Nos. 181 (1 Germinal IV/21 March 1796), 183 (3 Germinal IV/23 March 1796).
[31]*Moniteur*, Nos. 186 (6 Germinal IV/26 March 1796); 193 (13 Germinal IV/2 April 1796).
[32]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, i, 3 - 6.

Another crisis provoked yet more measures against foreigners. On 10 May 1796, the day Babeuf and his 'Equals' were arrested, the Directory called for the expulsion from Paris of a variety of people. The legislative councils obliged that same day by excluding, among others, all foreigners not attached to consulates and who had arrived in Paris since 1789. The penalty for non-compliance with this, the law of 21 Floréal, was deportation. The fact that the Italian Filippo Buonarroti was among the conspirators undoubtedly secured the inclusion of foreigners in the measure, but such treatment had almost become a reflex anyway.[33] On 3 September the law was extended to include Vendôme, the seat of the high court of justice specially assembled for the trial of the Babouvists.[34]

When on 11 May Meyer complained to Sieyès about a measure which could only have been prompted by a handful of foreigners, the revolutionary shrugged: 'Que voulez-vous faire, me dit-il, quelques coquins en sont la cause, & beaucoup d'honnêtes gens en souffrent.' Meyer was not the only person to object, as foreign ambassadors showered the Directory with protests. In the wake of the Babeuf conspiracy, the Directory and the Councils clearly saw order rather than individual liberties as the priority. Meyer reported that the law was rigorously applied. Using the registers of foreigners collected by the arrondissements from the issue of *cartes de sûreté*, foreigners living in the capital were sent a letter informing them of the law. Immediately, the Luxembourg and the ministry of police were besieged by foreigners and others clamouring for exemptions. Those who were fortunate enough to receive such dispensation had to renew their *cartes de sûreté*. Meyer secured permission to remain in Paris from the minister of foreign affairs, Charles Delacroix.[35] Theobald Wolfe Tone received his dispensation from the Director Carnot on 20 May.[36] Eventually, the expulsion of all foreigners from Paris and Vendôme was revoked on 29 June 1797 after the Spanish patriot Marchena had complained that he had been harrassed on account of his foreign birth, despite his naturalisation as a French citizen.[37] With the Babouvists safely tried and convicted a month earlier without a tremor in the streets of Paris, the immediate stimulus behind the law had also disappeared.

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[33]*Moniteur*, Nos. 237 (27 Floréal IV/16 May 1796), 238 (28 Floréal IV/17 May 1796).
[34]*Moniteur*, Nos. 351 (21 Fructidor IV/7 September 1796), 353 (23 Fructidor IV/9 September 1796).
[35]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, i, 275 - 278.
[36]Tone, *Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone*, ii, 113.
[37]*Moniteur*, Nos. 270 (30 Prairial V/18 June 1797), 289 (19 Messidor V/7 July 1797).

The end of the Terror certainly signalled an improvement in the conditions of foreigners. The vast majority imprisoned under the laws of 9 - 16 October 1793 were eventually released and others felt safe enough to return from exile. After 9 Thermidor there was never another law decreeing the arrest of enemy subjects and the confiscation of their property. When legislation was levelled against foreigners, as in the Terror the authorities used their discretionary powers to exempt those whom they believed to be useful or politically sound. Revolutionary pragmatism lived on. The demise of the Terror none the less begs the question as to why life for foreigners did not improve more than it actually did and why they were still subject to surveillance, passport controls and even expulsion. The police measures against foreigners in the Year II were not tied inextricably with the apparatus of the Terror, because while the Terror was dismantled, the fear of foreign intrigue remained.

The end of the Terror, the change in atmosphere and military success allowed some revolutionaries to vent their cosmopolitan idealism once more, but this hid the continuities in the treatment of enemy, neutral and allied subjects. To many revolutionaries, foreigners remained potential spies and agents of domestic subversion. Each new crisis, from the royalist landings at Quiberon to the Babouvist conspiracy, provoked laws against foreigners. In a time of international conflict, it was easy for both the Thermidorians and the Directory to see foreign conspiracy behind such domestic instability. In such circumstances, the revolutionaries usually came down on the side of order rather than on the individual liberties of foreigners. The war ensured that the revolutionaries would still respond to their internal crises with expressions of xenophobia, conspiracy theories and the exclusive implications of their ideology, often through legislation. The repression of foreigners was not bound inextricably to the apparatus of the Terror but, firstly and foremost, to the war.

II

Foreign troops, scattered as they now were among regular French units, no longer gave the revolutionaries real cause for soul-searching. The Thermidorians were well aware of the spectacular lack of success with which some foreign legions were met when they tried to recruit their compatriots. Bourdon de l'Oise reminded a war ministry commission that the *Deuxième légion batave* was still on the payroll, despite the

disbandment of the other foreign legions. It had probably survived that fate precisely because it had been overlooked due to its very ineffectiveness and small size: it 'n'equivaut pas à une simple compagnie'. Paying their salaries, argued Bourdon, was a waste of money. Orders were issued for its disbandment on 23 December, and its men were distributed among regular units of light-infantry and riflemen.[38] The Terror may have been over, but the Thermidorian policy towards foreign legions remained the same as before.

When the Polish refugee general Dombrowski and generals Wielhorski and Wyzkowski submitted their separate plans for the creation of a Polish legion in 1795, the Thermidorians were cautious. The arguments which the Poles used were the same as those employed by the founders of other national legions: they would deprive enemy armies of recruits now that Poland had disappeared as an independent state; contact with the French army would nourish Polish refugees and deserters with republican principles and it would form the nucleus of a Polish republican army which would liberate its people and spread the gospel of the French Revolution. Despite the fall of Robespierre, however, both the Convention and Committee of Public Safety remained wary of encouraging foreign ventures which brought no immediate benefit to France. The first seeds of the Polish legion fell on rocky ground.[39]

To pre-empt any further embarrassment or difficulty with the recruitment of foreign regiments or legions, Article 287 of the Consitution of 1795 simply forbade the employment of foreign troops by the French Republic. In some cases, however, there was little difficulty in using foreigners in the French army when they were redefined unequivocally as French citizens through annexation. When Belgium and Liège became new departments of the Republic on 1 October 1795, recruits were inducted into existing French regiments, preempting the development of units which might have a separate 'Belgian' character.[40] If they would not recruit new foreign legions, the French were not about to dismiss foreigners who were already serving with regular French units. Visiting Paris during the last months of the Convention, Meister noted that the deputies' military guard were drawn from the élite of the line regiments and that 'le plus grand nombre cependant est étranger: Suisses, Allemands, Suèdois'.[41] On 17 August 1794, captain H.

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[38]SHAT, X^k46 (Letter of Bourdon to the Commission de l'organisation du mouvement des armées de terre, 30 Thermidor II; letter of Gilles to Pichegru, 3 Nivôse III).
[39]Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 483; Lešnodorski, B., *Les Jacobins Polonais* (Paris: Société des Études Robespierristes, 1965), 315 - 320.
[40]Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 16.
[41]Meister, *Souvenirs de mon dernier voyage à Paris*, 107.

Nagtglas, a Dutch soldier formerly of the German Legion, petitioned the Committee of Public Safety to be allowed to join the Dutch officers in the Nord, where (he had heard) they were 'en réquisition pour une expédition'.[42]

Other officers of the former *Légion germanique* sought redress of injuries inflicted during the Terror. They secured the support of Tallien in favour of compensation for the loss of their personal property, horses, equipment and papers, a claim for which they submitted on 12 October 1794 to the Committee of Public Safety. They further demanded their rehabilitation at the same rank and pay as on the day of their arrest.[43] It was not until 21 June 1795 that they were formally reintegrated into the army and until then they received no pay. In February 1796, some were still looking for posts.[44]

As the revolutionary armies became more extended across Europe, French strategic needs demanded greater numbers of troops. The establishment of sister republics provided the means of circumventing the Constitution of the Year III and allowing the recruitment of foreign regiments or legions. Controversy was avoided in France because the units raised in the sister republics were officially the armies of allied powers, even if they were under the supreme command of the French, used for French strategic interests and sometimes even paid for by the French government.[45]

By such means, the Poles finally raised their own legion. On 30 October 1796, Petiet wrote to Dombrowski informing him that nothing prevented the Poles from 's'établir chez les peuples avec lesquels la République est en bonne intelligence', and that the French Directory would be willing to provide 'indirect' help to the Polish patriots working for the 'regeneration' of their homeland. As Dombrowski and his colleagues were living in exile in northern Italy, the two-thousand strong Polish legion raised at Mantua by the

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[42]SHAT, X^k3 (Letter of Nagtglas to the Committee of Public Safety, 30 Thermidor II).
[43]SHAT, X^k3 ('Copie de la Déclaration de Tallien député et délégué en 1793 à l'armée de la Vendée'; 'Réclamation de la Légion Germanique au Comité de Salut Public', 21 Vendémiaire III).
[44]SHAT, X^k3 ('Extrait d'un Rapport remis au Comité de Salut Public par Chateauneuf-Randon, Membre du Comité Militaire, sur les anciens officiers de la Légion Germanique', n.d.; 'Extrait d'une lettre du Ministre de la Guerre adressé aux Chefs et Conseil d'Administration de la Légion Germanique', 28 Pluviôse IV).
[45]In 1798, for example, the Cisalpine and Helvetic Republics were asked to raise their own armies, to be under the supreme command of the French. The Swiss, told in December to recruit an army of 18,000 men, to be equipped and maintained at French expense, could not even raise a quarter of that number (Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, ii, 320, 418 - 419).

convention of 9 January 1797 was officially in the service of Lombardy and then of the Cisalpine Republic.[46]

Ostensibly foreign units raised in France had only a scattering of foreigners in the ranks. When on 2 November 1796 the Directory authorised Hoche to help the United Irishmen with several battalions of the *armée de l'Océan*, Hoche formed the *brigade étrangère* which owed its title less to the fact that some Irishmen served in the ranks than to the Irish commanders of two of the infantry regiments within it, Lee and Thomas O'Meara. The latter had served in the Irish regiments before the Revolution and recruited Irish prisoners to serve in Hoche's invasion force. Carnot and Hoche also employed Nicholas Madgett to recruit Irish prisoners of war in March 1796. He was, in Tone's words, to 'propagate the faith amongst the Irish soldiers and seamen' and then to exchange them against British prisoners. Their actual use was not yet decided: Madgett suggested that they land in Ireland in advance of the French invasion to prepare hearts and minds, while general Clarke thought of using them to stir up a *chouannerie* in either Ireland or England. In the end, the government decided on the latter and general Humbert was ordered in April 1796 to prepare a force of 1,000 to 1,500 men to land in Cornwall and Wales. In November Irish prisoners of war, along with French deserters, mutineers and convicts, were marched to Brest, from where they were embarked on two frigates under the command of an American, William Tate, and set sail on 13 February 1797, after the Bantry Bay expedition had been scattered by the bitter winter winds. With Hoche's expedition shattered, Tate's famished, motley band landed on the Pembrokeshire coast and pillaged food and livestock shortly before surrendering.[47]

The fall of the revolutionary government on 9 Thermidor did not, at first, herald brighter days for prisoners of war. The law of 7 Prairial was extended to include Spanish troops on 11 August 1794. This decision was hidden in a decree which dealt with other aspects of the war with Spain and was in response to the failure of the Spanish to honour the terms of an exchange of prisoners of war. 'Cet exemple est nécessaire pour éclairer les soldats qui composent les armées coalisées,' explained Barère, who presented the decree,

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[46]Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 483; Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 41 - 44.

[47]Elliott, *Partners in Revolution*, 85, 116 - 117, 274; Elliott, M., *Wolfe Tone. Prophet of Irish Independence* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 293; Fieffé, *Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France*, ii, 34 - 35; Tone, *Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone*, ii, 61, 64, 80, 82.

'et pour leur démontrer le cas que les généraux font de leur sang et de leur existence'. The more obvious conclusion which Spanish troops might draw, of course, was that it was the French who were willing to waste human life. None the less, Barère curiously concluded that executing Spanish prisoners would stir up the Spanish people against their king.[48] The decree does not seem to have been applied in the field, although Barère indulged himself in his own rhetoric by describing, on 22 August, the massacre of two and a half thousand Spanish troops by the army of the Pyrénées-Orientales after Dugommier routed a small force near the village of Terrade.[49] As the apparatus of the Terror was dismantled, the war continued to exert its ugly weight on revolutionary attitudes towards foreigners.

Such attitudes were not helped by the numerous complaints which the Convention had received about the behaviour of foreign prisoners and deserters in France since 9 Thermidor. On 6 August the Convention heard the demand by the Jacobins of Chaumont in the Haute-Marne for severe measures against foreign prisoners and deserters. In response, several deputies added their own complaints, Beauchamp describing how deserters and prisoners of war 'divaguent dans les départemens pour piller, menacer et assassiner'. It was also reported that Spanish deserters had murdered two *défenseurs de la patrie* returning from leave in the Lot.[50]

None the less, the decrees of 7 Prairial and 24 Thermidor were finally repealed on 30 December 1794 'au milieu des applaudissements'. Brival rose to condemn the laws as 'contraires à toutes les lois; elles contrarient le droit des gens et de la guerre ... ces lois sont même en opposition avec les sentiments qui animent nos brave militaires, qui savent vaincre nos ennemis, et jamais assassiner les vaincus'. A mixture of embarrassed national honour and humanitarianism was behind Brival's motion to repeal the decrees, but there was also shame from the fact that the Convention had voted for them in the first place. Brival excused his colleagues by explaining that the laws 'ont été enlevées par une surprise faite à la Convention'.[51] What was left unsaid may have been important, too: French soldiers might be subject to brutal reprisals if the law were ever rigorously enforced.

The repeal of the laws of 7 Prairial and 24 Thermidor did not mean that the regime for prisoners of war already held in France was to be relaxed. Further news that prisoners had abused their liberty by leaving the communes in which they had been quartered,

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[48]AP, xciv, 492; *Moniteur*, No. 326 (26 Thermidor II/13 August 1794).
[49]*Moniteur*, Nos. 336 (6 Fructidor II/23 August 1794), 337 (7 Fructidor II/24 August 1794).
[50]AP, xciv, 238, 241.
[51]*Moniteur*, No. 102 (12 Nivôse III/1 January 1795).

coupled with the ever-lurking fear of espionage and sabotage, provoked a further draconian decree on 28 May 1795. Merlin de Douai reported to the Convention that some prisoners of war had filtered into Paris and that, only days after the Prairial uprising, 'le motif pour lequel on les y attirait ne peut être douteux'. The Convention decreed that any prisoner who left his place of detention or billeting without permission of the government would be tried before a military commission and punished with six years in irons. Prisoners found in the capital would be put to death unless they left within twenty-four hours. Those in Paris, argued Merlin, were not simple soldiers but 'des lords, ce sont des officiers qui entendent très bien le français, et qui espionnent toutes les démarches du gouvernement, toutes les opérations de la Convention'. As harsh as this decree was, it did not materially affect the everyday living conditions of those prisoners of war who remained in their assigned communes or prisons. Those who worked in the local community were considered to have government dispensation to move freely from their living quarters to their place of work.[52]

Exchanges continued as before and the Committee of Public Safety accepted petitions from individuals asking for repatriation. As under the Terror, those enemy soldiers sent home surplus to those in the exchange cartels were simply counted against future exchanges. Enemy officers sent home were asked to ensure that a French counterpart held by their countrymen was repatriated, and to swear that they would not bear arms against France or her allies. Those who could not fulfil these conditions were honour-bound to return to France within three months. In some cases, the French government permitted such exchanges on humanitarian grounds, for example to officers who were dangerously ill or wounded.[53] Soldiers in the ranks, meanwhile, had to rely on exchange cartels negotiated between their generals. The evidence suggests that the honour system for officers worked. On 29 June 1795, four French officers who returned from captivity in Britain petitioned the Committee of Public Safety and secured the release of two British prisoners in partial fulfilment of their 'parole d'honneur'.[54] The persistence of the honour system among officers suggests that, despite the rhetoric, both sides still observed some of the older customs and practices of eighteenth-century warfare.

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[52]*Moniteur*, No. 253 (13 Prairial III/1 June 1795).
[53]SHAT, YJ1 ('Prisonniers de Guerre étrangers: extraits des registres des délibérations du Comité du Salut Public de la Convention Nationale', 10 Prairial - 2 Thermidor III).
[54]SHAT, YJ1 ('Prisonniers de Guerre étrangers: extraits des registres des délibérations du Comité du Salut Public de la Convention Nationale', 11 Messidor III).

For those prisoners who remained in captivity in France, the orders given during the Terror that they should be confined and guarded closely were not strictly observed, even before 9 Thermidor. After the Terror, the regime under which prisoners of war lived did not change. Many were undoubtedly incarcerated in guarded barracks, but others were allowed some latitude to work and socialise locally. In May 1795, after peace with Prussia had been signed, Prussian prisoners of war working in the mines asked the inspector of glassworks, Daguilbel, if they might be permitted to remain in France 'en s'unissant à des françoises'. Daguilbel passed on the query to the Committee of Public Safety, which on 10 July replied that the law permitted them to do so.[55] Marriage between prisoners of war and local women is indicative of the freedom which the former had to form relationships and the request of the Prussians was not an isolated case. In July, the law-abiding citizen Andoyer asked the Committee if he might give his daughter in marriage to Joseph Jabonesqui, a prisoner of war. On 28 July the Committee 'arrête que tout prisonnier de guerre étranger est libre de s'établir en France et d'y contracter mariage'.[56] These conditions were dictated by the persistence of eighteenth-century practices, which in turn survived out of necessity. Certain communities did not have the resources to impose a restrictive regime on prisoners of war, while in others the authorities sought to put them to productive use, working in manufactures, workshops and agriculture. Prisoners who were locked up idle wasted resources while those who worked earned their own keep and contributed to the economy.

In the minds of many revolutionaries, deserters were no better than prisoners of war. On 6 September 1794 the Convention received a request from the Jacobins of Perpignan, who spoke of 'ses craintes relatives à cette classe d'hommes que le royalisme vomit parmi nous, sous le nom de déserteurs'.[57] No doubt that frontier town had received a fresh influx of frightened, hungry men fleeing the war zone as Dugommier marched into the northern periphery of Spain. On 25 August 1795 the administration of the Eure heard foreign deserters described as 'des fénéants, des ivrognes, des indociles, des volleurs, des destructeurs d'Effets de Cazernes, ils vendent leur pain quinze à vingt francs la livre, et se repandent dans les campagnes où ils se sont delivrer de force du pain et du cidre'.

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[55]SHAT, Yj1 ('Prisonniers de Guerre étrangers: extraits des registres des délibérations du Comité du Salut Public de la Convention Nationale', 22 Messidor III).
[56]SHAT, Yj1 ('Prisonniers de Guerre étrangers: extraits des registres des délibérations du Comité du Salut Public de la Convention Nationale', 10 Thermidor III).
[57]AP, xcvi, 303.

Districts had been forced to take measures to stifle any disorder.[58] Deserters were no longer men who had come to share in the fruits of liberty and to contribute to its growth, but were a nuisance, a menace and, probably, spies.

Such hostility and suspicion could be translated into action. In response to the report heard on 25 August, the department of the Eure decided to collate all foreign deserters in Évreux, the *chef-lieu*. There, they were placed under the surveillance of the *procureurs-syndics*, who were empowered to reallocate them to other municipalities. They could only send deserters to work in rural communes if they received written requests for such labour from the farmers, who would then be held responsible for any misdemeanours committed by the deserters. Anyone employing a deserter was to register him with the municipal authorities, who would keep watch over him. Those deserters who sold their bread, or who forcibly seized food or drink, were to be imprisoned.[59] The department used the latitude permitted by the law to increase surveillance over foreign deserters and to limit their activities. Above all, by discouraging their employment in rural areas, the department sought to restrict as many deserters as possible to the towns, where they might be more easily watched and controlled.

In other departments, however, deserters were encouraged to earn their keep as before. The order of the Committee of Public Safety issued on 17 July 1794 to arrest any deserter who refused to work still applied. This also meant, however, that those who could not work either through injury or lack of opportunity were still subsidised by the local authorities, who reclaimed their expenses from the *commission des secours publics*. By the same order, deserters unable to make ends meet were still owed the daily handout of ten *sous* and the inflation-proof bread ration of twenty-four ounces.[60]

The success of French arms between 9 Thermidor and the treaty of Campo Formio did not persuade the Thermidorians and the Directory to make dramatic changes in the conditions of foreign troops, prisoners of war and deserters. The opposition which had emerged in 1793 to recruiting foreigners in separate units remained much the same and was encapsulated in the ban on such recruitment in the Constitution of 1795. If during the

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[58]AN, F/9/137 ('Déserteurs étrangers: Eure: Du registre des délibérations de l'administration du département de l'Eure', 7 Fructidor III').
[59]AN, F/9/137 ('Déserteurs étrangers: Eure: Du registre des délibérations de l'administration du département de l'Eure', 7 Fructidor III').
[60]See, for example, AN, F/9/137 ('Déserteurs étrangers: Lot', petition of the mayor of Belmont, 11 Ventôse III; 'Déserteurs étrangers: Marne', report from the Bureau des Pensions Civiles to the Commission des Secours Publics, 17 Floréal III).

Terror foreign legions were discredited because of their alleged political allegiances to Dumouriez and the Girondins, the return of the surviving Girondins to revolutionary politics did little for them. For both the regime of the Terror and the post-Thermidor revolutionaries alike, a major flaw in the legions was their failure to recruit enough of the nationalities for which they were destined. For this very reason, the Thermidorians finished what the Convention had all but completed in 1793 and disbanded the last surviving legion.

Perhaps also military success from 1794 made redundant the extra manpower offered by foreign legions, at least until the French armies were overstretched. With Article 287 of the Constitution of 1795, the vision of Dubois-Crancé expressed in 1789 for a truly 'national' army was at last fulfilled - at least on paper. Requests by Polish officers in exile for their own legion, which might have been greeted enthusiastically in 1792, were met with cold indifference in 1795.

None the less, foreigners still served in the French army, although not in separate foreign units, and the revolutionaries' familiar pragmatism soon obliged them to circumvent the constitutional ban on foreign troops. When French military resources were stretched across Europe, sister republics were urged, as nominally independent states, to raise troops. It was in this way that the Poles finally got their legion early in 1797. Such recruitment was indicative less of a revival in the cosmopolitan exuberance of 1792 than of a practical response to the strategic needs of the French Republic. The French needed men to wage their campaigns which were being fought ever-further from home and across a wider range of territory.

A similar disregard for the earlier universal pretensions of the Revolution can be seen in the post-Thermidor treatment of prisoners of war and deserters. Very little changed in their day-to-day conditions. In some areas, both deserters and prisoners remained incarcerated, while in others they were free to work towards their upkeep. If the laws of 7 Prairial and of 24 Thermidor were repealed at the end of 1794, humanitarian impulses were certainly among the reasons, but so too was shame and embarrassment that the Convention could have voted such decrees in the first place.

Even if the conditions in which they lived were a far cry from the ideal outlined in the original laws in 1792, both prisoners and deserters still retained a degree of freedom which is unfamiliar to late twentieth-century observers. The fact that the Committee of Public Safety received requests for permission to marry from prisoners shows that they were able to establish close personal ties with their neighbours. If prisoners and deserters

were forced to work, it was in a small workshop or in the fields alongside local people rather than in labour camps and local administrators tried to find them tasks which corresponded to their skills. Such conditions were due less to any cosmopolitan ideals than to the persistence of eighteenth-century practices in the treatment of prisoners. Perhaps most surprising of all for politicians whose rhetoric was so full of hatred for the enemy, the central authorities still accepted the word of honour from enemy officers who sought repatriation. Nothing could illustrate better the weight of tradition among men who claimed to be waging a national war based on new principles.

III

On 2 October 1794, the staff and students of the English College of Saint-Omer were released from the citadel of Doullens and allowed to return to their town, but found that their buildings were being used as a military hospital.[61] On 17 October the Convention decreed that the Irish students and priests at the colleges were free to return to Ireland, perhaps because the revolutionaries were convinced that some of the Irish clergy retained some seeds of hatred for the British and Irish governments. In Bordeaux, the fifty-odd Irish priests and students were released, embarked on an American ship and sailed for Ireland.[62] The guards at the English Augustinian and Benedictine convents in Paris, where the nuns from all three orders in the capital had been held, were withdrawn in March 1795. The English Benedictine nuns from Cambrai regained their liberty in Compiègne, after the local mayor led a petitioning campaign for their release.[63]

The foreign clergy may have gradually regained their freedom, but until the authorities decided what to do with their property, the foreign clergy suffered penury. In December 1794, Walsh wrote to the Convention asking for help for the twenty-two Irish students and priests who still remained in Paris. On 2 March, the *commission des secours publics* told the Committee of Public Safety that it would furnish 'le secours et l'indemnité provisoires' until a decision was made on their property. The commission pointed out that

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[61]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 (Letter of Stapleton, 25 Brumaire III; letter of the students and masters of the English College of Douai, 14 Nivôse III).

[62]Loupès, 'Les Ecclésiastiques Irlandais dans le Diocèse de Bordeaux', 96; Simms, 'The Irish on the Continent', 652.

[63]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 159, 162, 309, 330 - 331.

the Irish clergy deserved such support because, in the first place, for three years the students had not studied theology, but literature, medicine and surgery, while some 'sont employés dans les hôpitaux et dans les armées de la République'. Others were ready to volunteer for the army. Such patriotism on the part of students who had been imprisoned by the authorities showed their dedication to the Republic, which was in turn spurred by their alienation from the existing order in Ireland. A list of the Irish students and clerics claiming financial support clearly impressed the commission with their republican credentials.[64] In fact, between 21 April 1795 and 16 September 1796, the Irish students and administrators of the Paris college were given monthly subsidies totalling over 23,235 *livres* taken from the funds made available by the Convention on 4 March 1794 for foreign patriots and refugees in France. This suggests that the authorities accepted the argument that the Irish clergy who remained in France were republicans.[65] Some ideological conformity still helped the foreign clergy in their struggle for survival, but it was not strictly necessary, as the Thermidorians seem to have recognised some obligation to those who had suffered from imprisonment and the confiscation of their property in the Terror. On 14 April 1795, the Convention voted to provide all English nuns in France with a daily allowance of 40 *sous* each from the funds of the *commission des secours publics* until a decision had been reached over the fate of their property.[66]

If the Terror was over, the anticlericalism now irrevocably linked to French republicanism was not. James Burke, who had been released from prison in Bordeaux during the Terror, was actually rearrested and jailed shortly after 9 Thermidor, as he put it 'comme prêtre, comme aristocrate et agent de monseigneur de Cicé', formerly archbishop of Bordeaux and *monarchien* in the Constituent Assembly.[67] As the Directory veered between the Scylla and Charybdis of Jacobinism and royalism, Walsh, superior of the Irish College in Paris, felt threatened enough in March 1796 to write to the foreign minister, Delacroix, asking for his protection. He had heard that he 'vient d'etre comprise dans les Mandats d'arret décernés contre les Ecclesiastiques'. Having regained the college's

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[64]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 (Letter of Walsh to the Convention, Nivôse III; report of the Commission des Secours Publics, 12 Ventôse III).
[65]AN, F/15*/17 ('Commission des Secours: Comptabilité: Réfugiés'). The students and administrators of the Irish College in Paris received a substantial proportion (27%) of the funds doled out in this seventeen-month period.
[66]*Moniteur*, No. 208 (28 Germinal III/17 April 1795).
[67]AN, H/3/2561[A] ('Burke a sauvé la Maison de Bordeaux: Révue des Faits'); Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy of the Diocese of Bordeaux', 37.

confiscated property for the administrators, Walsh complained of 'les craintes qui paralysent leurs opérations' and which stemmed from official persecution of the clergy.[68]

The persistence of anticlericalism, the experience of imprisonment and persecution certainly convinced many of the foreign clergy that they had had enough of life in revolutionary France. Meanwhile, developments in the British Isles promised brighter days for Catholics, who were being regarded with less suspicion than before 1789, partly thanks to the fact that French *émigré* clergy had made an impression as opponents of French republicanism. This combination of stick and carrot was of great importance in the demise of the foreign ecclesiastical institutions in France. On their release, the English Benedictines in Paris sold what remained of their linen and furniture to get enough money to travel to Britain in June, giving up all hope of regaining their property. Like their counterparts in Paris, the Cambrai Benedictines decided not to struggle for the return of their convent, which they considered 'much-beloved but now lost'. They applied for passports and received money, via Hamburg, from a sympathiser in Britain. They sailed from Calais on 23 May. Meanwhile the staff and students of the English Colleges of Saint-Omer and Douai petitioned for permission to return home.[69]

For the British and Irish clergy who remained in France, the most serious threat to the survival of their institutions was not anticlericalism, but the sale of their property which had been confiscated. This did not go ahead without resistance from certain foreign clergymen, who were confronted by ambiguities in the legislation passed by the Thermidorians and under the Directory. The release from confiscation of foreigners' property on 3 January 1795 gave the foreign clergy some leverage, but there was some confusion over whether or not the property of the foreign colleges, convents and monasteries could be retained and sold by the state as ecclesiastical wealth, or whether it ought to be defined as private property belonging to foreigners.

Different interest groups, from potential beneficiaries of the sales to the superiors and their supporters who hoped to reopen their houses in France, took their different interpretations to the authorities. On 21 February 1795, the Irish clerics of the college in Paris petitioned the commission of *domaines nationaux* claiming that the law of 3 January applied to their property. They stressed that 'ils sont aux droits de ces hommes qui,

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[68]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 (Letter of Walsh to Delacroix, 1 Germinal IV).
[69]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 (Letter of Stapleton, 25 Brumaire III; letter of the students and masters of the English College of Douai, 14 Nivôse III).

chassés de leur pays, ont mis sous la sauve garde de la loyauté française les débris de leur fortune pour fournir à l'éducation de leurs parens'. This tried and trusted argument did not immediately work, because the Irish did not regain possession of the college until a year later.[70] This was not the end of the troubles, because when the Directory established a new military academy, the legislative councils also ruled on 13 July 1797 that the bursaries of all the former Paris colleges were to be administered by the new institution. On the basis of this law, the academy claimed the property of the English, Irish and Scots colleges in Paris. Walsh, former superior of the Irish College, and Alexander Innes of the Scots College naturally objected, and the ensuing battle was not resolved until 1802, when the Consulate decreed that the former Irish, Scots and English colleges should form one single establishment with Walsh at its head.[71] Innes, meanwhile, struggled to retain one of the foundations of his institution, the Scots farm at Grisy. He succeeded in enlisting the help of the British government in preventing the sale of both the farm and the college buildings in Paris and in 1801 he received formal acknowledgment of the Scots possession of its property. This saved the college.[72]

Other foreign houses were not so fortunate. When the Directory finally ordered the sale of the property of the foreign houses in May and July 1798, the English Conceptionists in Paris saw some of their buildings scattered around the rues de la Roquette, de Charonne and de Lappe auctioned off, while the English Augustinians and the English Benedictine friars lost their main buildings to buyers.[73] The losses almost drove the Augustinians to leave France, but for the intervention of the Second Consul, Charles Lebrun, in 1802. The Conceptionists fled to Norfolk.[74] The Scots College of Douai was found by Innes in 1801 to have been parcelled out to buyers of *biens nationaux*. 'Only the college walls remain unsold; all our landed property, amounting to near 500 acres of excellent ground, beside 5 houses, have been sold and resold',[75] which of course made future claims more difficult. In Bordeaux, the Irish College's church of Saint-Eutrope was sold to a manufacturer of saltpetre on 22 February 1795. The other

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[70]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 (Petition of 3 Ventôse III; letter of Walsh to Delacroix, 1 Germinal IV).
[71]AN, H/3/2561[A] ('Prytanée français: Collèges britanniques 1734 - 1812'); MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 (Petition of Walsh to the ministers of finance and foreign affairs, 28 Frimaire VIII).
[72]Moran, 'Grisy, the Scots College Farm', 62.
[73]AN, H/3/2561[A] ('Département de la Seine: Vente des Domaines Nationaux', an VII).
[74]Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 159 - 160, 162 - 163.
[75]Quoted in Moran, 'Grisy, the Scots College Farm', 62.

buildings on the rue du Hâ were still national property, but being rented. From prison, James Burke took upon himself the task of saving the college from sale and of reopening it as a seminary for Irish students. He drew up a petition and used his contacts outside the *maison d'arrêt* to help him in his campaign, including several Protestants in the departmental administration, which suspended the transfer of the deeds to the manufacturer. Burke was released shortly after this first victory, but he had a long struggle ahead of him. It took him another eight years before he succeeded in definitively preventing the sale of the buildings, but he never managed to reopen the college. The other Irish colleges in the provinces were similarly never resurrected.[76]

Perhaps the most important reason for the failure of the Irish colleges to rise from the ashes was the establishment of Maynooth college in Ireland in 1795. Some of the Irish clergy remaining in France voiced opposition to this development, particularly as the government in Dublin encouraged the Irish establishments on the continent to sell their property and transfer the wealth to Ireland. As Walsh wrote to Delacroix, the French foreign minister, on 21 March 1796, 'les administrateurs des Etablissements de Paris s'opposent formellement a cette mesure comme contraire 1° aux voeux des fondateurs 2° aux interets des Irlandais qui auroient le plus grand tort de réunir tous leurs fonds sous la main du Gouvernement Brittannique'.[77] There was of course some understandable self-interest in Walsh's reasoning, having worked so hard to restore the property of the Paris college, but the French Revolution and the foundation of a Catholic college in Ireland together signalled the end of an era for the British and Irish Catholic institutions in France.

The prospects for the survival of the foreign clergy in France as human beings were undoubtedly made brighter after Thermidor with their release from the squalid conditions of imprisonment, but the struggle for their institutions was only just beginning. The Terror disgusted and intimidated some of the foreign clergy to the extent that some of the houses, such as the English Benedictines of Paris and Cambrai, did not even attempt to recover their property and emigrated to Britain at the earliest opportunity. As unpleasant as incarceration and anticlericalism were, what made the prognosis for the survival of the

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[76]AN, H/3/2561[A] ('Burke a sauvé la Maison de Bordeaux: Révue des Faits'); Preston, 'Le Collège Irlandais de Bordeaux', 26; Loupès, 'Les Ecclésiastiques Irlandais dans le Diocèse de Bordeaux', 96; Loupès, 'The Irish Clergy of the Diocese of Bordeaux', 37; Simms, 'The Irish on the Continent', 652.

[77]MAE (Fonds Ancien), ADP, France, Carton 10, Dossier 233 ('Mémoire' of Walsh to Delacroix, 1 Germinal IV).

foreign houses unsure was the actual or potential sale of their property. The dual status of this property as clerical and as foreign wealth meant that the authorities were ambiguous over its release from confiscation. Before October 1793, its foreign status had protected it from the ecclesiastical reforms of the Revolution. Once the revolutionaries had broken the glass wall which sheltered foreign wealth from the revolutionary whirlwind, however, the authorities came to regard it increasingly as ecclesiastical wealth, liable to nationalisation and sale. It was because of this equivocal status that the foreign clergy found themselves embroiled in complex legal battles to save their property. As Walsh, Innes and Burke discovered, such struggles could grind on for years and by the time they had made progress, developments in the British Isles favourable to Catholics ensured that interest in the institutions in France would never reach pre-revolutionary levels.

IV

Most foreign patriots were relieved to see the Terror collapse. Those who had been imprisoned were freed, while some of those who fled returned to taste the new freedom. Some foreign patriots certainly felt unwelcome after the experience of imprisonment, expulsion or harrassment during the Terror. Paine, ill from almost a year in the disease-ridden Luxembourg, refused a pension and Monroe petitioned the Committee of Public Safety on his behalf on 4 January 1795, asking for him to be entrusted with a mission to the United States. The Committee replied that 'the position he holds will not permit him to accept it'.[78] Paine, having been denied his seat in the Convention and imprisoned as an enemy subject at the end of 1793 was now being prevented from returning to his other adopted country on the grounds that he was, after all, a deputy. Mary Wollstonecraft returned to Paris from Le Havre in the late autumn of 1794. She returned to Britain in April 1795, possibly because, as Archibald Hamilton Rowan implied, laws against foreigners were being more rigorously enforced than during the Terror. She was also penniless and disillusioned with Paris.[79]

Among those who, on the other hand, returned directly to political activity was Karl Reinhard, who was released from prison and appointed diplomatic envoy to the Hanseatic

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[78]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, ii, 154 - 155; Claeys, *Thomas Paine*, 31 - 33.
[79]Tomalin, *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*, 176 - 178; Rowan, *Autobiography*, 248.

towns, with Georg Kerner as his secretary. In 1799, he became the Directory's last foreign minister. Oelsner returned to Paris from Switzerland with Zschokke, who wanted to study the Republic. Refusing the post of French envoy to Switzerland, on the grounds that he did not wish to serve a foreign country, Oelsner remained in Paris in 1796 as Frankfurt's representative.[80] His vision of a league of Rhenish states under French protection was at odds with the demands of the German patriots gathered around Reubell, who wanted annexation. The Spanish patriot Marchena took French citizenship despite his imprisonment during the Terror, and, with the advent of the Directory, settled in France.[81]

Many foreign patriots, burned by the Terror, now avoided the unpredictable flame of politics altogether. It is not surprising that the most notable of them all should have been German, many of whom saw the importance of the Revolution not so much in political as in moral terms. Bitaubé, also freed from capitivity, remained in France and successfully engaged in literary and philosophical pursuits. He was elected to the *Institut national des sciences et des arts* created by the Directory on 25 October 1795, to which foreign associates could be admitted. When Friedrich Meyer, professor of law at Hamburg, visited Paris in March 1796, he found that Bitaubé had become an established member of the intellectual cream of French society.[82] Schlabrendorf, released from prison after Thermidor, lived among his books, devoting as much attention to his interests in literature and philosophy as he did to politics.[83] Helen Maria Williams, Benjamin Vaughan and John Hurford Stone returned safely to France, but kept a low profile: Wolfe Tone ran into 'my old friend Stone of Hackney', walking with Williams in the Tuileries on 19 July 1796. While Wolfe Tone was formally in Paris incognito, it is a measure of Stone and Williams's removal from political activity that they had been completely unaware of his presence in France, unlike the American ambassador and several Irish radicals in exile, with whom Tone dined publicly on several occasions.[84]

The post-Thermidor period also saw the arrival of new radical faces in France, often fleeing persecution. Karl Cramer, a professor of rhetoric at Kiel, was dismissed from his

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[80]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 330, 340, 342; Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, ii, 405.
[81]*Moniteur*, No. 270 (30 Prairial V/18 June 1797).
[82]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, ii, 53 - 54; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 188.
[83]Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 336.
[84]Williams, *Letters containing a Sketch of the Politics of France*, i, 177; Gerbod, 'Visiteurs et résidents britanniques', 340; Alger, *Englishmen in the French Revolution*, 73, 95, 97; Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 186; Tone, *Life*, ii, 163.

post and from the city by the Danish government in 1794 due to his sympathies for the French Revolution. At the end of 1795, he was in Paris, employing Mainz refugees in his printshop. Georg Rebmann had fled Saxony after his biting attacks on the existing order. Tracked from one German state to another by the police, he finally emigrated to Paris in 1796. Bitterly disappointed by the realities of life under the Directory, corruption and immorality in particular, he none the less took up a position as a judge at the tribunal at Mainz when the left bank of the Rhine was occupied by the French after Campo Formio. He described himself as a 'citoyen allemand de la République français'.[85] Thomas Muir, escaped from Botany Bay, ended his odyssey when he arrived at Bordeaux to a triumphal reception in 1798.[86] Besides individuals such as Cramer, Rebmann and Muir, whole new groups were drawn to France for refuge, namely the United Irishmen after the catastrophic uprising in 1798 and 5,200 Italian Jacobins when the Austrians and Russians swept through Italy in 1799.[87]

If the demands for political conformity were no longer as stringent as they were during the Terror, foreign radicals who once applauded the Revolution for its political freedom and its democratic promise found themselves facing a leadership hostile to some of the more radical propositions which had once caused so much excitement. On 7 July 1795, Paine made his only appearance in the Convention after his release. Still a proponent of direct representative democracy, he warned against restrictions of the male suffrage and a powerful executive and roundly condemned the proposed constitution. Murmurs arose from around the chamber and when the printing of his comments was proposed, some deputies opposed it 'avec force'. His opinions brought an onslaught from Merlin de Douai two days later.[88] The Convention sought order and feared a return to the 'anarchy' of the early Republic. Paine was out of step with mainstream revolutionary opinion. After the dissolution of the Convention, he would have nothing to do with the organisation of the Directory, which he had so eloquently attacked. He remained in France until 1802 working with Monroe in protecting American interests, rather than with the French government. The experience of the Terror had made Paine unequivocally an American.[89]

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[85]Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 266 - 268; Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, 345 - 347; Gilli, M., 'La ville et le peuple de Paris vus par quelques voyageurs allemands', Vovelle, *Paris et la Révolution*, 369 - 370.
[86]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 188 - 189.
[87]Rao, A.-M., 'Paris et les exilés italiens en 1799', Vovelle, *Paris et la Révolution*, 226.
[88]*Moniteur*, Nos. 292 (22 Messidor III/10 July 1795), 295 (25 Messidor III/13 July 1795).
[89]Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, ii, 165; Claeys, *Thomas Paine*, 32 - 34.

As a rightward shift in revolutionary politics, Thermidor also exposed to suffering those foreign radicals who had succeeded in attaching themselves too closely to the regime of the Terror. Archibald Hamilton Rowan, who had been freed from captivity by orders of the revolutionary government at the height of its power, chose to leave France for the United States after the Grenelle explosion ensured that 'the Jacobins were considered to be the evil genii of the French nation'. He was also disillusioned with the 'distracted state of Paris', which meant that no attention was being given to Irish affairs.[90] The German doctor Saiffert, an associate of the Hébertists and a founder of the German Legion, who had enjoyed an acquittal before the Revolutionary Tribunal, returned to Germany after Thermidor and tried to shed his extremist past.[91] Even Valckenaer, who had only escaped arrest during the Year II by keeping a low profile and embracing the cult of the supreme being, was watched along with others of his kind as 'intrigants adroits', who shared 'toutes les idées désorganisatrices qui ont désolé la France'. His alleged 'intimacy' with Robespierre would later implicate him in the conspiracy of Equals.[92]

The Robespierrist Filippo Buonarroti was recalled from his mission in Oneglia on 14 March 1795 and arrested after a subject of a neutral country complained of the confiscation of his property and its distribution among 'sans-culottes'. He was not released until October 1795, when the Convention sought the help of the Jacobins to offset the surge in royalist and monarchist sympathies which had culminated in the Vendémiaire uprising. Buonarroti was no repentant Terrorist, however, and was later implicated in the Babeuf conspiracy.[93] Buonarroti was not simply caught, accidentally, on the 'wrong' side as the revolutionary tide moved away. He at least actively conspired against the Directorial regime. Others seem to have been accused of complicity in the plot because of their suspected political ties with Jacobins, as the Directory shifted rightwards in reaction to the conspiracy. Valckenaer was passing through Paris on his way to take up the post of Batavian ambassador to Madrid when the French government warned him on 12 June 1796 that it was best that he did not stay for very long. The French then demanded of the Batavian Directory that it actually recall Valckenaer and Jacob Blauw, Dutch ambassador to Paris, who was also suspected of links with the Equals. On 1

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[90]Rowan, *Autobiography*, 240.
[91]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 187 - 188.
[92]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 256; Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 216.
[93]*Moniteur*, No. 243 (3 Prairial IV/22 May 1796); Rao, A.-M., 'La Révolution française et l'émigration politique. Les réfugiés italiens en 1799', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, lii (1980), 236; Woolf, *A History of Italy*, 161; Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 226.

December 1796 the Directory secured the expulsion from Paris of the Genevan radical Janot, whom the French ambassador described as closely linked to the 'anarchists'. At the same time, it refused to recognise the credentials of the Genevan ambassador to France, Delaplanche, whom it suspected of Babouvist ties.[94]

Embroiled in a war and buffeted by real or imagined conspiracies, the Directorial regime did not give foreign patriots the same benefit of the doubt as the revolutionaries might have done prior to the Terror. On 27 March 1796 Friedrich Cotta, a Württemberg patriot and editor of the *Gazette allemande du Rhin* came to the attention of the authorities in the Bas-Rhin for his repeated journeys between Strasbourg and Basle. The minister of police ordered his expulsion if he was liable to the law of 23 Messidor III. An Italian refugee named Cetto was ordered to leave France in accordance with the same law, only being allowed to stay on 23 April after he had appealed to the Directory.[95] Far from resurrecting the proselytising exuberance of 1792, the post-Thermidor regimes remained hard-nosed, usually - and ironically - adopting the 'Robespierrist' policy of serving French interests in their dealings with foreign patriots. The resurgence of cosmopolitan language merely veiled the continuities.

The earliest group of patriots to discover this was a delegation of Polish exiles seeking French help for their beleaguered country on 14 August 1794. Speaking the cosmopolitan language of 1792, they reminded the French that while other nations were either spectators or enemies in France's struggle, the Poles stood up to fight despotism. This common cause formed 'les noeuds sacrés qui lient déjà les destinées présentes et futures des Français et des Polonois'. Such language merely brought a useless assurance from the president that the French people 'sait qu'en combattant pour sa propre liberté il combat aussi pour la liberté polonaise'.[96] It was clear that the Poles would receive no help from the French. Not even the restoration of the surviving Girondins to the Convention on 8 December resurrected to its former exuberance the militant cosmopolitanism of 1792. Military success certainly reinvigorated French cosmopolitan rhetoric, but as before the policies of the Thermidorians and the Directory were dictated by French strategic concerns.

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[94]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 255 - 256; Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, ii, 187, 195 - 196; Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 231 - 232.
[95]AN, F/7/3081, dossier 1 ('Passeports et Étrangers: Analyse du Travail: Germinal - Messidor, an IV').
[96]AP, xcv, 65 - 67; Lešnodorski, *Les Jacobins Polonais*, 319 - 320.

It was for this reason that the Thermidorian Convention and the Directory paid subsidies to foreign refugees. This was no re-emergence of cosmopolitanism, but a continuity from the decree of 14 Ventôse II (4 March 1794), which allocated twenty million *livres* for the subsistance of foreign patriots in France. Handouts were entered on the same register as before 9 Thermidor, up to 16 September 1796. The motives behind the payment of subsidies are illustrated by the gradual disappearance of Belgians and Liégeois from the register. They were the main beneficiaries until 23 February 1795, taking 97% of the 182,710 *livres*, 7 *sous* distributed, with the rest going to refugees from the Rhineland. Between 24 February 1795 and 16 September 1796, however, Belgians and Liégeois received only 14.5% of the 85,901 *livres* distributed. All their allocations were towards the 'frais de route' decreed on 25 September 1794 for those refugees returning home to the Low Countries.[97] Mainz patriots in Paris, Alsace and Lorraine now took a much larger proportion than before, 42%, reflecting not a new influx of Germans, but the departure of their more numerous counterparts from Brabant and Liège.[98] As before, the revolutionaries supported foreign refugees because of the role they would play in the occupied territories. The payment of travel costs for the Belgians and Liégeois returning home suggests that foreign patriots were expected to take up positions in the new pro-French administrations.

French interests, however, did not always coincide with the aspirations of the foreign patriots. Such differences could lead to acrimonious disputes between the revolutionaries and the foreigners. After Fleurus, the French lent their support only to those Belgians and Liégeois who actively supported the annexation of Belgium and Liège by France.[99] Those suspected of opposition were sidelined. Immediately after the annexations were pronounced on 1 October 1795, Lefebvre de Nantes warned that 'il existe à Paris des individus des différents partis qui ont divisé la Belgique'. None of them, he warned, should be allowed to carry the news of annexation to their homeland and he persuaded the Convention to send the decree by courier instead.[100]

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[97]On 27 August 1794 Belgian exiles had appeared before the Convention and asked for subsidies to pay their journey north (AP, xcvi, 19).
[98]AN, F/15*/17 ('Commission des Secours: Comptabilité: Réfugiés'). The vast majority of the remaining 43.5% went to Irish refugees and the students and administrators of the college in Paris. A tiny fraction was paid to a small group of Italian refugees at Brainçon in the Isère in April 1795.
[99]Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 214.
[100]*Moniteur*, No. 16 (16 Vendémiaire IV/8 October 1795).

When the Dutch Patriot Herman Daendels, formerly of the Batavian Legion and now serving as a general in the French Army of North, issued his own proclamation to the Dutch people in September 1794, his French superiors were stunned because this behaviour smacked of Dumouriez-style adventurism. Such independence of action by a Batavian commander would also undermine French claims that they were the virtually unaided liberators of the United Provinces. Daendels was arrested and he was only released when one of the representatives on mission insisted that it was over-enthusiasm, not sabotage, which explained the general's behaviour.[101] It was in vain that foreign patriots in France warned the French that, while they may have adopted French forms and ideology, their people sought reform in tune with their own traditions and on their own terms. On 15 August 1794, Dumont-Pigalle, the secretary to the *comité batave*, wrote to Carnot saying that only a handful of Patriots wanted 'de tout leur coeur la liberté française'.[102] It was a plea which, in their concern to safeguard their own strategic interests, the French would ignore.

The Vaudois exile La Harpe, who saw himself as the spokesman of the French-speaking Swiss in Paris, was listened to by Bonaparte and the Directory in September 1797 only because his proposals for an independent state of francophone cantons under French protection coincided with the strategic perspectives of the general and his government. For this, he found himself in conflict with the recognised leader of the German-speaking radicals, Peter Ochs, who did not envisage French intervention, but a spontaneous uprising of the Swiss people, who would form their own National Assembly. In the end Ochs was invited to Paris, where he was persuaded to accept La Harpe's point of view.[103]

Italian patriots were similarly prey to the hard-edged pragmatism of French policy towards their neighbours. Buonarroti understood this and sought to ensure that Piedmont would avoid military rule by France. He knew that both the strategic concerns of the French and their common prejudices towards Italians might lead to Italy's treatment as a bargaining chip for territorial concessions in Germany. From his position among the Jacobin Amar committee after the closure of the Club du Panthéon on 27 February 1796, Buonarroti sought to show, firstly, that the Italians were ready for liberty and, secondly, that they were able to have a revolution to achieve it. The rapidity of Bonaparte's

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[101]Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 180 - 181.
[102]Quoted in Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 215.
[103]Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, ii, 408 - 409.

advance into Italy that spring put paid to such illusions. Meanwhile, the discovery of Buonarroti among the Babouvists ensured that the Italian patriots became almost synonymous with Jacobin conspiracy. A few days after the arrest of the Equals, Reubell was warned that other Italian patriots in Paris, Selvaggi, Celentani, Serra and Sauli were in Paris 'sous les auspices du conspirateur Buonarroti'.[104]

Pragmatism naturally led the revolutionaries to support foreign patriots in their aspirations where those suited French interests. The problem was that interpretations of French interests could vary with both changes in the political colour of the revolutionary regime and the personal ambitions of individual generals. After the French armies spilled into Germany the previous October, the Mainz patriots in Paris launched a press campaign in favour of 'reunion' in the summer of 1795 and lent their weight to Reubell's arguments for *les frontières naturelles*. The campaign finally petered out in March 1796, but the shifting of Directorial politics also brought disappointment a year later with the royalist success in the elections and the nomination of Barthélemy as a Director. A rapid peace with concessions to Austria seemed to be on the table with this political shift in Paris, which did not bode well for those who hoped that Austria would be bludgeoned into ceding the Rhineland to France. Moreover, Bonaparte sought to protect his own interests in Italy at the peace preliminaries at Leoben on 18 April 1797, which guaranteed that the subsequent negotiations would be based on the 'integrity' of the Holy Roman Empire. The Rhenish exiles switched, therefore, to the goal of a Cisrhenan sister republic, which coincided more with the aims of Carnot and Barthélemy, the Directors who were in favour of a peace based on *les anciennes limites*. It also suited general Hoche, the plan's main proponent, who sought to imitate Bonaparte in establishing a sister republic as his own personal fiefdom. This scheme sank in turn when the coup of 18 Fructidor V (4 September 1797) destroyed the right-wing landslide and when general Hoche died a few weeks later.[105]

Irish patriots were equally prey to shifts in Thermidorian and Directorial politics. Archibald Hamilton Rowan left France in the autumn of 1794 partly because he believed the revolutionaries 'were too busy with their own intestine divisions to think of assisting

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[104]Wolff, *A History of Italy*, 161 - 162; Lyons, *France under the Directory*, 29 - 31, 206 - 207; Woronoff, *La République bourgeoise*, 57 - 65, 78; Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 227, 229.

[105]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, i, 129 - 130; Ruiz, 'Un regard sur le jacobinisme allemand', 266; Godechot, *La Grande Nation*, 217 - 219; Woronoff, *La République bourgeoise*, 78.

Ireland'.[106] Theobald Wolfe Tone arrived in France on 1 February 1796, seeking to convince the Directory that a French invasion was necessary to spark an uprising in Ireland. That French strategic concerns would be paramount in any such support for Irish independence was made clear on 14 March when Tone met general Henri Clarke of the war ministry. Clarke asked 'what security could I give, that in twenty years after our independence, we might not be found engaged as an ally of England against France?' On 10 April Clarke insisted to another Irish patriot, Aherne, that Ireland should consult Paris on the form of government she chose, which cast the shadow of the Second Propagandist decree over the procedings. It was not altogether certain that the French even sought Irish independence, but rather to turn Ireland into a festering wound for Britain: on 2 April Clarke asked Tone for a plan 'for a system of *chouannerie* in Ireland'. Tone recognised that it might have the suited aims of the French, but not the aspirations of the United Irishmen.[107]

The conflict of interests which sometimes afflicted relations between the French government and foreign patriots may be illustrated by two experiences of Irish exiles in France. First of all, while the French naturally hoped that an independent Ireland would be a republic attendant to their strategic needs, they disregarded ideological compatibility in their search for allies among the Irish people. Richard O'Shee was sent by the Directory to Ireland to discover the strength and intentions of the Catholic Defenders, an underground organisation whose sectarianism had little in common with French republicanism. Tone was kept in the dark about this overture: the French wanted an uprising in Ireland and it did not matter who was involved. On the other hand, from the point of view of the United Irishmen in France, the ideological makeup of the Directory did matter. Monroe pleased Tone shortly after his arrival when he said that the Directory and the whole people 'were most violently exasperated against England'. Any change of government might therefore have upset the plans of the United Irishmen. When Babeuf's conspiracy was exploded, Tone commented with a shiver, 'as an Irishman, I cannot but rejoice at the discovery of this complot. Had it succeeded, what would have become of us?'[108]

The politics of the French government were particularly important when Britain made peace overtures to France in October 1796 and when negotiations opened in Lille in June

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[106]Rowan, *Autobiography*, 240.
[107]Tone, *Life*, ii, 51, 80 - 82, 93.
[108]Elliott, *Partners in Revolution*, 88 - 90; Tone, *Life*, ii, 24, 110.

1797. The Irish exiles were naturally alarmed as they were depending on the war for their plans to come to fruition. Tone was happy on the first occasion to see that relations between Malmesbury and Delacroix were chilly. The second negotiations at Lille, however, were more serious. They came after the royalist success in the legislative elections that previous April, which made the political balance look more favorable to peace than previously. Tone feared that a treaty might be inevitable and so towards the end of July, when he heard that Hoche had been appointed to a post in the Ministry of War, he asked the general to exert his influence to ensure that Ireland was given independence as part of the settlement. When the coup of Fructidor overthrew the peacemakers in the Directory and replaced them with less compromising republicans, Tone sensed a good omen. The negotiations at Lille collapsed in the wake of this change of political colour and Tone celebrated this 'excellent news'. The entire affair underlined the fact that foreign patriots were dependent on French support. They were therefore prey to the shifting character of Directorial politics, which led Tone to remark that 'wretched ... is the nation whose independence hangs on the will of another'.[109]

The rejection of the Terror in France on 9 Thermidor brought about a new flourish in political activity. The release of political prisoners, the restoration of press freedom and the repeal of the law of suspects encouraged foreign patriots to re-emerge and participate once more in the Revolution. Renewed French advances into neighbouring countries, accompanied by a resurgence of the old cosmopolitan rhetoric, created an atmosphere in which the 'crusade for universal liberty' seemed to have been rejuvenated after the apparent stagnation under the revolutionary government. In fact, the flowering of proselytising expectations and language hid the continuities between 'Robespierrist' attitudes towards foreign patriots as they were emerging in 1794 and the post-Thermidor approach. Like every government since the Propagandist Decrees of 1792, the Thermidorians and the Directory put French security and French strategic concerns above international fraternity. Foreign patriots in France found themselves negotiating with a French government whose motives were at least partially concealed by a veil of secrecy because the French had their own plans for the countries concerned. Most patriots understood this sooner or later and tried to adapt their own aims accordingly, which meant that, as both Wolfe Tone and Reubell's circle of Rhenish patriots discovered, their aspirations were tied to the fickle barometer of Directorial politics and military fortunes.

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[109]Tone, *Life*, ii, 100, 225, 409, 424, 447.

Foreign patriots in France therefore sought not only to adopt French language and ideology in order to ingratiate themselves with the government of the day, but they also showed an increasing interest in French strategy after 9 Thermidor. This was the main change in their concerns in this period, but it first stirred in the last months of the Terror, as French armies began to spill back over the frontiers. None the less, the law of 22 Prairial ensured that this arousal would be hidden beneath the more pressing, individual concerns of personal survival. It was with the dismantling of the Terror and the continuing progress of French armies that the strategic concerns and the negotiations between foreign patriots and the French government could take precedence over concerns about political orthodoxy.

Political orthodoxy did not, however, disappear as a consideration altogether. The old fears over espionage and conspiracy still existed. They were stirred by the exposure of genuine plots such as that of the Equals in which at least one foreign radical was involved. Foreign radicals seemingly sympathetic to the Terror or to Jacobinism could still provoke surveillance or expulsion, as Buonarroti, Valckenaer and Blauw discovered. Rowan felt uncomfortable enough during the Thermidorian backlash against Jacobinism to leave France. Others whose activities simply looked suspicious could still be threatened with punitive action, as Friedrich Cotta discovered. Despite the rhetoric, the period between the fall of Robespierre and Campo Formio did not see the emergence of a cosmopolitan era of fraternity between foreign patriots and revolutionary France. Post-Thermidor French governments did not need political equals, but adminstrators in the territories they occupied, to help them exploit local wealth, to protect French interests and to place those interests above local aspirations. They hoped, as the revolutionary government had done in the last months of its existence, that foreign patriots would fulfil this role. While their own personal freedom to express their views gained greater latitude after the Terror, foreign radicals discovered that the peoples whom they claimed to represent shared the same rights only in so far as their desires coincided with French strategic needs.

V

The uncertainty of the direction which the Revolution should take immediately after 9 Thermidor is illustrated in the Convention's treatment of those foreigners who contributed to French economic life. The Thermidorians did not immediately dismantle the controlled

economy and until they lifted the sequestration of property belonging to enemy merchants, neutrals would remain important to efforts to attract imports of food and war materials. The trading partners of the German mercantile community in Bordeaux, for example, continued to be exploited. The Bordeaux-based Danish merchant, Meyer, worked as the Republic's intermediary with Hamburg and Copenhagen in its search for vital imports. The restoration of the freedom of commerce was a gradual one. On 17 October 1794, the government lost its right of first purchase of all imported goods of prime necessity. This initially applied only to French merchants, with neutrals having to wait until 15 November before they were allowed to trade at will.[110]

Eventually, on 24 December 1794, the same day that the Maximum was lifted, it was proposed to release confiscated foreign property and to reimburse the funds which came from any sale. Johannot, who proposed this measure on behalf of the government, claimed that it would mean the resumption of free trade and restore confidence in France as a trading partner.[111] The proposal provoked a lively discussion. Those opposed warned that foreign money corrupted French politicians and that enemy merchants retained agents in Paris who were engaged in dealings less wholesome than trade. Cambon and Thirion argued, on the basis of *droit des gens* and the Ancien Régime custom of reciprocity, that enemy property should be withheld until the British, Spanish and Dutch released that of French citizens. Those in favour argued that free trade was the best means of meeting French needs for raw materials and food. Ramel even reverted to the language heard before the Terror, that it was up to France to lead by example. The war was being waged against governments and not peoples: 'il faut distinguer dans la guerre ce qui tient qu'aux droits des gouvernements et ce qui tient aux rélations particulières'. While wars broke the former, the latter remained intact, which was standard eighteenth-century thinking.[112]

The debate showed that the Thermidorians were not entirely convinced of the wisdom of a return to freedom of commerce between French and foreigners. They were not against free trade in principle, regarding it as the best means of meeting demand for food and material, but some believed that its restoration might give certain advantages to the Republic's enemies. The fact that in the debate both sides pointed to malign foreign influence behind the arguments of the opposition reflects a deep anxiety about the

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[110]Lefebvre, 'Le Commerce extérieur en l'an II', 266, 274.
[111]*Moniteur*, No. 95 (5 Nivôse III/25 December 1794).
[112]*Moniteur*, Nos. 101 (11 Nivôse III/31 December 1794), 102 (12 Nivôse III/1 January 1795).

consequences of so significant a change in economic policy. The Convention, however, eventually accepted the proposals. This decision was due less to a cosmopolitan view of commerce, but to a calculation that the benefits of free trade for France would be more durable than the potential risks of returning financial and economic advantages to her enemies.

For the Thermidorians as for the Terrorists, the real hidden enemy were not foreign merchants, but foreign speculators. Girod, Richard, Ramel and Réal, all supporters of the repeal of sequestration, suggested that the seizure of foreigners' property was the product of intrigue by foreign *agioteurs*, among whom Edouard Walckiers was cited by name, who sought to benefit from the resultant shifts in exchange rates. The eighteenth-century fear of foreign banking networks emerged in these discussions, with London and Amsterdam as the centre of international speculation on the money markets.[113] These suspicions only intensified with the explosion in prices which followed the abolition of the Maximum. Some hostility towards foreign financiers was justified, if not on the scale that some revolutionaries suspected. From 1795, Oberkampf used the Paris-based Genevan financier Théodore Rivier to channel French money to Britain via Basle, which allowed the entrepreneur to trade illegally with Britain without having to draw British currency in Paris.[114] The period after Thermidor witnessed vast fortunes being made by speculators who were willing to run the high financial risks. In 1798 Heinzmann remarked of that some of his fellow Germans had come to France and got rich by 'une spéculation avantageuse'.[115] As the Genevan economist Francis d'Ivernois, now a confirmed counter-revolutionary, noted, such people made their fortune not from private enterprise, but off the state, through the purchase and resale of *biens nationaux*, confirming the worst fears of those in the Constituent Assembly who had opposed the nationalisation of church lands in 1789.[116] The Swiss Henri Meister concurred with many revolutionaries in seeing foreigners as the worst of the speculators, believing that foreigners had profited from the sale of *émigré* property far more than French citizens.[117]

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[113]*Moniteur*, Nos. 101 (11 Nivôse III/31 December 1794), 102 (12 Nivôse III/1 January 1795).
[114]Chassagne, *Oberkampf*, 178.
[115]Heinzmann, *Voyage d'un Allemand à Paris*, 16 - 17.
[116]Lyons, *France under the Directory*, 183.
[117]Meister, *Souvenirs de mon dernier voyage à Paris*, 71 - 72, 79.

While such evidence is highly subjective, it illustrates the extent to which the economic and financial climate of the Revolution after Thermidor had aggravated fears of foreign *agioteurs* who pillaged the Republic of its wealth. Despite the continued suspicion, however, foreign financiers still had their uses. The Swiss banker Perregaux, who had played a leading role in raising funds for the purchase of foreign currency during the Year II, was allowed to use some of these funds to buy merchandise in Copenhagen.[118] When the government finally ceased to print *assignats* in February 1796, Perregaux was among the bankers appointed to a consortium which would issue new notes based on unsold *biens nationaux*.[119]

As with the regime of the Terror, the only foreigners whom the Thermidorians and the Directory regarded in an unequivocally favourable light were foreign manufacturers and artisans. The war and the Terror had certainly dissuaded newcomers from establishing new workshops and manufactures. In 1798 Heinzmann met German artisans who had set up shop in northern France, but remarked that few seem to have arrived since the Terror. German and Swiss artisans who had once come to France to ply their trade could, he suggested, make just as much money in their home countries.[120]

For this reason, the revolutionaries sought to encourage and protect those who remained because they contributed to the war effort and enriched the economy. On 25 December 1794, Boissy d'Anglas reported on 'un des prodiges de la liberté'. He was speaking of the manufacture of clocks set up in Besançon by the representatives on mission to the Doubs in 1793. He claimed that the attractions of the Republic had brought 'douze mille étrangers, habiles dans l'art de l'horlogerie' from Geneva, Neuchâtel and London. Boissy sought a decree which would ensure that they remained in France and encourage others to come. Among the measures proposed was the payment of bounties to the entrepreneur who employed the most workers and produced the best quality. All this, he argued, would also lead to the growth of auxiliary industries such as those which made watch-chains and the necessary tools.[121] To attract foreign craftsmen, the Thermidorians were using methods identical to those of the Ancien Régime *bureau de commerce*. They also shared the same long-term goal: to transmit the skills and

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[118]Lefebvre, 'Le Commerce extérieur en l'an II', 266.
[119]Woronoff, *La République bourgeoise*, 111.
[120]Heinzmann, *Voyage d'un Allemand à Paris*, 16 - 17, 106 - 107.
[121]*Moniteur*, No. 98 (8 Nivôse III/28 December 1794).

knowledge of foreigners to French apprentices who would ensure the future prosperity of a particular industry in France.

Both the Thermidorians and the Directory found that they faced an uphill struggle in trying to achieve these aims. Their financial and economic policies, from the deregulation of prices on 24 December 1794 to the return to coin in February 1797, brought dramatic oscillations in the value of French currency which made enterprise in France a risky business. Some artisans did flourish in the more relaxed social climate of the Directory. Meyer remarked that in Paris the Scottish glassmaker O'Reilly was doing very nicely by producing one vase in eight days of work, but to such a degree of perfection and skill that he could charge a very high price. Meanwhile, a German porcelain manufacturer named Dihl showed Meyer the stores of his vast workshop which were 'richement garnis' and the shop floor where painters and gilders worked on his plates and vases.[122] Others suffered, however, from the economic dislocation brought by the winter of *nonante-cinq*, the financial crisis of 1797 and the continuing conflict. The war made the transfer of the most desirable technology and expertise from abroad almost impossible. Oberkampf made use of his sisters' residence at Aarau in Switzerland to obtain sketches and notes about the methods of his Swiss competitors. He also used his contacts in London to obtain information about recent developments in the machinery and processes of fabric printing.[123] These semi-legitimate methods of obtaining new skills and processes were no different from the industrial espionage encouraged by the Ancien Régime. None the less, the teams of expert British workers needed to implement these processes were not readily available. There were some exceptions, of course. In 1797, William Robinson brought a flax-spinning machine to France, while the incorrigible Charles Albert, the Alsatian arrested and imprisoned in Lancaster in 1791, was released in 1796, returned to France and set up an agency to import British technology. He set up a spinning mill at Coye-la-Forêt, north of Paris, with the help of some of the British artisans with whom he had once worked in Toulouse.[124]

For most French manufacturers, however, the war signalled the loss of foreign skills. Albert's former employer, Boyer-Fonfrède, had expanded his plant by 1798 to include forty-eight looms, originally operated by Manchester workers. Their imprisonment during

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[122]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, ii, 241 - 243.
[123]Chapman & Chassagne, *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century*, 140 - 144; Chassage, *Oberkampf*, 179.
[124]Henderson, *Britain and Industrial Europe*, 25, 32, 47.

the Terror left him with a labour shortage.[125] The declining proportion of foreigners among Oberkampf's workforce might have been symptomatic both of the disruption caused by the war and of the successful training of French workers in the skills originally brought by foreigners. Before 1793, 9.3% of his workers were foreigners, thereafter that figure gradually declined to 4.6%.[126] None the less, the demand for new techniques did not cease and when the British mills proved inaccessible, the French turned elsewhere. In 1798 two Americans, Reynaud and Ford, were given a grant of 6,000 *livres* by the Directory to establish a textile factory with the most up-to-date technology, but the enterprise failed. That same year, in an echo of Alcock's hiring of skilled British prisoners of war under the Ancien Régime, La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt employed an Englishman named Gibson and four Irish prisoners at the cotton mill at Cire des Mello.[127]

If the end of the Terror had not made the recruitment of foreign artisans and expertise any easier, it had at least freed foreign manufacturers and artisans from the necessity of political orthodoxy. At Jouy-en-Josas, Oberkampf's role as local magnate remained unchallenged. He did not bother to renew his membership of the local Jacobin club in Vendémiaire III. With the Terror over, he was probably happy to wash his hands of political militancy. In the less restrictive political climate, the entrepreneur who had paid out so much in patriotic contributions now protested against the forced loan decreed on 10 December 1795, to which he was ordered to pay 300,000 *livres* in coin and paper. He claimed that he wanted to invest in bringing production and profits back to pre-war levels. A reluctant political animal from the start, Oberkampf's political opportunism was dictated by his ultimate aim of protecting his business. The former Jacobin would eventually applaud the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte as the harbinger of 'general happiness and peace'.[128]

The war and the economic crises of the post-Thermidor period made life especially hard for the poorest foreign migrants. In April 1796, Meyer crossed the Pont-Neuf and noted that 'même les pauvres petits Savoyards, établis avec leurs sellettes le long des trottoirs pour nettoyer les souliers des passans, ont beaucoup de peine à gagner leur vie, leurs grands protecteurs ont disparu, & il arrive rarement aux piétons d'une espece très-

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[125]Lyons, *France under the Directory*, 187.
[126]Chapman & Chassagne, *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century*, 178.
[127]Henderson, *Britain and Industrial Europe*, 26.
[128]Chassage, *Oberkampf*, 175 - 176, 184 n.64; Chapman & Chassagne, *European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century*, 162.

différente de leurs prédecesseurs de faire nettoyer leurs bottes, ou leurs souliers."[129] Heinzmann stuffily cited a French pamphlet which claimed of the women forced into prostitution that 'elles viennent la plûpart de l'étranger'. Without a flicker of sympathy, he concurred, saying that 'on compte parmi les filles publiques beaucoup de Suissesses, des Italiennes, des Espagnoles, des Allemandes, des Hollandaises et des Angloises ... le superflu le plus impûr de tous ces pays'. Heinzmann was determined to suggest that the libertine decline in morals commented on by some of his compatriots was due not to the system of government, but to foreigners who 'croyent avoir trouvé ici le sol qui leur convient le mieux'.[130]

The end of the Terror, as Oberkampf's experience shows, enabled foreign entrepreneurs to leave the political arena and to concentrate on their businesses. The return to free commerce certainly benefited foreign merchants who were still able to trade despite the war. Foreign artisans who had remained in France could still prosper, as Meyer discovered. The extravagant social climate in the upper reaches of Directorial society enabled those foreign craftsmen whose skills were devoted to luxury industries to make money from the *nouveaux riches*. In other respects, however, matters did not improve for foreigners involved in French economic life. Besides the economic hardship from which most people suffered, the continued conflict meant that, despite the efforts of the government to attract foreign expertise, British skills and technology were not forthcoming. Such British workers as remained in France were not always available, as Boyer-Fonfrède discovered. Meanwhile, if the political repression of the Terror had disappeared, the vagaries of French finances made investment in anything other than land a risky venture, and this in turn aggravated the old suspicions of foreign financiers. The Directory, like the revolutionary government of the Year II, was at least pragmatic enough to use the connections of some foreign bankers, such as Perregaux. If the revolutionary government had gone to great lengths to retain the skills, contacts and services of foreign artisans, merchants and financiers during Terror, the economic difficulties which resulted from the continuing conflict and the financial policies of the Thermidorians and the Directory discouraged the flow of new expertise and skills into

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[129]Meyer, *Fragments sur Paris*, i, 18 - 19.

[130]Heinzmann, *Voyage d'un Allemand à Paris*, 100. Richard Cobb, however, drew a sample of ninety-six prostitutes from three Parisian sections between 1793 and 1795, and found that only three were 'foreign' and were in fact from the Belgian departments (*The Police and the People*, 236 - 237).

France. As both Meister and Heinzmann observed, if it was the Terror which had driven these foreigners out, the regimes which followed failed to create the conditions which would attract many of them back.

VI

The end of the Terror did bring an improvement in the conditions of most foreigners in France. Those imprisoned during the Terror were eventually released. For radicals, the political activity which flowered anew encouraged them in their activities and aspirations once more. For many foreign merchants, bankers, manufacturers and artisans, the lifting of trade restrictions and of sequestration freed them from economic restraint. Some of those foreigners who had left France in fear or disgust felt safe enough to return, if only to see how things had changed. These improvements did not necessarily stem from measures aimed specifically at making life more comfortable for foreigners, but rather from more general changes in the apparatus of government and policing after 9 Thermidor.

It is true that most of the repressive laws against foreigners decreed during the Terror were eventually withdrawn. The appalling law of 7 Prairial II, offering no quarter to British or Hanoverian prisoners, was repealed, but not before it had been extended by the Thermidorians themselves to include Spanish troops. The law of 27 Germinal II, expelling foreign subjects from Paris, French ports and frontier towns, was also repealed. It took longer to rescind these laws, however, than it did to revoke those aimed more generally at French citizens. Moreover, both the Thermidorians and the Directory enacted their own legislation against foreigners, often reverting to measures similar to those taken in 1793 - 1794. This may suggest that the punitive, exclusive mentality of the Terror did not disappear with 9 Thermidor, but remained lurking beneath the surface of republican ideology and attitudes. Alternatively, it may mean that the urge to exclude, restrict and watch foreigners was not attributable to any such mentality, but was a response to problems external to ideology and attitudes, such as the continuing conflict and the persistence of political instability. Both possibilities carry weight. Ideology and attitudes probably combined with the circumstances to ensure the occasional resurrection of 'Terrorist' measures against foreigners.

On one hand, the revolutionaries retained the fear of conspiracy and the exclusive implications of their ideology. The vast majority of revolutionaries usually accepted laws against foreigners because they still feared their malign capabilities. They saw them at work behind the popular uprisings, conspiracies, economic crises and royalist movements which harrassed regimes after Thermidor. This paranoia can be explained by a predisposition to see conspiracy - and foreign conspiracy in particular - behind complex problems. On the other hand, xenophobia and an obsession with conspiracy were not the only implications of the revolutionaries' cultural and ideological background. The Terror had given most revolutionaries a jolt and throughout the post-Thermidor period some objected to renewed measures against foreigners on the grounds of civil liberties, because they feared a return to the dark days of the Year II. If revolutionary attitudes and ideology were so powerful a force in politics, it is necessary to explain why certain implications of that ideology won out over others, why the xenophobic, rather than the benign, elements were carried over into legislation.

The answer lies in the circumstances of war and internal problems. Despite their military success, French regimes remained beset by domestic difficulties. For as long as the war continued, it was natural for revolutionaries to explain problems closer to home by reference to the conflict and to enemy influence. In fact, it seemed that the more successful the French were by feats of arms, the more likely the enemy were to resort to domestic subversion. Conspiracy and counter-revolution did exist in France, of course, and there was genuine evidence that some foreigners were involved in political intrigue, be it Jacobin or royalist. It was the failure to secure outright victory in the war that ensured that life for foreigners never returned to the freedom enjoyed before 1793. Not only did war and instability bring out the darker side of the revolutionary mentality, but they persuaded the more reluctant among them that repressive measures against foreigners were necessary, if temporary. It was these circumstances which allowed 'Terrorist' laws to be recast by post-Thermidor regimes without much fear of being accused of returning to the days of the Jacobin 'dictatorship'. That the war and domestic instability were vital factors can be shown by the rhythm of legislation against foreigners: after Thermidor, each major law followed a particular crisis.

Despite the problems faced by the post-Thermidor regimes, military success did encourage the resurgence of cosmopolitan rhetoric. None the less, this language reflected nothing more than French strategic interests and justified annexations and the enforced 'liberation' of France's neighbours, as it had done since the Propagandist decrees of 1792.

The revolutionaries were also governed by national interest rather than their cosmopolitan ideology in their treatment of foreigners within France. Such pragmatism could none the less shelter foreigners from the more exclusive, nationalising implications of revolutionary ideas and legislation. As with every regime since 1789, under the Thermidorians and the Directory those foreigners who could be of some use to the Revolution were protected.

Both the Thermidorians and the Directory attempted to attract foreign entrepreneurs and artisans, like every eighteenth-century regime in France, because they brought much-needed technology, skills and prosperity. If foreigners were now officially excluded from service in the French army by Article 287 of the new Constitution, in reality the revolutionaries were still reluctant to demobilise seasoned troops and they were simply subsumed into regular French units. As the French conquered more territory and so stretched their own resources, the Directory circumvented the Constitution by recruiting foreign legions under the theoretical command of the 'sister republics'. It was this pragmatism, above all in pursuit of French foreign policy, which also ensured that foreign patriots would be well-received. They were, however, expected to serve French strategic interests as well as the aspirations of their own country. Although those tainted with Jacobinism and Terrorism were distrusted, at least with the end of the Terror the pressures for political conformity were no longer as acute.

On the other hand, foreigners who could not be of use to the Republic still suffered from the possibility of exclusion and persecution. The foreign clergy in particular remained the targets of both popular and official hostility. Once the regime of the Terror had eliminated the distinction between foreign ecclesiastical property and that of the French church, the Thermidorian and Directorial authorities were reluctant to reassert it. This led to bitter disputes over the confiscation and sale of the property. For the foreign clergy, the end of the Terror simply signalled new struggles for survival.

The driving force behind this pragmatic approach, in which inclusion and encouragement was interspersed with surveillance and persecution, was the combination of political instability and war. While in some cases the need for troops, material, money and foreign allies ensured that certain foreigners would be welcomed, in other cases military and political crises stirred the darker, exclusive forces of revolutionary anxieties. For as long as France remained both at war and dogged by domestic insecurity, the Revolution would not - and could not - return to its earlier, cosmopolitan openness.

Conclusion. The French Revolution, citizenship and national identity.

In early February 1997, the small town of Vitrolles near Marseille prepared for its second ballot in the mayoral elections.. The Socialist incumbent faced a strong challenge from the candidate of the extreme right-wing and xenophobic Front National. A couple of days before voting, a local coal miner told a British journalist that, come the final vote on Sunday 9 February, 'a Republican reflex' would bring out enough people to destroy the Front National's attempt to take political control of yet another town.[1] This hope was not realised, but its persistence shows that the memory of the French Revolution retains its emotive power in current debates on citizenship and immigration in the Fifth Republic.

Revolutionary ideology had two implications as regards the place of foreigners in the nation. On one hand, the doctrine of the rights of man implied that all men could be citizens, either in their own countries or in France, on fulfilment of certain basic conditions. As these rights were universal, race, religion, or language were theoretically irrelevant: being human and having a proven desire and ability to contribute to the life of the nation was sufficient. In the early years of the Revolution, certain revolutionaries uttered or wrote invitations to virtuous, talented and diligent foreigners to come and enjoy the fruits of liberty, while enriching the country at the same time. On the other hand the notion of national sovereignty implied that, while conditions for membership of the nation may be assimilationist, only citizens - those who fulfilled those conditions - were to be allowed an active role in the state. This implication was only understood by the Constituent Assembly when it began to reform France in accordance with its principles and were stalled by the stumbling block of foreigners in the army, the clergy and even in state administration. Some revolutionaries, such as Dubois-Crancé for the army and Grégoire for the clergy, argued that foreigners be squeezed out of these institutions, which, they argued, should be run by nationals for the sake of the nation. From the very outset, however, diplomatic, economic and political circumstances demanded a pragmatic approach in the treatment of foreigners. The sweeping terms of legislation which excluded foreigners were rarely applied in full, because the revolutionaries were unwilling to lose the expertise, skills and the support which certain types of foreigners might offer, particularly with the outbreak of war. Even during the Terror, the revolutionaries

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[1]Lichfield, J., 'Basildon-en-Provence, the grey French town that is sorely tempted by infamy', *Independent* (7 February 1997).

protected those whom they believed would be of some use to the war effort, exempting them from the harshest laws and putting them to work for the Republic.

This is not to deny that many foreigners were excluded from the life of the nation. The foreign clergy, for example, were initially protected from the nationalisation of church land and the closure of religious orders because of their foreign status. Eventually, however, it was the fact that they were enemy subjects which led to their arrest and the seizure of their property. None the less, while some foreigners were clearly persecuted for their nationality, some revolutionaries could not abandon the universal implications of their ideology, even as the Republic faced the crises of 1793 - 1794. To have done so would have meant admitting that their struggle was of less significance than they had previously claimed. All men, regardless of nationality, were therefore capable of patriotism, defined as a lack of self-interest and a concern for the welfare of the nation. The problem was that as the Revolution pursued its radical path, that patriotism became increasingly exclusive, not on lines of nationality, but along those of political allegiance. By the Year II, when patriotism focused on loyalty to the government, this circle of true patriots was very exclusive indeed. It was none the less not one which excluded on the basis of nationality. Foreigners who conformed to the political orthodoxy or who contributed to the war effort were serving the *patrie* and were therefore defined as patriots.

The Revolution therefore saw the persistence of two inheritances from the Ancien Régime. Firstly, while a significant number were driven out by legislation and by circumstances, some foreigners remained in the structures of French state and society. Secondly, the inclusive, assimilationist definition of the nation survived. These continuities suggest that, while the political language and structures may have changed, at a deeper level there were similarities between the old order and the new in their approach to foreigners. The explanation for this lies in the fact that the pressures facing both regimes remained the same. The Revolution, of course, did not blindly adopt Ancien Régime practices, and sometimes adopted its own policies, as the abolition of the *droit d'aubaine* suggests. Moreover, if it inherited its problems from the old order, the Revolution also created difficulties of its own, which intensified the original troubles. None the less, the differences between ideology and practice and the blend of continuities and novelty in the treatment of foreigners implies at least three conclusions on the Revolution.

Firstly, the gap between what revolutionary ideology implied and how the revolutionaries actually dealt with foreigners in practice suggests that ideology was not the dynamic which drove the Revolution along its radical course.[2] Instead, the revolutionaries were pragmatic, restraining, even denying, the logical implications of their principles as circumstances dictated. When foreigners were expelled from the positions which they had previously occupied in the French state, it was usually when new considerations outweighed the revolutionaries' original reservations, as was the case with the Swiss regiments in August 1792. It was the revolutionaries' calculation, that the diplomatic upset was worth the elimination of a potentially counter-revolutionary force, which led to their disbandment. If revolutionary ideology implied exclusion, it was not the prime factor in decisions over the fate of foreigners. At the very most it took certain circumstances for the revolutionaries to follow up such implications with concrete action.

A result of this pragmatism was that foreigners remained in the service of the French state throughout the Revolution. The service of the state was not the exclusive reserve of French citizens, even under the revolutionary government in the Year II. The second conclusion is, therefore, that the model provided by Joan Landes's work on women is not applicable to foreigners.[3] There was no concerted effort to exclude them from the 'public sphere', despite legislation to the contrary and despite the implications of a xenophobic, exclusive patriotism which emerged by the Year II. In fact, it is possible that, too tied by diplomatic, economic and political concerns to expel foreigners from French public life, the revolutionaries actively sought instead to ensure their loyalty by establishing assimilationist conditions for citizenship.

For all their ideological claims to a new order, therefore, the revolutionaries did not entirely 'nationalise' the state. Bound by the same conditions which dictated the Ancien Régime's approach foreigners, their approach to the problem represented a continuity from the absolute monarchy. Both regimes based their decisions on a careful weighing of the interests of the state, even if the language used and specific laws may have differed between the absolute monarchy and the Revolution. The resulting persistence of foreigners in the army, administration, the church and finance suggests that in practice the legal differences between citizens and resident foreigners remained blurred during the Revolution. Foreigners continued to serve the state in capacities which would be

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[2]Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, 19 - 51; Furet, *Penser la Révolution française*, 81 - 119.

[3]Landes, *Women in the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution.*

anathema to modern nation-states. This inheritance from the Ancien Régime suggests the third conclusion, that one should be wary of seeing too much modernity in the order created by the French Revolution. If both the war and the Terror gave rise to 'le réveil du nationalisme', attitudes and practices still had a long way to develop before matching those which have characterised the 'total wars' of the twentieth century.[4] To be sure, the intense xenophobia and the suspension of the civil liberties of enemy aliens, familiar to modern wars, were very much in evidence in France in the 1790s, but their full implications were never realised. While the modern world has inherited some of its political culture from the French Revolution, the revolutionaries themselves may have been driven by circumstances to invest that same culture with a different degree of significance.

The modernity of the measures taken by the revolutionaries is also cast in doubt when it is understood that the French were not alone in enacting laws against foreigners. Spain was the first country to take such steps and its laws were especially draconian, even before she entered the European conflict. As early as November 1789, foreigners were expelled from Madrid. In July 1791, all foreigners in Spain had to register with the authorities, 'transients' had to have the permission of the secretary of state to remain in the country and they were not permitted to perform any occupation. In March 1793, when Spain entered the war, and months before the French took comparable measures, the king ordered all non-domiciled French citizens to leave the kingdom.[5] Catherine II of Russia went further still. On the news of the execution of Louis XVI, the *ukaz* of 8/19 February 1793 prohibited all trade between Russia and France, expelled all French citizens from Russia and recalled all the Tsarina's subjects from France.[6] Britain also enacted police measures against French citizens, just before she joined the coalition powers. On 15 December 1792, the Alien Bill was presented to parliament, which aimed to control the movements of French citizens in Britain.[7] The Alien Act of 7 January 1793, in force for a period of ten years until its expiry in 1803 (when it was not renewed), was enforced by the police and led to a 'complete system of surveillance for suspects, whether British or foreign'.[8] Even the republic of the United States succumbed, passing the Alien and

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[4]Mathiez, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, 137, 177.
[5]Herr, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain*, 256 - 257, 269 - 270, 311, 380 - 381.
[6]Madariaga, I. de, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great* (London & New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 442.
[7]Goodwin, *The Friends of Liberty*, 266.
[8]Sparrow, E., 'The Alien Office, 1792 - 1806', *The Historical Journal*, xxxiii (1990), 362.

Sedition Act in 1798, empowering the authorities to expel foreigners who might have had subversive intentions.[9]

Such measures had their precedents in Ancien Régime practices in times of war, and had been exercised under the old concept of *droit des gens*. What was novel was the intensity with which the legislation was enforced. If modernity can be gauged by the severity of measures taken against enemy aliens in wartime, then it was not only the political culture of the French Revolution which was at the source of the state's harsh discrimination between citizens and foreigners. It was also produced by the reaction of other powers *against* the 'contagion' of revolutionary ideology.

Such discrimination between foreigners and citizens suggests that the experience of foreigners in France may also shed light on the Revolution's contribution to notions of nationality and citizenship. The intensity of police measures against foreigners taken by many countries in this period represented an expansion of state surveillance over ordinary people. In France, the state itself played a central role in the evolution of the French understanding of citizenship and nationality, and not just in the revolutionary period.[10] The Ancien Régime's conception of nationality, defined by the subject's loyalty to the monarch and residence on French territory, was reinforced by the Revolution, which also stressed residence and loyalty, only to the nation rather than to the king. What had changed was the source of legitimacy for the state's activities, which had been transferred from king to people. In practical terms, however, it was the territorial and institutional framework of the state which remained the focus of loyalty and the protector of a citizen's rights. Under both the Ancien Régime and the Revolution, the state and its various institutions was the cement which gave coherence and unity to the various linguistic, religious and cultural groups who inhabited French territory.

During the Revolution, however, the state intruded into the everyday lives of ordinary people on an unprecedented scale. This development encouraged people to discriminate more between citizens and non-citizens. During the Terror, not only did certain laws against foreigners set them apart from French people, but they made nationality matter on a daily basis. The authorities demanded from individuals details such as place of birth and

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[9]Godechot, J. (trans. Rowen, H. H.), *France and the Atlantic Revolution of the Eighteenth Century, 1770 - 1799* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 233; Kramer, L. S., 'The French Revolution and the creation of American political culture', Klaits, J., & Haltzel, M. H. (eds.), *The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 45.

[10]Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, xi, 1 - 3.

nationality as they issued documents like passports and *cartes de sûreté*. Surveillance and control of foreigners was nothing new, but the apparatus by which the laws were implemented entered the lives of individuals with an efficiency and intensity which was unfamiliar to most people. In 1793 - 1794, decrees were applied by local committees who may have known many of the foreigners by sight and who had the ability to make life for them very unpleasant. It was this bureaucratisation of everyday life which made nationality significant and which demanded clarity in one's origins and allegiances. Demanding as the French revolutionary state was, the controls imposed on foreigners were only the beginning of the process, when compared to the expansion of official bureaucracy in the twentieth century. Under the Revolution, foreigners were certainly discriminated against by being denied their civil rights for significant periods of time. More recently, however, the state has expanded from an almost purely political entity, to a provider of social services. It was not the French Revolution, but the modern urge to protect standards of living and to ensure that work, health and social security remain available to citizens which gave discrimination between citizens and foreigners the urgency with which it is today invested. Citizenship is now 'a powerful instrument of social closure', protecting prosperous states from the migrant poor and excluding foreigners from certain rights, benefits and obligations.[11]

The extension of state surveillance during the Revolution made differences between foreigners and citizens more explicit, but not absolute. The indistinct line of demarcation between citizens and non-citizens in the revolutionary period stemmed from the peculiar circumstances of the 1790s. The Revolution never succeeded, therefore, in applying in practice the strict discrimination between foreigners and citizens which was implicit in the doctrine of the sovereignty of the nation.

Meanwhile, the evolution of national identity, as distinct from political notions of citizenship and nationality, was the result of long-term social and cultural conditioning rather than of revolutionary ideology. If the French Revolution's doctrine of national sovereignty was the ideological root of modern political nationalism, it was the deep-rooted prejudices and fears, drawn out by circumstances such as political crises and invasion, which gave the conception of the nation its emotive force.

This was as true of Britain, Germany and the United States in the eighteenth century as it was for France. British identity was shaped by the interlinked responses to war with France, a defensive reaction of Protestantism against Catholicism, the growth of

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[11]Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, ix - x.

commerce and the expansion of empire. All these factors led ordinary people to identify themselves as Britons and, in engaging with them, ultimately to lay claim to 'a much broader access to citizenship'. Germany also experienced the growth of a 'primitive nationalism' and a sense of a separate national identity in reaction to French invasion and occupation. It was claimed that the French version of liberty and equality was an abstraction and that under their enlightened rulers, Germans enjoyed true freedom, which meant freedom from arbitrary oppression and moral liberty. Germans, it was argued, were also different - and superior - from the French in character. In the United States the Alien and Sedition Act was a 'concerted legislative attempt to define what it meant to be an American, and the definition tended to exclude precisely those people who showed the greatest inclination to support "French" ideas'.[12] It was these responses, and not any particular political conception of the nation, which helped to develop a sense of national identity in the countries concerned. Ideological forces such as nationalism are given potency and relevance by the specific political and cultural contexts in which they are enunciated.

This implies that, no matter how universal the revolutionaries claimed that their doctrine of national sovereignty was, it would vary in intensity and meaning from place to place and from one era to the other. Much as the revolutionaries insisted on defining nationality on political or contractual lines, culture, language and specific political and social circumstances were inescapable contexts for the development both of national identity and of the various forms of nationalism across the world. In France, the civic ideal of nationality, based on a contract between citizens without reference to religion, language and race, therefore developed alongside a national identity which was emerging both from the experience of the Revolution itself and from long-term political, social and cultural conditions peculiar to France. Despite the revolutionaries' attempts to define French nationality with reference only to an egalitarian, political community, in the long term they could not forestall the linguistic and the cultural from lending their weight in determining attitudes towards nationality and, above all, towards what it was to be French.

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[12]Colley, *Britons. Forging the Nation 1707 - 1837*, 1 - 6; Blanning, *Reform and Revolution in Mainz*, 293 - 295; Kramer, 'The French Revolution and the creation of American political culture', 45.

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